wish to make an abuse of power impossible, you must grant no power to be abused. This is why the United States, from 1781 to 1789 tried to govern with a government that had no power to govern. The result was that by 1787 it had become clear to all thoughtful men that the nation was confronted with these alternatives; it must either give itself a real government or sink into anarchy; it must take the risk of arming its so called government with power, or sink, in the language of Washington, into wretched and contemptible fragments of empire. To create a real government was the work that called the Federalist party into existence.

We do not need to be told by history that before our forefathers determined to make fundamental changes in their government, they tried to modify the Articles of Confederation so as to make it possible to get along with them. The conservatism of men of Anglo-Saxon blood, their distrust of untried experiments in matters of government would be sure to find expression in attempts to modify the existing system, hopelessly and irretrievably bad as it was, before radical changes were resolved on. We could also anticipate, in a rough and general way, the sort of modifications they attempted to make. The defect in the system that made it a glaring impossibility for it to live, was its failure to provide any means for raising money. The nation owed money; it could provide none to pay it. It had necessary current expenses; it could provide no means of meeting them. Naturally, there

Attempts to

ticles of Confederation.

fore an attempt was made to patch up the existing system in such a way as to make it possible to raise money. In 1781, before the Articles of Confederation had been ratified by all of the states, Congress passed a resolution recommending to the several states the indispensable necessity of vesting in Congress a power to levy a duty of five per cent on imports, the money to be used in paying the debts incurred in the Revolution, and the power to cease when these debts were paid. amend the ArBut since the Articles of Confederation were framed on the theory that the states were independent and sovereign, and that their confederation was a sort of league or treaty into which each of them had voluntarily entered, no new article could be added without the consent of all of the states. To add a new article, was, on the prevailing theory, to modify the treaty, and we cannot modify a treaty without the consent of all the parties to it. When, therefore, Rhode Island refused to consent to the article, the scheme failed.

In 1783, a new proposition was submitted to the states. They were asked to give Congress the power to levy a duty of five per cent on imposts for twenty-five years, the money to be used in paying the interest-not the principal on the Revolutionary debt as it became due. Congress hoped that in twenty-five years they could sell western land enough to pay the principal, and they asked the states to provide "supplementary funds" to meet current expenses.

By February, 1786, nine of the states had consented. to the proposed article in such terms that Congress could act on it at once as soon as the other four consented. At the urgent request of Congress, three of the remaining. four consented to it during the course of the year, but as the fourth, New York, qualified her consent with impracticable conditions, this plan also failed.

The refusal of New York to grant the impost decided the fate of the Confederacy. A government that cannot pay its debts, that cannot borrow money, that cannot provide for its current expenses, will not long keep up the farce of pretending to be a government, but whether even this would have sufficed to make the states abandon the wretched Confederation, it is impossible to say. The refusal of Rhode Island to assent to the article proposed in 1781, and of New York to the one proposed in 1783, with the reluctant consent of the other states, were only symptoms of a state of society more closely bordering on anarchy than any other this country has

ever seen.

Paper money party; causes that led to it.

Deluded as men are ever prone to be by names, many people imagined that with liberty secured, all the evils from which they suffered would vanish. Ignorant of the fact that the excellence of a government consists largely in the means it provides that frugality and industry shall receive their due reward, there was a strong party in most of the states that looked to the government for measures to do away

with the necessity for these virtues. In spite of their experience with the paper money of 1779, when flour had sold for a dollar a pound and a hat for fifty dollars, this party insisted that the state should make a lot of money and wipe out its debts at once. How absurd, they said, to toil till the bones are weary and the muscles ache when the state can so easily add to the wealth of the country by the manufacture of paper money. When we know that in seven states this party carried the day, and that in four others it was a strong minority, we can more clearly understand why the states paid so little attention to the requisitions of Congress, and why they were so reluctant to authorize the five per cent duty. For the great majoriy of the men who suffered from this paper money mania were deluded because they wished to be. They had been greatly impoverished by the Revolution. Their property had been seized by both armies and their commerce almost destroyed by the fleets of Great Britain. But the close of the war found them with very absurd ideas as to the immediate financial future of the country. Many of them supposed that Europe was about to inundate the country and thus raise the price of lands wonderfully. Deluded by these hopes and relying on the supposed value of the government securities which they possessed, and on their calculations as to the value of the produce of their soil when all restrictions were removed from trade, they went heavily in debt,and soon became hopelessly involved.*

*See Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. V, 87–9.

Laws passed by paper money party.

The same causes that led to the paper money mania produced other effects of a kindred character. Where ever the debtor party was in power, laws were passed affording facilities for the payment of debts or suspending their collection, and remitting taxes, as well as for the manufacture of paper money. The result was a lack of confidence in the government which almost paralyzed business. So little confidence was felt in the government of the various states that in many of them owners of public securities had to lose from fifty to seventy-five per cent. So great was the fear that laws would be passed releasing men from the obligation to pay their debts, that in some states the notes of those whose ability to pay was undoubted, could not be negotiated except at a discount of from thirty to fifty per cent.

In New Hampshire the influence of the debtor class induced the legislature in 1785 to pass a law making every sort of property a legal tender at an appraised value. But this only increased the distress. Credit could not be had when debts were to be paid in such a medium of exchange. This led to the calling of a convention which urged the government to issue paper money. While the legislature was considering this request, a body of armed insurgents assembled at the seat of government and demanded immediate compliance with the request of the convention. When General Sullivan, the president,

Insurrection in New Hampshire.