CHAPTER XXXV.

SUBMISSION OR WAR?

A

FTER the rejection of Monroe's treaty, Monroe was inclined to sulk in his tent. He felt that the Adininistration had set him an impossible task,

Presidential

and rejected his treaty without due con- election. sideration because he had gone contrary to

his instructions. Monroe's attitude inclined most of the Republicans who were dissatisfied with the Administration, and especially those who disliked Madison-who was known to be Jefferson's candidate-to make Monroe their candidate for the presidency. It seemed likely for a time that the unpopularity of the embargo would lead to the defeat of Madison if the Federalists and Anti-administration Republicans could combine on a single candidate. But as Madison was selected by the Republican caucus, party discipline prevailed, and he was elected by 122 out of total of 176 electoral votes. George Clinton was elected Vice-President.

Before the result of the election was officially known, Jefferson practically threw down the reins

Jefferson

embargo.

of government. When Congress met on and the November 7, 1808, he acknowledged in his

message that his "candid and liberal experiment"— offering to England and Napoleon to suspend the embargo

on certain conditions-"had failed." He said that it must "rest with the wisdom of Congress to decide on the course best adapted" to the existing state of things. Gallatin, whom Madison intended to make his Secretary of State, urged Jefferson to recommend some positive course. But in vain. It was evident that the embargo could not be continued much longer, and Jefferson could not recommend its repeal. The theory of commercial restrictions as a means of coercion had been the dream of his life-his one great piece of constructive statesmanship. In all of his hopes for playing a great part in history in advancing the interests of the world, this theory had been an important element. He had hoped to be the philosophic statesman, the humanitarian ruler, whose destiny it was to prove to the world that the brutalities and barbarisms of war could be dispensed with. And now to admit that his life-long dream was, after all, only a dream! To admit that in spite of his efforts to save them from it, the American people must travel over the same road that had proved so fatal to the happiness and liberties of the race. To sign the death warrant of his favorite child-the offspring of all his philanthropic hopes! It was too much, and apparently the one great hope that animated him in the closing months of his administration was to be spared the humiliation of signing a repeal of the embargo. He could not bring himself to admit that his policy of peace had failed. “If we go to war now," he said, "I fear we may renounce

forever the hope of seeing an end of our national debt. If we can keep at peace eight years longer, our income, liberated from debt, will be adequate to any war, without new taxes or loans, and our position and increasing strength will put us hors d' insulte from any nation." "If we can keep at peace"-but how was that possible? How were the United States to remain at peace when the two greatest powers in the world insisted on making war upon them? Jefferson refused to say. In December, 1808, he said: "I have thought it right to take no part in proposing measures, the execution of which will devolve on my successor. I am therefore chiefly an unmeddling listener to what others say."

Madison's policy.

As he would formulate no plan that looked beyond the close of his administration, Madison and Gallatin were obliged to take the responsibility. Their plan was to continue the embargo till June 1, pass a total Non-intercourse Act against both France and England, providing for a suspension of it in favor of the one which might revoke her anti-neutral decrees, and, in the event of failing to secure such revocation, a special session of Congress, and a declaration of war against both powers. The Nonintercourse Act would remove England's "grievances" by placing her on an equality with France. England had complained of the Non-importation Act which had gone into effect in 1807, and of the proclamation issued by the President on account of the "Chesapeake❞ affair

as unjustly discriminating against her in favor of Napoleon. With these complaints removed, Madison and Gallatin believed that England would revoke her orders when she saw that war was the alternative and that the "obstinate Emperor" would persist in his course so that war would take place with Napoleon, with England as an ally.

Campbell's report.

To prepare Congress for such a policy, Gallatin wrote a report which may be regarded as in a sense the message of the incoming Administration. The report was presented November 22 by G. W. Campbell, who was chairman of the committee to whom had been referred that part of the President's message which related to foreign affairs. It aimed to show that there was "no other alternative, but abject and degrading submission; war with both nations; or a continuance and enforcement of the embargo. * ** War with one of the belligerents only, would be submission to the edicts and will of the other; and a repeal in whole or in part of the embargo must necessarily be war or submission. *** A partial repeal must, from the situation of Europe, necessarily be actual submission to one of the aggressors and war with the other."

As the measure finally decided on was partial repeal, it is important to consider the arguments by which Gallatin sought to prove beforehand that it was equivalent to submission. "It is said that the adoption of that

proposition"--to repeal the embargo except as to France and her allies, and England-"would restore our commerce with the native powers of Asia and Africa, and with Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Russia." Assuming it to be true, the effect of it "would be to open an indirect trade with Great Britian which, through St. Bartholomew and Havana, Lisbon, Cadiz, or Gottenburg, would receive, at prices reduced by glutted markets and for want of competition, all the provisions, raw materials for her manufactures, and other articles, which she may want. *** A measure which would supply exclusively one of the belligerents would be war with the other." To supply Great Britain exclusively "can only be defended on the ground that France is the only aggressor, and that, having no just reason to complain of England, it is our duty to submit to her." That supposition being inadmissible, the painful alternatives were the continuance of the embargo, and a war with both Powers.

But a permanent embargo would "not properly be resistance; it would be withdrawing from the contest, and abandoning our indisputable right freely to navigate the ocean." The alternatives therefore, the report intimated, were not a permanent embargo, war or submission, but, a repeal of the embargo in the near future, war or submission. The chief reason for hesitation, since the choice ultimately lay between submission and war, was the necessity, if war were resorted to, of making