that the claimant was entitled to recover what was offered for the services he rendered. Judgment affirmed. Mr. Attorney General for appellant. Mr. O. S. Lovell and Mr. Lewis Abraham for appellee. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY v. WALKER. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE. No. 219. Submitted March 23, 1880.- Decided April 5, 1880. A railroad company which runs its line by telegraph, is bound to have a suitable telegraph line, with a proper number of operators, and in case of an accident it is for the jury to decide whether their duty in this respect has been performed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. Although much and probably all the testimony in this case is embodied in the bill of exceptions, the only exception taken below was to the following instruction to the jury: "The defendants, if they undertook to manage and conduct the business of running their trains by telegraph, were bound to have a proper and fit telegraph line for this purpose, with a reasonable number of telegraph stations and operators to properly conduct and control the movements of the trains. And it is for the jury to decide whether this duty was performed by the defendants or whether they were guilty of negligence and want of ordinary care in this respect by not having the requisite number of telegraph stations and operators for conducting the business of the road. If they were guilty of such negligence and want of care and thus occasioned the injury which otherwise would not have occurred, then the jury would be authorized to find a verdict for plaintiff.” We see no error in this instruction as an abstract principle of law, and no complaint is made of it here on that account. The whole effort on the part of the plaintiff in error has been to show that upon the evidence the verdict ought to have been in its favor. That question we cannot consider. The instruction was right, and certainly not so far inapplicable to the allegation in the writ as to justify a reversal of the judgment on that account. Mr. John Rand for plaintiff in error. The judgment is affirmed. BURR v. MYERS. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 223. Argued March 24, 1880.- Decided April 5, 1880. The court has no jurisdiction in this case. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The matters in dispute on this appeal are those presented by the exceptions to the master's report. These are: The addition of interest to this amount from the date at which the master made up the account until the decree below will not make the value of the amount in dispute equal to that necessary to give us jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed. Mr. C. H. Armes for appellant. Mr. John F. Hanna and Mr. James M. Johnston for appellee. DALLAS COUNTY v. HUIDEKOPER. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI. No. 225. Argued March 25, 1880.- Decided April 5, 1880. County of Macon v. Shores, 97 U. S. 272, and Smith v. Clark County, 54' Missouri, 59, followed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. We think the only question in this case was settled by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Smith v. County of Clark, 54 Mo. 59, where it was held on a petition for rehearing, after the case had been once decided, p. 81, that "whether the corporation had a legal existence or not when the subscription was made, is a question that cannot be raised in a collateral proceeding." In this case, as in that, the corporation "did exist as a matter of fact, and was in the exercise of all its chartered franchises when the subscription was made and the bonds issued." That case, like this, was a suit upon coupons for interest attached to bonds issued by the county in payment for its subscription to the capital stock of a railroad corporation, and the point made was, "that the charter of the company had ceased before the company was organized." That, the court said, was "a question between the State and the company," and gave judgment against the county. We had occasion to consider the same question in County of Macon v. Shores, 97 U. S. 272, 276, and held the same way. Judgment affirmed. Mr. S. H. Boyd, Mr. A. D. Matthews and Mr. B. L. Brush for plaintiff in error. Mr. Joseph Shippen for defendant in error. DALLAS COUNTY v. HUIDEKOPER. SAME v. DAVOL. APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI. Nos. 224 and 226. Argued March 25, 1880.- Decided April 5, 1880. Dallas County v. Huidekoper, ante, 654, followed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. These are suits in equity to enjoin the collection of judgments against Dallas County on coupons for interest attached to the same class of bonds just considered in Dallas County v. Huidekoper, No. 225, ante, 654, and relief is asked on the ground that the charter of the railroad company had expired before any organization was effected under it, and that this fact was not known to the county until after the judgment was rendered. After what has been said in the other case, it is clear that the bills were properly dismissed without considering the power of a court of equity to sustain such a suit, and the decree in each of the cases is consequently Affirmed. Mr. S. H. Boyd, Mr. A. D. Matthews and Mr. B. L. Brush for appellant. Mr. Joseph Shippen for appellees. BANK OF THE REPUBLIC v. MILLARD. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 240. Submitted October 27, 1879. - Decided November 3, 1879. Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, followed. MOTION TO DISMISS. The case is stated in the opinion. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The value of the matter in dispute in this case is less than twenty-five hundred dollars, and, therefore, under our ruling in Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, the judgment is not now reviewable here. The special allowance of a writ of error to reverse a former judgment in the same cause, under which a reversal was had, cannot be made applicable to this writ, because the case as now presented is entirely different from what it was before. In fact, after the case went back, it was made to conform to what, as was suggested in the opinion reported in 10 Wall. 157, might perhaps entitle the plaintiff to recover. The motion to dismiss is granted, each party to pay his own costs. Mr. J. H. Bradley for plaintiff in error. Mr. R. D. Mussey for defendant in error. Dismissed. GAGE v. CARRAHER. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. No. 243. Submitted April 6, 1880.- Decided April 12, 1880. Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, followed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The order remanding this cause to the state court is affirmed on the authority of Meyer v. Construction Co., 100 U. S. 457. Carraher occupies one side of the controversy about which the suit is brought, that is to say, the title to the property in question, and Portia Gage, Henry H. Gage and John Forsythe the other. Henry H. Gage and Forsythe are citizens of the same State with Carraher. There is no controversy in the suit which is wholly between citizens of different States and which can be fully determined as between them. Affirmed. Mr. Henry D. Beam for appellant. Mr. James E. Munroe and Mr. W. C. Goudy for appellee. THE LOUISVILLE, GIBSON, Claimant, v. HALLIDAY. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. No. 278. Argued April 23, 1880.- Decided April 26, 1880. The findings of fact by the Circuit Court in an admiralty suit are conclusive upon this court. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. It is conceded that upon the facts found by the Circuit Court the decree appealed from was right. That finding is conclusive upon us. The Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440. No exceptions were taken to the rulings of the court in the progress of the trial. An appeal in admiralty from the District Court to the Circuit Court vacates the decree appealed from. The case is heard de novo in the Circuit Court, without any regard to what was done below. An entire new decree is entered, which the Circuit Court carries into execution. The cause is not remanded to the District Court. After the suit once gets into the Circuit Court it is proceeded with substantially in the same way as it would have been if originally begun in that court. The Lucille, 19 Wall. 74; Montgomery v. Anderson, 21 How. 388; Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 283. Affirmed. Mr. T. D. Lincoln for appellants. Mr. William B. Gilbert for appellee. JOUAN v. DIVOLL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 485. Submitted December 22, 1879.- Decided January 5, 1880. This decree is affirmed on the facts on the various points stated in the opinion of the court. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. We think the evidence shows that Divoll was induced to make his purchase from Cooke on the representation of Jouan that Cooke was the owner of one-half the claim. For this reason Jouan is now estopped from denying Cooke's title. As Jouan and Cooke have settled all their disputes, and Jouan has been released by Cooke from all further liability to him under the original assignment, Cooke's representatives are not necessary parties to this suit. This objection does not seem to have been made below. VOL. CLIV-42 |