from the story of an attack on the African town Hippo.' The Roman adventurers sailed into the harbour, plundered and destroyed a great part of the town, and escaped at last, though with some trouble, over the chain with which the Carthaginians had in the meantime attempted to close the harbour. CHAP. III. FIFTH PERIOD, 248-241 B.C. the alli ance with Two events belonging to the years 248 and 247 may en- Renewal of able us to form an idea of the situation of the Roman republic at this time. These are the renewal of the alliance Hiero. with Hiero, and the exchange of Roman and Carthaginian prisoners. In the year 263, Rome had granted to Hiero only a truce and an alliance for fifteen years. During this long and trying period Hiero proved himself a faithful and indispensable ally. More than once circumstances had joccurred in which, not merely enmity, but even neutrality on the part of Hiero would have been fatal to Rome. The Romans could not afford to dispense with such a friend. They therefore now renewed the alliance for an indefinite period, and Hiero was released from all compulsory service for the future. of Carthage. The second event, the exchange of the Roman and Exchange Carthaginian prisoners, would not be surprising if it were prisoners not for the tradition that such a measure had been proposed with by Carthage three years before (250 B.C.), and rejected by Rome on the advice of Regulus. Be this as it may, the exchange of prisoners in the year 247 cannot be denied, and it follows that the losses of the Romans, especially in the battle of Drepana, were sensibly felt. The consul Junius was probably among the prisoners now set free.3 Barcas. In Sicily the war was now locally confined to the ex- Arrival of treme west. The chief command over the Carthaginians Hamilcar was given in the year 247 to Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, that is Lightning,' the great father of a still greater son— 1 Zonaras, viii. 16. 2 Zonaras, viii. 16. Livy, epit. 19. It looks very much like an empty boast, if the Roman historians reported fat the number of the Carthaginian prisoners was much larger than that of the Romans. It seems unlikely that the Carthaginians ever ransomed their mercenaries. It was probably easier, cheaper, and safer to engage new ones. BOOK His treat merce naries. of of Hannibal, who made this name above all others a terror When Hamilcar arrived in Sicily, he found the Gallic metallic mercenaries in a state of mutiny. The prayers, promises, and donatives by which three years before Himilco had purchased the fidelity of his mercenaries in Lilybæum, were more likely to encourage them in their insubordination than to keep them in strict discipline. Different and more efficient means were now applied to coerce them. The mutineers were punished without mercy. Some were sent to Carthage or exposed on desert islands, others thrown overboard, and the remainder surprised and massacred by night. Operations of Hamilcar. In a war carried on with such soldiers, even the best general had hardly any prospect of success against a national army like the Roman. So much the more brilliant appears the genius of the Carthaginian leader, who made his own personal influence among the troops supply the place of patriotic enthusiasm. He could not carry on the war on a grand scale. Neither the numbers nor the fidelity and skill of his troops were such that he could venture to attack the Roman armies, which from their fortified camps were threatening Lilybæum and Drepana. Compelled to conduct the war differently, 1 Diodorus (xxiv. 1), following, probably, Philinus, applies to him the Homeric verse ἀμφότερον βασιλεύς τ ̓ ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμήτης. he took possession of Mount Heircte (now Monte Pellegrino), near Panormus, whose precipitous sides made it a natural fortress, while on its level summit some ground was left for cultivation, and its nearness to the sea secured immediate communication with the fleet. While, therefore, the Romans lay before the two Carthaginian fortresses, Hamilcar threatened Panormus, now the most important possession of the Romans in the whole of Sicily; for not only had the reinforcements and supplies of their army to be forwarded from it, but it was the only place through which direct communication with Italy by sea was kept up. By the Carthaginian garrison at Heircte, not only was the importance of Panormus neutralised, but its safety was endangered, and Rome was compelled to keep a large garrison in it. CHAP. III. FIFTH Period, 248-241 B.C. tion of For three years this state of things continued. From Occupahis impregnable rocky citadel, Hamilcar, as irresistible Eryx by as the lightning whose name he bore, attacked the Romans Hamilear. whenever he chose, by sea or by land, in Italy or in Sicily. He laid waste the coasts of Bruttium and Lucania, and penetrated northwards as far as Cumæ. No part of Sicily was secure from his attacks. His adventurous raids extended as far as Mount Etna. When he returned from such expeditions he made the Romans feel his presence. The task of describing the almost uninterrupted fighting between the Romans and the Carthaginians before Panormus seemed to Polybius almost as impossible as to follow every blow, every parry, and every turn of two pugilists.1 The detail of such encounters escapes observation. It is only the bearing of the combatants in general and the result of which we become aware. Hamilcar, with his mercenaries, supported gloriously and successfully the unequal struggle with the Roman legions. The war thus waged by him was a prelude to the battles which his illustrious son was to fight on Italian soil. At length in the year 244 he left Heirete unconquered, and chose a new battle-field in a 1 Polybius, i. 57, § 1. BOOK Sufferings of the Roman allies. 1 much more difficult situation on Mount Eryx, in the immediate neighbourhood of Drepana. The reason for this change is not reported. Perhaps it may have been the precarious position of Drepana, which the Romans continued to besiege with increasing vigour. Close by Drepana, at the foot of the mountain, the Romans had an intrenched camp. On the summit they held the temple of Venus. Half way up the hill, on the slope towards Drepana, lay the ancient town of Eryx, demolished by the Carthaginians in the fifth year of the war,2 but now partly restored and converted into a Roman fortification. This post Hamilcar surprised and stormed in a night attack, and then took up a strong position between the Romans at the foot and those at the top of the mountain. He kept open his communication both with the sea and with the garrison at Drepana, though on difficult roads. It is easy to conceive how dangerous such a position was in the midst of the enemy. Predatory excursions could hardly be undertaken from this point. Instead of gain and spoil the soldiers encountered dangers and privations; the fidelity of the mercenaries again wavered, and they were on the point of betraying their position and surrendering to the Romans, when the watchfulness of Hamilcar anticipated their intentions and compelled them to fly to the Roman camp to escape his revenge. The Romans did what they had never done before. They took these Gallic troops as mercenaries into their pay.3 We need no other evidence to prove the extremity to which Rome was now reduced. The war now really began to undermine the Roman state. It is impossible to ascertain the weight of the burdens which fell upon the allies. Of their contributions and their services, their contingents for the army and the fleet, the Roman historians purposely tell Polybius, i. 58, § 2. 2 Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 9. See above, p. 60. After the war they got rid of this band. They disarmed the men and sent them out of Italy.—Polybius, ii. 7, § 10. us nothing. But we know, without any such record, that they furnished at least one-half of the land army, and almost all the crews of the fleet. The thousands who perished in the battles at sea and in the wrecks were, for the most part, maritime allies (socii navales) who had been pressed into the Roman service. Nothing is more natural than that the extreme misery and horror of the hated and dreaded service should have excited them to resistance, which could only be quelled with great difficulty. What Italy suffered by the predatory incursions of the Carthaginians is beyond our calculation. But an idea of the losses which this war caused to Italy is given by the census of this time. While in the year 252 B.C. the number of Roman citizens was 297,797, it fell to 251,222 in the year 247 B.C., being reduced in five years by one-sixth. СНАР. III. FIFTH PERIOD, 248-241 state. B.C. The prosperity of the people suffered in proportion. General The trade of Rome and of the maritime towns of Italy ishment of impoverwas annihilated. The union of so many formerly in- the Roman dependent political communities into one large state, which, by putting down all internal wars seemed so likely to promote peaceful development and progress, involved them all in the long war with Carthage, and exposed them all alike to the same distress. One sign of this distress is the debasement of the coin. Before the war the old Roman As was stamped, or rather cast, full weight. But by degrees it sank down to one-half, one-third, a quarter, and in the end to one-sixth of the original weight, so that a coin of two ounces in weight was substituted, at least in name, for the original As of twelve ounces,' by which, of course, a proportionate reduction of Asses of the full weight of twelve ounces have not been preserved. It is supposed that they were never struck of the full nominal value, to keep them from being melted down for other purposes, and to cover the cost of minting (Mommsen, Röm. Münzwesen, p. 261). It seems, however, that a very slight reduction from the full weight would have answered these purposes. If, therefore, Asses of eleven and even of nine ounces are called heavy or full Asses, the term is applicable only from the contrast of the later Asses, which ranged between five and a half and two ounces. It would seem that, in reality, |