BOOK IV. Tedious prolongation of the war. debts-in other words, a general bankruptcy-was caused. It was natural that in this gradually increasing poverty of the state, some individuals should become rich. War has always the effect of injuring general prosperity for the benefit of a few; just as diseases, which waste the body, often swell the growth of one particular part.. In war, certain branches of industry and trade flourish. Adventurers, contractors, capitalists make their most successful speculations. In antiquity, the booty of war constituted a source of great profit for a few, particularly because the prisoners were made slaves. The armies, accordingly, were followed by a great number of traders who understood how to turn the ignorance and recklessness of the soldiers to their own advantage, in buying their spoils and purchasing slaves and articles of value at the auctions which were held from time to time. Another mode of acquiring wealth called forth by the war after the destruction of peaceful industry and trade was privateering, a speculation involving risks,' like the slave trade and the blockade-running of modern times. This kind of private enterprise had the further advantage of injuring the enemy, and formed a naval reserve, destined at no distant period to be of the most important service. The war in Sicily made no progress. The siege of Lilybæum, which had now continued for nine years, was carried on with considerably less energy since the failure of the first attack, and its object was plainly to keep the Carthaginians in the town. The lingering siege of Drepana was equally ineffectual. The sea was free, and the garrisons of both towns were thus furnished with all necessaries. It was not possible to dislodge Hamilcar from Mount Eryx. The Roman consuls, who during the last six years of the war had successively commanded in even the older Asses of eleven or nine ounces were minted in consequence of ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι κακὸν ἀλλοδαποῖσι φέροντες. Sicily, could boast of no success which might warrant them in claiming a triumph, in spite of the easy conditions on which this distinction might be obtained. CHAP. III. FIFTH PERIOD, B.C. of Caius with a fleet to Sicily. At length the Roman government determined to try 248-241 the only means by which the war could be brought to an end, and once more to attack the Carthaginians Dispatch by sea. The finances of the state were not in a condition Lutatius Catulus to furnish means for building and equipping a new fleet. The Romans therefore followed the example of Athens, and called up the richest citizens, in the ratio of their property, either to supply ships or to unite with others in doing so. The Roman historians were pleased to extol this manner of raising a new fleet as a sign of devotion and patriotism. It was, however, in reality only a compulsory loan, which the state imposed upon those who had suffered least from the war, and had probably enjoyed great gains. The owners of privateers had the obligation and the means of supporting the state in the manner just described. A new fleet of two hundred ships was thus fitted out and sent to Sicily under the consul C. Lutatius Catulus in the year 242. The Carthaginians had not thought it necessary to maintain a fleet in the Sicilian waters since the defeat of the Roman navy in the year 249. Their ships were otherwise engaged in the very lucrative piratical war on the coasts of Italy and Sicily. Lutatius therefore found the harbour of Drepana unoccupied. He made some attacks on the town from the sea and the land side, but his chief energies were directed to the training and practising of his crews, thus avoiding the mistake by which the battle of Drepana was lost. He exercised his men during the whole of the summer, autumn, and winter in rowing, and took care that his pilots should be minutely acquainted with the nature of a coast singularly dangerous from its many shallows. Thus he anticipated with confidence a struggle which could no longer be delayed if Carthage did not wish to sacrifice her two fortresses on the coast.' 1 Polybius, i. 59. Zonaras, viii. 17. BOOK the Car thaginians at the Ægatian Islands. The die was cast in March the following year (241). A Carthaginian fleet, heavily laden with provisions for the Defeat of troops in Sicily, appeared near the Ægatian Islands. The object of the commander was to land the provisions, to take Hamilcar, with a body of soldiers, on board, and then to give battle to the Romans. This object was frustrated by the promptness of Catulus, who, although wounded, took part in the battle after having handed over the command to the prætor Q. Valerius Falto. When the Carthaginians approached with full sail, favoured by a strong west wind, the Roman ships advanced, and compelled them to give battle. It was soon decided. A complete and brilliant victory crowned the last heroic exertions of the Romans. Fifty ships of the enemy were sunk, seventy were taken with their crews, amounting to 10,000 men; the rest, favoured by a sudden change of wind, escaped to Carthage. Negotiations for peace. The defeat of the Carthaginians was not so great as that of the Romans had been at Drepana. But Carthage was exhausted and discouraged. Perhaps she was alarmed by the premonitory signs of the terrible war with the mercenaries which soon after brought her to the very brink of ruin. Sicily had now been for several years as good as lost to the Carthaginians. The continuation of the war held out to them no prospect of winning back their former possessions in that island. Carthage therefore decided on proposing terms of peace, and she might entertain the hope that Rome would be not less ready to bring the war to a close. The negotiations were carried on by Hamilcar Barcas and the consul Lutatius as plenipotentiaries. At first the Romans insisted on dishonourable conditions. They demanded that the Carthaginians should lay down their arms, deliver up the deserters, and pass under the yoke. But Hamilcar indignatly refused these terms, and declared he would rather die in battle than deliver up to the enemy the arms with which he was intrusted for the defence of his country. Lutatius therefore waived this claim, the more readily as he wished to bring the negotiations speedily to an end, in order to secure for himself the credit III. FIFTH PERIOD, B.C. of having brought the long war to a close. The prelimi- CHAP. naries of peace were thus settled. Carthage engaged to evacuate Sicily; not to make war upon Hiero of Syracuse; to give up all Roman prisoners without ransom, and to pay 248-241 a sum of 2,200 talents in twenty years. On the whole the Roman senate and people approved of these terms. The formal conditions of the treaty involved the abandonment by Carthage of the smaller islands between Sicily and Italy (which was a matter of course), as well as the mutual obligation that each should refrain from attacking and injuring the allies of the other, or entering into an alliance with them; but the war indemnity imposed on Carthage was raised by 1,000 talents, to be paid at once. the Ro mans at the close Thus ended at length the war for the possession of Position of Sicily, which had lasted uninterruptedly for three-andtwenty years, the greatest struggle known to the genera- the war. tion then living. The most beautiful island of the Mediterranean, the possession of which had been contested for centuries by Greeks and Punians, was wrested from them both by a people who till quite lately had lain beyond the horizon of the civilised nations of the ancient world, which had exercised no influence on their political system and international dealings, and had never been even taken into account. Before the war with Pyrrhus, Rome was among the Mediterranean states of antiquity what Russia was in Europe before Peter the Great and the war with Charles XII. By her heroic and successful opposition to the interference of Pyrrhus in the affairs of Italy, Rome emerged from obscurity, and made herself known to the rulers of Egypt, Macedonia, and Syria as a power with which they might soon have to deal. to Rome After the departure of Pyrrhus (273 B.C.) an Egyptian Embassies embassy was sent to Rome, to offer, in the name of from King Ptolemy Philadelphus, a treaty of amity, which the foreign Roman senate willingly accepted.' About the same time 'Zonaras, viii. 6: Καὶ Πτολεμαῖος δὲ ὁ Φιλάδελφος τόν τε Πύῤῥον κακῶς ἀπηλλακότα μαθὼν καὶ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους αὐξανομένους δῶρά τε αὐτοῖς πεμψε καὶ states. BOOK IV. Changes in the mili tary institutions of Rome. messengers came to Rome from Apollonia, a flourishing While Rome, by the conquest of Sicily, gained, with regard to other powers, a position of importance and influence, it became unmistakeably clear for the first time that old institutions, suited for a town community and for the simplicity of ancient life, were insufficient for a more extended field of political and military operations. The Roman military system was organised for the defence of narrow boundaries, and not for aggressive warfare in distant parts. The universal duty of military service and the periodical formation of new armies, which was a consequence of it, had not appeared prejudicial in the wars with the Italian nations, who had the same institutions, and as long as the theatre of war was the immediate neighbourhood of Rome. When, however, it became no longer possible to dismiss every legion after the summer campaign, it was at once seen that a citizen army on the old plan had great military and economical disadvantages. The peasants, who were taken from their homesteads, grew ὁμολογίαν ἐποιήσατο. Valerius Maximus, iv. 3, 10; Livy, epit. 14; Dion |