BOOK and we can only guess what must have taken place on the occasion in question. But thus much seems certain, that the war with Rome, and still more the mutiny of the mercenaries, shook the power of the aristocracy.' A war is, under all circumstances, a severe test for the constitution of a state. Whatever is unsound in the administration and government comes to light, and an unsuccessful war is frequently the cause of reforms, provided a people has still vital energy enough left to discover and to apply the remedies which it needs.2 This was the case in Carthage. In the war with the mercenaries, when the state could only be saved by the arms of its own citizens, when the people of Carthage were obliged to fight their own battles, they were justified in claiming for themselves a greater share in the government. A democratic movement took place, at the head of which we find Hamilcar Barcas, the most eminent statesman and soldier that Carthage possessed at that time. It is perfectly clear, even from the scanty reports preserved in the extant writers, that at the end of the Sicilian war Hamilcar found himself in opposition to the party which was then in possession of the government. He ceased to be commander-in-chief. In the perils of the war with the mercenaries, he again entered the service of the state. It was he to whom Carthage owed her deliverance from a ruin that seemed inevitable. His triumph in the field gave him the ascendancy over the aristocratic party and its leader, Hanno, surnamed the Great. It appears that from this time forward Hamilcar practically directed the government of Carthage, somewhat in the way in which Pericles had 1 Polybius, vi. 51. The policy of the house of Barcas is called a dŋuokorla and a Taipía Tv тоvпρотáтwv åν0púлwv. (Apрian, vi. 5; Diodorus, xxv. p. 96, Tauchnitz.) Such a misrepresentation is not surprising; it is similar to the account of the revolution in Volsinii (see vol. i. p. 479), which exhibits the spite and mendacity of aristocratic historians. 2 It will not be necessary to give many instances. The regeneration of Prussia after the disastrous war with Napoleon in 1806; the abolition of slavery in Russia after the Crimean war; the establishment of parliamentary government in Austria after Sadowa, are among the most striking illustrations of the historical law referred to in the text. governed Athens, without interfering materially with the forms of the republican constitution. His accession to power was not unlike a change of ministry in a modern state. The party which had governed the state before, now formed the Opposition; as a matter of course, it became the party of peace when Hamilcar and his sons looked upon the renewal of the war with Rome as an inevitable necessity, and as the only chance for the preservation of liberty and independence. It is a proof no less of the high political qualities of the Carthaginians than of the magnanimity of Barcas and his house, that, under such circumstances, Carthage preserved her republican liberties, and was not overwhelmed by a military despotism. CHAP. VIII. FIRST PERIOD, 218-216 B.C. Barcas. The mutiny of the mercenaries was scarcely suppressed, Policy of and the revolted African subjects brought back to obe- Hamilcar dience, when Hamilcar directed his attention to a country where he could hope to find compensation for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. This country was Spain, to which, from the remotest antiquity, Phoenician traders and settlers had been attracted, but which had hitherto not been conquered by the Carthaginian arms, or made subject, to any considerable extent, to Carthaginian authority. settle ments in The island town of Gades, situated beyond the pillars Phoenician of Hercules in the outer sea, was older perhaps than Carthage herself. Its national sanctuary of the Phoe- Spain. nician Melkarth (Hercules) vied in importance and dignity with the temples of the mother country. The fertile plain of Andalusia, the old land of Tartessus, was celebrated for its wealth, and enriched at an early period the merchants of Tyre and Sidon. The abundance of precious metals in Spain attracted the skilful Phoenician miners, who knew how to work the mines with profit. No doubt Spain had been for ages of the greatest importance for the trade of Carthage; but as long as her possessions in Sicily and Sardinia absorbed her attention and her energies, it seems that Spain was not so much the object of the public as of the private enterprise of the BOOK Rapid growth of Carthaginian power in Spain. Attitude of the Roman state. Carthaginian citizens, and that conquests in that country were not contemplated. This was changed now after the war with Rome. Carthage began to extend her power and dominion in Spain, as England did in India after the loss of the American plantations. With an astounding rapidity she spread her possessions from a few isolated places on the coast over the southern half of the peninsula, and she appeared destined to establish the ascendancy of the Semitic race, and of Semitic culture, in a country where, nearly a thousand years later, the Arabs, a kindred Semitic people, succeeded in gaining a footing, and in reaching a high degree of civilisation. At the time of the Carthaginian conquest it seemed that Spain was about to be for ever separated politically from Europe, and to be united with North Africa, with which it has much in common through its geographical situation and its climate. Yet, owing to the events which we are now about to relate, the Punic conquest of Spain was of short duration, and left no traces behind except a few geographical names, like Cadiz and Carthagena; but the Moorish dominion, which lasted for more than seven hundred years, has left a stamp on the Spanish people which can even now be recognised, and not least in the religious fanaticism of which it was the principal cause. For nine years Hamilcar worked with great success for the realisation of his plan, and a considerable portion of Spain was already subjected to the dominion of Carthage when he lost his life in battle. His son-in-law, Hasdrubal, raised to the command of the army by the voice of the soldiers and by the approval of the people of Carthage,1 We do not know in what manner the preliminary election of the general by the votes of the army was conducted. It could not have been an illegal usurpation of authority by the soldiers, nor a violation of discipline. Perhaps the committee of Carthaginian senators, which, as we know, accompanied the army, selected the most popular and able officer, conferred on him the preliminary command, and reported to Carthage, to obtain the consent of the home authorities. Some such arrangement must have been necessary, unless a general was named from the first as second in command, and as successor in case of the death of the commander-in-chief. At any rate, it is not likely CHAP. FIRST PERIOD, B.C. proved himself a worthy successor of Hamilcar, though he extended and secured the dominion of Carthage less by force of arms than by persuasion and peaceful negotiations with the native races. He founded New Carthage (Carthagena), 218-216 which he destined to be the capital of the new empire, as it was more favourably situated than Gades, and well suited to be a depot of arms and munitions of war for military undertakings in the central and eastern parts of Spain. The power and the influence of Carthage extended more and more northwards, and excited at last the attention and jealousy of Rome, which had for a time been apparently indifferent to the proceedings of the Carthaginians in the Pyrenæan peninsula. Hasdrubal was obliged to declare that Carthage would not extend her conquests beyond the river Ebro. At the same time the Romans entered into friendly relations with several Spanish tribes, and concluded a formal alliance with the important town of Saguntum,' which, though situated a good way to the south of the Ebro, was intended to oppose, under Roman protection, a barrier to the further progress of the Carthaginians. Hasdrubal. This was the state of affairs in Spain when in 221 B.C. Death of Hasdrubal was cut off prematurely by the hand of an assassin. The universal voice of the Spanish army appointed as his successor Hannibal, the eldest son of Hamilcar Barcas, then only twenty-eight years old. The Carthaginian people confirmed this choice, and by Hannibal doing so placed their fate in the hands of an untried Hamilear that the foreign mercenaries had any influence in the election. If the Carthaginian citizens serving in the army expressed their wishes as to the choice of a successor, and even if they possessed a formal right of election, it would have been a proceeding differing not very widely from the election of a Roman consul by the comitia centuriata, and it could be justified more easily than civil legislation by an army in the field, such as is reported of Rome (Livy, vii. 16). That the Carthaginians intentionally left to their armies a voice in the election of generals is clear from a proceeding in the war with the mercenaries, when the army is allowed to decide whether Hamilcar or Hanno is to command it.— See Polybius, i. 82. 1 The site of Saguntum, on the coast north of Valencia, is now known as Murviedro, or the Old Walls. son of Barcas. BOOK IV. young man, of whom they might hope, but could not know, that he had the spirit of his father. But of one thing the Carthaginians might well be assured, that the son had inherited his father's glowing hatred of Rome, and that with his ardent spirit he held as his sacred duty the task of avenging past wrongs, and of establishing the security and power of his native country on the ruins of the rival city. There can be no doubt that the people of Carthage shared the sentiments of Hamilcar's family— that the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, whilst prompting feelings of revenge, convinced them that a lasting peace with Rome was impossible. They saw that even the twenty-four years of war in Sicily had not sufficed to fight out their quarrel, and that, sooner or later, the contest must be renewed. Every danger in which Carthage might possibly be involved, every war with foreign enemies, and every civil disturbance, might, to the faithless and ungenerous enemy, offer an opportunity for coming forward with new demands, and for extorting humiliating concessions. If this was the conviction of the Carthaginian people (and we have no reason to doubt it), they could not make a happier choice than in appointing Hannibal to the command in Spain. Never has a nation found a more fit and worthy representative. Never has the national will and spirit been embodied so completely and so nobly in one person, as in Hannibal was embodied the spirit and the will of Carthage. Even the low passion of hate seemed ennobled in a man who, in a lifelong, almost superhuman struggle with an overwhelming force, was animated and fired by it to persevere in a hopeless cause. No Roman ever gathered up and concentrated in himself so fully the great qualities of his nation as Hannibal did those of Carthage. We should only insult him if we were to compare him with Scipio, or any other of his contemporaries.1 Rome has produced but one man who can compare with Hannibal. And this Hannibal, so great and powerful, so nearly fatal to the greatness and the very existence of 1 See Arnold, History of Rome, iii. 64. |