CHAP. VIII. FIRST PERIOD, B.C. mountain-climbing among ice and snow, was more pernicious to his men than anything else. A march of fifteen days under the weight of arms and baggage, over the highest and steepest mountains of Europe, and 218-216 on such roads as the tramp of men and animals alone, without any engineering skill, had made, and fifteen nights' bivouac where even in October piercing cold winds sweep down from the snow-fields and glaciers, were alone sufficient to destroy an army. What must have been the fate of those who fell down from exhaustion, or were left behind wounded or diseased? Nothing is said in this narrative (and very rarely at any other time in the accounts of ancient warfare) of the sick and wounded. No doubt every serious wound or illness caused death, especially on a march where even vigorous men experience difficulty in keeping pace with their comrades. Recent events have shown that the care of the sick and wounded in war is a very late and a very imperfect product of civilisation and philanthrophy. and the The army required a few days to recover from their Hannibal fatigue before Hannibal could venture to begin the cam- Tauripaign, at a season when, under ordinary circumstances, nians. the time for winter-quarters had arrived. He then turned against the Taurinians, a Ligurian tribe which was hostile to the Insubrians, and had rejected his proffered alliance. In three days their chief town was taken, their fighting men cut down,' and it was made evident to all their neighbours that they had only to choose between destruction and the Carthaginian alliance. In consequence of this, all the tribes in the upper valley of the Po, Ligurians as well as Gauls, joined Hannibal. The tribes living further eastward still hesitated, from fear of the Roman armies that occupied their country.2 Hannibal, in order to enable them to join him, found it necessary to march 1 According to Appian, viii. 5 : τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἔσφαξεν ἐς κατάπληξιν τῆς ἄλλης Κελτικής. 1 Polybius, iii. 60, § 12: τινὲς δὲ καὶ συστρατεύειν ἠναγκάζοντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. BOOK Alleged device of Hannibal for the enment of his courage soldiers. March and defeat of Scipio. immediately against the Romans, and to force them to accept a battle. We may presume that it was hardly necessary for Hannibal to urge his soldiers to bravery. Their conduct up to this time was a sufficient guarantee for the future. Nevertheless, as we are told,' Hannibal placed before their eyes a spectacle to show that death has no terrors for a man if death or victory is the only chance of deliverance from unendurable evils. Before the assembled army he asked his Gallic prisoners if they were prepared to fight with one another unto the death, provided that liberty and splendid arms were the reward of victory. When with one voice they all professed themselves ready to stake life for freedom, Hannibal selected by lot several pairs of combatants. These fought, fell or conquered like heroes, and were envied by those of their companions who had not been fortunate enough to be selected. Thus wretched barbarian captives showed what can be expected of soldiers fighting for the highest prize, and Hannibal's men were not disposed to yield to them in military spirit. It would almost appear that the issue of the first Punic war had produced among the Romans a feeling of superiority over the Carthaginians. They had no conception of the change that had taken place in the Carthaginian army, and that, instead of Gallic mercenaries, Libyan and Spanish subjects and allies formed now the principal strength of their old enemies. Of course they were still more ignorant of the military genius of Hannibal. They were consequently full of courage and confident of victory; and Scipio, as he had ventured in Gaul to advance against Hannibal with an inferior force, did not hesitate now to do the same. From Placentia he marched westward along the left bank of the Po, crossed the Ticinus, and found himself suddenly face to face with a considerable corps of cavalry, which Hannibal, advancing on the same bank down the river, had sent before the main body of his army 1 Polybius, iii. 62. Dion Cassius, fr. 57, 4. Livy, xxi. 42. to reconnoitre. CHAP. VIII. FIRST PERIOD, B.C. Thus the first encounter on Italian soil took place between the Po and the Ticinus. It did not assume the dimensions of a battle. No Roman infantry, except the light-armed troops, were engaged; but the 218-216 conflict was severe, and terminated, after a spirited resistance, in a decided repulse of the Romans. Scipio himself set his men the example of bravery. Fighting in the foremost ranks, he was wounded, and owed his life to the heroism of his son, then a youth of seventeen years, but destined to become the conqueror of Hannibal, and to terminate the terrible war so inauspiciously opened at the Ticinus. After this check, Scipio could not think of venturing on a regular battle. The level country round about was too favourable for the superior cavalry of the Carthaginians. He made therefore a hasty and even precipitate retreat, sacrificing a detachment of 600 men, who covered the bridge over the Po until it was destroyed by the retreating army, and, less fortunate than Horatius. Cocles in the good old time, were all made prisoners of war. the Trebia. In order to cross the Po, Hannibal was obliged to Passage of ascend its bank for some distance, until he found a place where the elephants and the cavalry could swim the stream, and where it was easy to construct a bridge for the infantry. Then he advanced towards Placentia, near which city the consul Scipio had constructed a fortified camp. He crossed, as it appears, the small river Trebia, which, running down from the Apennines in a northerly direction, joins the Po not far to the west of Placentia. Thus the two armies again eonfronted one another, and Hannibal was anxious to bring on a decisive engagement, whilst Scipio, moderating his ardour after his recent ill success, and moreover compelled to inactivity by his wound, kept within his lines. It was most fortunate for the Romans that they had completed the fortification of Placentia and Cremona. Without these two strongholds 1 Polybius, x. 3. Livy, xxi. 46. According to the account of Cœlius, preserved by Livy (loc. cit.), Scipio's life was saved by a Ligurian slave. BOOK Attitude of the Gallic tribes. Move ment of left bank of they would, after Hannibal's appearance, have been unable to keep their footing in the valley of the Po, and the Gauls would have been throughout the war much less hampered in their offensive operations as Hannibal's allies, if the Roman garrisons in those two fortresses had not kept them in constant alarm for the safety of their own country. As yet the Gauls had not unanimously declared themselves for Hannibal. Most of them were ready to abandon the cause of Rome, others wavered in their fidelity, a few remained steadfast and sent auxiliaries. But Scipio could not rely on these men. In one night more than 2,000 of them mutinied in the Roman camp, overpowered the sentinels at the gates, and rushed out to join Hannibal. They were received kindly, praised for their conduct, and dismissed to their homes with great promises if they would persuade their countrymen to revolt from Rome. Hannibal was now in hopes that all the Gallic tribes would join his standard, and he eagerly wished for an opportunity to deal the Roman army a decisive blow, which might inspire the Gauls with confidence in his strength. Scipio, on his side, sought to avoid a conflict. As he the Roman did not feel safe enough on the level ground, in the imarmy to the mediate vicinity of Placentia, he broke up his camp in the Trebia. the night, and, using the utmost silence, marched higher up the Trebia, in order to gain a more favourable locality for a camp on the hills which form the last spurs of the Apennines running northward towards the Po. As Hannibal's army was not far off, this movement was no doubt hazardous, especially as Scipio's march went past the hostile camp. In spite of the care employed to avoid noise, the movement of the Romans was perceived. Hannibal's horsemen were immediately at their heels, and had they not been delayed by the plunder of the Roman camp, it would have been difficult for Scipio to reach, without great loss, the left, or western, bank of the Trebia, and there to fortify a new camp. As it was, he succeeded in gaining a strong position, where he was in perfect safety, and was able to await the arrival of his colleague Sempronius, who, with his army, was on his way from Sicily. CHAP. VIII. FIRST PERIOD, B.C. of Sempro As we have seen above, Sempronius had, in the early 218-216 part of the summer, sailed with two legions to Sicily. In that province he had made preparations for a landing Operations n Africa, but had been detained by the energy with which nius in Sicily. he Carthaginians had begun hostilities in that quarter. Even before his arrival, a Carthaginian squadron of twenty vessels of war had appeared in the Sicilian waters. Three of them had been driven by a storm into the Straits of Messana, and had been captured by the Syracusan fleet with which the old king Hiero was in readiness to join the Roman consul. From the prisoners, Hiero ascertained that a Carthaginian fleet was on its way to surprise Lilybæum and to promote a rising of the Roman subjects in Sicily, many of whom regretted the change of masters, and would fain have returned to their old allegiance. This important news was at once communicated to the prætor, M. Æmilius, who at that time commanded in Sicily; the garrison of Lilybæum was warned, and the Roman fleet kept in readiness, while all round the coast a strict look-out was kept for the Carthaginians, and messengers were dispatched into the several towns to enjoin vigilance. Accordingly, when the Punic fleet, consisting of thirty-five sail, approached Lilybæum, it found the Roman garrison ready to receive it. There was no chance of taking the town by surprise. The Carthaginians resolved, therefore, to offer battle to the Roman fleet, and drew up at the entrance of the port. The number of the Roman ships is not given. Livy only mentions the circumstance that they were manned with better and more numerous troops than those of the Carthaginians. The latter, therefore, tried to avoid being boarded, and relied on their skill in using the beaks (rostra) for disabling and sinking the hostile vessels. But they succeeded only in a single instance, whereas 1 ' Livy, xxi. 49. |