Flaminius was elected to the consulship in spite of all opposition. It was customary that the newly-elected consul, on the day of entering on his office, should dress himself in his house in his official robe (the prætexta or purple-bordered toga), ascend the Capitol in solemn procession, perform a sacrifice, convene a meeting of the senate, in which the time was fixed for the Latin festival (feriæ Latina) on the Alban Mount by the temple of Jupiter Latiaris, and that he should not start for his province before the termination of this festival, which at the period of the Hannibalian war lasted several days.' In order to avoid the chicanery of his opponents, who might have retained him in the city or compelled him to resign, under some futile pretext of a bad omen 2 or of an irregularity in the ceremonies, Flaminius disregarded the usual formalities, and left Rome abruptly, in order to enter on his office in his camp at Ariminum. The senate, greatly exasperated, resolved to recall him, and sent an 1 See Becker, Handbuch der röm. Alterthümer, ii. 122; iv. 440. 2 Livy, xxi. 63: Flaminius ratus auspiciis ementiendis, Latinarumque feriarum mora, et consularibus aliis impedimentis retenturos se in urbe, simulato itinere privatus clam in provinciam abiit.' Livy (xxii. 1) gives a formidable list of these 'prodigia,' which were evidently intended to keep Flaminius from taking the field:-In Sicily the spears of soldiers were seen to be on fire; in Sardinia the staff which a Roman knight carried burnt away in his hand whilst he was on his round to inspect the sentinels on the wall of a town; frequent fires lighted up the sea-coast; from two shields blood exuded; several soldiers were struck by lightning; the orb of the sun appeared to grow smaller; in Præneste fiery stones fell from the sky; at Arpi shields were seen in the sky, and the sun appeared to be fighting with the moon; at Capena two moons were seen by day; at Cære the water of a stream was mixed with blood, and spots of blood even appeared on the water that flowed from the fountain of Hercules; at Antium bloody ears fell into the baskets of reapers; at Falerii the heavens seemed to be rent asunder, and from the gap a bright light shone forth; the prophetic tablets shrank, and one of them fell on the ground, containing the words: Mavors shakes his spear;" sweat appeared on the statue of Mars in the Appian road, and on those of the sacred wolves; at Capua the heavens seemed to be on fire, as also the moon, which set amidst a shower of rain; goats were born covered with wool; a hen was changed into a cock, and a cock into a hen.' The list of expiatory rites and sacrifices is equally interesting. In it are comprised the dedication to Jupiter of a golden thunderbolt fifty pounds in weight, several other offerings, lectisternia, and a public feast (convivium publicum). CHAP. VIII. FIRST PERIOD, 218-216 B.C. BOOK IV. Marches of the two consuls. embassy to insist on his immediate return. Flaminius paid no attention to the order of the senate, which he knew to be of no legal force, and assumed the command of the army at Ariminum without the observance of the usual religious formalities. But signs of warning occurred even now. At the sacrifice a calf, already struck, but not killed by the axe, escaped from the hands of the attendant, sprinkled many persons with its blood, and disturbed the solemn proceedings by the terror which such an evident sign of the divine displeasure produced. The great calamity that was to befall Italy was hastened by the wickedness of men like Flaminius, who disregarded the warnings of the gods. The internal disputes did not prevent the Romans from making their preparations for the ensuing campaign with circumspection and care.' The military strength of Italy was sufficient, not only once more to encounter the principal enemy with perfect confidence, but amply to provide for the safety of the distant parts of the Roman dominion. Troops were sent to Sicily, Sardinia, Tarentum, and other places. Sixty quinqueremes were added to the fleet. The faithful Hiero of Syracuse, as indefatigable in the service of Rome as ever, sent 500 Cretans and 1,000 light-armed infantry. Four new legions were raised, and magazines of provisions were established in the north of Etruria and in Ariminum, by one of which two routes the advance of the Carthaginians was expected. In the latter place the remnants of the army beaten at the Trebia were collected, and hence Flaminius led his men by cross and by-roads over the Apennines into northern Etruria, to 1 Polybius, iii. 75. 2 The Cretans were probably archers; they were as much in repute for their skill in the use of the bow as the Balearians for their expertness in using the sling. The Romans used neither of these weapons. • Probably, as Mommsen suggests, conveyed by water from Placentia and Cremona. Livy, xxi. 62: 'Per tramites Apennini.' Probably the cavalry of these four legions remained at Ariminum; for, in the first place, the mountain roads would be very difficult to pass with cavalry; secondly, the cavalry was of more importance in the plain near Ariminum than in the hilly country of Etruria; join them to the two new legions which had been directed there straight from Rome.' The second consul, Cn. Servilius, proceeded to Ariminum with the two other newly-levied legions. His army thirdly, the army of Servilius at Ariminum must have been unusually strong in cavalry, as a detachment of 4,000 horse could be dispatched to intercept Hannibal (see p. 204). Thus the divergent statements of Polybius (iii. 77) and Livy (xxi. 62) can be made to agree. 2 Polybius is not sufficiently explicit in his statements concerning the armaments and the strength of the military force in 217 B.C. It seems almost that he purposely avoids expressing himself clearly. He says (iii. 75) that the Romans sent two armies (σrparómeda) to Sardinia and Sicily, garrisons to Tarentum and other places, that they fitted out sixty penteres, and that the consuls raised new armies (σrparтóneda). It is especially important to understand the latter expression, συνῆγον τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ κατέγραφον τὰ παρ' abтoîs στрATÓTeda. Mommsen, as it seems, infers that the consuls did not raise any new legions, but only completed those that had been defeated on the Trebia. This cannot be right. The words of Polybius do not admit such an interpretation. Moreover, it does not agree with the statements of the strength of the army of Flaminius in the battle on Lake Thrasymenus, nor with a report of Appian (vii. 8). In the battle on the Thrasymene the Romans lost, according to Polybius, 30,000 men, i.e., their whole army, the strength of which Appian also gives at 30,000 men. This was in round numbers the two new legions (20,000 men), and 10,000 men more, i.e. the remnants of the legions from Transalpine Gaul. Accordingly, of the 42,000 men who fought at the Trebia, only 10,000 men were disposable for the campaign of 217 B.C., a result which is in perfect accordance with all that we know of the disastrous battle on the Trebia. The statement of Appian (vii. 8) is to this effect, that in 217 B.C. the Romans had on foot thirteen legions. This number cannot be made up, if we suppose that the consuls of 217 had not formed four new legions, but simply replenished the legions of the preceding year. On the other hand, the number of thirteen legions agrees with the assumption that in 217 B.C. four new legions were raised. There were in Spain two legions, in Sicily and Sardinia one each, in Tarentum and the rest of Italy one, on the Po the remnants of four legions, and, lastly, four new ones. Apart from the objections which these positive statements cause against Mommsen's unsupported assumption, the course of events seems to show that the Romans did not confine themselves to supplementing the remnants of the defeated legions, and thus expose themselves to the risk of another defeat by Hannibal's victorious army, which was now considerably swelled by Gauls. This view is hardly borne out by the expressions of Polybius (iii. 75, § 4), did kai napadókov φανέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πράγματος περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς διαφερόντως ἐγίγνοντο: 37: πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς ἡτοίμαζον. Polybius is silent on the circumstance related by Livy, that Flaminius entered on his office at Ariminum. Following his narrative alone, we might fancy that Flaminius had proceeded from Rome straight to Arretium in Etruria. This silence is perhaps intentional. Polybius, as a free-thinker, was disgusted with the use which the Roman aristocracy made of the popular superstition, but instead of reproving CHAP. VIII. FIRST PERIOD, 218-216 B.C. IV. BOOK consisted, according to Appian, of 40,000 men in all. If this statement is to be trusted, Servilius must have had, besides the two new legions and the usual number of allies, a body of 20,000 auxiliaries, who were perhaps Cenomanians. The cavalry of his army was very strong if, as Polybius reports,' Servilius dispatched 4,000 of them into Etruria as soon as he was informed of Hannibal's march in that direction. Miscalculation of the Romans. March of the Car The situation was, upon the whole, identical with that of 225 B.C., eight years before, when the Romans expected that the Gauls would advance either by the eastern road through Picenum, or on the western side of the Apennines from the Upper Arno. They had then divided their armies between Ariminum and Arretium, in order to cover both roads to Rome. But as they were then deceived by the Gauls, who crossed the Apennines, not near the Upper Arno, but far westward near the sea-coast, and suddenly appeared in Etruria without having encountered any opposition, so they were now a second time surprised by Hannibal. On the first appearance of spring the Carthaginian thaginians. army broke up from the plain of the Po. It had been considerably strengthened by Gauls. Crossing the Apennines, probably by the pass which is now called that of Pontremoli and leads from Parma to Lucca,2 Hannibal had reached the Arno, while Servilius was still expecting him at Ariminum. The march to Fæsulæ, through the low ground along the Arno, was beset with great difficulties. The country was flooded by the spring rains and the melting of the snow on the mountains, and had in several places assumed the aspect of vast lakes. Men and beasts sank deep into the soft ground; many of the horses his friends, he remained silent. But this silence cannot invalidate the positive testimony of Livy. Polybius, iii. 86. 2 The locality where Hannibal crossed the Apennines cannot be fixed with more certainty than his passage over the Alps, as Polybius mentions no names and does not describe the country accurately. Nissen (Rhein. Museum, xxii. 574) is in favour of the road from Modena or Bologna to Pistoja, and thinks the inundated country was the valley of the Ombrone between Pistoja and Fiesole. lost their hoofs and perished. A portion of the army was obliged to wade through the water for three days, and to pass the nights without being able to find dry spots on which they might rest or sleep, except the bodies of fallen animals, and heaps of the abandoned baggage. The damp and variable weather, together with excessive fatigue, and especially the want of sleep, caused sickness and terrible havoc among the troops. Hannibal himself lost one of his eyes by inflammation. The Gauls suffered most. They formed the centre in the line of march, and if Hannibal had not taken the precaution of causing the cavalry, under his brave brother Mago, to close the rear, they would have deserted in crowds, for they were near home, and, as Gauls, they had no perseverance to bear up against continued hardships. CHAP. VIII. FIRST PERIOD, 218-216 B.C. ments of Rome. Having reached the Upper Arno, Hannibal allowed his Movearmy to repose. Then he marched southwards, passing Hannibal by the camp of Flaminius near Arretium, in the direction of towards Cortona. To attack the fortified camp of the consul would have been hopeless. Even at the Trebia Hannibal had left the defeated and wounded Scipio and his discouraged army unmolested in his camp, and had preferred to engage two united consular armies in the field rather than attack one within its intrenchments. It was therefore natural that he should now try to provoke Flaminius to leave his camp and fight a battle.' If he marched further south towards Rome, it was impossible for Flaminius to remain stationary at Arretium. Between Hannibal and Rome there was now no Roman army. Who would take the responsibility of letting the enemy march unopposed upon Rome? Whether Hannibal would attack the city, and whether an attack would succeed, nobody could tell. At any rate the apprehensions in Rome were great. It was the duty of the two consuls to beat the enemy in the field.2 According to Polybius (iii. 82), Flaminius was aggravated and offended because Hannibal marched past him as from contempt. This is surely a misrepresentation, like many others, intended to cast a blemish on the character of Flaminius, and it owes its origin probably to his political opponents. 2 The same view is expressed by Nissen (Rheinisches Museum, xxii. 565). |