BOOK IV. Move ments of Flaminius. On no account could they think of remaining in the north of Italy whilst the capital was threatened.' Flaminius accordingly broke up from Arretium and followed Hannibal closely. It is not at all probable that he had any idea of offering or accepting battle before his colleague, whom he had now every reason to expect in Etruria, should arrive from Ariminum. Perhaps he contemplated a repetition of the campaign in the late Gallic war, which eight years before had led to such brilliant results. At that time a Gallic army, followed by the army of one Roman consul, suddenly encountered the other consul in front, and was cut to pieces by a combined attack of the two colleagues. Now, if Servilius marched rapidly by the Flaminian road from Umbria, and succeeded in placing himself between Hannibal and Rome, the two consuls could, as on the previous occasion, fall upon the enemy from two sides. It appears that Servilius acted upon such a plan as this. He dispatched a body of 4,000 horse, under C. Centenius, in advance, and followed with the infantry on the Flaminian road.3 It was therefore the duty of Flaminius to keep as close as possible to the Carthaginians, in order to be near enough, on the expected approach of the second Roman army, for a combined action. He was strong enough for this, for he had more than 30,000 men. This force sufficed to hamper the movements of the invaders, and even to protect the country to some extent from devastation. In a few hours Roman soldiers could make a fortified camp, in which they would be safe from a surprise, and even from an attack in due form. For this reason a Roman general could venture close to an enemy, without exposing himself to any extraordinary risks. The plan of Flaminius cannot therefore Thus the Roman legions followed Pyrrhus when he marched upon Rome. See vol. i. p. 523. 2 See above, p. 129. These marched on the Flaminian road (see Nissen, Rhein. Museum, XX. 228), and had probably left it at Mevonia to turn to the right towards Perusia, when the battle on the Lake Thrasymenus forced them to return. On this retreat they were overtaken and defeated by Maharbal. See below, p. 210. This was usual in the strategical operations of the Romans. A well be called rash. CHAP. VIII. FIRST PERIOD, 218-216 B.C. for the upon Fla But he had in his calculation overlooked one item, or rated it at too low a figure. The enemy he had to deal with was not a horde of barbarian Gauls, but a disciplined army of veteran soldiers, led by Hannibal. The unfortunate are seldom treated with justice by their friends, never by their enemies. Flaminius was the Reasons recognised leader of the popular party, and the history of censures Rome was written by the adherents and clients of the passed nobility. Thus Flaminius has experienced, even at the minius. hands of Polybius, an ungenerous, nay, unjust, treatment. But, in truth, if he committed faults in his command, if he allowed himself to be outwitted and surprised in an ambush by a superior antagonist, he is not more guilty than many other Roman consuls before and after him, whose faults were forgiven because they belonged to the ruling party. And yet few of these have an equal claim to consideration and forgiveness with Flaminius, who atoned for his fault with his life. Nevertheless, party hatred survived him, and delighted in making him responsible for the whole misfortune which the genius of Hannibal inflicted on his ill-fated army. Polybius disdains repeating the silly charge brought Charges against Flaminius, that he rushed into misfortune through brought against his contempt of the gods. Livy, however, is more Flaminius. punctilious in preserving traits which are characteristic of Roman manners and sentiment. He relates, therefore, that, on starting from Arretium, he was thrown from his horse, but disregarded not only this warning of the gods, known illustration is the campaign of Fabius Maximus in the following year. Compare Livy, xxii. 12: Fabius per loca alta agmen ducebat modico ab hoste intervallo, ut neque omitteret eum, neque congrederetur.' Arnold (History of Rome, iii. 110) says most justly and eloquently: Flaminius died bravely, sword in hand, having committed no greater military error than many an impetuous soldier whose death in his country's cause has been felt to throw a veil over his rashness, and whose memory is pitied and honoured. The party feelings which have so coloured the language of the ancient writers respecting him need not be shared by a modern historian. Flaminius was indeed an unequal antagonist to Hannibal; but, in his previous life, as consul and as censor, he had served his country well; and if the defile of Thrasymenus witnessed his rashness, it also contains his honourable grave.' BOOK IV. but another also which still more plainly bade him stay. An ensign-bearer being unable with all his strength to pull the ensign out of the ground, Flaminius ordered it to be dug out. On the other hand, Polybius prefers a graver charge against the unfortunate general. He says that he was urged by political considerations by the fear of losing the popular favour; that he wished to appropriate to himself the glory of defeating Hannibal without sharing it with his colleague; that he was puffed up with vanity, and considered himself a great general; and that for these reasons he was anxious to hurry on an engagement with Hannibal, and rushed heedlessly into danger. We hold these charges to be unjust, and to be refuted by the events themselves.3 If Flaminius had been foolishly eager to bring on an engagement, he would surely not have waited till Hannibal had advanced as far as Arretium, still less would he have allowed him to pass by his camp. He would have gone to meet him, and he would have been able to attack the Punic army before it had recovered from the fatigues and hardships of a long march across the Apennines and through the lands inundated by the Arno. He would, then, if he had been victorious, have prevented the devastation of northern Etruria, and have secured for himself the glory which he is said to have so much coveted. Instead of doing this, he remained quietly in his camp; and the fatal battle on the Thrasymene was not offered by him, but accepted, because he had no chance of avoiding it. It is no less an invention of his political enemies that, as Polybius says, Hannibal built his plan on his knowledge of the inconsiderate ardour, audacity, and vainglorious folly of Flaminius. His faults were too much the general faults of most Roman consuls to make it necessary for Hannibal to devise peculiar stratagems against this particular leader. 1 Livy, xxii. 3. 2 Polybius, iii. 81. The statement of Polybius (iii. 82, § 8), that the number of soldiers in the army of Flaminius was less than that of the unarmed crowd attracted by the hope of booty, is a self-evident and unpardonable exaggeration. CHAP VIII. FIRST PERIOD, B.C. Hannibal's When, on his march, Hannibal had passed Cortona, and reached the Lake Thrasymenus (Lago di Perugia), he resolved to halt and to wait for the Romans, who were closely following him; and then, having chosen his 218-216 ground, he made his dispositions for the coming struggle. On the northern side of the lake, where it is skirted by Disposithe road from Cortona to Perusia, a steep range of hills tion of approaches near to the water's edge, so that the road (from forces. Borghetto to Magione) passes through a defile, formed by the lake on the right and the mountains on the left. In one spot only (near the modern village of Tuoro) the hills recede to some distance, and leave a small expanse of level ground, bordered on the south by the lake, and everywhere else by steep heights. On these heights Hannibal drew up his army. With the best portion of his infantry, the Libyans and Spaniards, he occupied a hill jutting out into the middle of the plain. On his left or eastern side he placed the slingers and other light troops; on his right he drew up the Gauls, and beyond them his cavalry, on the gentler slopes as far as the point where the defile begins and where he expected the advance of the Romans. Probably the ground near the lake was marshy, and consequently the road wound along the foot of the hills, where they receded from the water.1 Thrasy mene lake. Late in the evening of the day on which these arrange- The battle ments were made (it was still April), Flaminius arrived in of the the neighbourhood, and encamped for the night not far from the lake. Early the next morning he continued his march, anxious to keep close up to the enemy, and not suspecting that the lion whose track he was following was crouching close by and was prepared to leap upon him with This is the description of the battle-field given by Nissen (Rhein. Museum, xxiii. 580 ff.). But it is evident that Polybius (iii. 83) imagined it to be different. He seems to have thought that the road on which Flaminius was attacked ran right through, and not past, the valley, the two sides of which Hannibal had lined with his troops. But, as the road from Cortona to Perusia passes through no such valley near the lake (see Arnold, Hist. of Rome, iii. 106), we have no alternative but to adapt to the locality, as well as we can, the description of the battle given by Polybius. BOOK a sudden bound. A thick mist had risen from the lake and covered the road and the foot of the hills, while their summits were shining in the morning sun. Nothing betrayed the presence of the enemy. With the feeling of perfect security, in regular marching order, laden with their baggage, the soldiers entered the fatal ground, and the long line of the army wound along slowly between the lake and the hills. The head of the column had already passed the small plain on their left, and was marching along that part of the road where the mountains came close to the water's edge. The rear-guard had just entered the defile, when suddenly the stillness of the morning was broken by the wild cry of battle, and the Romans, as if they were attacked by invisible enemies, were struck down without being able to ward off or return a blow. Before they could throw down their cumbersome baggage and seize their arms, the enemy was among them. They rushed in masses from all the hills at the same time. There was no time to form into order of battle. Every one had to rely on the strength of his own arm and strike for life as well as he could. In vain Flaminius tried to rally and form his men. They rushed in all directions upon the enemy or upon each other, wild with dismay and despair. It was no battle, but a butchery. The office of the general could no longer be to lead his men, and to superintend and control the fight, but to set the example of individual courage, and to discharge the duty of the meanest soldier. This duty Flaminius performed, and he fell in the midst of the brave men whom he had led to their death. The Romans were slain by thousands, showing in death that unwavering spirit which so often led them to victory. A few, pushed into the lake, tried to save their lives by swimming, but the weight of their armour pressed them down. Others waded into the water as far as they could, but were mercilessly cut down by the hostile cavalry, or died by their own hands. Only a body of 6,000 men, which had formed the head of the line of march, cut their way through the Carthaginians and reached the top of the hills, |