BOOK IV. Plans of transports, destined for the legions in Spain, had been surprised and taken by the Carthaginians near Cosa on the coast of Etruria. Upon this news Servilius was sent to Ostia, to arm and equip the Roman ships in that port. Out of the lower class of people he enrolled seamen for the fleet and a body of soldiers to serve as a garrison for the city. Already the pressure of war was felt, and was producing alarming symptoms. In spite of the apparently inexhaustible population of Italy, in spite of the vast superiority of Rome over Carthage in men trained to war-the point in which the preponderance of Rome chiefly lay-the Romans were obliged, in the second year of the war, to take soldiers from a class of citizens which in the good old time was looked upon as unworthy of the honourable service of war. From among the freedmen, the descendants of manumitted slaves, those were enrolled who were fathers of families, and seemed to have given pledges to the state for their fidelity in its service. The time was not yet come, but it was approaching, when the proud city would be compelled to arm the hands of slaves in her defence. The apprehension that Hannibal, after his victory over Flaminius, would march straight upon Rome, proved unfounded. Hannibal knew perfectly well that, with his reduced army, his few remaining Spanish and African veterans, and with the unsteady Gauls, he could not lay siege to such a town as Rome. His plan had been from the very beginning to induce the Roman allies to revolt, and in union with them to strike at the head of his foe. He calculated above all on the Sabellian nations in the heart of Italy. They had offered the longest and stoutest resistance to the Roman supremacy. If he succeeded in gaining their co-operation, his great plan was realised, Carthage was avenged, and Rome annihilated or permanently weakened. Hannibal therefore did not remain long in Etruria, which was entirely in his power, and where he would have found ample resources and booty for his army. It seems that he did not expect much help from the Etruscans, who were too fond of peace and quiet, and looked CHAP. VIII. FIRST PERIOD. B.C. upon his allies, the Gauls, their old national enemies and despoilers, with unmitigated distrust. After an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Spoletium, he marched westwards, through Umbria and Picenum, to the coast of the Adria- 218-216 tic. These rich and well-cultivated districts now felt the scourge of war. The Roman settlers, who, since the agrarian law of Flaminius, were very numerous in Picenum, suffered most. No doubt Hannibal followed the same rule which since his first victory he had observed with regard to the Roman citizens and Roman allies that fell into his hands. The former he had treated, if not cruelly, yet with harshness and severity, by keeping them as prisoners and loading them with chains. The latter he had endeavoured to gain over by his generosity, and had dismissed them without ransom. There is something, therefore, perplexing in the statement of Polybius,' that Hannibal now put to death all the men capable of bearing arms that fell into his hands. We have no hesitation in declaring this to be a pure fiction or a gross exaggeration. By such an act of cruelty, Hannibal, even if he had been capable of it, would have interfered with the success of his own plan. But we can hardly hold him capable of causing the murder of inoffensive people, when the utmost severity he showed to soldiers taken in battle was imprisonment. The Roman reports were therefore either inspired by national hatred, or caused by isolated acts of barbarity, such as occur even in the best disciplined armies, not with the sanction, but against the explicit order of the commander-in-chief. Yet, though in all probability the lives of the people of The CarPicenum were spared, their property was forfeited to the thaginians wants and the rapacity of the invading host. Hannibal's num. The language of Polybius (iii. 86, § 11) is not quite precise. Having said that Hannibal killed πολὺ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων on his march, he adds, παράγγελμά τι δεδομένον ἦν, φονεύειν τοὺς ὑποπίπτοντας τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις. Whether this order was executed, and whether those that were actually killed were killed in compliance with it, or for other reasons, he does not say, but he leaves us to infer it. It is to be remarked, however, that Livy, who seldom omits an opportunity for stigmatising what he calls Hannibal's inhumana crudelitas,' is silent on this alleged act of barbarity, which he might have brought in with effect (xxii. 9). in Pice BOOK Adoption of the Roman arms. Exultation at Car thage. soldiers had not yet recovered from the hardships of the But the time had not yet arrived for mere enjoyment and repose, as if the hardships of war were all over. Hannibal made use of the short interval of rest, the fruit of his victory, to arm a portion of his army in the Roman style. The quantities of arms taken in battle sufficed to equip the African infantry with the short swords and the large shields of the Roman legionary soldiers. We cannot imagine a more striking proof of the superiority of the Roman equipment, and consequently of the instinctive aptitude of the Roman people for war, than the fact that the greatest general of antiquity, in the heart of the hostile country, exchanged the accustomed native armament of his soldiers for that of the Romans. A march of ten days had brought Hannibal from the lake Thrasymenus across the Apennines to the shore of the Adriatic. Having reached the sea coast, he renewed the communication with Carthage which had long been interrupted, and sent home the first direct and official report of his victorious career. Of course the Carthaginians were not ignorant of his proceedings. The sudden withdrawal of the Roman legions, which had been sent to Sicily for an expedition into Africa, was in itself a sufficient 'Polybius (iii. 87, § 2) calls it λqμófwpos. 2 Polybius (iii. 88, § 1) tells us that Hannibal's soldiers had washed their horses with old wine. VIII. FIRST PERIOD, 218-216 B.C. intimation that the Romans were attacked in Italy. CHAP. Carthaginian cruisers hovered about the Italian coasts. At Cosa, on the coast of Etruria, a fleet of Roman transports had been taken. The state of affairs in Italy was therefore, on the whole, perfectly well known in Carthage. Nevertheless, the first direct message from Hannibal, and the authentic narrative of his immense success, produced raptures of joy and enthusiasm, which showed that Hannibal was supported by the consentient voice of his countrymen. The Carthaginians resolved to continue with all their strength the war in Italy and Spain, and to reinforce in every possible manner, not only Hannibal, but his brother Hasdrubal in Spain.' The fidelity of the Roman Having completely restored and re-organised his army, Hannibal left the sea-board, and marched again into the midland parts of Italy, where the genuine Italians lived, allies. who vied with the Romans and Latins for the prize of courage. He passed through the country of the Marsians, Marrucinians, and Pelignians into the northern part of Apulia, called Daunia. Everywhere he offered his friendship and alliance for a war with Rome, but everywhere he met with refusals. Not a single town opened her gates to him. All were as yet unshaken in their fidelity to Rome. No doubt this fidelity was due in part to the character of the Roman government, which was not unjust or oppressive, and allowed to the subjects a full measure of self-govern 1 Polybius, iii. 87, § 5: Εφ ̓ οἷς ἀκούσαντες μεγαλείως ἐχάρησαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι· καὶ πολλὴν ἐποίουντο σπουδὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπικουρεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ιβηρίᾳ πράγμασι. Compared with this evidence of Polybius, we cannot attribute the slightest weight to the statements of Appian (vii. 16) and Zonaras (viii. 26), who say that, upon Hannibal's report of his victories, the Carthaginians laughed at his demand:ng reinforcements and assistance, saying that, if he were victorious, he ought to be able to send money home, and not to ask for aid. Such silly language refutes itself. The wonder is that any man pretending to the name of an historian could attribute it to the government of a state like Carthage. This is the line of march given by Livy (xii. 9). Polybius (iii. 88, 3) does not take Hannibal so far away from the coast, but straight from Picenum, through the country of the Marrucinians and Frentanians, into Daunia. Perhaps the main body of the army marched on the more direct road, and the more inland districts were only visited by detached flying corps. BOOK IV. Roman firmness. ment; and partly it was produced by fear of the revenge which Rome would take if in the end she proved victorious. But it is apparent that another motive operated at the same time. A feeling of Italian nationality had grown up. The Italians had been bound together with the Romans by the fear which they both entertained of the Gauls, the worst enemies of their fertile country. As the numerous tribes of Greeks learnt to feel and act as one nation in their common war with the Persians, thus the Italians first became conscious of being a kindred race in consequence of the repeated invasions of the Gauls, and they learnt to look for safety in a close union under the leadership of Rome. These Gauls, the hereditary enemies of all Italy, were now the most numerous combatants in Hannibal's army. It was chiefly their co-operation that made the present war so terrible, and threatened universal devastation, ruin, and extermination. These feelings of the Italians were the disturbing force which crossed Hannibal's expectations. Nevertheless, he did not yet despair of the ultimate success of his plan. Perhaps his sword could yet break the charm which bound up the Italians with Rome. If they were acted upon mainly by fear, he had only to show that he was more to be feared than the Romans, and that they risked more in remaining faithful to their masters than in joining the invader. The fidelity of the allies was justified by the firmness which the Romans displayed. Stunned for a moment by the terrible blow of the late battle, the senate had speedily recovered its composure, its confidence, and its genuine Roman determination. There were no thoughts of yielding, of compromise, or peace; but the spirit of unwavering resistance animated the senate and every individual Roman. Not a single soldier was withdrawn from Spain, Sardinia, or Sicily. The spirit with which Rome was determined to carry on the war was most clearly expressed in the order issued to the different How the country flourished is seen from Polybius, iii. 90, § 7. |