of the Bætis, which had revolted, and was reduced only CHAP. VIII. SECOND PERIOD, 216-215 B.C. Corsica, While the Roman arms in Spain not only opposed a State of barrier to the advance of the Carthaginians, but laid the Sardinia, foundation for a permanent acquisition of new territory, and Sicily. the two provinces of Sicily and Sardinia, lately wrested from Carthage, showed alarming symptoms of dissatisfaction. The dominion of Rome in these two islands had not been felt to be a blessing. Under its weight the government of Carthage was looked upon by a considerable portion of the natives as a period of lost happiness, the evils of the present being naturally felt more keenly than those of the past. The battle of Cannæ produced its effect even in these distant parts of the Roman empire, and revived the hopes of those who still felt attachment to their former rulers, or thought to avail themselves of their aid to cast off their present bondage. Carthaginian fleets This town of Ibera, which Livy (xxiii. 28) calls urbem opulentissimam ea tempestate regionis eius,' is never mentioned again by any other writer, and its locality is entirely unknown to us. Livy, xxiii. 29: Ea pugna Hasdrubali non modo in Italiam traducendi exercitus sed ne manendi quidem satis tuto in Hispania spem reliquerat.' BOOK cruised off the coasts of Sicily and kept the island in a continued state of excitement. The Roman officers who commanded in Sicily sent home reports calculated to cause disquiet and alarm. The proprætor T. Otalicius complained that his troops were left without sufficient supplies and pay. From Sardinia the proprætor A. Cornelius Mammula sent equally urgent demands.' The home government had no resources at its disposal, and the senate replied by bidding the two proprætors do the best they could for their fleets and troops. In Sardinia consequently the Roman commander raised a forced loan -a measure il calculated to improve the loyalty of the subjects.2 In Sicily it was again the faithful Hiero who volunteered his aid, and this was the last time that he exerted himself in the cause of his allies. Although his own kingdom of Syracuse was at this very time exposed to the devastations of the Carthaginian fleet, he nevertheless provided the Roman troops in Sicily with pay and provisions for six months. The old man would have been happy if before his death he could have seen the war ended, or at least warded off from the coasts of Sicily. He foresaw the danger to which its continuance exposed his country and his house, and he conjured the Romans to attack the Carthaginians in Africa as soon as possible. But the year after the battle of Canna was not the time for such an enterprise, and before it came to be carried out a great calamity had overwhelmed Sicily, had overthrown the dynasty and exterminated the whole family of Hiero, and had reduced Syracuse to a state of desolation from which it never rose again. Livy, xxiii. 21. 2 Livy says (xxiii. 21): Cornelio in Sardinia civitates sociæ benigne contulerunt.' This expression is apt to mislead. What the effect of the measure of Cornelius was, we learn from Livy, xxiii. 32, where the people of Sardinis are spoken of as complaining that they had had to submit to harsh and extortionate demands, and that they were oppressed by being made to pay heavy contributions and to furnish supplies. The loans of the Sardinians appear from this to have been not unlike those which English kings used to raise in the city of London, and which were euphemistically called benevolences.' CHAP. VIII. SECOND PERIOD, B.C. Although since the battle of the Trebia the seat of war had been shifted from Cisalpine Gaul to central and southern Italy, and although Rome itself was now more directly exposed to the victorious arms of Hannibal, yet the 216-215 Romans had neither given up Cremona and Placentia, their fortresses on the Po, nor relaxed their efforts for continuing the war with the Gauls in their own country. They hoped thereby to draw off the Gallic auxiliaries from Hannibal's army,' and moreover to prevent any Punic army which might succeed in crossing the Pyrenees and Alps from advancing further into Italy. For this reason in the spring of 216 two legions and a strong contingent of auxiliaries, amounting altogether to 25,000 men, were sent northward, under the command of the prætor L. Postumius Albinus, at the time when Terentius Varro and Æmilius Paullus set out on their ill-fated expedition to Apulia. The disaster of Cannæ naturally rendered the task of Postumius very difficult by increasing the courage of the tribes hostile to Rome, and by damping that of their friends. Nevertheless the prætor kept his ground in the country about the Po during the whole of the year 216, and so far gained the confidence of his fellow-citizens that he was elected for the consulship of the ensuing year. But before he could enter on his new office he was overtaken by an overwhelming catastrophe,' second only to the Defeat of great disaster of Cannæ. He fell into an ambush, and was cut to pieces with his whole army. It is related Cisalpine that the Gauls cut off his head, set the skull in gold, and used it on solemn occasions as a goblet, according to a barbarous custom which continued long among the later Gauls and Germans. 3 Postumius Gaul. Rome was in a state of frantic excitement. The worst Further calamities of the disastrous year that had just passed away Roman revolts of seemed about to be repeated at the very time when the 1 Polybius, iii. 106, § 6. 2 This was early in the year 215 B.C., more than seven months after the battle of Cannæ. Polybius (iii. 118, § 6) is careless in stating that it happened a few days after.' Livy, xxiii. 24. Zonaras, ix. 3. allies in Bruttium. BOOK IV. Sojourn of in Capua. brave garrison of Casilinum had been forced to capitulate, and when by this conquest Hannibal had opened for himself the road to Latium. A short time before the faithful towns of Petelia and Consentia in Bruttium had been taken by storm. The others were in the greatest danger of suffering the same fate. Locri soon after joined the Carthaginians under favourable conditions: and thus a maritime town of great importance was gained by the enemy. In Croton the nobility tried in vain to keep the town for the Romans, and to shut out the Bruttian allies of Hannibal. The people admitted them within the walls, and the aristocratic party had no choice but to yield to the storm and to purchase for themselves permission to leave the town by giving up possession of the citadel. Thus the whole of Bruttium was lost to the Romans, with the single exception of Rhegium. The legions were stationed in Campania, and did not venture beyond their fortified camps. Everywhere the sky was overhung with black clouds. In Spain alone the victory of the Scipios at Ibera opened a brighter prospect. By it the danger of another invasion of Italy by Hannibal's brother was for the present averted. Had the battle near the Ebro ended like the battles hitherto fought on Italian soil, it would seem that even the hearts of the bravest Romans must have despaired of the republic. Hannibal passed the winter of 216-215 B.c. in Capua. Hannibal These winter-quarters became among the Roman writers a favourite topic of declamation. Capua, they said, became Hannibal's Cannæ.3 In the luxurious life of this opulent city, to which Hannibal's victorious soldiers gave themselves up for the first time after long hardships and privations, their military qualities perished, and from this time victory deserted their standards. This statement, if not altogether false, is at any rate a vast exaggeration. The date of the loss of Locri and Croton cannot be ascertained with perfect accuracy. Livy reports it twice: xxiii. 30, and xxiv. 1. 2 Livy, xxiv. 2, 3. Florus, ii. 6: Capuam Hannibali Cannas fuisse.' Livy, xxiii. 18. Valerius Maximus, ix. 1, ext. 1. VIII. SECOND PERIOD, B.C. As we have seen, only a portion of Hannibal's army passed CHAP. the winter in Capua, whilst the rest was in Bruttium, Lucania, and before Casilinum. But apart from this, it is manifest that the people of Capua could not at that time 216-215 have been sunk in luxury and sensual pleasures. If their wealth had been little affected by the calamities of the war, surely the necessity of feeding some thousand soldiers would soon have sobered them down and taught them the need of economy. Hannibal knew how to husband his resources, and he would not have allowed his men to drain his most valuable allies. We can scarcely suppose that voluntary extravagance and excessive hospitality marked the conduct of a people which had, at the very outset, stipulated for immunity from contributions. Lastly, it is not true that the Punic army had in Capua the first opportunity of recovering from the hardships of the war, and of enjoying ease and comfort. The soldiers had had pleasant quarters in Apulia after the battle on the lake Thrasymenus,' and had already passed one winter comfortably. But whatever may have been the pleasures and indulgences of Hannibal's troops in Capua, their military qualities cannot have suffered by them, as the subsequent history of the war sufficiently demonstrates. in Cam 215 B.C. That Hannibal's offensive tactics were relaxed after the Operations battle of Cannæ is particularly evident from the events pania, of 215 B.C. The year passed without any serious encounters between the two belligerents. The Romans had resolved to avoid a battle, and applied their whole strength to prevent the spread of revolt among their allies, and to punish or re-conquer the towns that had revolted. The war was confined almost entirely to Campania. In this country Hannibal did not succeed, after the surrender of Casilinum, in making any further conquests. An attempt to surprise Cumæ failed, and on this occasion the Capuans suffered a serious reverse. Neapolis remained steadfast 1 See abore, p. 216. 2 Livy's account (xxiii. 35), divested of the specific colouring which a patriotic Roman would naturally give it, comes to this, that the Roman consul, |