CHAP. VIII. FIFTH PERIOD, B.C. tribes, as they thought proper. It seemed that the senate had intrusted the management of the Spanish war entirely to the family of the Scipios, as in the legendary period the war with the Veientines was made over as a family 211-207 war' to the Fabii. Their command was cut short only by their death, and it was now transferred to the son of one of them, as if it was hereditary in the family. The manner, too, in which this was done was strange in itself, and had on no occasion been known before. Such men as Pomponius and Centenius, it is true, had in the course of the war been intrusted with the command of detachments of troops, without having ever previously discharged any of the offices to which the 'imperium' was attached. But the troops of these officers were wholly, or for the most part, volunteers and irregulars, and they were bent more on plundering and harassing the revolted allies of Rome than on fighting the Carthaginians. On the other hand, the supreme command of the Roman legions in Spain was a matter of the greatest importance. The senate had not allowed the brave L. Marcius to retain the command of the remnants of the Spanish army, though it was due to him that any portion of it was saved. Nor was it the want of able generals, such as the Romans could boast of, that made it absolutely necessary to place at the post of danger an inexperienced young man, who had not yet given proofs of his ability. C. Claudius Nero, who had rendered good service during the siege of Capua, and who afterwards proved himself a master of strategy in the campaign against Hasdrubal, had already been sent to Spain. There was no reason why he should not be left there, and if there had been an objection to him, there were other tried officers in abundance, fit to take the command. The eulogists of Scipio related a silly story, viz., that nobody came forward to volunteer his services for the dangerous post in Spain,3 A familiare bellum,' as it is called by Livy (ii. 48). 2 See above, pp. 318-330. Livy, xxvi. 18: Primo expectaverant, ut qui se tanto imperio dignos crederent, nomina profiterentur. Quæ ut destituta expectatio est, redintegratus BOOK IV. Character of Scipio. and that Scipio, by boldly declaring his readiness to undertake the command, inspired the people with admiration and confidence, and in a manner compelled them to give the appointment to him. The Roman republic would indeed have been in a deplorable condition, if cowardice had restrained even one man capable of command from dedicating his services to the state in a post of danger. It was not so. The appointment of Scipio was due to the position and influence of his family.' It was one of the irregularities caused by the war, and a long time elapsed before proconsular command was again conferred on a man who had not previously been consul. Scipio was, however, a man far above the average of his contemporaries, and there was in him greatness of mind, which could not fail to rivet general attention.2 His character was not altogether of the ancient Roman type. There was in it an element which displeased men of the old school, and which, on the other hand, gained for him the admiration and esteem of the people. His bearing was proud, his manners reserved. From his youth his mind was open to poetical and religious impressions. He believed, or pretended, that he was inspired; but his keen understanding kept this germ of fanaticism within the bounds of practical usefulness to his political purposes. Whether the piety that he displayed ostentatiously, his visions and communions with the deity, were the results of honest conviction, as his contemporaries believed, or whether they were merely political manoeuvres, as Polybius thought,3 luctus acceptæ cladis desideriumque imperatorum amissorum,' etc. This is apparent in his election to the ædileship (Livy, xxv. 2). As ædile he made himself popular by his liberality. Livy, ibid: 'Ludi Romani pro temporis illius copiis magnifice facti et diem unum instaurati et congii olei in vicos singulos dati.' In this passage it seems that before the word congii,' a number has dropped out of the text. Compare Weissenborn's note. * Polybius, x. 2, § 2 : Τῷ γὰρ σχεδὸν ἐπιφανέστατον αὐτὸν γεγονέναι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ, ζητοῦσι μὲν πάντες εἰδέναι, τίς ποτ ̓ ἦν κ.τ.λ. * Polybius, x. 2, § 12: Πόπλιος ἐνεργαζόμενος ἀεὶ δόξαν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὡς μετὰ VIII. FIFTH PERIOD, B.C. intended to deceive the populace and to serve his political CHAP. ends, we can hardly decide with any degree of certainty, as no genuine speeches or writings of his are preserved, which might have revealed the true nature of his mind. 211-207 But whatever we may think of the genuineness of his enthusiasm, it appears un-Roman in any light. His imaginative mind was powerfully affected by the creations of Greek poetry. It is not incredible that he may himself have believed stories like that of his descent from a god.' If he did, he will stand higher in our esteem than if we look upon him as a clever impostor. for Spain. In the autumn of the year 210,2 Scipio sailed from the Departure Tiber under a convoy of thirty ships of war, with of Scipio 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse. The second in command under him was the proprætor, M. Junius Silanus; the fleet was under the orders of C. Lælius, Scipio's intimate friend and admirer. As usual the fleet sailed along the coast of Etruria, Liguria, and Gaul, instead of striking straight across the Tyrrhenian Sea. In Emporiæ, a trading settlement of the Massilians, the troops were disembarked. Thence Scipio marched by land to Tarraco, the chief town of the Roman province, where he spent the winter in preparation for the coming campaign. Scipio. The plan of this campaign was made by Scipio with the Plans of utmost secrecy, and was communicated to his friend Lælius alone. He had received information that the three τῆς θείας ἐπινοίας ποιούμενος τὰς ἐπιβολὰς εὐθαρσεστέρους καὶ προθυμοτέρους 1 Gellius, Noctes Attica, vii. 1. 2 The time cannot be fixed accurately. See Becker, Vorarbeiten z. zweiten punisch. Krieg. p. 113 ff., and Weissenborn's note to Livy, xxviii. 16. BOOK IV. Siege and capture of New Carthaginian armies, commanded by Mago and the two Hasdrubals, were stationed at great distances from one another and from New Carthage. This important place was intrusted to the insufficient protection of a garrison of only one thousand men. Thus an opportunity was offered of seizing by a bold stroke the military capital of the Punians in Spain, whose excellent harbour was indispensable to their fleet, and where they had their magazines, arsenal, storehouses, dockyards, their military chest, and the hostages of many Spanish tribes. The preparations for this expedition were made with the greatest secrecy. The very unlikelihood of an attack had lulled the Carthaginian generals into a criminal security, and compromised the safety of the town. If New Carthage were able to hold out only a few days, or if Hasdrubal, who was at a distance of ten days' march, had the least suspicion of Scipio's plan, it had no chance of success. It was bold and ingenious, and is so much more creditable to its author as the sad fate of his father and uncle might have been expected to make him lean rather to the side of caution and timidity than of daring enterprise. In the first days of spring (209 B.C.) Scipio broke up with his land army of 25,000 infantry and 2,500 horse, and marched from Tarraco along the coast southward, whilst Lælius, with a fleet of thirty-five vessels, kept constantly in sight. Arriving unexpectedly before New Carthage,' the united force immediately laid siege to the town by land and sea. New Carthage lay at the northern extremity of a spacious bay, which opened southwards, and whose mouth was protected by an island as by a natural breakwater, so that inside of it ships could ride in perfect safety. Under the walls of the town on its western side, a narrow strip of land was covered by shallow water, a continuation of the bay; and this sheet of water extended some way northwards, leaving only a sort of isthmus, of inconsiderable width, which connected the According to Polybius (x. 9, § 7), in only seven days. This is impossible. The distance from Tarraco to New Carthage is too great; even from the Ebro an army would take longer to march to Carthagena. VIII. FIFTH PERIOD, B.C. town with the mainland and was fortified by high walls CHAP. and towers. New Carthage had therefore almost an insular position, and was very well fortified by nature and art. But it had a weak side, and this had been betrayed 211-207 by fishermen to the Roman general. During ebb tide the water of the shallow pool west of the town fell so much that it was fordable, and the bottom was firm. On this information Scipio laid his plan, and, in the expectation that he would be able to reach from the water an undefended part of the wall, he promised to his soldiers the co-operation of Neptune. But first he drew off the attention of the garrison to the northern side of the town. He began by making a double ditch and mound from the sea to the bay, in order to be covered in the rear against attacks from the Punic army in case the siege should be postponed and Hasdrubal should advance to relieve the town. Then having easily beaten off the garrison, which had made a foolhardy attempt to dislodge him, he immediately attacked the walls. Having an immense superiority of numbers, the Romans might hope by relieving one another to tire out the garrison. They tried to scale the walls with ladders, but met with so stout a resistance that after a few hours Scipio gave the signal to desist. The Carthaginians thought the assault was given up, and hoped to be able to repose from their exertions. But towards evening, when the ebb tide had set in, the attack was renewed with double violence. Again the Romans assailed the walls and applied their ladders on all parts. Whilst the attention of the besieged was thus turned to the northern side, which they thought was exclusively endangered by the second attack, as by the first, a detachment of five hundred Romans forded the shallow water on the west, and reached the wall without being perceived. They quickly scaled it, and opened the nearest gate from the inside. Neptune had led the Romans through his own element to victory. New Carthage, the key of Spain, the basis of the operations against Italy, was taken, and the issue of the Spanish war was determined. |