party in Salapia regained confidence and strength, and succeeded in betraying the town to the consul Marcellus, on which occasion the brave Numidians were cut down to the last man. Marcellus, who was consul for the fourth time, had the conduct of the war in Italy, whilst his colleague, M. Valerius Lævinus, brought the war in Sicily to a close by the conquest of Agrigentum. After gaining possession of Salapia, he marched to Samnium, where he took a few insignificant places, and the Carthaginian magazines which they contained.4 3 CHAP. VIII. FIFTH PERIOD, 211-207 B.C. Cn. Ful at Herdo Whilst he was here occupied with operations of little Defeat of moment, and apparently paid little attention to Hannibal's vius Cenmovements, and to acting in concert with the prætor tumalus Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, who commanded two legions nea. in Apulia, the latter officer and his army paid dearly for the negligence and unskilful strategy which again marked the divided command of the Roman generals. He lay encamped near Herdonea, a town of Apulia, which, like Salapia, had joined the Punians after the battle of Cannæ. By the co-operation of the Roman party in the place, he hoped to gain possession of it. But Hannibal, far away in Bruttium, had been informed of the peril in which the town was placed. After a rapid march he appeared unexpectedly before the Roman camp. By what stratagem he succeeded in drawing Fulvius from his safe position, or in forcing him from it, we are not informed. It is not at all likely that, as Livy relates, the Roman prætor voluntarily accepted battle, confident in his own strength.5 By a most extraordinary coincidence, it happened that, in the same place where, two years before, Hannibal had 2 This is correct, if the consulship of 215 is reckoned, which Marcellus was obliged to lay down immediately after his election, as 'vitio creatus.' 3 See above, p. 313. These places-Marmorea and Meles (Livy, xxvii. 1)—are not mentioned anywhere else. 3 Livy, xxvii. 1: 'Pari audacia Romanus copiis raptim eductis conflixit.' The reason why Fulvius could not avoid a battle may perhaps be looked for in the circumstance mentioned by Livy (loc. cit.), that the Roman camp was 'nec loco satis tuto posita nec præsidiis firmata.' BOOK IV. Destruction of Herdonea bal. defeated the proprætor Fulvius Flaccus, he was now again opposed to a Fulvius. The happy omen which lay in this casual identity of name and place was improved by Hannibal's genius to lead to a second equally brilliant victory. The Roman army was utterly routed, the camp taken, 7,000 men, or, according to another report, 13,000 men, were slain, among them eleven military tribunes and the prætor Cn. Fulvius Centumalus himself. It was a victory worthy to be compared with the great triumphs of the first three glorious years of the war. Again it was shown that Hannibal was irresistible in the field, and again Rome was plunged into mourning, and people locked anxiously into the future when they reflected that not even the loss of Capua had broken Hannibal's courage or strength, and that he was more terrible now and in the possession of a larger part of Italy than after the day of Canna. He Yet Hannibal was far from overrating his success. saw that, in spite of his victory, he was unable to hold by Hanni- Herdonea for any long time. Accordingly he punished with death the leaders of the Roman faction in the town, who had carried on negotiations with Fulvius. He then set the town on fire, and removed the inhabitants to Thurii and Metapontum.' This done, he went in search of the second Roman army in Samnium, under the command of the consul M. Claudius Marcellus. Operations of Mar cellus. Whether Marcellus might have prevented the defeat of Fulvius is a question which we do not venture to decide. But it is quite evident, even from the scanty and falsified reports of his alleged heroic exploits, that, after the disaster, he did not venture, with his consular army of two legions, to oppose Hannibal. The boastful language with which Livy introduces these reports seems to indicate that they were taken from the laudatory speeches preserved in the family archives. Marcellus, it is said, sent a letter to Rome, requesting the senate to dismiss all fear, for that CHAP. VIII. FIFTH PERIOD, B.C. he was still the same who after the battle of Cannæ had so roughly handled Hannibal; he would at once march against him, and take care that his joy should be short-lived.' The hostile armies met indeed at Numistro, an utterly unknown 211-207 place-perhaps in Lucania2-and a fierce battle ensued, which, according to Livy, lasted without a decision into the night. On the following day, it is further reported, Hannibal did not venture to renew the struggle, so that the Romans remained in possession of the field and were able to burn their dead, whilst Hannibal, under cover of the subsequent night, withdrew to Apulia, pursued by the Romans. He was overtaken near Venusia, and here several engagements took place, which were of no great importance, but on the whole ended favourably for the Romans. It is much to be regretted that the account of these events by Polybius is lost. Yet we are not altogether deprived of the means of rectifying the palpable boastings of the annalists whom Livy followed. Frontinus, a military writer of the first century after Christ, has by chance. preserved an account of the battle of Numistro, from which we learn that it ended, not with a victory, but with a defeat of Marcellus.3 So barefaced were the lies of the family panegyrists even at this time, and so greedily and blindly did the majority of historians, in their national vanity, adopt every report which tended to glorify the Roman arms! The whole success of which, in truth, Marcellus could boast was, in all likelihood, this-that his army was spared such a calamity as had befallen Flaccus and Centumalus. The year passed away without further military events in Italy. But at sea the Romans sustained Defeat of a reverse. A fleet with provisions, destined for the garrison fleet by the of the citadel of Tarentum, and convoyed by thirty ships Taren 'Livy, xxvii. 2: 'Eundem se, qui post Cannensem pugnam ferocem victoria Hannibalem contudisset, ire adversus eum, brevem illi lætitiam qua exultet futuram.' 2 Pliny, Hist Nat. iii. 15. Frontinus, Strategem. ii. 2, 6: Hannibal apud Numistronem contra Marcellum pugnaturus cavas et præruptas vias obiecit a latere ipsaque loci natura pro munimento usus clarissimum ducem vicit.' the Roman tines. BOOK Pressure of the war on the Ro mans. of war, was attacked by a Tarentine squadron under Demokrates, and completely defeated.' Yet this event had no essential influence on the state of things in Tarentum. The Roman garrison of the citadel, though pressed very hard, held out manfully, and by occasional sallies inflicted considerable loss on the besiegers. We must presume that provisions were from time to time thrown into the place. Under these circumstances the Romans could calmly maintain their position, whilst the populous town of Tarentum, whose trade, industry, and agriculture were paralysed, felt the garrison of the citadel like a thorn in the flesh. The year 210, as we have seen, had produced no material change in the situation of affairs in Italy. The re-conquest of Salapia and a few insignificant places in Samnium was amply compensated by the defeats which the Romans sustained by land and sea. Hannibal, though driven out of Campania, was still master of southern Italy. The Romans had indeed put two legions less into the field-twenty-one instead of twenty-three-but a permanent reduction of the burdens of war was out of the question as long as Hannibal held his ground in Italy unconquered and threatening as before. The war had now lasted for eight years. The exhaustion of Italy became visibly greater. All available measures had already been taken to procure money and men. The foremost senators now set the example of contributing their gold and silver as a voluntary loan for the purpose of equipping and manning a new fleet. At length the government appropriated a reserve fund of 4,000 pounds of gold, which had in better times been laid by for the last necessities of the state.3 1 Livy, xxviii. 39. 2 Livy, xxvi. 35. Livy, xxvii. 10. The aurum vicesimarum' consisted of the proceeds of a tax of five per cent. of the value of manumitted slaves, which had been imposed 357 B.C., in an extraordinary manner, by a popular vote, according to tribes in the camp before Sutrium. That the proceeds of this tax were intended to be used for the formation of a reserve fund was not mentioned previously, but comes out casually on the present occasion. thing strange, not to say mysterious, about the whole story. There is some Again, there is СПАР. VIII. FIFTH PERIOD, B.C. Refusal of twelve nies to contribute men and money for the war. As long as the undaunted spirit of Roman pride and determination animated the state, there was hope that all the great sacrifices had not been made in vain. Up to the present moment this spirit had stood all tests. The 211-207 defection of several of the allies seemed only to have the effect of uniting the others more firmly to Rome, especially the Roman citizens themselves and the Latins, who Latin coloon all occasions had shown themselves as brave and patriotic as the genuine Romans. But now, in the year 209, when the consuls called upon the Latins to furnish more troops and money, the delegates of twelve Latin colonies formally declared that their resources were completely exhausted, and that they were unable to comply with the request. This declaration was no less unexpected than alarming. When the consuls made their report to the senate of the refusal of the twelve colonies, and added that no arguments and exhortations had the least effect upon the delegates, then the boldest men in that stubborn assembly began to tremble, and those who had not despaired after the battle of Cannæ almost resigned themselves to the inevitable downfall of the commonwealth. How was it possible that Rome should be saved if the remaining colonies and allies should follow the example of the twelve, and if all Italy should conspire to abandon Rome in this hour of need ?1 ness of the crisis. The fate of Rome was trembling in the balance. SeriousHannibal's calculations had so far proved correct that now even the Roman senate feared that his plan must be realised. The fabric of Roman power had not, it is true, yielded to one blow, nor even to repeated blows; but the miseries of a war protracted through so many years had gradually undermined the foundations on which it rested, and the moment seemed approaching when it would collapse with a sudden crash. Everything depended on the attitude which the no mention of the Gaulish ransom, which Camillus is reported to have re- |