opened a gate; the Romans rushed in, and now, after a short and ineffectual resistance of the Tarentines, followed the promiscuous massacre which usually accompanied the taking of a hostile town by Roman troops.' The victors put to the sword not only those who still resisted, like Niko, the leader of the treason by which Tarentum had fallen into the hands of Hannibal two years before, and Demokrates, the brave commander of the Tarentine fleet, so recently victorious over that of the Romans, but also Carthalo, the commander of the Punic garrison, who had laid down his arms and asked for quarter. In fact they slew all whom they met, even the Bruttians who had let them into the town, either, as Livy observes, by mistake, or from old national hatred, or in order to make it appear that Tarentum was taken by force, and not by treason. The captured town was then given up to be plundered. Thirty thousand Tarentines were sold as slaves for the benefit of the Roman treasury. The quantity of statues, pictures, and other works of art almost equalled the booty of Syracuse. All was sent to Rome; only a colossal statue of Jupiter, the removal and transport of which proved too difficult, was left by the generous Fabius. He would not, he said, deprive the Tarentines of their patron deities, whose wrath they had experienced.4 Thus Tarentum, which was, after Capua, the most important of the Italian cities that had joined Carthage, was again reduced to subjection. The limits were contracting more and more within which Hannibal could range freely. The whole of Campania, Samnium, and Lucania, almost all Apulia, were lost. Even the Bruttians, the only 1 See above, p. 354. * Compare Plutarch, Fabius, 22. Possibly the slaves found in Tarentum are included in this number. 4 According to Livy's description (xxvii. 16), Fabius took only smaller statues and pictures, but no colossus. But Plutarch (Fabius, 22) tells us that he caused a colossal statue of Hercules to be transported to Rome, and to be put up on the Capitol. This statement is confirmed by Pliny (Hist. Nat. xxxiv. 7), who adds that he left untouched a colossus of Jupiter, the work of Lysippus, on account of its size and the difficulty of moving it. Compare vol. i. p. 563, note 3. BOOK Fifth consulship lus. one of the Italian races that had not yet made their peace with Rome, began to waver in their fidelity to him. Tarentum had been betrayed to the Romans by the Bruttian corps of the garrison; and the tempting offers of Fulvius, who promised pardon for the revolt, were readily listened to by several chiefs of this half-barbarous people.1 Rhegium, the important maritime town which kept open the communication with Sicily, and, in conjunction with Messana, closed the straits to the Carthaginian ships, had always remained in the possession of the Romans. The impoverished Greek towns and the narrow strip of land from Lucania to Sicily were all that was left to Hannibal of the promising acquisitions made after the first few brilliant campaigns. Pushed back into this corner, like the Duke of Wellington behind the lines of Torres Vedras, the unconquered and undaunted Hannibal waited for the moment when, in conjunction with his brother, whom he expected from Spain, he could with renewed vigour assail Rome and force her to make peace. The taking of Tarentum at the same time with the fall of Marcel of New Carthage was a compensation for the efforts and losses of the year 209. The remainder of this year passed without any further military events, and for the succeeding year, as has been already stated, Marcellus was for the fifth time raised to the consulship. His colleague was T. Quinctius Crispinus, one of the many Roman nobles whose names call forth no distinct pictures in our imagination, because they mark nothing but the average mediocrity of their class. The campaign of this year had for its object, as it appears, the re-conquest of Locri, the most important of the towns still in Hannibal's possession. The Romans steadily adhered to their plan of avoiding battles as much as possible, and of depriving the enemy of his means for continuing the war in Italy by taking from him the sup port of fortified places. Seven legions and a fleet were destined to operate for this end in the south of Italy. 1 Liry, xxvii. 15. Whilst the two consuls, with two consular armies, covered in the rear by a legion in Campania, occupied Hannibal, Q. Claudius, who commanded two legions in Tarentum, was ordered to advance on Locri by land, and L. Cincius was to sail from Sicily with a fleet and attack Locri from the sea side. Hannibal, who was opposing the combined armies of the consuls, was informed of the march of the Roman army along the coast from Tarentum to Locri. He surprised it in the neighbourhood of Petelia and inflicted a severe defeat, killing several thousands and driving the remainder in a disorderly flight back to Tarentum.1 СНАР. VIII. FIFTH PERIOD, 211-207 B.C. Thus, for the present, Locri was out of danger, and Death of Hannibal was at leisure to turn against the two consuls, Marcellus. whom he hoped to force to accept a decisive battle. But Marcellus and Crispinus were resolved to be cautious. They were not going to allow Hannibal to try one of his stratagems and to catch them in a trap, as he had so often done with less experienced or less careful opponents. The sexagenarian Marcellus himself headed a reconnaissance, accompanied by his colleague, his son, a number of officers, and a few hundred horsemen, to explore the country between the Roman and the Carthaginian camps. On this expedition the brave old soldier met his death. From the wooded recesses of the hills in front and in the flank, Numidian horsemen rushed suddenly forward. In a moment the consuls' escort were cut down or scattered; Crispinus and the young Marcellus escaped, severely wounded, and Marcellus fell fighting like a brave trooper, closing his long life in a manner which, though it might befit a common soldier, was hardly worthy of a statesman and a general. His magnanimous enemy honoured his body, with a decent funeral, and sent the ashes to his son. If we calmly examine what is reported of the virtues of Character Marcellus, we shall come to the conclusion that he is one of Marceland ability of those men who are praised far beyond their merits. lus. This is caused partly by the circumstance that, owing to 1 1 Livy, xxvii. 26. BOOK IV the scarcity of men of eminent abilities, the Roman historians were almost driven to speak in high praise of men scarcely raised above mediocrity, because otherwise they would have had nobody to compare with the great heroes and statesmen of Greece, by whose greatness they loved to measure their own. If it happened that a Roman possessed a little more than the average amount of national virtues-if by family connexions, noble birth, and wealth he was marked out for the high offices of state, and if he was fortunate enough to find on the occasion of his funeral a sufficiently skilful and not too bashful panegyrist, his fame was secured for ever. All these favourable circumstances were combined in the case of Marcellus. He was a brave soldier, a firm intrepid patriot, and an unflinching enemy of the enemies of Rome. But to extol him as an eminent general, or even as a worthy opponent of Hannibal, argues want of judgment and personal or national partiality. He was not much better than most of the other Roman generals of his time. The reports of his victories over Hannibal are one and all fictitious. Thus much is evident from what has been said before, for the tissue of falsehood is after all so thin that it covers the truth but imperfectly; but it can also be proved from the statement of Polybius. This historian says, evidently for the purpose of refuting assertions current in his own time, that Marcellus never once conquered Hannibal.' After such emphatic evidence as this, we are allowing a great deal if we admit that, perhaps once, or even on several occasions, Marcellus succeeded in thwarting the plans of Hannibal, by beating off attacks or withdrawing from a conflict without the total rout of his army. Something of this sort must have supplied the materials for exaggerations for which there may have been some pretext or excuse. Accordingly, if Cicero calls Marcellus fiery and 1 Plutarch (compare Pelopid. et Marcell. 1): Avvíßav dè MápкeλλOS, &s oi μὲν περὶ Πολύβιον λέγουσι, οὐδὲ ἅπαξ ἐνίκησεν. Compare Cornelius Nepos, Hannib. 5: Quamdiu in Italia fuit (Hannibal) nemo ei in acie restitit, nemo adversus eum post Cannensem pugnam in campo castra posuit.' CHAP. VIII. FIFTH PERIOD, B.C. dashing,' he no doubt speaks the truth; but if he extols his clemency towards the conquered Syracusans, it is clear that he only employs him as a foil for the purpose of placing in a more glaring light the horrible villany of 211-207 Verres.2 How Marcellus treated the Sicilians we learn from the events which followed the capture of Syracuse. He was, in truth, a merciless destroyer and insatiably greedy. When the Sicilians heard that, in the year 210, he was again to take the command in their island, they were distracted with terror and despair, and declared, in Rome, that it would be better for them if the sea were to swallow them up, or if the fiery lava of Mount Etna were to cover the land; they assured the senate that they would much rather leave their native country than dwell in it for any time under the tyranny of Marcellus.' So vigorous and so just was the protest of the Sicilians that Marcellus was obliged to exchange provinces with his colleague Valerius Lævinus, and to take the command in Italy instead of Sicily, which had been awarded to him by lot. That he exceeded the limits of Roman severity is evident from the decree of the senate, which, though it does not exactly censure his proceedings in Syracuse, or annul the arrangements which he had made, yet enjoined his successor Lævinus to provide for the welfare of Syracuse, as far as the interest of the republic allowed. The old Fabius Maximus was surely a gennine Roman, but he acted very differently from Marcellus. He warmly 1 Cicero, De Repub. v. 8: 'acer et pugnax.' 2 Cicero, Verr. ii. 2, 2. Compare above, p. 312, note 3. Livy, xxvi. 29. Livy, xxvi. 32: Ut quod sine iactura rei publicæ fieri posset, fortunis eius civitatis consuleret.' It appears, however, that the wretched people of Syracuse did not gain much by this humane injunction. For when Scipio came to Syracuse in 205 B.C., he was assiduous in protecting them from the continued rapacity of individual Romans, to which they had been exposed. Livy, xxix. 1: 'Græci res a quibusdam Italici generis eadem vi, qua per bellum ceperant, retinentibus concessas sibi a senatu repetebant. Scipio omnium primum ratus tueri publicam fidem, partim edicto partim iudiciis etiam in pertinaces ad obtinendam iniuriam redditis suas res Syracusanis restituit.' We may perhaps doubt if this put an end to the oppression of Syracusuns by Italians. |