.BOOK IV. Source of the exaggerations in the story of pleaded in the senate in favour of the Tarentines whom he had reduced, and he shielded them from the rapacity and revenge of men who, like Marcellus, delighted in venting their evil passions on helpless foes. We can see clearly that public opinion no longer declared it to be a Roman virtue to treat conquered enemies with excessive severity, that feelings of humanity began to influence the more refined minds, and that the panegyrists (those, for example, of the Scipios) found it necessary to throw over their heroes the colour of kindliness and clemency.2 It would be interesting to know from what source the vast exaggerations and fictions are derived which have the praises of Marcellus for their object. Perhaps we Marcellus. shall not go wrong in supposing that their fountain-head was the funeral speech delivered, according to Livy, by the son of Marcellus. This document seems, however, not to have met with unconditional credence at first, as may be inferred from the quoted declaration of Polybius, and from Livy himself. But when the Emperor Augustus had selected M. Claudius Marcellus, the descendant of the conqueror of Syracuse, for the husband of his daughter Julia, a new period of glorification began for the family of the Marcelli. A careful search was now made for everything that redounded to the praise of the ancestors of the young man in the glorious times of the older republic. Augustus himself composed an historical work on this subject, and we cannot fail to perceive that Livy wrote under the influence of the Augustan court. He treats Marcellus as a favourite hero, and even in Plutarch we can trace this preference accorded to Marcellus. If we deduct all that family conceit and national pride have invented about 1 Livy, xxvii, 25. Compare also the proceedings of Cornelius Cethegus in Sicily, who supported the accusations directed against Marcellus. Mommsen (Röm. Gesch. i. 621; English translation, ii. 140) has a much higher opinion of Marcellus than we can subscribe to. 3 Livy, xxvii. 27. 4 According to Livy (xxvii. 27), Caelius rejected the evidence of young Marcellus. Plutarch, Marcell. 30. Id. comparatio Pelop. et Marcell. 1. VIII. Marcellus, there remains, indeed, the image of a genuine CHAP. Roman of the old type, of an intrepid soldier, and an energetic officer; but the parallel between Marcellus and Pelopidas seems inappropriate, and all comparison between him and Hannibal is absurd. The death of Marcellus and that of his colleague Crispinus, who very soon after died of his wounds, appears to have paralysed the action of the two consular armies for the whole of the campaign, though they had remained intact when their leaders were cut off. It is very strange that the Roman people, which year after year found new commanders-in-chief, now allowed four legions to remain inactive for at least half a year because both consuls had by chance fallen in the field. If it be indeed true, as is related, that the armies suffered no further losses-in other words, that after the death of Marcellus they were not attacked and beaten by Hannibal-the strategy of the Romans appears in a sorry light. One of the two armies. retired to Venusia, the other even as far as Campania, and they left the Carthaginian general at liberty to put an end to the siege of Locri, which had been again undertaken. The prætor Lucius Cincius had obtained from Sicily a great quantity of engines necessary for a siege, and had attacked Locri vigorously, both by land and sea. Already the Punic garrison was much reduced, and despaired of being able to hold the town much longer, when Hannibal's Numidians showed themselves in the neighbourhood and encouraged the garrison to make a sally. Attacked in front and rear, the Romans soon gave way, left all their siege engines behind, and took refuge on board their ships. Locri was saved by the mere arrival of Hannibal.' FIFTH PERIOD, 211-207 B.C. Raising of the siege of Locri. Romans. Through the failure of the attack on Locri, the campaign Prospects of 208 proved entirely fruitless to the Romans, and all of the further military proceedings were suspended. For the first time since the establishment of the republic both consuls had fallen in battle. The commonwealth was Livy, xxvii. 28. BOOK Discontent in Etruria. bereaved, and religious fears and scruples no doubt contributed to paralyse military action for the time. It was most fortunate for Rome that, in consequence of her indefatigable perseverance and gigantic efforts, Hannibal had been pushed into the defensive, and was no longer able to carry on the war on a large scale. For at this very time the signs of discontent and disobedience multiplied among the subjects of Rome in Italy, whilst the news that arrived from Spain, Massilia, Africa, and Sicily left little doubt that the time had come at last when the long prepared expedition of Hasdrubal from Spain into Italy might be looked for as imminent. It seemed as if the war, which had now lasted ten years, instead of gradually flagging and drawing to a close was to begin afresh with renewed vigour. The refusal of the twelve Latin colonies to bear any longer the burdens of the war could not fail to produce an effect on the other allies of Rome. Soon after there appeared most alarming signs of growing discontent in Etruria. This country had hitherto been almost exempt from the immediate calamities of war. Hannibal, it is true, had in his first campaign touched a part of Etruria, and had on Etruscan soil fought the battle of Thrasy menus. But, as he wished to conciliate the allies of Rome and to appear as their friend, he had probably spared the country as much as possible. In the succeeding years the theatre of war had been shifted to the south of Italy, and whilst Apulia, Lucania, Campania, and, above all, Bruttium were exposed to all the horrors of war, and whilst the African, Spanish, and Gaulish barbarians in Hannibal's army penetrated with fire and sword into the interior of Samnium and Latium, nay even to the very gates of Rome, Etruria had heard the storm rage at a distance, and had, almost without interruption, enjoyed practically the blessings of peace. The countryman had securely tilled his field, the shepherd had tended his flock, the artisan and the tradesman had each plied his craft. In its fidelity to Rome, Etruria had hitherto remained unshaken. It was an Etruscan cohort from Perusia, which, side by side with one from Præneste, had heroically resisted the Carthaginians in the protracted siege of Casilinum.' Without any doubt the Etruscans had supplied their full contingents to all the armies and fleets of the Romans, and nothing but the customary injustice of the Roman annalists has ignored this co-operation of their allies. Financially, too, the rich towns of Etruria had helped to bear the burdens of the war. Of especial importance were the supplies of grain that came from this country. We cannot suppose that the Roman treasury was in a condition to pay for this grain in cash, and probably the price was fixed very low, in the interest of the state. Thus it was that Etruria also began to feel the pressure of the war; and the desire for peace showed itself naturally in an unwillingness to comply with further demands on the part of Rome. As early as 212 B.C. the first symptoms of discontent had become apparent. On that occasion a Roman army was sent to Etruria to keep the country in check. Three years later the agitation became much more critical. It showed itself especially in Arretium, a town which at one time was reputed as one of the foremost of the Etruscan people, and which, as an old friend and ally of Rome," might consider itself entitled to be treated with some degree of preference and indulgence. Marcellus, who, immediately after his election to the consulship of 208 B.C., was sent to Arretium, succeeded for the moment in quieting the people; but when he had set out on his campaign in the south of the peninsula, where he was soon afterwards killed in ambush, the Etruscans again became troublesome, and the senate now dispatched C. Terentius Varro, the consul of 216, with military authority, to Arretium. Varro occupied the town with a Roman legion, and required hostages from the Arretine senate. Finding that the senators hesitated to comply with his CHAP. VIII. FIFTH PERICD, 211-207 B.C. BOOK Events in order, he placed sentinels at the gates and along the walls, to prevent anybody leaving the place. Nevertheless seven of the most eminent men escaped with their families. The property of the fugitives was forthwith confiscated, and one hundred and twenty hostages, taken from the families of the remaining senators, were sent to Rome. The unsatisfactory state of Etruria seemed, however, to require a better guarantee than a few hostages from a single town. The senate therefore dispatched a legion to back the measures which were everywhere taken for keeping the country in subjection and for crushing in the bud every attempt at revolution.1 This growing discontent among a considerable portion of the most faithful and valuable allies caused the more anxiety in Rome as about the same time disquieting news arrived of the movements of Hasdrubal. As early as two years before (in 210 B.C.) the admiral M. Valerius Messala had sailed from Sicily with fifty vessels to Africa, to obtain accurate information about the plans and preparations of the Carthaginians. He returned after an absence of thirteen days to Lilybæum, and reported that the Carthaginians were making armaments on a large scale to increase Hasdrubal's army in Spain and to carry out at last the plan of sending him with a strong force across the Alps to Italy. This news was confirmed by the Carthaginian senators taken prisoners by Scipio at New Carthage, who, as commissioners of the Carthaginian government, were necessarily well informed of the plan of war and of the progress of the armaments in Carthage.* It was now of the utmost importance, just as in the beginning of the war, to detain Hasdrubal in Spain; and after the decided progress which the Roman arms had made in Spain during the last year, after the conquest of 2 Livy, xxvii. 5. 1 Livy, xxvii. 21. $ See p. 355. This was probably the order of the senate which Laelius conveyed to Scipio (Polybius, x. 37, § 6). Compare Vincke, Der zweite punische Krieg p. 312. |