BOOK Character the senate had refused to accord to Marcellus the triumph which he eagerly coveted, and an ovation on the Alban mount was but a poor substitute for the usual display of triumphal pomp within the walls of Rome. Fabius indeed had triumphed when he had been fortunate enough to get possession of Tarentum by the treachery of the Bruttian garrison. But, in spite of the great show of treasures and works of art which he displayed before the gazing multitude, nobody was deceived as to his real merits in a military point of view. Now at length Roman generals had fought a pitched battle and had overcome an enemy second in reputation only to Hannibal. The senate decreed that both consuls, as they had fought side by side, should be united in their triumph. They met at Præneste, Livius at the head of his army, Nero alone, as his legions had been ordered to remain in the field to keep Hannibal in check. Livius entered the city on the triumphal car, drawn by four horses, as the real conqueror, because on the day of battle he had had the auspices, and the victory had been gained in his province. Nero accompanied him on horseback; but, though the formal honours accorded to him were inferior, the eyes of the crowd were chiefly directed on him, and he was greeted by the loudest applause, as the man to whose bold resolution the victory was principally due.' Sixth Period of the Hannibalian War. FROM THE BATTLE ON THE METAURUS TO THE TAKING OF From the beginning of the war to the great victory at of Cartha Cannæ the star of Carthage had been in the ascendant. The defection of Capua, Syracuse, Tarentum, and numerous other allies of the Romans was the fruit of this rapid ginian and Roman conquests in Spain. Livy, xxviii. 9: Itaque iret alter consul sublimis curru multiiugis, si vellet, equis: uno equo per urbem verum triumphum vehi, Neronemque etiam si pedes incedat, vel parta eo bello vel spreta eo triumpho gloria memorabilem fore... Notatum eo die plura carmina militaribus iocis in C. Claudium quam in consulem suum iactata.' succession of victories. But the fortunes of Carthage did not rise higher, and soon the re-conquest of Syracuse, of Capua, and of Tarentum marked the steps by which Rome gradually rose to her ancient superiority over her rival. The annihilation of Hasdrubal's army was the severest blow which she had yet inflicted, and it proved the more disastrous to the cause of Carthage as Hasdrubal's expedition into Italy had been effected only at the price of the virtual abandonment of Spain. Whatever may have been the tactical result of the battle of Bæcula,' in which Scipio claimed the victory, its results were, as far as he alone and the campaign in the Spanish peninsula were concerned, those of a great military success; for the best and largest portion of the Carthaginian forces in Spain withdrew immediately after and left him almost undisputed master of all the land from the Pyrenees to the Straits of Calpe (Gibraltar). An additional advantage for Scipio was, that on the withdrawal of the Punic army more and more of the Spanish tribes embraced the cause of the Romans, whose dominion had not yet had time to press heavily on them, and through whose help they hoped, in their simple-mindedness, to recover their independence.2 This vacillation of the Spanish character explains to some extent the sudden and wholesale vicissitudes of the war in that country. Nothing appeared easier than to conquer Spain; but nothing was, in reality, more difficult than to keep permanent possession of it. Thus the first Carthaginian conquests in Spain, under Hamilcar Barcas and his son-in-law Hasdrubal, had been effected with wonderful rapidity, owing to internal divisions among the Spanish tribes. Hannibal had, on his march to Italy, subdued, as he thought permanently, all the country between the Iberus and the Pyrenees; but the mere appearance of the Roman legions under the Scipios had swept away this acquisition, and in their very first campaigns the two See above, p. 379. 2 Livy, xxvii. 17: Velut fortuita inclinatio animorum Hispaniam omnem averterat ad Romanum a Punico imperio.' CHAP. VIII. SIXTH PERIOD, 207-205 B.C. BOOK IV. Alleged Roman generals penetrated far to the south, into the heart of the Carthaginian possessions. When the Carthaginians were entirely expelled from Spain, it took the Romans two hundred years of hard fighting before they could say that the whole of Spain was in their possession and pacified. In the first ten years of the Hannibalian war they persistently reinforced their armies in Spain at the greatest cost, and their perseverance was not without its effect; for the hold that the Carthaginians had on Spain was materially weakened, and they could no longer draw from it the large supplies of soldiers and treasure which they had received from that country in the beginning of the war. It lost accordingly much of the importance which it had had in their eyes. Yet it was not entirely given up by them, even after Hasdrubal had evacuated it with the best part of the Carthaginian forces. Another Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, a very able general, and Hannibal's youngest brother Mago remained still at the head of respectable armies in Spain, and were receiving reinforcements from Africa. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to perceive that the power of Carthage was now on the wane. Not a single vigorous effort was made to regain what had been lost. The theatre of war was transferred more and more southward, into the neighbourhood of Gades, the last town of any importance which had remained of the whole of the Punic possessions in the peninsula. It seemed that the Carthaginians placed all their hopes of final success on the issue of the war in Italy, and that from the victory of the two sons of Barcas in Italy they expected the recovery of Spain as a natural consequence. Under such circumstances the task of Scipio was exploits of comparatively easy; and however much his panegyrists No terms can be more to the point than those by which Livy (xxiv. 42) characterises the Spaniards as a 'gens nata instaurandis reparandisque bellis.' This was felt not only by the Romans, but in modern times by the French. Equally appropriate is Livy's expression at another place (xxviii. 12): Hispania non quam Italia modo, sed quam ulla pars terrarum bello reparando aptior erat locorum hominumque ingeniis.' VIII. SIXTH PERIOD, 207-205 B.C. endeavoured to extol his exploits in Spain and to represent CHAP. him as a consummate hero, they have not succeeded in convincing us that, in a military point of view, he had an opportunity of accomplishing great things. We see clearly that the glory of Scipio is the engrossing topic of the writers who record the progress of affairs in Spain. Scipio in Spain. His individual action is everywhere conspicuous. We can almost fancy that we are reading an epic poem in his honour, and some of the scenes described unmistakably betray their origin in the poetical imagination of the original narrator or in an actual poem.' It is not difficult to discover these traces of poetry. But as we possess no strictly sober and authentic report of events by the side of the poetically coloured narrative, we are unable to separate fiction from truth by any but internal criteria, and in many instances this separation must be left to the tact and individual judgment of the critical reader. in Spain. On his first appearance in Spain, Scipio had won the Popularity hearts of the people. When, after the capture of New of Scipio Carthage, they had seen his magnanimity and wisdom, their admiration for the youthful hero rose to such a height that they began to call him their king. At first Scipio took no notice of this. But when, after the battle of Bæcula, he liberated the prisoners without ransom, and the Spanish nobles, seized with enthusiasm, solemnly proclaimed him their king,' Scipio met them with the declaration that he claimed indeed to possess a royal spirit, but that, as a Roman citizen, he could not assume the royal title, but was satisfied with that of Imperator. Polybius makes this the opportunity for extolling Scipio's moderation and republican sentiments, and he expresses Such a passage is that where the meeting of Scipio and Masinissa is described (Livy, xxviii. 35): 'Coeperat iam ante Numidam ex fama rerum gestarum admiratio viri substitueratque animo speciem quoque corporis amplam ac magnificam ceterum maior præsentis veneratio cepit; et præterquam quod suapte natura multa maiestas inerat, ornabat promissa cæsaries habitusque corporis non cultus munditiis sed virilis vere ac militaris et ætas in medio virium robore,' etc. 2 Polybius, x, 40. Livy, xxvii. 19. BOOK surprise that he stretched out his hand to seize a crown neither on this occasion nor at a later period when, after the overthrow of Carthage and Syria, he had reached the height of glory, and 'had free scope to obtain royal power in whatever part of the earth he wished.' This opinion, so unhesitatingly expressed by Polybius, is in the highest degree strange and startling. It proves beyond dispute that in his time, i.e. in the first half of the second century before our era, the establishment of monarchical government was a contingency which the imagination of the Romans did not place beyond the reach of possibility; that at any rate distinguished members of the nobility were reputed capable of aspiring to a position above the republican equality which befitted the majority of citizens. It is true we find this idea expressed by a Greek, who perhaps had no conception of the deep-seated horror with which a genuine Roman looked upon the power and the very name of a king, and whom the history of his own. nation since the time of Alexander the Great had made familiar with the assumption of royal dignity by successful generals. Moreover, Polybius intimates that, in his 1 The passage of Polybius (x. 40) is of great significance, and deserves to be quoted at full length: Διὸ καὶ συναθροίσας τοὺς Ιβηρας βασιλικὸς μὲν ἔφη βούλεσθαι καὶ λέγεσθαι παρὰ πᾶσιν καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν βασιλεύς γε μὴν οὔτε ἐθέλειν εἶναι οὔτε λέγεσθαι παρ' οὐδενί. Ταῦτα δ ̓ εἰπὼν παρήγγειλε στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν προσφωνεῖν. Ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε δικαίως ἄν τις επεσημήνατο τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν τἀνδρὸς, ᾗ κομιδῇ νέος ὢν καὶ τῆς τύχης αὐτῷ συνεκδραμούσης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, ὥστε πάντας τοὺς ὑποταττομένους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπί τε ταύτην κατενε χθῆναι τὴν διάληψιν καὶ τὴν ὀνομασίαν, ὅμως ἐν ἑαυτῷ διέμεινε καὶ παρῃτεῖτο τὴν τοιαύτην ὁρμὴν καὶ φαντασίαν. Πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἄν τις θαυμάσειε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα μεγαλοψυχίας βλέψας εἰς τοὺς ἐσχάτους τοῦ βίου καιροὺς, ἡνίκα πρὸς τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἔργοις κατεστρέψατο μὲν Καρχηδονίους καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα μέρη τῆς Λιβύης ἀπὸ τῶν Φιλαίνου βωμῶν ἕως Ηρακλείων στηλῶν ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς πατρίδος ἐξουσίαν ἤγαγε, κατεστρέψατο δὲ τὴν ̓Ασίαν καὶ τοὺς τῆς Συρίας βασιλεῖς καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ μέγιστον μέρος τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπήκοον ἐποίησε Ῥωμαίοις, ἔλαβε δὲ καιροὺς εἰς τὸ περιπονήσασθαι δυναστείαν βασιλικὴν ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐπιβάλοιτο καὶ βουληθείη τόποις τῆς οἰκουμένης. With these startling words we may compare Dion Cassius (frgm. lvii. 36): ὅτι (Σκιπίων) μείζων τῆς κοινῆς ἀσφαλίας ἐγεγόνει . . . ὅπως μὴ ἑαυτοῖς τύραννον αυθαίρετον ἐπασκήσωσιν (Ρωμαίοι), and Zonaras (ix. 11): οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ρώμῃ . . . . φόβῳ μὴ ὑπερφρονήσας τυραννίσῃ ἀνεκαλέσαντο αὐτόν. |