BOOK Story of the funeral games at New Carthage. 1 be made to harmonise with it. The alleged treaty with Syphax turns out to be a fable, and the Quixotic voyage to Africa cannot be fitted chronologically into the year 206.2 If therefore negotiations really took place between Scipio and Syphax, it is probable that Lælius, or some other confidential agent, was the negotiator, and not the commander-in-chief himself.3 4 Not a whit more authentic, and not a whit more interesting as bearing on the course of events, is the detailed narrative given by Livy of the magnificent funeral games which Scipio celebrated in New Carthage in honour of his father and his uncle. The gladiatorial combats on this occasion were not of the kind usually exhibited in Rome at the funerals of great men. Instead of hired gladiators, free and noble Spaniards, who had offered themselves voluntarily and with a chivalrous zeal, fought with one another to do honour to the great Scipio. Nay, the mortal combat was turned into an ordeal. Two kinsmen, rival claimants of a disputed crown, resolved to decide their quarrel by an appeal to arms, and at the same time to enhance the brilliancy of Scipio's funeral games by their 1 Livy (xxviii. 18): 'fœdusictum.' 2 Compare Weissenborn's note to Livy xxviii. 16. The fact is, too many events are crowded into the year 206; first, the march of Scipio from Tarraco into the valley of the Bætis (Andalusia) and the battle of Bæcula; this alone takes, according to Livy (loc. cit. § 10), at least five months; secondly, the voyage to Numidia (Livy, xxviii. 17); thirdly, the taking of Illiturgi, Castulo, and Astapa (ch. 19 ff.) which presupposes a second expedition from the north of Spain into Andalusia; fourthly, the funeral games (ch. 21); fifthly, Scipio's illness and the mutiny of the army (ch. 24-29); sixthly, the campaign across the Ebro against Mandonius and Indibilis (ch. 31 ff.); seventhly, Scipio's journey to Masinissa, being the third expedition into Andalusia (ch. 35); eighthly, Scipio's journey to Rome before the end of the year, for the purpose of securing his election to the consulship of 205. Weissenborn proposes to apportion some of these events to the year 207; but even if this were done, there would still remain a good deal to be apportioned to the limbo of fiction. An analogous case of misrepresentation occurs at a later period of the war. In the year 203 B.C., negotiations again took place between Scipio and Syphax (Livy, xxx. 3), which, according to the general account of the annalists, were conducted by messengers. But here again one writer-Valerius Antias, not notorious for his veracity-preferred a more striking account, and related a personal interview in Scipio's camp, for which, of course, he had to draw on his imagination. 4 Livy, xxviii. 21. VIII. SIXTH PERIOD, 207-205 B.C. personal encounter. Scipio's refined humanity was of CHAP. course revolted at this singular and atrocious suggestion; he sought to persuade the rivals to desist from their intention, but, being unable to do so, he consented at last to this singular trial by battle, which was at the same time a show for his troops, and in which one of the two princes was killed after a severe, and no doubt interesting, fight. What are we to think of historians who gravely accept such wild flights of imagination as actual facts, to be recorded in sober historical prose, and who dwell upon them with visible satisfaction? A single chapter of such history as this is sufficient to cast doubt on other stories connected with Scipio's doings, even though they should not in themselves be fantastic or ridiculous. When the Carthaginians had evacuated all Spain with Storming of Illiturgi. the single exception of Gades, there remained nothing for Scipio to do but to make war upon those of the former Carthaginian allies who might not be found willing to exchange the dominion of one foreign and alien power for that of another, or upon those tribes which had distinguished themselves by their hostility to Rome. To the latter belonged the town of Illiturgi on the river Bætis. The inhabitants of this place, formerly subject to Carthage, had joined the Romans in the beginning of the war, but after the defeat of the two Scipios they had made their peace with Carthage, by killing the Roman fugitives who had fled into their town from the battle-field.' This cruel treachery now called for vengeance. Illiturgi was taken by storm. All the men, women, and children were killed indiscriminately, and the town was levelled with the ground.2 'Livy, xxviii. 19. 2 Livy, xxviii. 20: Tum vero apparuit ab ira et ab odio urbem expugnatam esse: nemo capiendi vivos, nemo, patentibus ad direptionem omnibus, prædæ memor est trucidant inermes iuxta atque armatos, feminas pariter ac viros, usque ad infantium cædem ira crudelis pervenit. Ignem deinde tectis iniiciunt ac diruunt quæ incendio absumi nequeunt.' The evident satisfaction with which Livy paints this scene, and which is hardly disguised by the qualification of ira as crudelis, shows that the barbaric practices of ancient warfare caused little compunction even to the humanity and refinement of the Augustan age. BOOK Destruction of Astapa. Illness of troops. The neighbouring town of Castulo was treated less severely, because, terrified by the fate of Illiturgi, it had surrendered to Marcius and delivered up a Punic garrison.' Marcius then marched upon Astapa (the modern Estepa, south of Astigi). This unfortunate town became the scene of one of those horrible outbreaks of frenzied patriotism and despair of which the natives of Spain in ancient and modern times have given several examples. The men of Astapa raised in their town a huge funeral pile, cast all their treasures on it, killed their wives and children, and let the flames consume all, whilst they themselves rushed against the enemy and fell in battle to the last man.2 They had had no choice left between this terrible end and the still more terrible one of Illiturgi, and they thought that the bitterness of death would be less at the hands of sacrificers than of butchers. Hitherto Scipio had met with uninterrupted success. Scipio and The Carthaginians were driven out of Spain; all the mutiny of native peoples were subdued or had voluntarily joined the Roman cause; negotiations had been entered into with the two most powerful Numidian chiefs, who promised their assistance in the further prosecution of the war in Africa, when suddenly the promising result was jeopardised—for Scipio, the man on whom everything depended, was suddenly taken ill. Even the bare rumour of this calamity, exaggerating his illness the further it spread, caused disquietude in the whole province; and not only the fickle Spanish allies, but even the Roman legionary soldiers, unexpectedly evinced a spirit of insubordination and even mutiny. A body of eight thousand Roman soldiers, stationed near Sucro, had even before this time been animated by a bad spirit; they had complained that their pay was withheld, that they had been forbidden to despoil the Spaniards, and that they were kept too long 1 This was probably the remnant of the broken-up Carthaginian army. 3 Livy, xxviii. 24: Apparuitque quantam excitatura molem vera fuisset clades cum vanus rumor tantas prccellas excivisset.' on foreign service. Now, when the news of Scipio's illness had reached them, their discontent broke out into open resistance to the orders of the legionary tribunes; they elected two private soldiers as their leaders,' plundered the surrounding country, and seemed to be about to imitate the example of the Campanian legion in the war with Pyrrhus, in renouncing the authority of Rome, and in establishing somewhere an independent dominion of their own. As yet, however, they had not been guilty of any open act of violence and bloodshed, and had ventured on no outrage against the majesty of Rome beyond the violation of military discipline and subordination, when the news arrived that Scipio was not dead, nor hopelessly ill, but that he had recovered, and that he ordered them to march to New Carthage, for the purpose of receiving the pay that was due to them. They obeyed, and were soon brought to their senses. Scipio caused them to be surrounded and disarmed by faithful troops, the ringleaders to be seized and executed, and order and discipline to be restored without further difficulty. The danger disappeared as if by magic, and it was shown again what a power Scipio possessed over the minds of his soldiers.2 СНАР. VIII. SIXTH PERIOD, 207-205 B.C. Mandonius The mutiny of the army being suppressed, the re- Defeat of bellious Spaniards were soon punished. Scipio crossed and Indithe Ebro, penetrated into the land of the llergetes and bilis. Laretani, on the north side of this river, defeated the brothers Mandonius and Indibilis, and forced them to submission and to the payment of a sum of money. Before the year closed, Gades fell into the hands of the Romans. For a regular siege of this strong island town, Scipio would have needed not only a considerable army but also a large fleet. But he could not avail himself of his ships, as he had taken the rowers from them to employ The names of these men were C. Atrius and C. Albius, i.e. John Black and John White (Livy, xxviii. 24), and they seem hardly historical. 2 The story of the mutiny at Sucro contains nothing that is improbable in itself; but the intention is evident to glorify Scipio as the upholder of Roman discipline. At any rate too much has been made of the affair, Fall of Gades. BOOK on land service. He sought, therefore, to gain the town by treason, a plan which had succeeded in so many instances, and which promised an easier and speedier result. Negotiations were begun. In Gades, as well as in all places occupied by the Carthaginians, it was easy to find traitors who declared their readiness to deliver the town, as well as the Punic garrison, into the hands of the Romans.' But the plot was discovered, and the ringleaders were seized and sent to Carthage, to await their punishment. Nevertheless, the Carthaginians seem to have despaired of holding Gades permanently. The inhabitants were Punians, but not Carthaginians. They were in the condition of subject allies, a condition which was, no doubt, felt to be burthensome and unsatisfactory. They took very little interest in the struggle for supremacy between Rome and Carthage, for neither the one state nor the other allowed them an independent position. Perhaps the commercial rivalry of Carthage was considered to interfere with the prosperity of Gades, whilst nothing was to be apprehended from Rome on this score; and the whole trade in the western seas was, after the humiliation of Carthage, sure to fall into the hands of Gades, under the protection of the Romans. Such dispositions as these, on the part of the population of Gades, would explain the severity with which Mago was ordered by the home government to treat the town-a severity which could aim not at maintaining possession of Gades, but at exacting from it mercilessly the means for continuing the war with Rome, and then giving it up. Mago plundered not only the public treasury and the temples,3 but even private citizens, and then left the port of Gades with the whole fleet and all the forces. In this undignified way the Carthaginians abandoned the last hold they still Livy, xxviii. 23. 2 With shortsighted selfishness the Carthaginians had sacrificed the interest and prosperity of the provincial towns for the benefit of the capital (see above, p. 11), just as the maritime powers of modern Europe formerly did with regard to their colonial possessions. Livy, xxviii. 36. |