VIII. numerous transports and to overpower the forty ships of CHAP. war, Scipio met no resistance on the part of the Carthaginians, and landed undisturbed, on the third day, near the SEVENTH Fair Promontory, close to Utica.' Seventh Period of the Hannibalian War. THE WAR IN AFRICA TO THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE, 204-201 B.C. PERIOD, 204-201 B.C. of the war The details of the short war in Africa would, if faithfully Character recorded, be amongst the most attractive and the most in Africa. interesting of the whole struggle. We should learn from them more of the conduct of the Carthaginian people than from all the campaigns in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. A veil would be lifted, so that we could look into the interior of that great city, where the nerves of the widely extended state met as in a central point. We should see how nobles and people, senate, officials, and citizens thought, felt, and acted at the near approach of the final decision of the war. We should become acquainted with the spirit which moved the Carthaginian people, and should be able in some measure to judge what the fate of the old world would have been if Carthage, instead of Rome, had been victorious. But in place of a history of the African war, we have only reports and descriptions of the victorious career of Scipio, drawn up by one-sided Roman patriotism. Only the great and The poetical narrative of Coelius (Livy, xxix. 27) dwelt on the dangers of the sea, told of storms and shipwrecks, and related that at last the crews abandoned the sinking vessels and gained the land in boats. Livy's account also is clearly incorrect. He says that Scipio intended to land on the coast of the Emporiæ, i.e. in the Lesser Syrtis, and that he lost his course, owing to fogs and contrary winds. We cannot imagine it possible that Scipio intended to begin his campaign at so great a distance from Carthage as the coast of the Emporiæ. But if he did, then he would surely not have given up his plan, and have begun his operations from a place to which mere chance had brought him. It seems certain that it was Scipio's intention to begin with taking Utica, and thus to gain a commodious port for his communication with Sicily, and a basis of operations for his advance upon Carthage. It was for this purpose that he took a complete siege train with him (Livy, xxix. 35, 8), which would have been of no use to him in the Syrtis. IV. BOOK leading events are ascertainable with any degree of certainty. The details, which might have enabled us to judge of the manner in which the war was conducted, of the plans, exertions, sacrifices, and losses of both belligerents, are either entirely lost, or are disguised by party spirit. At no period of the war do we more keenly feel the want of a Carthaginian historian.' Plans of Siege of Scipio's object, in the first instance, was the gaining a strong position on the coast, where, by means of a secure communication with Sicily, he could establish a firm basis for his operations in Africa. For this purpose he selected Utica, the ancient Phoenician colony allied with Carthage, and situated on the western side of the wide Carthaginian gulf. During the war with the mercenaries Utica had fallen into the hands of the enemies of Carthage, but after the suppression of the rebellion she was again most intimately connected with Carthage. In spite of the burdens which the campaigns of Hannibal imposed on the Carthaginians, as also upon their allies and subjects, we hear of no revolt or discontent on their part, such as broke out in Italy among the Capuans and among many others. Up to the time of the landing of Scipio, it is true, the Romans had only appeared on the African coast now and then, to ravage and plunder rather than to make war. No Roman Hannibal had established himself in the interior of the country, or challenged the allies to revolt from Carthage. For this reason Scipio might entertain the hope that, after the great exhaustion and the innumerable troubles of the war, the subjects of Carthage would be ready to revolt now, as they had been during the invasions of Agathokles and Regulus. Perhaps he thought thus to obtain easy possession of Utica. But it appears that the state of things in Africa was this time different. The reason is unknown to us; but the fact is certain that Scipio found among the Carthaginian subjects no readiness for revolt or treachery. Arnold (Hist. of Rome, iii. 449) says justly, Wherever the family of Scipio is concerned, the impartiality of Polybius becomes doubtful.' Utica had to be besieged in due form, and it offered such determined resistance that the siege-which lasted, with occasional pauses, almost to the conclusion of peace, that is, nearly two years-remained without result. If Scipio had been so fortunate as to take Utica, many particulars of this remarkable siege would no doubt have been preserved. But the Roman chroniclers passed briefly over an undertaking which contributed in no way to swell their national renown, and the Carthaginian writings, which would have exhibited in a proper light the bravery of the Uticans, are unfortunately lost. We know therefore but little of an event which was of the very greatest importance to the war in Africa, and what has been preserved cannot be considered authentic in detail, because it comes from Roman sources. CHAP. VIII. SEVENTH PERIOD, 204-201 B.C. resistance of the After Scipio had landed his army, he took up a strong Vigorous position on a hill near the sea, and repulsed the attack of a troop of cavalry, which had been sent out from Carthage Uticans. to reconnoitre, on the news of a hostile landing. He then sent his transport ships, laden with the spoils of the surrounding open country, back to Sicily, and advanced to Utica, where, at the distance of about a mile from the town, he established his camp.2 After a short time the transport ships returned from Sicily, bringing the remainder of the siege train, which Scipio, from want of room, had not been able to take with him before. The siege was now begun,3 and it appears to have lasted the whole summer without 1 Some writers made of this single engagement two battles, in each of which a Carthaginian general of the name of Hanno was taken. On this occasion Livy (xxix. 35, 2) remarks: Duos eodem nomine Carthaginiensium duces duobus equestribus præliis interfectos non omnes auctores sunt, veriti, credo, ne falleret bis relata eadem res.' Cœlius and Valerius knew how to get over this difficulty. They related that one of these Hannos was not killed, but made prisoner, and afterwards exchanged for Masinissa's mother. This old lady had to play her part in the fables of the African war. She was a prophetess, and helped to discover a conspiracy against Scipio.-Zonaras, ix. 12. 2 Livy, xxix. 34, 3. Livy, xxix. 35, 6: Ad oppugnandam Uticam omnes belli vires convertit, eam deinde si cepisset sedem ad cetera exsequenda habiturus.' Compare Appian, viii. 16. BOOK any considerable interruption.' Scipio took up his position on a hill close to the walls of the town, and attacked them with all the appliances of the ancient art of siege. The trenches were filled up by mounds of earth; battering-rams were pushed forward under protecting roofs to open breaches, and at the same time ships were coupled together and towers for attacking the sea walls were erected on them. But the defence was still more vigorous than the attack. The Uticans undermined the mounds, so that the wooden structures on them were thrown down; by letting down beams from the walls they weakened the blows of the battering-rams, and made sallies to set the works of the besiegers on fire. The whole of the citizens were inspired by the spirit which, half a century before, had rendered Lilybæum impregnable. When towards the end of the summer, as it appears, the Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal advanced, united with a Numidian army under Syphax, Scipio found himself obliged to raise the siege. He confined himself now, as Marcellus had done before Syracuse, to occupying a fortified camp in the neighbourhood, from whence he could observe Utica, and at any time begin a fresh attack. This camp, known even in Cæsar's time as the Cornelian 1 1 Livy's statement, that it lasted forty days, is probably to be understood of the period of actual assault, and does not include the time required for the preliminary works. 2 This was Hasdrubal (Gisgo's son), who distinguished himself in the Spanish campaign, and was, after Hannibal and his brothers, the most eminent of all the Carthaginian generals. It is highly characteristic of the sources from which the account of the war in Africa is taken, that Appian (viii. 9) seriously reports that the Carthaginians, upon the news of Scipio's armaments in Sicily, dispatched this Hasdrubal to hunt elephants (èπì Oĥpar ¿Xepártær ¿ÉTEμπUV). Mommsen accepts this statement as simple truth (Röm. Gesch. i. 662; English translation, ii. 182) as if the Carthaginians had had no better employment for their principal general than to go out on a hunting expedition. To judge of the probability of the fact, we should bear in mind that elephants are found wild only in that part of Africa which is south of the great desert of Sahara. The Carthaginians obtained their supply probably from the Senegal, by ship. In spite of the statements of Ælian (Nat. Animal. x. 1) and of Pliny (Hist. Nat. vii. 11), we cannot believe that elephants were ever found in a wild state in Mauritania. The climate and vegetation of the country make it impossible. 200 camp,' was on the peninsula which runs eastward from Utica towards the sea. Scipio here drew his ships ashore -to protect them, and so he passed the winter uncomfortably enough, enjoying only this advantage, that, being in communication with Sicily and Italy, he was preserved from want by the continual conveyance of supplies, arms, and clothing, and was enabled to collect together means for the next campaign. Hasdrubal and Syphax encamped in the neighbourhood, and it appears that during the winter (204 to 203) nothing of importance was undertaken on either side. CHAP. VIII. SEVENTH PERIOD, 204-201 B.C. Masinissa On Scipio's landing in Africa, Masinissa immediately Alliance of joined him, at the head of only two hundred horsemen.' with He was, as has been already mentioned, expelled from his Scipio. kingdom by Syphax and the Carthaginians. His adventures, which Livy relates in detail, correspond exactly to the circumstances under which the Berber races lived for centuries, and live still. Some chief holds hereditary authority over a tribe. A dispute with a neighbour drives him, after a short struggle, to take flight into the desert. He returns with a few horsemen, collects a troop of followers around him, and lives for a time on plunder. His band grows, and with it grows his courage. The men of his tribe, and the old subjects of his family, flock around him. The struggle with his rival begins anew. Cunning, dissimulation, treachery, courage, fortune decide who shall keep the mastery, and who shall suffer imprisonment, flight, or death. Such a struggle is never decided until one of the two combatants is killed; for no dominion is established on a firm basis, and the personal superiority of the one who is to-day vanquished may, without any material cause, become to-morrow dangerous to the conqueror. Thus Masinissa, although a dethroned prince, was nevertheless a welcome ally to the Romans. In addition to this, To the cunning and he was not a mere barbarian. 1 Livy, xxix. 29. According to some statements he had 2,000 men with him. This divergence is a sample of the unsatisfactory character of the sources for the narrative. 2 Livy, x ix. 29, 33. |