BOOK Composi tion of the Roman navy. was built in so short a time. Extensive dockyards, and the necessary number of skilled ship-carpenters, might perhaps be found in a town like Carthage, where shipbuilding was practised and carried on on a large scale all the year round. These conditions did not exist in Rome; and we may therefore well ask whether it is probable that all the ships of the new fleet were now newly built and built in Rome, and, further, whether in the Etruscan towns, in Naples, Elea, Rhegium, Tarentum, Locri, and, above all, in Syracuse and Messana, there were no ships ready for use, or whether it was impossible to build any in these places. Surely this would be in the highest degree surprising. We know that the Romans availed themselves without scruple of the resources of their allies,' and we see no reason why they should have done so less now than at the breaking out of the war, when they made use of the Greek ships for crossing over to Sicily. We believe, therefore, in spite of the account of Polybius, that the greater portion of the ships of the Roman fleet came from Greek and Etruscan towns, and were manned by Greeks and Etruscans. The latter supposition is even more forced upon us than the former. A few rowers may have been drilled in the way indicated, and mixed up with old, experienced seamen; but how anyone can possibly imagine that the ships were entirely manned by crews who had learnt rowing on land is incomprehensible. We should have to consider the art of navigation of the ancients as in the highest degree contemptible; we should not be able to understand how the historians could speak of naval powers and of a dominion of the sea; how her Next to the naval service, the cavalry service was least congenial to the Romans, and of this, therefore, they threw by far the greater burden on their allies. The name for the crews was socii navales,' a term which shows that the allies principally had to furnish them. The Greek towns were not obliged to send contingents to the land army, but they had to furnish ships and sailors instead (Livy xxvi. 39, xxxvi. 42). As we have previously observed (vol. i. p. 275), the Roman historians systematically omitted to mention the assistance of their allies; yet Zonaras (viii. 14) reports that Hiero of Syracuse supplied the consul C. Aurelius Cotta (252 B.C.) with ships. Compare also Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 9, above, p. 51, note 2. CHAP. III. SECOND PERIOD, B.C. fleet could be said to constitute the glory, security, and greatness of Carthage, if it had been possible for a continental power like Rome, without any preparation or assistance, in two months to find ships, captains, and sailors 261-255 who on their first encounter were more than a match for the oldest naval empire. If we bear in mind that it was a common practice among the Roman historians to appropriate to themselves the merits of their allies,' we shall with the less hesitation doubt the boastful stories which tell us how the first fleet was built, and we shall in the end venture to suspect that a greater, and perhaps much the greater, part of the credit belongs to the Etruscans and to the Italian and Sicilian Greeks. the fleet of The first undertaking of the Roman fleet was a failure. Capture of The consul Cn. Cornelius Scipio sailed with a detachment Cn. Corneconsisting of seventeen ships to Sicily, and was incautious lius Scipio. enough to enter the harbour of the small island of Lipara, which had been represented to him as ready to revolt from Carthage. But a Carthaginian squadron which lay in the neighbourhood, and blocked up the harbour in the night, took the consul's ships and their crews, and, instead of the expected glory, Scipio obtained only the nickname of Asina.2 This loss was soon after repaired. The Carthaginian Battle of admiral, Hannibal, the defender of Agrigentum, embol- Myla. dened by this easy success, sailed with a squadron of fifty ships towards the Roman fleet, which was advancing along the coast of Italy from the north. But he was suddenly surprised by it, attacked, and put to flight, with the loss of 1 Vol. i. p. 276. 2 Polybius, i. 21. Macrobius, Sat. i. 5. See Niebuhr, Röm. Gesch. iii. 677; English translation, iii. 579. Some Roman writers so represented this incident as to make the Carthaginians appear guilty of treachery and perjury (see Zonaras, viii. 10). They related that Boodes, the Carthaginian admiral, fearing to drive the Romans to despair, invited Scipio and his officers to come on board his ship for the purpose of negotiating, and then seized them all, whereupon the Roman crews lost courage and surrendered. It is needless to say that this attempt to clear Scipio of the charge of rashness and to accuse the Carthaginians of treachery is futile and childish. Polybius says nothing even of a stratagem of the Carthaginians. BOOK 6 the greater part of his ships. After this preliminary trial of strength, the Roman fleet arrived in the harbour of Messana; and as the consul Scipio, who was to have taken the command of the fleet, was made prisoner, his colleague, Caius Duilius, gave the command of the land army to his subordinate officer, and without delay led the Roman against the Carthaginian fleet, which was devastating the coast in the neighbourhood of Pelorus, the north-eastern promontory of Sicily. The enemies met off Mylæ, and here was fought the first battle at sea, which was to decide whether the Roman state should be confined to Italy, or whether it should gradually extend itself to all the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean-a sea which they were now to prove themselves entitled to speak of as emphatically their own.' It is said that the Carthaginian fleet, under the command of Hannibal, consisted of one hundred and thirty ships. It had therefore ten more ships than the Roman. Each of these was without doubt far superior to the Roman ships in the manner of sailing, in agility and speed, but more especially in the skill of the captains and sailors, even though, as we suppose, a great number of the Roman vessels were built and manned by Greeks. The tactics of ancient naval warfare consisted chiefly in running the ships against the broadside of the hostile ships, and either sinking them by the force of the collision, or brushing away the mass of bristling oars. For this purpose the prows had under the water-line sharp iron prongs called beaks (rostra), which penetrated the timbers of the enemy's ships. It was, therefore, of the greatest importance for each captain to have his ship so completely under his control as to be able to turn about, to advance, or retreat with the greatest rapidity, and to watch and seize the favourable moment for the decisive rush. To fight from the deck with arrows and other missiles could, in this species of tactics, be only of subordinate importance, and therefore there was only a small number of soldiers on board the ships by the side of the rowers. 1 Mare nostrum.' CHAP. III. SECOND PERIOD, B.C. Roman naval tac The Romans were well aware of the superiority of the Carthaginians in maritime tactics. They could not hope. to vie with them in this respect. They therefore hit upon a plan for supplying their want of skill at sea, by a mode of 261-255 fighting which should place not ship against ship, but man against man, and which in a certain way should make the sea-fight very much like a battle on land. They invented ties. the boarding-bridges.' On the fore part of the ship, against a mast twenty-four feet high, a ladder thirty-six feet long was fixed, twelve feet above the deck, in such a manner that it could be moved up and down as well as sideways. This drawing up and down was effected by means of a rope which passed from the end of the ladder through a ring at the top of the mast on to the deck. How the horizontal movements were produced does not appear from the account of Polybius, who fails also to explain how the lower end of the ladder, which was fixed to the mast twelve feet above the deck, could be reached. Perhaps there was a second part to the ladder fixed to it with hinges, leading from the deck up towards the mast, and serving at the same time to move the ladder all round the mast. The ladder was so broad that two soldiers could stand abreast on it. Railings right and left served as a protection against missiles and against the danger of falling. At the end of the ladder was a strong pointed hook bent downwards. If the enemy approached near enough, they had only to let go the rope which held the ladder upright. If it fell on the deck of the hostile ship, the hook penetrated the timbers and held the two ships together. Then the soldiers ran from the deck along the ladder to board, and the sea-fight became a hand-to-hand engagement.2 When the Carthaginians under Hannibal perceived the Defeat of It is not stated who was the real inventor. We should like to know whether it was a Roman or a Greek. 2 The description which Polybius (i. 22) gives of the boarding-bridges is the only one which we have, and it is not sufficiently clear and complete, so that doubts remain concerning some parts of the apparatus. See Haltaus, Gesch. der Römer, Beilage, pp. 607-628. BOOK IV. the Car Roman fleet, they bore down upon it and began the battle, confident of an easy victory. But they were sadly disappointed. The boarding-bridges answered perfectly. thaginians. Fifty Carthaginian vessels were taken or destroyed, and a great number of prisoners were made. Hannibal himself escaped with difficulty and had to abandon his flag-ship, a huge vessel of seven rows of oars, taken in the late war from King Pyrrhus. The remainder of the Carthaginian vessels took to flight. If the joy at this first glorious victory was great, it was fully justified. The honour of a triumph was awarded to Duilius; and the story goes that he was permitted to prolong this triumph throughout his whole life by causing himself to be accompanied by a flute-player and a torch-bearer whenever he returned home of an evening from a banquet. A column, decorated with the beaks of conquered ships and with an inscription celebrating the victory, was erected on the Forum as a memorial of the battle. Relief of 3 This decisive victory of the Romans happened just in time to restore the fortune of war, which had seriously gone against them in Sicily. Most of the towns on the coast and many in the interior had fallen, as we have seen, during the preceding year, into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginians were now besieging Segesta, to revenge themselves for the treachery of the Segestans, who had murdered the Carthaginian garrison and given the town over to the Romans. During the consul's absence from the army the military tribune C. Cæcilius had attempted to assist the town, but was surprised and suffered much loss. The greater part of the Roman army in Sicily lay in Segesta. It was, therefore, very fortunate that Duilius was able, after his victory at Mylæ, to take Livy, epit. 17. This was the first triumphus navalis. 2 Cicero, De Senectute, 13. Valerius Maximus, iii. 6, 4. The fragments of this inscription which are still extant appear to be parts of the column restored by Tiberius, and not of the original monument. Platner and Urlich's Rom, p. 234. See above, p. 44. See Zonaras, viii. 11. Of this defeat no mention is made by Polybius, i. 14. |