was none the less apparent. This of itself was a great gain. The Standard Oil Company had used methods of competition which had aroused the resentment of competitors. The methods were enumerated and described in the opinion of the Supreme Court. But whether the practices themselves were condemned, or whether the vice lay in the combination of them all, coupled with the size and power of the concern which used them, no reader of the opinion could tell. All that was certain was that the result was an illegal monopoly. In the new legislation, attention was directed toward the competitive methods and practices themselves, and machinery was devised by which these methods and practices could be isolated and studied. The second departure from the traditional point of view was even more important. Neither the Trade Commission Act nor the Clayton Act was a criminal statute. The machinery set up to administer them was corrective rather than punitive. As I have said, the traditional view had been that monopoly and restraint of trade were species of crimes which needed the attention of the district attorney and the deterrent influence of a jail sentence. A long and discouraging experience with Sherman Law indictments had finally satisfied the country that the problem could not be dealt with in this way. It was only in those flagrant cases in which economic power had been brutally misused, and selfish ends gained by the ruin of innocent men, that juries could be brought to the point of moral indignation at which a conviction was possible. The usual case, however, involved merely a conflict of interests between different economic groups. A large manufacturer might be in conflict with a group of wholesalers. An association of jobbers might be pitted against a mail order house or a department store. A retail association, representing the group interests of its members, might be at odds with a single retail trader, de termined to pursue his own policy. Or it might be a case of a whole industry in conflict with a group of consumers. Either side in such a controversy might, it is true, use weapons which would shock the moral sense, and fall within the popular conception of criminal conduct. The controversy itself, however, would not be a conflict between right and wrong, but a conflict between opposing interests. Such a conflict calls for adjustment rather than for a moral crusade. Everyone knows how useless in a negotiation is the man who sees a profound moral issue in every small business difference. To remain on friendly terms with a man although your economic interests are opposed to his, to recognize that men may have legitimate business conflicts, to concede that your competitor may be an honest man and a gentleman, these are signs of the growing maturity of civilization, just as the trust-busting fervor of the first decade of the century and the crusades of the Middle Ages were signs of immaturity. Of course, in the field of government this conception of the trust problem calls for a certain degree of abnegation on the part of the men engaged in administering the law. A crusade is more spectacular than a scientific inquiry, and a moral issue has greater political value than a practical adjustment. It is precisely for this reason, however, that the enforcement of the new laws was entrusted to a non-partisan commission, to be composed of men of training and experience whose tenure would not depend upon political considerations. It seems to me that from this point of view the Commission has a great and important opportunity. I conceive it to be, potentially, an expert tribunal, of steady tenure and scrupulous judicial poise, firm in the public interest but impartial as between the private economic groups affected by its action. I do not look upon it as a prosecuting agency, at war with the forces of evil. Where a crusade is necessary, as of course it may be at times, the matter should be left to the political branch of the Government. The Commission's procedure should be such that a trade practice or a method of competition, deemed by some to be injurious and defended by others, could be brought before it for calm and impartial study, the facts and arguments developed in a formal procedure, and an order issued which, if confirmed in the courts, would settle for the benefit of the business world whether or not the practice was consistent with the letter and spirit of the law. With the amendments which I have suggested, the Commission can be relieved of the stigma of partiality now conveyed by the very words of the statute. With a corresponding change in the spirit in which the proceedings are conducted, I see no reason why the Federal Trade Commission should not realize fully the promise of the legislation of 1914. APPENDIX ACTS OF CONGRESS FROM WHICH POWERS. I. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT. AN ACT To create a Federal Trade Commission, to define its powers and duties, and for other purposes. [Pub. No. 203, 63d Cong. Chap. 311, 38 Stat. at L. 717] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That a commission is hereby created and established, to be known as the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as the commission), which shall be composed of five commissioners, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than three of the commissioners shall be members of the same political party. The first commissioners appointed shall continue in office for terms of three, four, five, six, and seven years, respectively, from the date of the taking effect of this Act, the term of each to be designated by the President, but their successors shall be appointed for terms of seven years, except that any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the commissioner whom he shall succeed. The commission shall choose a chairman from its own membership. No commissioner shall engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. Any commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. A vacancy in the commission shall not impair the right of the remaining commissioners to exercise all the powers of the commission. The commission shall have an official seal, which shall be judicially noticed. SEC. 2. That each commissioner shall receive a salary of $10,000 a year, payable in the same manner as the salaries of the judges of the courts of the United States. The commission shall appoint a secretary, who shall receive a salary of $5,000 a year, payable in like manner, and it shall have authority to employ and fix the compensation of such attorneys, special experts, examiners, clerks, and other employees as it may from time to time find necessary for the proper performance of its duties and as may be from time to time appropriated for by Congress. With the exception of the secretary, a clerk to each commissioner, the attorneys, and such special experts and examiners as the commission may from time to time find necessary for the conduct of its work, all employees of the commission shall be a part of the classified civil service, and shall enter the service under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the commission and by the Civil Service Com mission. All of the expenses of the commission, including all necessary expenses for transportation incurred by the commissioners or by their employees under their orders, in making any investigation, or upon official business in any other places than in the city of Washington, shall be allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the commission. Until otherwise provided by law, the commission may rent suitable offices for its use. The Auditor for the State and Other Departments shall receive and examine all accounts of expenditures of the commission. SEC. 3. That upon the organization of the commission and election of its chairman, the Bureau of Corporations and the offices of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Corporations shall cease to exist; and all pending investigations and proceedings of the Bureau of Corporations shall be continued by the commission. All clerks and employees of the said bureau shall be transferred to and become clerks and employees of the commission at their present grades and salaries. All records, papers, and property of the said bureau shall become records, papers, and property of the commission, and all unexpended funds and appropriations for the use and maintenance of the said bureau, including any allotment already made to it by the Secretary of Commerce from the contingent appropriation for the Department of Commerce for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and fifteen, or from the departmental printing fund for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and fifteen, shall become funds and appropriations available to be expended by the commission in the exercise of the powers, authority, and duties conferred on it by this Act. The principal office of the commission shall be in the city of Washington, but it may meet and exercise all its powers at any other place. The commission may, by one or more of its members, or by such ex |