I quite agree that there is no absolute duty to abstainto stay our hand-until the state courts have at least been asked to construe their own statute, but for me it is the negation of sound judicial administration—and an unwarranted use of a limited judicial resource-to impose this kind of case on a three-judge federal district court, and then, by direct appeal, on this Court. Indeed, in my view, a three-judge district court would be well advised in cases such as this, involving no urgency or question of large import, to decline to act.

This Court has an abundance of important work to do, which, if it is to be done well, should not be subject to the added pressures of non-urgent state cases which the state courts have never been called on to resolve. Neither the historic role of this Court nor any reasonable duty placed on us, calls for our direct intervention when no reason for expedited review is shown. Here we have an example of an unwise statute making direct review prima facie available, and an unwillingness by the Court to follow its own precedents by declining to pass on the Wisconsin statute before Wisconsin courts do so. We should remand this case with directions to the three-judge court to refrain from acting until the Wisconsin courts have acted.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE BlackMUN joins, dissenting.

I agree substantially with the dissent of THE Chief JUSTICE. I would vacate the District Court's judgment and remand with directions to withhold its proceedings to enable appellee to file a declaratory judgment or other state court action challenging the police chief's posting of notices in all Hartford retail liquor outlets forbidding sales or gifts of liquors to appellee for one year. As the Court's opinion, the cases there cited, and THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent point out, such a course of action is justified "where the issue of state law is uncertain" and where the state court might confine the state law's

meaning so "as not to have any constitutional infirmity." The Wisconsin Act appears on its face to grant authority to a man's wife, a mayor, a town's supervisors, the county superintendent of the poor, a sheriff, or a district attorney to post notices forbidding liquor establishments from giving or selling any alcoholic beverages to the person so posted. The effect of such sweeping powers, if there is nothing else in the State's law to limit them, is practically the same as that of an old common law bill of attainder, against which our forebears had such an abhorrence that they forbade it in Art. I, § 9, of the Constitution. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946). And here the Wisconsin law purports on its face to place such arbitrary and tyrannical power in the hands of minor officers and others that these modern bills of attainder can be issued ex parte, without notice or hearing of any kind or character. It is impossible for me to believe that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin would uphold any such boundless power over the lives and liberties of its citizens. It seems to me therefore wholly uncertain that the state law has the meaning it purports to have, and I believe it is unfair to Wisconsin to permit its courts to be denied the opportunity of confining this law within its proper limits if it could be shown that there are other state law provisions that could provide such boundaries. For example, notice and hearing might be provided by principles of state administrative procedure law similar to the federal Administrative Procedure Act.

I realize that there are many cases where federal counts should not stay their hands to permit state courts to interpret state law. Compare Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, 363 U. S. 207, 213-227 (1960) (BLACK, J., dissenting), with Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943). Here, however, no state court appears to have passed on this Act at all, and a state decision might well apply the body of other state law to require notice, hearing, and other necessary provisions to render the challenged Act constitutional.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

May 24, 1971 (402 U.S. 1000)

No. 6106. TARVER V. SMITH, SECRETARY of DepartMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES OF WASHINGTON. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted. Reported below: Wash. 2d, 470 P. 2d 172. earlier order herein, see 401 U. S. 906.]

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

[For

The ability of the Government and private agencies to gather, retain, and catalogue information on anyone for their unfettered use raises problems concerning the privacy and dignity of individuals. Public and private agencies are storing more and more data. "If your name is not in the records of at least one credit bureau, it doesn't mean that you don't rate. What it does mean is that you are either under twenty-one or dead." "

A file may show that an individual was arrested. But will it show the arrest was unconstitutional because it was solely for purposes of investigation? Or that the charges were dropped? Or that a jury acquitted him?

Other "facts" may be in a file. Did he vote for Henry Wallace? Was he cited by HUAC? Is he subversive? Did he ever belong to any subversive organizations?

Private files amass similar irrelevancies and subjective information. Is he well regarded in his neighborhood as to character and habits? Does he have domestic difficulties? Is he "slow" in paying his bills?

1 Law reviews have been devoting increasing attention to the problem. Recently two total issues have been devoted to the legal problems. See 15 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 1374 and 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 251. See also Symposium: Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 211; Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 400; Freed, A Legal Structure for a National Medical Data Center, 49 B. U. L. Rev. 79; Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1091.

2 H. Black, Buy Now, Pay Later 37 (1961).

3

The problems of a computerized society with large data banks are immense. Who should have access to the files on an individual? For what purposes should access be allowed? Should an individual be informed each time information is passed on to new parties? How long should information be retained? What mechanisms ought there be for correcting factual errors?

This case presents the latter issue. A caseworker has prepared a highly critical report on petitioner setting forth in detail factual allegations and accusing petitioner of child neglect. The report recommends petitioner be permanently deprived of the custody of her children. Custody was temporarily placed in juvenile court because petitioner was hospitalized. Subsequently a hearing in juvenile court was held and petitioner was exonerated and retained custody of her children. But the critical report-which petitioner alleges is falseremains in the files with the Department of Social and Health Services of the State of Washington.

Not surprisingly, petitioner would like the allegedly false information removed from those files. But her efforts to obtain a hearing to correct the information have failed.

The State says that petitioner's file is "confidential and privileged" and under current state law the file may be disclosed only "for purposes directly connected with the administration of public assistance and specific investigatory purposes by legislative committees and properly authorized bodies." Respondent's Brief 6. Just how many people and agencies this includes is unclear. The only thing perfectly clear from this record is that

3 "[T]he computer can also be an agent of oppression. if, for example, its fantastic memory is used to place indelibly on record all the events in a man's life, all his mistakes and weaknesses, precluding all hope of their effacement, every stimulating possibility of a new chance in life." R. Prebisch, Change and Development, Latin America's Great Task 209 (1970).

petitioner has no rights under state law to a hearing to correct the reports even if they are total lies. And it appears petitioner will never be informed prior to transmittal of her file to the various "authorized" groups.

The State contends that petitioner will suffer no harm from having the material in her files. We are told everyone will know the report is only an opinion; the decree of the juvenile court will be included; and the file will be treated confidentially. While, of course, we cannot know if the information is false and cannot tell which and how many uses will be made of the file, it is apparent that petitioner does raise some serious questions concerning its use. Participation "in the new WorkIncentive Programs is initiated by a referral by respondent's department of, among others, persons who are 'appropriate for referral.' R. C. W. 74.22.020; 74.23.040. Those who are referred receive substantial training benefits as well as increased cash benefits. R. C. W. 74.22.050, 060; R. C. W. 74.23.060, 070. Similarly, the availability of sheltered workshop programs depends upon a determination by the respondent's department that the subject, if a 'disadvantaged person,' 'can reasonably be expected to benefit from, or in his best interests reasonably requires' such a program. R. C. W. 28A.10.080 (2)." Petition 7 n. 2. The only answer that respondent gives to this is that any "information transmitted to the Employment Security Department under the Work Incentive Program is for the benefit of the recipient." How petitioner would benefit from the transmission of the allegedly false material we are not told.

The Washington State public assistance programs are designed to receive federal assistance whenever federal funds are available. Various provisions in the appropriate title of the Revised Code of Washington dealing with public assistance refer to conformity with and pri