the Secret Service for maintaining such a data bank? Will this information be computerized? Will it be available for use by other federal agencies? If so, which

ones?

What procedures have been established for (1) Preserving the confidentiality of this data; (2) affording citizens subject to such a report the opportunity to review their files and to rebut derogatory information?

Would you also supply copies of any published federal regulations governing this data bank and its use.

Your assistance in our study is appreciated.
With all kind wishes, I am.

Sincerely yours,

SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.,

Chairman.

Hon. RANDOLPH W. THROWER,

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
Washington, October 22, 1969.

Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Treasury Department,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR COMMISSIONER THROWER: A recent supplement to the Internal Revenue Service Manual regarding protection of the President entitled, "Guidelines for Reporting Information", dated August 26, 1969, has come to our attention. Recognizing as we do the importance of safeguarding the life of the President, nevertheless, it appears to us that a number of the guidelines contained in that supplement are overly broad and devoid of relevance for that purpose. They will succeed in doing nothing but adding to investigative files the names of American citizens who are doing nothing more than exercising their right of freedom of speech and their right to petition their government for redress of grievances. The disastrous effects of having information considered derogatory in such investigative files on employment possibilities, security clearance and even to positions on advisory committees of government agencies is too well known to require reiteration here. (You may have noticed recent news stories in the New York Times concerning scientists being blacklisted by HEW for service on advisory review committees on the basis of such so-called derogatory information.)

In particular, I would like to suggest modification be considered or elimination of the following guidelines:

I. PROTECTIVE INFORMATION

A. Information pertaining to a threat, plan or attempt by an individual, a group, or an organization to physically harm or embarrass the persons protected by the U.S. Secret Service, or any other high U.S. Government officials at home or abroad.

Comment: Certainly the desire to embarrass any government official hardly indicates a desire to harm him. Embarrassment may be caused in many ways, including the exposure of peccadilloes, or even malfeasance in office.

D. Information on persons who insist upon personally contacting high Govern ment officials for the purpose of redress of imiginary grievances, etc.

Comment: Many Americans attempt to contact high Government officials for the purpose of redressing grievances. The grievances may be in the view of some individuals including the government officials involved, imaginary. Nevertheless, it is fairly clear many of the grievances are not imaginary and it has only been by the sustained effort of such individuals that the grievances have been brought to public attention and corrective measures taken. American citizens should not be inhibited in trying to see high government officials by fear that this will be considered derogatory information by the Secret Service.

E. Information on any person who makes oral or written statements about high Government officials in the following categories: (1) threatening statements, (2) irrational statements, and (3) abusive statements.

Comment: A comment similar to the item above could be made about irrational statements and abusive statements. There are many people who write abusive letters and make abusive statements about government officials. However, merely because a letter or statement is abusive in tone does not indicate a desire to cause physical harm. Similarly, those who make irrational statements

do not necessarily indicate any desire nor inclination to harm. Unless the purpose of this guideline is really just to collect a list of all those who make abusive or irrational statements about high government officials in the United States, it seems difficult to believe that this kind of information is necessary as a positive method of protecting such officials.

Just in passing the recent speech by Vice-President Spiro Agnew reported in yesterday's Washington Post and New York Times as well as being carried by all the news media, was considered by at least Senators William Fulbright and Hugh Scott to be abusive about some Congressional leaders who are opposed to the war in Vietnam. Would Vice President Agnew's speech be covered by this regulation and would it have to be reported?

I. Information regarding anti-American or anti-U.S. Government demonstrations in the United States or overseas.

Comment: To be specific, are the recent moratorium demonstrations on October 15th considered to be either anti-American or anti-Government and must all participants be reported to the Secret Service? If so, are you including the names of all the U.S. Senators and Congressmen who participated?

Is there a difference between anti-American or anti-U.S. Government or is one term intended to mean anti-administration?

As I stated at the beginning of my letter, I recognize the necessity for guarding the President and other government officials protected by the U.S. Secret Service. However, collecting information of the kinds suggested in these guidelines will not really focus on this problem and instead, will fill investigatory files with useless information which will be derogatory to countless millions of Americans. We would appreciate your reconsidering this manual supplement. We would be quite willing to discuss this matter further either with you or with those who have the responsibility of issuing such instructions.

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE SPEISER, Director, Washington Office.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEISER: Commissioner Thrower has asked me to respond to your October 22 letter regarding our Manual Supplement "Protection of the President: Guidelines for Reporting Information." If you have a copy of the document in question, you will see that the guidelines in question were issued by the United States Secret Service. The guidelines were distributed to Internal Revenue Service employees in an effort to be of maximum assistance to Secret Service in meeting their protective responsibilities.

I have referred your letter to the Secret Service, and I assume you will be hearing from that office in the near future.

Sincerely,

LEON C. GREEN, Deputy Assistant Commissioner.

[From manual Supplement, U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service,
Aug. 22, 1969]

PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING INFORMATION

SECTION 1. BACKGROUND

The U.S. Secret Service is charged with the responsibility of protecting the President and certain other high-level Government officials and public figures. This responsibility includes the evaluation of all information concerning threats against the personal safety of those being protected. It is incumbent upon the Internal Revenue Service, along with other agencies, to assist the Secret Service in this responsibility by the timely reporting of any information which will help that organization to do its job effectively.

SECTION 2. PURPOSE

This Manual Supplement provides: U.S. Secret Service Liaison Guidelines, which outlines the type of information most useful to the Secret Service (see

Attachment 1); instructions for reporting this information; and a list of Secret Service field offices.

SECTION 3. GUIDELINES

Employees should: familiarize themselves with the attached document, U.S. Secret Service Liaison Guidelines; be alert to circumstances which warrant their consideration; report information in accordance with Section 4 of this Manual Supplement; and upon request, cooperate fully with the Secret Service in discharging their responsibilities in this area.

SECTION 4. REPORTING PROCEDURES

.01 As indicated in the Secret Service guidelines, information should be promptly referred to the Secret Service Washington Office. Employees will use their discretion to determine the most judicious method of notifying the Secret Service. If the referral is urgent, employees are authorized to telephone the nearest Secret Service Office. When time permits, a written report should be sent to the Secret Service Washington Office. Attachment 2 to the Manual Supplement contains a list of Secret Service field offices giving their addresses and telephone numbers.

.02 In all cases, the person making the referral will prepare a written report for his own file. This report will contain: all the information given to the Secret Service, the Secret Service office and personnel notified, and the time and date of the referral.

SECTION 5. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS

IRM 1941.7 is supplemented; and Manual Supplement 19G-46, dated June 1, 1966, is superseded.

(Attachment)

U.S. SECRET SERVICE LIAISON GUIDELINES

Subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Secret Service is charged by Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-Elect and Vice President, or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of President, and the Vice PresidentElect, protect the person of a former President and his wife during his lifetime, the person of the widow of a former President until her death or re-marriage, and minor children of a former President until they reach 16 years of age, unless such protection is declined, protect persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee as being major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates which should receive such protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection).

Detecting and arresting any person committing any offense against the laws of the United States relating to coins, obligations, and securities of the United States and foreign Governments. Several other responsibilities are delegated to the U.S. Secret Service by the Secretary of the Treasury, such as investigation of violations of the Gold Reserve Act, and such other functions as are authorized by law.

Effective liaison with other law enforcement and Government agencies is necessary to insure we receive all information they may develop regarding any of our responsibilities. A Special Agent of the Liaison Division, U.S. Secret Service, will maintain contact with your agency at a headquarters level. Certain guidelines are set forth below which may assist you in determining our interests.

1. PROTECTIVE INFORMATION

A. Information pertaining to a threat, plan or attempt by an individual, a group, or an organization to physically harm or embarrass the persons protected by the U.S. Secret Service, or any other high U.S. Government official at home or abroad.

B. Information pertaining to individuals, groups, or organizations who have plotted, attempted, or carried out assassinations of senior officials of domestic or foreign Governments.

C. Information concerning the use of bodily harm or assassination as a political, weapon. This should include training and techniques used to carry out the act. D. Information on persons who insist upon personally contacting high Government officials for the purpose of redress of imaginary grievances, etc.

E. Information on any person who makes oral or written statements about high Government officials in the following categories: (1) threatening statements, (2) irrational statements, and (3) abusive statements.

F. Information on professional gate crashers.

G. Information pertaining to "Terrorist" bombings.

H. Information pertaining to the ownership or concealment by individuals or groups of caches of firearms, explosives, or other implements of war.

I. Information regarding anti-American or anti-U.S. Government demonstrations in the United States or overseas.

J. Information regarding civil disturbances.

2. COUNTERFEITING AND FORGERY INFORMATION

A. Information regarding counterfeiting of U.S. or foreign obligations, i.e., currency, coins, stamps, bonds, U.S. Treasurer's checks, Treasury securities, Department of Agriculture food stamp coupons, etc.

B. Information relating to the forgery, alteration and fraudulent negotiation of U.S. Treasurer's checks and U.S. Government bonds.

3. GOLD AND "GOLD COIN" INFORMATION

A. Gold regulations prohibiting the acquisition, holding, transportation, importing, and exporting of gold by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Gold in its natural state may be purchased, held, sold or transported within the United States and may also be imported without a license.

B. Gold coins of recognized special value to collectors may be acquired, held and transported within the United States and may be imported as permitted by the gold regulations.

Routine reports may be mailed to the U.S. Secret Service, Liaison Division, Room 825, 1800 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20226, or handled during personal liaison contact.

Emergency information, especially in reference to Presidential protection, should be reported immediately by telephone to the nearest U.S. Secret Service field office or the U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C. Area Code 202-WO4-2481; (government Code 184-2481).

[70 Duke Law Journal (1970)]

COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY: A PROPOSAL FOR SELF-REGULATION*

(By Edward J. Grenier, Jr.*)

In framing the issues of its landmark Computer Inquiry, the Federal Communications Commission cited the critical importance of the preservation of information privacy:

"Privacy, particularly in the area of communications, is a well established policy and objective of the Communications Act. Thus, any threatened or potential invasion of privacy is cause for concern by the Commission and the industry. In the past, the invasion of information privacy was rendered difficult by the scattered and random nature of individual data. Now the fragmentary nature of information is becoming a relic of the past. Data centers and common memory drums housing competitive sales, inventory and credit information and untold amounts of personal information, are becoming common. This personal and proprietary information must remain free from unauthorized invasion or disclosure, whether at the computer, the terminal station, or the interconnecting communication link." 1

Congress, too, has demonstrated an increasing concern with the possible threats to individual privacy which might result from the establishment, by the federal government or by private industry, of a national data bank.' In fact Paul Baran of Rand Corporation, testifying several years ago before a congressional Footnotes at end of Article.

subcommittee, stated that the United States is unconsciously moving toward an integrated, nationwide, automated information system:

"My thesis is this: Today we are already building the bits and pieces of separate automated information systems in both the private and government sectors that so closely follow the pattern to the present integrated communications structure that a de facto version of the system you are now pondering is already into the construction phase. It is in many ways more dangerous than the single data bank now being considered." 3

Although the threat posed by automated information systems to the privacy of individuals is perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the "computer revolution," another very important aspect is the possibility of unauthorized disclosure of proprietary data. The "privacy problem" in both of these contexts is most acute where the separate proprietary data of a large number of businesses or sensitive personal information about thousands of individuals is stored or processed in multiprogrammed, time-sharing data processing systems and transmitted to and from the processing and storage units over common communications lines. In such systems there exists at numerous points a high potential for "information leakage," including leakage due to hardware and software failures and wire taps.*

In addition to examining both of these aspects of the privacy problem from the point of view of the computer system operator, this article proposes the establishment of a logical legal framework which would serve the public interest by assuring, first, that computer systems which handle sensitive individual or proprietary data will meet certain minimum standards established for the protection of privacy, and, second, that computer system operators will be able to continue to operate in a competitive economy unhindered by either overly restrictive governmental regulation or the fear of private legal liability. The analysis and suggestions herein set forth are relevant to all types of computer systems which store information or use computer programs belonging to persons or entities other than the computer system operator or which collect and store information about private individuals."

The computer industry, which when viewed in its broadest significance extends from manufacturers of main frame hardware to computer service bureaus and computerized information services, should now cooperate with the communications industry to adopt and implement, under the auspices of the federal government, a comprehensive system of self-regulation to ensure the privacy and security of data. As a corollary of such a scheme, computer systems complying with the established standards should be freed from certain types of civil legal liability for the unauthorized or accidental divulgence of individual or proprietary information."

6

THE PRESENT LEGAL SITUATION: A STUDY IN UNCERTAINTY

For the purpose of analyzing the present legal controls pertinent to privacy and the computer, it will be helpful to consider a few illustrative situations: "1. Computer service company A operates a multi-programmed, time-sharing, remote-access data processing system. It services 25 customers scattered over a wide area, each with at least one remote terminal device. Each of A's customers stores at least one proprietary program and a good deal of data in A's system. Companies X and Y are competitors and are both customers of A. Let us suppose that company X has been able to obtain confidential data belonging to Y at X's remote terminal.

"2. Assume the same basic set of facts with the exception that A has 500 customers, most of which are very small.

"3. Company A runs a computerized information service containing personal data about thousands of individuals, including credit data, medical data, employment data, and educational data. A offers this service to carefully selected classes of subscribers, each of whom promises to use the information for only circumscribed and legitimate purposes. Company A's subscribers are linked to its computer system by remote terminal. Mr. X, a nonsubscriber, manages to tap into company A's system and connect an unauthorized remote terminal, thereby gathering information about a number of individuals. The information so obtained is used in an article which he publishes in a national magazine.

"4. Assume the same facts as in example 3, except that a programmeremployee of company A, without authority, extracts information about some individual from the system and sells such information to Mr. X."

Footnotes at end of Article.