privileged communication. In Waller v. Lock, 45 L. T. (N. S.) 243, Jessel, M. R., says: "If an answer is given in the discharge of a social or moral duty, or if the person who gives it thinks it to be so, that is enough. It need not even be an answer to an inquiry, but the communication may be a voluntary one." Ct. Er. and App., N. J., June 16, 1891. Rothholz v. Duncan. Opinion by Van Syckel, J. MARRIAGE-FOREIGN DIVORCE-RIGHT TO REMARRY. -Where the husband obtains a divorce from his wife for her fault, by a decree of the court of another State which prohibits the wife from remarrying, the wife still residing here, held, that the prohibition to remarry is in the nature of the penalty, and has no force as a disability to remarry in another State. Such disability does not attach to the person of the wife in this State. Held, also, that the prohibition upon the guilty party to remarry, by the statute of this State, does not attach in such case. This rule is held in many courts. Cox v. Combs, 8 B. Monr. 231; People v. Chase, 28 Hun, 310; Ponsford v. Johnson, 2 Blatchf. 51; Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521; Van Voorhis v. Brinthall, 86 id. 18; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 id. 602; Vau Storch v. Griffin, 71 Penn. St. 240; Com. v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458. Nor does the prohibition upon the guilty party to remarry by the statute of this State attach to the wife. Our statute applies only to divorces granted by the courts in this State. It has no reference to a decree granted in another State. Bullock v. Bullock, 122 Mass. 3. Me. Sup. Jud. Ct., March 12, 1891. Inhabitants of Phillips v. Inhabitants of Madrid. Opinion by Libbey, J. HUSBAND'S AGENCY-PAINTING WIFE'S HOUSE EVIDENCE.- Where a husband contracts for the painting of a house belonging to his wife, who selects the colors, and is living in the house at the time it is painted, a finding of an auditor that the husband acted as agent for his wife will not be disturbed, although he testified that he expected to pay for the painting from his own money, and the wife testified that she had no money to pay for the painting, and never expected to do so. Westgate v. Monroe, 100 Mass. 227; Gardner v. Bean, 124 id. 347; Lovell v. Williams, 125 id. 439; Arnold v. Spurr, 130 id. 347; Wheaton v. Trimble, 145 id. 345; Jefferds v. Alvard, 151 id. 94. The fact that, after the plaintiff had been told that the house belonged to defendant, he made out his bill against the husband, while perhaps evidence of an intention to look to the husband alone, was not absolutely conclusive of such a purpose, and of an abandonmeut of any claim against the defendant. Gardner v. Bean, 124 Mass. 347; Raymond v. Crown & Eagle Mills, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 319. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass., June 26, 1891. Dyer v. Swift. Opinion by Morton, J. MASTER AND SERVANT-DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. -The dissolution of a copartnership by the death of a partner terminates a contract of employment for a year between the firm and a salesman, under the Civil Code of California, section 1996, providing that every employment in which the power of the employee is not coupled with an interest in the subject, is terminated by notice to him of the death of the employer, and if the surviving partners retain him to assist in winding up the affairs of the partnership without an express agreement, the implied contract is only for such time as his services may be needed, and at such a salary as his services may be reasonably worth. Wood Mast. & Serv. 165; Whart. Cont., § 322; Civ. Code, §§ 1996, 1997; Tasker v. Shepherd, 6 Hurl. & N. 575; Farrow v. Wilson, L. R., 4 C. P. 744. Cal. Sup. Ct., June 23, 1891. Louis v. Elfelt. Opinion by Vanclief, C. NEGLIGENCE- -EVIDENCE- SUBSEQUENT PRECAUTIONS.-In an action against a canal company for fail ure to shore up a bank properly, in consequence of which it fell, killing an employee, plaintiff's husband, working in a trench thereunder, evidence of precautions taken by defendant after the accident is incompetent as an admission that such precautions were needed at the time of the accident. The plaintiff contends that, when an accident has happened through the alleged negligence of a person, the subsequent acts of this person in taking additional precautions to prevent other accidents are admissible in evidence in an action against him for the injuries occasioned, for the purpose of showing that such precautions were needed at the time of the accident. If such acts are admissible it must be on the ground that the conduct of the person amounts to an admission of negligence, and this is the ground upon which such evidence has been sometimes held to be admissible. Railroad Co. v. Henderson, 51 Penn. St. 315; Railroad Co. v. McElwee, 67 id. 311; McKee v. Bidwell, 74 id. 218. And in Dale v. Railroad Co., 73 N. Y. 468, it is said by Mr. Justice Rapallo, speaking of repairs made by a railroad corporation immediately after an accident: In such a case the making of the repairs may be regarded as some evidence that they were needed, and conse-, quently that the road was out of repair." This remark was however obiter, and although in accord with some decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, which we need not further refer to, is contrary to what is now the well-established doctrine of the Court of Appeals of that State, as will presently appear. The Pennsylvania doctrine was at first followed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. O'Leary v. Mankato, 21 Minn. 65; Phelps v. Mankato, 23 id. 276; Kelly v. Railroad Co., 28 id. 98. But these cases were deliberately overruled in Morse v. Railroad Co., 30 Minn. 465, in an elaborate opinion, in which the question is fully and carefully considered. Such evidence has also been held to be inadmissible by the highest tribunals in New York, Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois and Iowa. Dougan v. Transportation Co., 56 N. Y. 1; Baird v. Daly, 68 id. 547; Corcoran v. Peekskill, 108 id. 151; Nalley v. Carpet Co., 51 Conn. 524; Railroad Co. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15; Hodges v. Percival (Ill.), 23 N. E. Rep. 423; Cramer v. Burlington, 45 Iowa, 627; Hudson v. Railroad Co., 59 id. 581. See also Hart v. Railway Co., 21 L. T. (N. S.) 261. In a recent case in this Commonwealth (Menard v. Railroad Co., 150 Mass. 386) the plaintiff was struck by a locomotive engine of the defendant at a highway crossing. At the time of the accident no flagman was stationed there, but the jury when they took a view found one there. The plaintiff's counsel in argument proposed to comment upon this fact, and was stopped by the court. On exceptions, this action of the court was held to be correct, and Mr. Justice Knowlton, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The defendant's method of managing its business before, or after, or at the time of the accident was not evidence of what due care required. The defendant, or any other corporation, might at any time do more or less, in some particular, than a reasonable regard for the safety of the public demanded. Its adoption of a particular safeguard at any time, whether an accident had previously occurred or not, could not be deemed an admission that taking any less precaution would be negligence, any more than its use of a more dangerous system would indicate that it considered that reasonably safe." The plaintiff relies upon the case of Readman v. Conway, 126 Mass. 374, where the fact that the defendants repaired a platform, after an injury occasioned to the plaintiff by a defect therein, was held to be admissible as an admission "that it was their duty to keep the platform in repair." This case is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. The defendants were the owners of a building containing a number of shops, NEGLIGENCE HOSPITAL'S DUTY TO PATIENT.-One H., plaintiff's intestate, was received as a patient in defendant's hospital for treatment, and submitted to an operation, which was apparently successful, but in the early morning four days later, while temporarily insane, she arose unobserved from her bed in the ward, leaped from a window and was killed. An action was brought to recover damages, and on the trial it was shown that in the ward at the time there were nineteen patients and one nurse; the physician had seen intestate every day and found nothing wrong. About 1 A. M. the nurse's attention was called to the fact that she was trying to get out of bed. She quitted her, reported it to the physician, who gave her a sedative, after which she was quiet. About 4 A. M. the nurse passed her bed and she was apparently asleep, then hearing a noise, went to see what it was, returning, found intestate's bed empty; there was no lack of skill shown in the surgeon who performed the operation, the house physician, or of capacity in the uurse. Held, that there was no negligence shown on the part of the defendant. N. Y. Com. Pleas, Gen. Term, June 1, 1891. Harris v. Woman's Hospital in the State of New York. Opinion by Daly, C. J. of his representative character, and the withdrawal of the road and its property from his custody by the order discharging him, no judgment could be rendered against him properly, as the representative of the company, whereby to make its property chargeable. His official liability ended with his official existence. The third plea disclosed a perfect defeuse for the receiver. See Telegraph Co. v. Jewett, 115 N. Y. 166; Woodruff v. Jewett, id. 267; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Central R. Co., 2 McCrary, 181; Brown v. Gay, 76 Tex. 444; Beach Rec., §§ 715, 720. The case of Miller v. Loeb, 64 Barb. 454, cited and relied upon by counsel, is not at all in conflict with the authorities generally. This case is authority for the proposition that the discharge of a receiver cannot be successfully pleaded in an action brought to recover for a personal liability incurred by that officer during his receivership. In this case of Miller v. Loeb the receiver had seized and sold property claimed by third parties, and not belonging at all to the estate which he held as receiver, and on this state of fact the court held the discharge no bar to the action. We do not dissent from that opinion, nor is it inharmonious with the opinions generally concurring with the views we have advanced. We are not to be understood as intimating, as counsel for appellant contends the law is, that the discharge of the receiver abates a pending suit. We see no reason for holding otherwise, in this case, than is held in cases generally where persons are sued in a representative character, and for any reason, cannot be proceeded against further. By proper application, we are of opinion that the cause may be revived or proceeded with against the successor of the receiver, if intervening rights do not forbid all hope of a fruitful recovery. Miss. Sup. Ct., June 1, 1891. Bond v. State. Opinion by Woods, J. REMOVAL OF CAUSES AGAINST NATIONAL BANKRECEIVERSHIP. A suit against a National bank to reach property held as a part of its assets by its receiver, appointed by the comptroller of the currency, arises under the laws of the United States, and may be removed from the State court into the Federal court. The orator insists that the suit is against the bank, and not against the receiver, and relies upon Whittemore v. Bank, 134 U. S. 527, to show that this court has no jurisdiction. In that case the bank was not in the hands of a receiver, but was sui juris. This bank is altogether in the hands of the receiver, and the decree sought, if it would reach any thing, would reach assets of the bank in his hands. Although the bank, as an organization, is not extinguished, but is continued in existence for the purposes of being wound up, it has no control, as a bank, of any of its property inRECEIVER-DISCHARGE PENDING SUIT-REVIVOR.— terests, and cannot, apart from the receiver, be afWhere the receiver of a railroad is sued in his offi- fected by a decree to reach them. The receiver is the cial character to subject to liability the property in his real party in this behalf. He is an agent of the United hands, but is afterward discharged from the receiver-States, and an officer thereof for this purpose. Kenship before pleading, and the property withdrawn from his custody, no judgment can be rendered against him in his representative capacity, although if intervening rights do not interfere, the cause may be revived by proper application against his successor. The final discharge of the receiver put an end to his official existence, and withdrew from his care and management the road and property of the company. The discharge having terminated the representative character of the receiver, we are at a loss to understand how any judgment could be rendered against him officially that would render liable to its satisfaction any property of the company-property in his hands when suit was brought, but now finally withdrawn from him by the extinction of his official character before his plea was filed. There is no demand against him as an individual, but only as the representative of the railroad company. It seems plain to us, that with the termination nedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498. The assets in his hands belong to the United States for distribution among those entitled to them. Hitz v. Jenks, 123 U. S. 297. U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Vt., May 27, 1891. Sowles v. First National Bank of St. Albans. Opinion by Wheeler, J. 46 Fed. Rep. 513. TENANTS IN COMMON-PURCHASE AT TAX SALETRUSTEE-One tenant in common of a remainder cannot, by purchasing the land when sold for delinquent taxes, cut off the rights of his co-tenants, and acquire the exclusive title himself, but he will be deemed a trustee of the title for the equal benefit of all the cotenants. Freem. Co-Tenancy, $ 158; Cooley Tax. (2d ed.) 500; Burr. Tax., § 123; 1 Blackw. Tax Titles, § 141; Weare v. Van Meter, 42 Iowa, 128; Flinn v. McKinley, 44 id. 68; Tice v. Derby, 59 id. 312; Pruitt v. Holly, 73 Ala. 369; Bailey's Adm'r v. Campbell, 82 id. 342; Dou nor v. Quartermas, 90 id. 164. Each tenant in common has an equal right to occupy the common freehold, and the exercise of ordinary acts of ownership by one is not, without more, an adverse holding which can ever ripen into a title. To have that effect there must be an actual ouster, or actual refusal of the co-tenants' right to occupy. Actual occupancy, actual exercise of acts of ownership, actual improvements of the property, may all co-exist, and yet the holding not become adverse to the co-tenant. Eviction, denial of the right to enter, or exclusive claim of the right to occupy must exist, and must be shown to have been made known RE to the co-tenant before the possession becomes adverse in law. Newbold v. Smart, 67 Ala. 326; 3 Brick. Dig. 17, §§ 20, 21; Iron Co. v. Roberts, 87 Ala. 436; Burrus v. Meadors, 90 id. 140; Fitzgerald v. Williamson, 85 id. 585. Sup. Ct. Ala., June 9, 1891. Johns v. Johns. Opinion by Stone, Ch. J. CORRESPONDENCE. STANDING WITNESSES. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: NOTES. J. B. DALEY. EPUTATION, primarily and properly, is of neu tral and indifferent significance, so that the reputation of a drunken prize-fighter or of a frail beauty may be good, and that of a (foreign) bishop or duchess exceedingly bad. But, however bad, a reputation may be made much worse by mendacity and slander, and therefore such as it is will be entitled to, the law's protection.-Indian Jurist. "Gentlemen of the jury," said a Minnesota judge, "murder is where a mau is murderously killed. The killer in such a case is a murderer. Now murder by poison is just as much murder as murder with a gun, pistol or knife. It is the simple act of murdering that constitutes murder in the eye of the law. Don't let the idea of murder and manslaughter confound you. Murder is one thing, manslaughter is quite another." -Washington Law Reporter. The following letter recently appeared in our sporting contemporary, Rod and Gun: "Sir-While staying in Devonshire last week at a farm, I had a practical illustration of an interesting case of sheep-worrying. Looking out of my bedroom window just as it was day Irving Browne in his letter from London in your issue of the 15th inst., expresses surprise that witnesses are compelled to stand while testifying in English courts. We need not go so far as England for such customs-this rule prevails in Massachusetts. I attended a trial at Springfield, Massachusetts, a few weeks ago, and all the witnesses were compelled to stand while giving their testimony. One of the witnesses was a prominent New York lawyer who, ignor-light, I saw a flock of ewes that had recently lambed ant of the local customs, seated himself, but was promptly called to his feet by the local attorney, who was very indignant at this want of respect! The custom appeared very ancient and silly to our modern views and I can readily imagine that it might often become a cruel hardship. tearing about the field as if alarmed, and I quickly discovered that two dogs were hunting them. I woke up the farmer aud we were soon on the spot, but the dogs were too quick for us, and we could only identify one of them, which we recognized as belonging to a farm about three miles off. They had killed and partially eaten two lambs, and seriously mauled three others. My friend at once got out his gig, and we drove off to the farm from whence we thought the culprit hailed, expecting to reach there before the dog. On arriving we told the owner of the animal our errand, and he at once invited us to come and see his sheep-dog, which could not possibly have committed the crime, as he was shut up of a night in the stable. There, truly enough, did we find the collie, looking half asleep and curled up in a corner among the straw. His owner triumphantly pointed him out, but he was a peculiarly-marked dog, and we had both spotted him, and moreover there was a broken window in the stable, and traces of dirty and apparently recent clawmarks on the wall. My farmer looked in the brute's mouth, and thought there was wool on the teeth, but the owner contended that that proved nothing, as the dog had been among his own sheep the previous evening. I then suggested that a dose of salt and water might prove if any mutton had been recently devoured, and the two farmers consenting to this, we dosed poor Some time since we ran across that same anecdote of Brady, attributing the winning of the case to the same cause, in a book on the Bench and Bar. The true inwardness of the hero-worshiping proclivities of the author appears elsewhere in the same volume in still greater degree, where in sketch of John Van Buren and coming to trial of the Forrest divorce case, he says that his subject 'being opposed by Charles O'Conor was of course defeated." Our Court of Ap-collie accordingly, and in a few minutes he disgorged peals have not thought that "being opposed by Charles O'Conor" would per se produce defeat, consummate as was that lawyer's ability. The evidence Forrest had made against himself, the beauty and history of Mrs. Forrest and the high standing of some of her witnesses are thus all overlooked. O that Prince John might reply from the leaden silence of the tomb! Such hero-worship has not its root in reason or fact, and is calculated in time to sap and mar that lofty symmetry which for a season it may drape in picturesque beauty. a quantity of raw lamb with the wool on it, unmistakably recently killed. The case was admitted proved, and the neighbors speedily came to terms as to the question of damage. To me it seemed a most interesting case of canine intelligence, that two scamps of dogs, one we know having sheep within a few yards of him, should not attempt any sport on their own ground, but should deliberately meet some miles off, and then when interrupted tear off to their homes, and like a human criminal endeavor to prove an alibi by being found asleep in bed about the time when the murder was committed."-Law Times. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1891. CURRENT TOPICS. cannot afford to have our favorite after-dinner speaker incarcerated for even a short period - it would make things too dull. The same thing may occur again, and nobody will suffer but the victims. Probably railroads will continue to defy the law against stoves in cars. In the city where we are now writing the street railway companies utterly ignore the ordinance directing them to depress their NE who has just returned from a first tour in rails to the surface of the highway, and nobody speaking ou toy is tional contrasts, and if they are not always to the advantage of his native country he is at least enti ́tled to the concession of impartiality. A lawyer travelling in Europe cannot fail to be struck by the minuteness and detail of public attention and police regulation in respect to private rights and safety. The individual is treated as a helpless or careless and credulous creature, who must be protected against himself at all hazards by the care of the government. The paternal State absorbs all, and the subject supinely submits. He is locked into the railway coach lest he should jump out and hurt himself; he is not permitted to cross a railway at grade lest he should be run over; the fares of public vehicles are laid down and enforced; his very beer is regularly inspected by the police, and if not up to the mark is emptied into the gutter. An English passenger will not suffer more than the lawful number in an omnibus, although the intruders are willing to stand. In one place the pub-trophe of the tumble-down building in New York, lic authorities have planted walnut trees along a road, and numbered them and leased them and their fruit to individuals. In ancient Venice fishing off the Lido was prohibited, because that was the dumping-place for the decapitated bodies of State criminals. The spirit if not the exact practice has descended to these days. Everywhere one sees printed posted notices of legal regulations and penalties for infraction. In our country the citizen resents this interference with his personal freedom. For example, many years ago, the Hudson River Railroad Company tried in vain to keep its coaches locked while in motion; there was a .key in some passenger's pocket to unfasten the door. The individual American, by nature and education and habit, is better qualified to take care of himself than the individual European, but he is proportionately careless about the rights and capacities of others. Perhaps we have just as many careful police statutes and ordinances in this country as there are in Europe, but there is nothing like the disposition to enforce them. Our people are too busy and too indifferent. A New Yorker submits to an enormous and unlawful charge for a public carriage, without even an expostulation, which in London would inevitably send the driver to prison. In matters more serious the contrast is even more glaring. In the matter of the safety of human health and life our people are exceedingly thick-skinned and obThat tunnel accident in the city of New York does not seem to have resulted in any thing but the heartily-approved acquittal of Mr. Depew and his fellow so-called "directors." Of course we VOL. 44-No. 11. with the council. What serious attempt is there anywhere to enforce the excise laws? There are enough of such laws on our statute books to prevent much of the mischief caused by the sale of intoxicants, but there is very little effort to enforce these laws. What was ever done about that rotten dam at Johnstown - or ever will be? For want of a few armed guards, railway trains are frequently "held up" by brigands in the West, and the passengers insulted and robbed, and the employees killed; and yet at every point in Europe is posted an armed policeman or soldier to preserve a peace which seems in little danger of being broken. Mischiefs and emergencies are met here by passing new and more threatening laws, but there is no diligence nor vigor in administration. The offender "takes his chances," as he does in a lottery, and generally with much better success. To all the foregoing utterances we have been moved by the terrible catas tuse. with its appalling attendant destruction of human life. This has occurred in spite of the spasmodic lesson of the Buddensieck case, several years ago, and there is considerable "public excitement," and the ubiquitous newspaper reporter's pencil glows with sharp words, and there is an "investigation;" but who believes that any thing will come of it? Will there be any better supervision of building in the future? Will old buildings be any more sharply examined? The same carelessness and apathy will continue. The citizen, too busy and greedy in his pursuit of the "almighty dollar," and his eagerness to catch it before it becomes so debased as to be substantially worthless, will regret such occurrences, but console himself with the reflection that it is not his business, but that of the public authorities, and continue to take his chances, and add to his life and accident insurance. So the citizens of New York city will continue to have their nostrils offended and their health threatened by the unlawful and noxious use of the public waters as a dumping-place for sundry powerful manufacturing corporations, and even for the deposit of the city sewage. These smells do not reach Albany, but every sojourner in the great city is subject to the danger of being crushed in some monster rickety hotel, or of being burned to death by reason of a failure to enforce the law concerning fire-escapes, even if he is not consumed in the cars or dismembered by a careless collision, or blown up by an uninspected steamboat boiler on his journey thither. Our deduction is, that individual rights are much more sacred and human life is much safer in Europe than in America. What we need here is fewer laws and a more stringent enforcement, less promise and more performance, less vainglory and boasting and more willingness to cultivate a public and efficient regard for individual demands. Perhaps we are a little too broad in the assertion that the chief remedy pursued for infractions of public rights in this country is the enactment of fresh and severer laws. There is one other common remedy a ghastly one, and one that constitutes our main reproach abroad. We refer to lynch-law. Every intelligent public man in Europe with whom we recently conversed on the institutions of this country, brought up against us the existence of this evidence of disorder and a weak government. It must be confessed that it is the one point at which the American feels at a disadvantage, and that it is a very powerful and potent argument against us. The barbarity of slavery has passed away; duelling has fallen almost into disuse, and is everywhere unlawful in this land, we believe; but lynch-law is not only commonly prevalent, but in many communities and in the aggregate has almost usurped the functions of the lawful court of justice and the legal executioner. There have been some faint attempts here to defend or mitigate this wicked practice, but the sufficient answer to them is, that lynch-law knows no mercy and is incapable of reflection or moderation. It always means death, even in a community where the offense in question might not be punishable by death. The lyncher has no prison. So whether the offense is against a man or a mule the rope is the inevitable punishment. We are led to these reflections by reading an account of the recent success, in this country, of the officers of justice in rescuing an offender from the hands of a mob by means of moral.suasion and the assurance that he should be impartially and promptly dealt with by the regular courts. The newspaper in which we saw this incident recorded remarked that there would be no lynch-law in States where the people could trust the lawful courts and officers. The natural reply to this would be that if they are unworthy of trust, the people would better set themselves at the work of reforming them. To the current number of the American Law Review David Dudley Field contributes an instructive article on "Law Reform in the United States and its Influence Abroad," and Mr. Robert Ludlow Fowler, one of the most accomplished legal scholars in this country, supplies a very suggestive article on "The State and Private Corporations." There are several other articles of a good deal of practical interest. In the "Notes," as usual, we find vigorous and original ideas, set forth with all the courage of conviction and with no apology for the appearance of what is regularly stigmatized as the "dogmatic" and "oracular." An earnest man generally gets the reputation of being dogmatic, when in fact he may be much more modest than he who consumes time and space by use of unmeaning phrases, such as "it seems to me," "I venture to think," "in my hum ble opinion," "with all due deference," and sundry other superfluous and Heepish expressions. A man may well speak or write his opinions without any of these apologistic introductions and verbal taking off sation of vanity or dogmatism. of hats, and without any real ground for the accuadmired the manly independence of the Review in We have always this respect, and have never supposed that its editors intended by their directness to entertain any immodest partiality for their own opinions or unduly to desire to impose them upon others. It may be evident that we speak with a grain of personal feeling on this point, for although we do hold certain opinions, and have never been conscious of any diffi dence about declaring them, we do not like to be dogmatic," thought unduly "opinionated" or nor do we presume to set ourselves up as an "oracle." On the contrary, we like to have others disagree with us, for we love a manly and useful controversy, we have a sound respect for the opinions of others, and we are not at all afraid of hard hits. While as usual we find in these "Notes" of the find some things from which we are moved heartily Review much with which we heartily concur, we also to dissent. In the present instance we advert to the instances of the latter rather than the former kind, because they are few and take but little space. For example, the editors say in a notice of the death of Judge John R. Brady: "The courts of New York city have, in several instances, been adorned by judges of the most eminent character, whose opinions are intrinsically superior to the average of those delivered in the court of last resort of that State. This encomium is deserved by the late Judge Duer, John R. Brady also." It would not be difficult to by Charles F. Daly, and unless we are mistaken, by F. Daly, whom Alexander Humboldt, we believe, assent to this estimate of the great Duer. Charles pronounced the best-informed man in America, has learned and elegant opinions. But Judge Brady, adorned our jurisprudence by some extremely although an exceedingly bright, witty, ready and agreeable man, and a lawyer of average attainments, has never been accorded in this State the rank to which our contemporary assigns him, nor can we recall a single opinion of his which is in any degree celebrated. He deserves the reputation of a useful and industrious judge, but it would be mere adulation to liken him to an Allen or a Rapallo, or indeed to almost any other of the judges who have sat in the Court of Appeals in the last twenty years. Again, the Review says: "Whatever title Abraham Lincoln has to fame, it is a misrepresentation of his character to ascribe to him any great distinction as a lawyer. He was a second or third rate western country lawyer, who possessed some learning and a good deal of native wit, but whose chief power lay in pleasing a jury and in telling a smutty anecdote to a lot of old farmers. Lincoln became great through the fact that he was called upon to fill the role of a leader in a crisis, and that he had strength |