Cratty v. City of Bangor, supra, the plaintiff was travelling on foot on Sunday with other persons to make a visit of pleasure to a friend, and it was held that he was travelling in violation of a statute prohibiting travelling on Sunday, unless for charity or necessity. The court further says that "no distinction is made between those who travel within town and those who travel from town to town." In going from Burlington to Colchester and back, a distance of twelve or fourteen miles, to visit Coates for pleasure, or to hunt, the plaintiff was clearly violating the provisions of the Revised Laws, section 4315, prohibiting travelling on Sunday. Every step he took in making that trip was in and of itself a violation of law. In taking one of those steps he slipped and was injured. We think it would savor too strongly of hair-splitting refinement to hold that the injury was not directly caused by the violation of the law in travelling. But in this view of the case, the exception in the policy exempts the defendant from liability, whether the travelling is held to be the cause or only a condition producing injury. or influencing it, directly or indirectly. The liability to accident must be greatly enhanced in the case of a person, who, like the plaintiff, engages in hunting or travelling about the country on Sunday, in open violation of law, as compared with one who observes the law. The defendant has a right to say that it would not assume such increased risk. Vt. Sup. Ct., April 14, 1891. Duran v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co. Opinion by Thompsou, J. INSURANCE -LIFE-LIABILITY -DEATH FROM INHALING GAS.-Under an insurance policy which exempts the company from liability in case of death caused by inhaling gas, recovery cannot be had in case of death caused by the inhalation of illuminating gas, where it is uncertain whether the death was result of an accident or of suicide. There was no visible sign of violence or external injury on his body. The proof shows that when found dead he was lying upon his side in his bed, as if asleep, with no distortion of limb or features, or other evidence of violence, pain or suffering. Plaintiff relies for recovery entirely on Paul v. Insurance Co., 112 N. Y. 472, where, under a policy precisely like this in its terms, the court held that the defendant, "in expressing its intention not to be liable for death from inhaling of gas, can only be understood to mean a voluntary and intelligent act by the insured, and not an involuntary and unconscious act. Read in that sense, and in the light of the context, these words may be interpreted as having reference to medical or surgical treatment in which, ex vi termini, would be included the dentist's work, or to a suicidal purpose." The reasoning by which that court reached its conclusion is not satisfactory to my mind. The language of the policy is so clear as to require no construction. The words are unequivocal that the defendant does not insure against death caused by inhaling gas. There is nothing in the terms of the policy intimating or suggesting that the inhalation of gas must be voluntary or involuntary in order to exempt defendant from liability. That the defendant had the right to so limit its liability there can be no doubt. All the plaintiff's rights in this action arise under the policy. It constitutes the only relation between the parties. If the policy does not, by the fair and natural import of its words, give a right of action under the facts, then the plaintiff has no right of action. It seems to me that the clause under which defendant claims exemption from liability was expressly adopted because of the impossibility, in most cases of death by the inhalation of gas, to decide whether the death was occasioned by the inhalation of gas with suicidal intent or whether it occurred accidently. U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. Ill., June 22. 1891. Richardson v. Travellers' Ins. Co. Opinion by Blodgett, J. 46 Fed. Rep. 843. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO EMPLOYEE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-Plaintiff was injured while coupling an engine to a car because there was not sufficient space for his body between them. The drawbars of the engine and of the car were unusually short, leaving a space of only about ten inches between the end of the car and of the engine when the draw-bars came together, whereas the usual space is from twentyfour to thirty inches. It appearing that plaintiff was injured in consequence of his failure to obey the rule of defendant that he must examine so as to know the kind and condition of the coupling apparatus, the rule giving him sufficient time to make such examination in all cases, held, that he could not recover. It would be contrary to sound policy to suffer the master to exonerate himself from liability in all cases, even by agreement with the servant. But there are defects resulting from the careless performance of the master's duties, so patent that it is very reasonable for the master to charge an employee with the duty of discovering such defects at his peril. Even in the absence of any regulation, the servant is often held accountable for his failure to guard against such defects. In this case the regulation but augmented this obligation. It called the servant's attention to the fact that the very difficulty which occasioned the injury sometimes existed. It notified him that the coupling apparatus of cars and engines were not uniform in size; this embraces differences in length. It apprised him of the dangers of the work; enjoined upon him the duty of examining so as to know the kind and condition of the draw-heads, draw-bars, links and coupling apparatus; prohibited him from placing in the train any car with a defective coupling; and that the rule might be faithfully obeyed by the servant, it explicitly granted to him ample time to observe its behests. The language is unmistakable: "Sufficient time is allowed and may be taken by employees in all cases to make the examination required." It was insisted at the bar of this court that this rule was not ordained in good faith; that it was never expected that an employee would observe it, and that any servant who took sufficient time to follow and obey its requirements must inevitably look for discharge. On what principle this court is asked to attribute a Machiavellian policy to the defendant, we are at a loss to determine; and should we find that only grasping self-interest without one touch of humanity was the motive for this rule, still we must adjudge that its grant of sufficient time to make the examination enjoined was written in good faith, when the rule receives, as we believe it was the purpose of the defendant that it should receive, a reasonable construction. In the light of such an interpretation of it, it is obvious that the use of this time by the servant will not seriously discommode the master or delay the shipment of its freight. And on the other hand, the master has a deep interest in the safety of the servant, for no matter how perfect the former's defense to a claim for damage, the making of that defense is always attended with expense. Unadulterated selfishness would prompt the adoption of a regulation, the observance of which would save such expense, while not materially reducing the servant's efficiency or affecting the volume of work he can perform. It is without force to assert that the master would discharge an employee who would take the necessary time to make the required examination. Should he discharge the servant before his term of employment had expired, for no other reason, the law would give the servant redress; and if no time of employ ment is prescribed, it is the master's legal right, as it is the legal right of the employee, to terminate the relation at any time, without any excuse at all, or for any reason, however unjustifiable in ethics. We would not however be understood as asserting that the master could insist upon a rule when the master's conduct in the discharge of its employees, or in any other manner, indicated a purpose not to accord to the latter the necessary time without which the master's command to the exercise of a higher degree of care could not be obeyed. Its actions must not belie its words. This record discloses no such condition of affairs. Neither the plaintiff nor any other employee of the defendant has been discharged, or threatened with discharge, because he sought in good faith to comply with this regulation, and took the necessary time for that purpose. Nor are we confronted with the difficult question as to the rights of the plaintiff, had some one in superior authority commanded a disregard of the rule; neither was the press of business such that a full observance of its behests was not practicable. There was no exigency. The plaintiff, with the defects in full view one immediately beneath his gaze, and one before his eyes only a short distance away-moved slowly toward his fate, oblivious of danger, because, as he conceded, he took no precautions to discover an open peril. He seeks to excuse his omission to examine the length of the draw-bar by his statement, upon which the verdiet of the jury has set the seal of truth, that he was engaged in looking for a pin with which to make the coupling. The pin could have been found as well after he had observed the defendant's rule, that he must examine to ascertain whether there was any danger from the size of the draw-bars of the engine and of the car. The same argument would exonerate him from blame had the coupling apparatus and the dead-woods been entirely wanting. The defects were patent; the difference between the combined lengths of these drawbars and the combined lengths of those in ordinary use was fourteen to twenty inches. The ratio was about ten to thirty. One was directly beneath his gaze; the other was almost directly before his eyes. There was time for inspection while the engine was moving slowly backward. Further time might have been taken if necessary, under the rule. To fail to discover, under these circumstances, that these drawbars were only about one-third the usual length, must be negligence, particularly in view of the express warning contained in the rule, the injunction to examine so as to know the kind and condition of the coupling apparatus, and the granting of sufficient time for that purpose. When warned of the danger generally, and afforded time to pause and examine whether it existed in the particular case, the servant may not, with thoughtless imprudence, rush headlong upon peril at the expense of his master. Said the court in Karrer v. Railroad Co., 76 Mich. 400, after quoting a regulation of the defendant very similar to the one in the case at bar: "It was plaintiff's duty to examine into the coupling arrangements of both cars before he attempted to couple them, and as they were only a rod apart at most before he started the train back, and as he says the defect was visible at once to any one looking, one or two seconds would have furnished all the time needed to satisfy himself had he been acting under any one else's orders; but as he had personal direction of the engineer's movements and could move when he pleased, the case, as he presents it, was an aggravated one, of the grossest carelessness, for which he, and no one else, was responsible." Said the court in Darracutts v. Railroad Co. (Va.), 2 S. E. Rep. 511, 514: "At all events, the evidence shows that the dangerous condition of the coupling was obvious, and that the plaintiff, in violation of the rules of the company, voluntarily put himself in a position of danger, in consequence of which he was injured. Under these circumstances, in the eye of the law, he was the author of his own misfortune; that is to say, his negligence, or what is the same thing, his failure to use reasonable and proper care and caution was the proximate cause of the injury complained of. The action is not therefore maintainable." In Railroad Co. v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212, there was no rule giving warning, enjoining examination and according sufficient time for that purpose; and yet it was held fatal to recovery that the plaintiff, a brakeman, had failed to notice that there were double dead-woods on the cars he was coupling, instead of a single dead-wood on each, it being contended that it was negligence for the defendant to receive and transport cars equipped with double deadwoods. Said Judge Cooley: "If therefore a switchman were to declare that he had attempted to couple the double dead-woods without noticing how they differed from the cars of defendant, the conclusion would be inevitable that he had gone heedlessly in the performance of a duty requiring great care, and that he had not allowed his eyes to inform him what was before him. *** The best notice is that which a man must of necessity see, and which cannot confuse or mislead him. He needs no printed placard to announce a precipice when he stands before it." In a similar case, Hathaway v. Railroad Co. (Mich.), 16 N. W. Rep. 634, the court said: "In this case the danger consisted in the brakeman being caught between the two deadwoods as they came together. The dead-woods were in plain sight. They were really the most prominent objects on the end of the cars. The plaintiff had a full opportunity of examining the one by which he stood some moments before the cars came together. Its size, shape and the location of the draw-bar were before him. He had only to look at it to be informed of any peril surrounding it. The moving car, at a distance of twenty feet, with its dead-wood and drawbar in plain view, slowly approached the one where the plaintiff was standing. It does not appear that there was any hurry about the business. How could the plaintiff have been better warned? Certainly he knew the car was coming and could see the deadwoods and draw-bar thereon as well as if he had made the coupling a thousand times before. He could not fail to see it if he looked at all. See also Kelly v. Railroad Co., 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 633; Railway Co. v. Black, 88 Ill. 112; Brewer v. Railroad Co. (Mich.), 23 N. W. Rep. 440; Railroad Co. v. Rice (Ark.), 11 S. W. Rep. 699. In several of the cases referred to the master had not, as in the case at bar, imposed upon the servant the duty of extra care, nor had he expressly granted to him sufficient time to enable him to examine the coupling apparatus before making the coupling. N. D. Sup. Ct., July 27, 1891. Bennett 7. Northern Pac. R. Co. Opinion by Corliss, C. J. SLANDER PRIVILEGEMEETING OF POOR LAW GUARDIANS.-At a meeting of a board of poor law guardians certain defamatory statements were made by a member of the board concerning a former clerk of the board. The meeting was open to the public in accordance with the general practice of the board, and some persons other than guardians were present. Held, that his statements, in the absence of malice, were privileged, and that that privilege was not taken away by the presence of persons having no interest in the matter, and not having been brought there by any action of the individual member, but by the action of the whole board. If these words had been spoken at a meeting at which guardians only were present, it is not disputed that the occasion would have been privileged. What is relied on by the plaintiff is, that there were other people than guardians present. not shown whether or not those other persons were rate payers. It has been asserted that, even if they were rate payers, their presence would prevent the occasion from being a privileged one. Rate payers would be parties interested in the matter, and I cannot suppose that their presence would take away the privi lege. But then it is said that those other persons may not have been rate payers, and that some of them were reporters. Suppose a person, whose duty it is to make It was a statement defamatory of another to persons having an interest in the subject-matter, calls in, beside those persons who are interested, other persons who have no interest, I should be inclined to say that it was not less his duty to make the statement, but that his calling in other persons might be evidence of malice. In the present case however it must be assumed that the defendant did not call in the reporters. What then was his position? He did not call them in, but they being there he did not order them out before he made his statement. It must be assumed that they were there by permission of his brother guardians, over whose acts he had no control. Was his duty to speak the words he did taken away by the presence of persons who were present at the instance of the whole body of guardians, over whose actious he had no control? ent. He could not prevent the reporters being presTherefore the occasion being prima facie privileged, the privilege was not taken away by the presence of such people under such circumstances. Asto the case of Williamson v. Freer, L. R., 9 C. P. 393, which was a ruling of my own, that was wholly different to the present case. In that case the defendant, the plaintiff's master, sent a telegram to the plaintiff's father in which he charged her with felony. I should not have had a doubt that, if he had written a letter to the plaintiff's father or mother making the same charge, that would have been privileged. But he in fact made the charge to other people besides the father and mother, at a different time and in a different way. At the time of sending off the telegram he must necessarily have published the charge to the telegraph clerks. That is a very different thing to saying the words to the father and mother, even in the presence of other people. If a man sends a closed letter, containing charges that would be defamatory if sent to a third person, to the person attacked, there is no publication of the defamatory matter; but if he sends the same words to the same person on a post-card, that is a publication to the post-office clerks. Then a question has also arisen as to whether the newspapers may publish defamatory matter that has been spoken on a privileged occasion. Take, for instance, a report of proceedings in a court of justice, where what is said is privileged at the time. Although the words are privileged when they are spoken, are they also privileged when they appear in the newspaper report? Yes, because it is for the public interest that proceedings in a court of justice should be published. The same rule applies as to what is said in the House of Commons. So in other cases, wherever it is for the benefit of the public that words which were privileged when they were spoken should be published in the newspapers, the original privilege is extended to such publication. Whenever, on the other hand, such publication is not for the public interest, although the words were privileged at the time and place when and in respect of the persons to whom they were published, the publication of them by the newspapers is not a publication on a privileged occasion. That is the meaning of the case in the Exchequer Chamber (Purcell v. Sowler, 2 C. P. Div. 215) that was much relied upon by counsel for the plaintiff. It is true that Cockburn, C. J., says incidentally that it would have been better if reporters had not been present when the words were spoken, but he does not suggest that their presence took away the privilege from that occasion. I am therefore of opin ion that the ruling of the learned judge that the occasion on which these words were spoken was privileged was right, that in the absence of malice the defendant was consequently entitled to judgment, and that this appeal should be dismissed. Hannen and Fry, L. J., concurring. Court of Appeal, Jan. 14, 1891. Pittard v. Oliver. Opinion by Lord Esher, M. R. 64 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 788. HOMER A. NELSON-PROPOSED PRESENTA- HE members of the Dutchess county bar propose to THE present a fine portrait of the late Homer A. Nelsou to the New York State Bar Association at its next annual meeting, to be held in this city January 21, 22 and 23 next. Mr. Nelson was a lawyer of learning, sagacity and integrity, acute and earnest, with elevated conceptions of justice and right, distinguished alike as a lawyer and civilian. He was one of the founders of the State Bar Association, and always actively interested in its prosperity. At the time of his death he was chairman of its committee on grievances. The presentation of his portrait to the State Bar Association by the members of a bar of the high standard for learning, thoroughness and precision which distinguishes the Dutchess county bar will be a graceful and honorable tribute to the memory of one of its most eminent members, who also took a high rank at the bar of the city of New York, and who was elected secretary of State by the people. The general committee charged with the duty of making arrangemen ts for the next annual meeting of the association are determined that it shall exceed all previous meetings in brilliance and interest. A jurist of the highest national reputation will deliver the annual address. A large number of members have been added to the roll of the association since the late annual meeting, and the names of fifteen candidates are now before the exe cutive committee to be passed upon for membership.-Albany Times. NOTES. THE case of Mark Hopkins, the man who made the by Searles, second husband, and an adopted son, is thought by the New York Sun to illustrate the old proverb that "no one knows for whom he is working." On the contrary it seems to point very clearly for whom the men who pile up great fortunes are working. They can always reflect that, if they make the accumulated wealth big enough to fight over, they are working to enrich the legal profession.-Pittsburg Dispatch. Inhabitants of Seattle, Wash., witnessed a unique sight on the diamond recently. It was a base ball game between disciples of Blackstone's art and disciples of Christ. The ministers of the Gospel, arrayed in uniform, wielding the willow in an enviable manner, and the legal lights disputed all the decisions with the most forcible verbal arguments which they could command. Bishop Brown emulated Tim Keefe, aud allowed only forty-two hits to be made off his delivery. His parabolic curves were solved with greater ease than his pulpit orations, and they were batted all over. The lawyers went around the bases in the first inning in a manner to suggest that Jay Gould's will was to be probated at the home plate, and secured the unlucky thirA dirge was then rendered for the "pastors' but they turned the tables and tied the score in the fifth inning. Both ines were tired and threw up the sponge with the follow ing score to their credit: teen. Ministera.. R. H. E. 0 3 0 3 12-18 43 17 13 1 3 1 0-18 42 21 The Albany Law Journal. WE ALBANY, OCTOBER 24, 1891. · CURRENT TOPICS. E are quite reconciled to the existence of the "West Reporter system" when it gives us a case like Ellis v. Newbrough, 27 Pac. Rep. 490. This was an action in the Supreme Court of New Mexico for fraud and deceit by means of which the plaintiff was induced to join himself unto the defendant cranks as a member of a body of religious communists and lunatics styling themselves "Faithists." Judge Freeman in the opinion indulges in some very irresistible pleasantry. The case arose on demurrer to the "unique and weird complaint," of which the Judge says: "while communistic in theory, agrarian in habits and vegetarian in diet, was not altogether void of sentimentality nor indifferent to the Muses. One of the fair members of the society, inspired by the poetic surroundings of this fair Land of Shalam, composed some beautiful lines that are incorporated into the record on page 62. They are as follows: 'For all things are held in common, Hooray! Hooray! Thus every thing belongs to all, Away, away, away out West in Shalam!' The authoress of these beautiful and touching lines is Nellie Jones, a member of the society. She is not made a party to this action however, and therefore no judgment can be rendered against her. The lines were by direction of one of appellants, Dr. Newbrough, sung to the air of Dixie. We cannot give our assent however to the views of the able counsel for the appellee, that causing these lines to be sung to the air or 'tune of Dixie' was of itself such an act of disloyalty as to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict. The writer of this "The most that can be gathered from the declara-opinion, like the appellee, is himself a native of the tion is that the defendants had conceived some Uto- land of Dixie, that Fair land of flowers, And flowery land of the fair.' -And as he reads these lines of Nellie Jones, memory carries him back to the days of his boyhood, and to the land of the 'magnolia and the mocking-bird.' O, glorious Laud of Shalam! O, beautiful Church of Tae! When the appellants, the appellee Ada Sweet, and Nellie Jones, aforesaid, formed their inner circle, and like the morning stars sang together, it matters not whether they kept step to the martial strains of Dixie or declined their voices to the softer melody of Little Annie Rooney, the appellee became forever es "Oahspe" is the title of the Faithists' holy book, Ac done; nor can he be heard to say that he has suffered great anguish of mind in consequence of the dishonor and humiliation brought on himself and children by reason of his connection with said defendant's community.' His joining in the exercises aforesaid con the Christian Bible. Looeamong, or Kriste, hav- "There is another reason however why this act of disloyalty on the part of the appellants should not prejudice them; and that is that the plaintiff himself joined in the chorus when the tune of Dixie' was ing, the plaintiff himself being upon the witness stand: sung. On page 109 of the record appears the follow "We think this part of the exhibit ought to have been excluded from the jury, because it is an attack in a collateral way on the title of this man Looeamong, who is not a party to this proceeding, showing that he had not only packed the convention (council) with his friends, but had surrounded the place of meeting with his hosts, a thousand angels deep on every side;' thus violating that principle of our laws which forbids the use of troops at the polls." Question. You all sang this with a good deal of lustiness? Answer. No, sir; we sang to the tune of Dixie. Q. All joined in the chorus? A. Yes, sir; all that could.' Pretermitting any expression of opinion as to whether it would, under any circumstances, be competent to allege and prove in this court that the ode of Shalam had been sung to the tune of Dixie, it is in proof, as we have seen, that the parties were in pari delicto, and therefore neither can avail himself of the other's wrong." We This is certainly sound law and very "exquisite fooling," in which, we suspect, counsel also took a hand. This precious band of idiots had a geographical nomenclature of great affluence. have only room in this number of the JOURNAL for a few of their most expressive names, such as Himalawowoaganapapa, Yublahahcolaesavaganawakka, EEughehabakax, Geobiathhaganegane wohwoh, Sonogallakaxkax, Thuazhoogallakhoomma, PowafucAmong other institutions, the Faithists had a hswowitchahavagganeabba, Anemoosagoochakak f"Faithist Country Store," "that did well as long uela. Of "the queen, Minnegane washaka, with the VOL. 44-No. 17. yellow hair, long hanging down," the judge remarks: "This unquestionably refers to Chicago." Of course Mr. Freeman must include this remarkable case in the American State Reports, and we are quite ready for a consideration-to write a note for it, in his exhaustive and admirable manner, giving a history of all the Utopias and communistic communities that were ever planned or ever existed, from the earliest ages down to Brook Farm, accompanied by comprehensive statistics of the leading and most influential lunatic asylums in this country. a strictly legal character in one week than they do in a month. Where those journals are cited once by lawyers or courts-if they ever are cited-this journal is cited a hundred times. We suppose that where such petty provincial pamphlets are read or referred to by one lawyer, this journal is read by twenty-read and not merely referred to. And we suppose that this journal has never proved any less interesting or influential because of a little attention to what the Central, in one of its scarce editorials, is pleased to satirize as "high literary art." about divorce in this country, and they are doing a good deal to unsettle some common notions about the causes of crimes and the character of those who commit them. The St. Paul Globe says: The Western Law Times is a law journal, edited Statistics are very disturbing things. They have by Archer Martin, and published at Winnipeg, Can-done a great deal to unsettle some of the traditions ada, once a month, to the extent of twenty pages, for which, with a few additional pages of alleged "reports," it asks $5 a year. Giving so little in quantity, it ought to make up in quality, but its quality may be judged by the following bit of criticism of what, in reference to this journal, it is pleased to term "the vagaries of our Yankee "But remember that this is the same scribe who calmly announces in his journal that the Supreme Court of the United States is 'the great-labor compiling and analyzing the data furnished in friend: " We est tribunal in the world' to the utter extinction of the Privy Council, and that Lincoln's Gettysburg oration is as immortal as our language, and without a rival since Pericles!' Let us draw the veil. Ye gods, to think that all these are but as nothings to the fearful jingle of the poetry he published with his said 'impressions!'" The editor also speaks of the "star-spangled snobbery of Central Park." In the same number he publishes some rhymes on the baccarat case which seem to us fully as bad as any that we have ever perpetrated. should think that his patrons would be glad that his paper comes only twelve times a year and that there is so little of it. Somebody having suggested to Sidney Smith that he ought to have some deer in his paddock, he fastened stags' antlers on the heads of his two donkeys. When we see this pseudo Manitoba moose peering solemnly at us over the Canadian boundary fence, we might be impressed were it not his speech bewrays him. If he keeps on with this sort of stuff he will probably unintentionally realize the announcement quoted from Magna Charta on his cover, "We will sell to no man." Insatiate Archer, let this once suffice. Now just one word of neighborly advice to these Scotch, Canadian and other outlandish periodicals that seem so much concerned about this journal. journal has never criticised their methods of editing, but has always minded its own business. If these critics would pay a little more attention to editing their own periodicals, and a little less to editing this journal, they mind find it to their account. If we insert matter that seems to them out of place in a law journal, by the same reasoning their criticisms on it must be out of place in their own. These clever gentry should remember the common fate of the lawyer who tries the opposing lawyer, and not his own case. This journal publishes more serious, solid and useful information of This "The most accepted and substantial theories are liable to be disturbed if the queer people who are always trying their hand at statistics have a chance. For instance, Mr. Morrison, one of the prison governors in England, has been spending a good deal of time and the reports of the British prison commissioners for the to afford conclusions of a general character. In the past five years. They are extensive and varied enough main, they may apply as well to the United States as to England and Wales. The prevalent theory has been that crimes, and especially those involving propwithout employment. As there are more of these in erty, are mainly committed by persons in need and winter than summer, it has been the impression that crimes are most numerous in the cold season. The figures adduced show that not to be the fact. The jails have the smallest number of inmates in February, and the increase is constant to October, when the reduction commences. to show that more than half of the crimes were comThen the relentless figures are made mitted by those who had employment and were credited with industrious habits. Only two per cent are charged to the habitually criminal classes, and not more to those impelled by want; nor was it found It was not so common among the petty and vulgar that education led notably to the paths of rectitude. criminals, but the men who operated in banks, counting houses, as trustees of estates, and in places of responsibility, among men whose education had enabled them to pursue criminal ways with more dignity and adroitness. Training and mental development increase the capacity for crime. But the fact most noteworthy in these investigations was that the poorer classes are given more of the criminal record than be longs to them. This will no doubt be found equally the fact in this country as in England." It does not appear that the Globe has any warrant for calling this statistician "queer." His statistics seem queer," but that is not his fault. We should free our minds of cant on this subject, as well as on all others, and if our pre-conceived opinions and beliefs are shown to be unfounded or doubtful, we should thank the statistician who corrects or modifies them. If industry, education, physical comfort and pecuniary ease do not absolutely prevent men from committing crime, it cannot hurt us any to know it, although it will probably not result in counselling idleness or abolishing common schools or recommending insufficient clothing and food. |