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upon it demonstrated. It may be otherwise where the relation between the parties is such that a reply might be properly expected." In this case I think it would be unreasonable and insensible to suppose that the defendant was called upon to answer the statements contained in the plaintiff's letter to him, upon the alternative that they must be taken to be true if he did not deny them. In Bessela v. Stern, 2 C. P. D. 265, a conversation between the plaintiff and defendant was overheard, in which the defendant, on being taxed with having promised to marry the plaintiff, did not deny it. That, it is true, was held to be some corroborating evidence. That however was a very different case from this. The Court of Appeal held, that having regard to the circumstances under which the statement was made, the fact that the defendant did not deny it was evidence of an admission that it was correct. The case only illustrates the limitation to be placed upon the doctrine that silence is not evidence of an admission unless it is reasonable to expect that if the statements made were untrue they would be met with an immediate denial. I am of opinion that there was no evidence in corroboration of the alleged promise to marry.

KAY, L. J. The plaintiff's counsel relies upon various matters as evidence which corroborated the plaintiff's testimony that the defendant promised to marry her. I may dispose of some of those matters very shortly. With respect to the ring, it is, to my mind, impossible to treat the possession by the plaintiff of the defendant's signet ring as corroboration of the promise. A man does not usually give his signet ring in such cases. It was said that the fact of the defendant not answering certain letters was evidence in corroboration of the promise. The letter written by the burgomaster contains no mention of a promise of marriage, and is clearly not evidence in corroboration. The letter written by the pastor of the German Church is a letter written by a perfect stranger to the defendant, and it contains a threat to punish him by means of the law or the press for his misconduct. It is clearly a letter which nine out of ten men would refuse to answer, and the refusal to answer it cannot be any corroboration. The real question is, whether the letters written by the plaintiff herself so imperatively required an answer, that the not answering is evidence that the defendant admitted the truth of the statement that he had promised to marry her. I decline to lay down any general rule on this matter. There are certain letters written on business matters, and received by one of the parties to the litigation before the court, the not answering of which has been taken as very strong evidence that the person receiving the letter admitted the truth of what was stated in it. In some cases that is the only possible conclusion which could be drawn, as where a man states, "I employed you to do this or that business upon such and such terms," and the person who receives the letter does not deny the statement and undertakes the busi

ness.

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the mere fact of his declining to answer affords the corroborating evidence required by the act of Parlia ment. I agree with what has been said by the rest of the court in this respect, and I think that the proper course which the learned judge at the trial ought to have taken was to say that the plaintiff's evidence with respect to the promise had not been materially corroborated in such a way that there was any thing left to go to the jury on the issue of breach of promise of marriage.

Motion granted accordingly.

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Charles A. Prince and R. D. Weston-Smith, for defendant.

LATHROP, J. The plaintiff does not contend that he had any express invitation from the defendant to en⚫ ter upon its premises, but that he was enticed or allured by the attractiveness of the turn-table, and the proposition of law upon which he relies is that, if a railroad company leaves a turn-table unlocked or unguarded upon its own premises, near a public highway. or in an open or exposed position near the accustomed or probable place of resort of children, it is for the jury to determine, even in the absence of other evidence as to the attractive nature of the turn-table, whether it is in and of itself calculated to attract children, and whether a child injured upon it was in fact attracted or allured by it; that if so allured or attracted, the child comes upon the premises of the railroad company through its implied invitation or inducement, and is not a bare licensee or trespasser, and that the company owes to such child the duty to refrain from ordinary negligence with respect to the condition and management of its turn-table. The turn-table is stated in the exceptions to have been five or six hundred feet from a highway crossing the railroad, and six hundred feet from another highway crossing. Shortly before the accident the plaintiff and some other boys were at a station on the railroad, which appears by a plan used at the trial to have been about one thousand feet from the turn-table; that they then asked some trainmen who were switching cars on the tracks adjacent to the turn-table to let them ride on the cars, and on being

in the exceptions to show that the turn-table was attractive is that it had large upright standards or guys, twelve to fifteen feet in height, which could be seen from a considerable distance.

The only fair way of stating the rule of law is that in every case you must look at all the circumstances under which the letter was written, and you must determine for yourself whether the circum-refused went to the turn-table. The only thing stated stauces are such that the refusal to reply alone amounts to an admission. The facts in the present case are that the defendant had had sexual connection with the plaintiff. They had parted, he giving her £100. She goes to an hotel at Cannes, where his mother was living, and she writes to him from that hotel, having seen his mother, and states in effect that he had promised her marriage. Is it an irresistible inference that by declining to answer the letter he must be taken to have admitted the promise? His declining to answer is just as consistent with his not having made the promise as with his having made it. I cannot see that

The cases upon which the plaintiff relies may be divided into two classes. Those of the first class rest upon the proposition that, if a turn-table is of a dangerous nature and character, when unlocked or unguarded, in a place much resorted to by the public, and where children are wont to go and play, it is the duty of the railroad company owning the turn-table to keep the same securely locked or fastened, so as to

prevent it from being turned or played with by children, or to keep the same guarded. Stout v. Railroad Co., 2 Dill. 294; Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United was apparently approved of in Railroad Co. v. Bailey, 11 Neb. 332, and followed in Railway Co. v. Simpson, 60 Tex. 103; Railway Co. v. Styron, 66 id. 421; Evansich v. Railway Co., 57 id. 123; Railway Co. v. McWhirter, 77 id. 356. See also Bridger v. Railroad Co., 25 S. C. 24; Ferguson v. Railway Co., 75 Ga. 637; 77 id. 102. The second class of cases proceeds upon the doctrine of constructive invitation; that is, that if a person is allured or tempted by some act of a railroad company to enter upon its land, he is not a trespasser, and it is held that leaving a turn-table unguarded is such an act. Keffe v. Railway Co., 21 Minn. 207; O'Malley v. Railroad Co., 43 id. 289; Railway Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 22 Kan. 686; Nagel v. Railway Co., 75 Mo. 653. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Railroad Co. v. Stout rests upon the proposition stated by Mr. Justice Hunt, "that while a railway company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts." The cases cited in support of this proposition are Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507; Daley v. Railroad Co., 26 id. 591, and Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628. With the exception of Daley v. Railroad Co., all of these cases come within other rules, or within well-defined exceptions to the general rule that a land-owner owes no duty to a trespasser, except he must not wantonly or intentionally injure him or expose him to injury. Lynch v. Nurdin, ubi supra, rests upon the doctrine that if a person unlawfully places an obstruction in a way, he is liable to a child who is injured thereby, although the child wrongfully meddles with the obstruction. The contrary however was held in Hughes v. Macfie, 2 Hurl. & C. 744, and in Mangan v. Atterton, L. R., 1 Exch. 239. In Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136, the plaintiff was found to be without fault, and not a trespasser. See also Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. Div. 327; Powell v. Deveney, 3 Cush. 300. Birge v. Gardner, ubi supra, rests upon the doctrine that an owner of land has no right to use his land near a highway in such a manner as to make it a public nuisance. To the same effect is Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Penn. St. 332. Bird v. Holbrook, ubi supra, decides that a land-owner cannot lawfully, without giving notice, set traps upon his own land for the purpose of injuring trespassers, and that if a person is injured by such a trap he may recover. And in Connecticut the rule is held to be the same, though no notice is given. Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1. This, as pointed out by Morton, J., in Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44, 49, proceeds upon the ground that the owner of land cannot wantonly injure a trespasser. The case of a trespasser injured by a vicious animal stands upon the same footing. Marble v. Ross, ubi supra. owner of land adjoining a public street is undoubtedly liable for an excavation made by him therein if the land, with his consent, has for a long time been used by the public as a street. Larue v. Hotel Co., 116 Mass. 67; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283. The case of Daley v. Railroad Co., ubi supra, so far as it tends to support the result reached in Railroad Co. v. Stout, ubi supra. must be considered as overruled by Nolan v. Railroad Co., 53 Conn. 461.

The

The Court of Appeals of New York has stated in a well-considered case, that it does not uphold the decision in Railroad Co. v. Stout, ubi supra, and, although it seeks to distinguish that case from the one before it, the difference between the two cases is not very ap

parent. McAlpin v. Powell, 70 N. Y. 126. In this case the plaintiff's intestate, a boy in his tenth year, stepped out of a window of the house in which he lived upon the platform of a fire-escape, and fell through a trapdoor therein which was insecurely fastened. The defendant was the landlord of the house, and it was his duty to keep the fire-escape in order. It was held that he owed no duty to one who was using the fire-escape for his own pleasure, and that the defendant was not liable. In Frost v. Railroad Co., 64 N. H. 220, the plaintiff, a boy seven years of age, was injured while playing upon a turn-table of the defendant's railroad. The ground upon which he sought to recover was that he was attracted to the turn-table by the noise of boys playing upon it. The turn-table was on the defendant's land, about sixty feet from a public street, in a cut with high, steep embankments on each side, and was insecurely fastened. It was held that the plaintiff was but a trespasser, and that, under the circumstances, the defendant owed him no duty. The court expressly refused to follow the case of Railroad Co. v. Stout, ubi supra. On the question whether the defendant was liable on the ground of an implied invitation, Clark, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "One having in his possession agricultural or mechanical tools is not responsible for injuries caused to trespassers by careless handling, nor is the owner of a fruit tree bound to cut it down or inclose it, or exercise care in securing the staple and lock with which his ladder is fastened, for the protection of trespassing boys who may be attracted by the fruit. Neither is the owner or occupant of premises upon which there is a natural or artificial pond, or a blueberry pasture, legally required to exercise care in securing his gates and bars to guard against accidents to straying and trespassing children. The owner is under no duty to a mere trespasser to keep his premises safe, and the fact that the trespasser is an infant cannot have the effect to raise a duty where none otherwise exists."

Subject to the exceptions we have before stated, and to some others which it is not necessary more particularly to refer to, an owner of land may use his land in such manner as he sees fit, and if a trespasser or mere licensee is injured he cannot complain that, if the owner had used it in a more careful manner, no injury would have resulted. Hounsell v. Smyth, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 731, and cases cited; Clark v. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577; Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271; Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 Penn. St. 74; Cauley v. Railway Co., 95 id. 398; Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 id. 144; Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1. See also Sweeny v. Railroad Co., 10 Allen, 368; Metcalfe v. Steamship Co., 147 Mass. 66, and cases cited; Barstow v. Railroad Co., 143 id. 535. In Johnson v. Railroad Co., 125 id. 75, the plaintiff bought a ticket of the defendant corporation which entitled her to be carried from Boston to Lawrence. She went as far as Somerville, a way station, and there left the cars and went to a house near by, intending to take a later train for Lawrence. After remaining at the house for a while, she returned to the station, and, while crossing the tracks to the station of another railroad corporation to meet her son, was injured. The space between the two stations was partly planked and partly filled in with earth so as to form a convenient passage-way, and evidence was offered that a large number of passengers were in the habit of using this space as the plaintiff was using it, and that no notice or warning to the contrary had been posted. It was held that the evidence failed to show that the defendant held out any inducement to the plaintiff to enter its premises; that the use of the premises as a passageway by strangers was a matter in which the defendant was absolutely passive, and from which nothing was to be inferred in favor of or in aid of the plaintiff, and

that the plaintiff was a mere intruder and could not recover. See also Wright v. Railroad Co., 129 Mass. 440. In Morrissey v. Railroad Co., 126 id. 377, a child four years of age was run over by the cars of a railroad corporation while using the track as a play-ground. There was a foot-path across the track which was used by persons, but in which the plaintiff had no rights, and by which he got upon the track. Evidence was offered that the defendant had been notified that the place was dangerous for children, and had been requested to place a fence across the path. The court held that the plaintiff was a mere trespasser upon the track; that no inducement or implied invitation had been held out to him, and that he could not recover. There was some evidence in this case that the engineer acted maliciously, or with gross and willful carelessness, and this question was submitted to the jury who found for the defendant. In Wright v. Railroad Co., 142 Mass. 296, there was a well-defined path leading to a railroad track, and an opening in a ridge near the track, and a passage-way for the path through the ridge. There was no fence or obstruction to prevent persons from going on the track from the path, and when freight cars stood on the track an opening opposite the path was sometimes left. This path had been used by persons to cross the track, and no objection had been made by the defendant's servants to persons crossing there, except when cars were approaching. The plaintiff, a boy between six and seven years of age, was injured while going to school, and crossing the track by the path. It was held that these facts would not warraut the jury in finding that the defendant had held out an inducement or invitation to the plaintiff to use the path to cross the track.

The case

of McEachern v. Railroad Co., 150 Mass. 515, came up on demurrer to the declaration, which alleged in substance that the defendant, a railroad corporation, left a car standing on one of several side tracks adjoining a public street; that the defendant knew that one of the doors of the car was insecurely fastened, and was liable, upon receiving a slight touch, to fall to the ground; that the defendant well knew that said car "then was, and would be, an enticing, attractive and inviting object to children, and well knowing that children then were, and long prior thereto had been, accustomed to play in, upon, around and about such cars as might happen from time to time to be placed upon any of said side tracks;" that the plaintiff, being then upwards of eleven years of age, was travelling upou the street in the vicinity of the side track upon which the car was standing, "and saw said car with its open door, and was thereby enticed and invited to look into said car, and thereupou did undertake to look into said car, exercising therein as much care as could reasonably be expected of a child of his years and capacity, and that in attempting to look into said car he carefully touched said door, and immediately said door fell upon him," and injured him. murrer was sustained, on the ground that the plaintiff was a trespasser, committing an unlawful act in meddling with the defendant's car; that he was not invited or enticed there by the defendant, and that the defendant owed him no duty to have the car safe for him to visit. In McCarty v. Railroad Co., 153 Mass.

The de

It was

, a child about five years old strayed from the yard of the house in which it lived onto a street, and thence into the freight-yard of a railroad corporation, where it was injured. The freight-yard was parallel with the street, and there was no fence between. held, in the absence of evidence, that a fence was required by the Public Statutes, chapter 112, section 115; that it did not appear that there was any evidence of a breach of any duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff. The cases which we have last cited are conclusive of the one at bar, whatever may be the rule elsewhere. The plaintiff was a mere trespasser upon

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the land of the defendant. We find no evidence of any invitation by the defendant or inducement held out to him to go there, and no evidence of a breach of any duty which it owed to him. The Superior Court rightly directed a verdict for the defendant. Exceptions overruled.

BANKS-NATIONAL-TAXATION- DEDUCTION OF INDEBTEDNESS.

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT, SEPT 16, 1891.

BRESSLER v. WAYNE COUNTY.

The owner of National bank stock, in listing his shares for taxation, is not entitled to deduct his bona fide indebtedness from the value of such shares of stock. The decision on the former hearing of the case, reported in 25 Nebraska, 468, overruled.

NORVAL, J. This case is on rehearing, the opinion being reported in 25 Nebraska, 468. The question involved is the right of the owner of shares in a National bank, having no other credits or moneyed capital, to have deducted, in the assessment and taxation of such shares, his bona fide debts. On the former hearing it was held that, under section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, he was entitled to such deduction. Said section 5219 permits State taxation of the shares of stock in National banks, subject only to two restrictions: First, "that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State," and second, "that the shares of any National bauking association, owned by non-residents of any State, shall be taxed in the city or town where the bank is located and not elsewhere."

The second limitation is not important in this case, but it is claimed that by not allowing bona fide debts to be deducted, in the assessment of shares in National banks, the State thereby places a higher burden of taxation upon money invested in National banks than is imposed upon other moneyed capital, and therefore contravenes the first restriction imposed by Congress in the section above referred to. The Supreme Court of the United States has in many cases considered and construed the provisions of the act of Congress which limit the power of the States in the taxation of National bank shares. A reference to some of these decisions will aid in the determination of the question involved in this case. In People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539, it was held that the statute of the State of New York, which permits a tax payer, in listing his property for taxation, to deduct the amount of his debts from the valuation of all his personal property, includ ing moneyed capital, except his bank shares, is in conflict with the act of Congress, in that shares of National banks are required to be assessed higher in proportion to their real value than other moneyed capital in the hands of citizens of the State is valued for taxation. It is further held that the rule of uniformity in the taxation of such shares applies to the valuation of the shares, as well as to the ratio of percentage laid on such valuation. To the same effect is Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305. In Pelton v. Bank, 101 id. 143, it is held that where a State statute provides for the valuation of all moneyed capital for taxation at its true value, including shares of the National banks, and the taxing officers intentionally assess such shares at their actual valuation, while other moneyed capital was assessed far below its real value, such assessment of National bank stock was in violation of section 5219 of the Revised Statutes. In Bank v. Britton, 105 U. S. 322, it was ruled that under the statute of Indiana, which allows deductions of bona fide debts

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ties by way of loans, discount or otherwise, which are from time to time, according to the rules of the business, reduced again to money and reinvested. It includes money in the hands of individuals employed in a similar way, invested in loans or in securities for the payment of money, either as an investment of a permanent character or temporarily, with a view to sale or repayment and reinvestment. In this way the moneyed capital in the hands of individuals is distinguished from what is known generally as personal property.'

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to be made from all credits, in listing the same for taxation, the assessing of National bank shares, without permitting the shareholder to deduct from the value the amount of his bona fide debts, is a discrimination forbidden by Congress. In the more recent case of Bank v. City of New York, 121 U. S. 138, the court, in an able and exhaustive opinion, construed the meaning of the words "other moneyed capital," as used in the act of Congress. We quote from the opinion: "The key to the proper interpretation of the act of Congress is its policy and purpose. The object of the law was to establish a system of National banking institutions, It follows from these decisions that any method of in order to provide a uniform and secure currency for assessment of taxes which prohibits the owner of Nathe people, and to facilitate the operations of the treas- tional bank shares, who owns no other credits or ury of the United States. * The main purpose moneyed capital, from deducting his bona fide indebttherefore of Congress, in fixing limits to State taxation edness from the value of such shares, and permits the on investments in the shares of National banks, was deduction of such debts in the assessment of like propto render it impossible for the State, in levying such a erty similarly situated, conflicts with the act of Contax, to create and foster an unequal and unfriendly gress. Was the rule of uniformity prescribed by the competition, by favoring institutions or individuals Federal statute violated in the assessment of the plaincarrying on a similar business, and operations and in- tiff in error? In determining this question it will be vestments of a like character. The language of the act necessary to examine some of the provisions of the of Congress is to be read in the light of this policy. Revenue Law of this State. Sections 27, 30 and 33 of Applying this rule of construction, we are led in the the Revenue Law are as follows: Sec. 27. In making first place to consider the meaning of the words 'other up the amount of credits which any person is required moneyed capital,' as used in the statute. Of course it to list for himself, or for any other person, company or includes shares in National banks; the use of the word corporation, he shall be entitled to deduct from the 'other' requires that. If bank shares were not gross amount of credits the amount of all bona fide moneyed capital, the word 'other' in this connection | debts owing by such person, company or corporation, would be without significance. But moneyed capital' to any other person, company or corporation, for a does not mean all capital the value of which is meas- consideration received; but no acknowledgment of inured in terms by money. In this sense all kinds of debtedness not founded on actual consideration, bereal and personal property would be embraced by it, lieved when received to have been adequate, and no for they all have an estimated value as the subjects of such acknowledgment made for the purpose of being sale. Neither does it necessarily include all forms of so deducted, shall be considered a debt, within the investment in which the interest of the owner is ex- meaning of this section, and so much only of any liapressed in money. Shares of stock in railroad compa- bility, as surety for others, shall be deducted as the nies, mining companies, manufacturing companies and person making out the statement believes he is legally other corporations are represented by certificates and equitably bound and will be compelled to pay on showing that the owner is entitled to an interest, ex- account of the inability or insolvency of the principal pressed in money value, in the entire capital and prop- debtor; and if there are other sureties who are able to erty of a corporation; but the property of a corpora- contribute, then only so much as the surety in whose tion which constitutes its invested capital may consist behalf the statement is made will be bound to conmainly of real and personal property, which in the tribute; provided, that nothing in this section shall be hands of individuals no one would think of calling so construed as to apply to any bank, company or cormoneyed capital, and its business may not consist in poration exercising banking powers or privileges, or any kind of dealing in money, or commercial repre- to authorize any deductions allowed by this section sentatives of money. So far as the policy of the gov- from the value of any other item of taxation than ernment in reference to National banks is concerned, credits." "Sec. 30. Every bank (not incorporated), it is indifferent how the State may choose to tax such banker, broker or stock jobber shall, at the time fixed corporations as those just mentioned, or the interest by this chapter for listing personal property, make out of individuals in them, or whether they should be and furnish the assessor a sworn statement showing: taxed at all. ** *The business of banking, as de- First, the amount of property on hand or in transit; fined by law and custom, consists in the issue of notes second, the amount of funds in the hands of other payable on demand, intended to circulate as money, banks, bankers, brokers or others subject to draft; where the banks are banks of issue, in receiving de- third, the amount of checks or other cash items, the posits payable on demand, in discounting commercial amount thereof not being included in either of the paper, making loans of money on collateral security, preceding items; fourth, the amount of bills receivbuying and selling bills of exchange, negotiating loans able, discounted or purchased, and other credits due, and dealing in negotiable securities issued by the gov- or to become due, including accounts receivable, and ernment, State and National, and municipal and other interest accrued but not due, and interest due and uncorporations. These are the operations in which the paid; fifth, the amount of bonds and stocks of every capital invested in National banks is employed, and it kind, State and county warrants, and other municipal is the nature of that employment which constitutes it securities, and shares of capital stock of joint-stock or in the eye of this statute 'moneyed capital.' Corpo- other companies or corporations, held as an investment rations and individuals carrying on these operations or any way representing assets; sixth, all other propdo come into competition with the business of Na-erty appertaining to said business, other than real estional banks, and capital in the hands of individuals thus employed is what is intended to be described by the act of Congress. ** ** * The terms of the act of Congress therefore include shares of stock or other interests owned by individuals in all enterprises in which the capital employed in carrying on its business is money, where the object of the business is the making of profit by its use as money. The moneyed capital thus employed is invested for that purpose in securi

tate (which real estate shall be listed and assessed as other real estate is listed and assessed under this act); seventh, the amount of deposits made with them by other parties; eighth, the amount of all accounts payable, other than current deposit accounts; ninth, the amount of bonds and other securities exempt by law from taxation, specifying the amount and kind of each, the same being included in the preceding fifth item. The aggregate amount of the first, second and third

items in said statement shall be listed as moneys. The amount of the sixth item shall be listed the same as other similar personal property is listed under this chapter. The aggregate amount of the seventh and eighth items shall be deducted from the aggregate amount of the fourth item of said statement, and the amount of the remainder, if any, shall be listed as credits. The aggregate amount of the ninth item shall be deducted from the aggregate amount of the fifth item of such statement, and the remainder shall be listed as bonds or stocks." "Sec. 33. The stockholders in every bank located within this State, whether such bank has been organized under the laws of this State or of the United States, shall be assessed and taxed on the value of their shares of stock therein in the county, town, precinct, village or city where such bank or banking association is located, and not elsewhere, whether such stockholders reside in such place or not. Such shares shall be listed and assessed, with regard to the ownership and value thereof, as they existed on the first day of April, annually, subject however to the restriction that taxation of such shares shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon any other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of this State, in the county, town, precinct, village or city where such bank is located. The shares of capital stock of National banks not located in this State, held in this State, shall not be required to be listed under the provisions of this act."

It will be observed that section 27 authorizes the individual tax payer to deduct the bona fide debts owing by him from the gross amount of his credits, and prohibits any deduction from the value of any other item or property of taxation than credits. The word "credits," as used in the section, was not intended to include notes, securities, accounts due or other credits which are the assets of any bank, banker, broker or stock jobber, but was intended to cover debts due the tax payer growing out of the other ordinary business transactions. We must therefore look elsewhere for the rule which governs the assessment of moneyed capital invested in the banking business. Section 33 declares that shares of stock in every bank within the State, whether incorporated under the laws of this State or the United States, shall be assessed according to their value, subject to the restriction" that the taxation of such shares shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of the individual citizens of this State." This limitation is the same as imposed by Congress upon the States as a condition to the taxation of National banks. So it cannot be said that the Legislature, in providing for the taxation of National banks, has unfavorably discriminated against them. The word "rate," as used in this section, applies as well to the valuation of the shares of the stockholder as to the ratio of tax to be levied thereon. There must be uniformity, both in the assessment and the levying of the tax. National bank shares cannot be assessed at their full value and "other moneyed capital" below its actual value. Looking to section 30, we find that in assessing the property of unincorporated banks, and that of bankers, brokers and stock jobbers, they are allowed to deduct the amount of their indebtedness to depositors and the amount of all accounts payable, other than current deposit accounts from the amount of their bills receivable, and other credits due, or to become due, but this deduction cannot be made from any other item of their property. The fact that the unincorporated bank is entitled to such deduction is no valid reason why the debts of the owner of National bank stock should be deducted from the value of his shares in assessing them. National banks are assessed solely by taxing the shares of stock. incorporated banks there are no shares to tax, and the Legislature of necessity was compelled to adopt a dif

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ferent method of taxing them, by assessing the value of the capital therein invested, which is practically the difference between the value of the assets and the amount of liabilities. The shares of a National bank do not represent the assets of the bank, but rather the difference between the value of its property and its liabilities. While the method of assessing National banks is different from that by which a private bank or banker is assessed, the rule of uniformity is preserved so that it cannot be said that the law of the State requires that National banks shall be taxed at a greater rate than is imposed upon the capital invested in the State banks.

It must we think be conceded that the larger part of the moneyed capital of the individual citizens of this State, within the meaning of the words " other moneyed capital," as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States, is in the hands of brokers, stock jobbers and incorporated and unincorporated State banks. And as the State has not, in the taxation of the capital thus invested, unjustly discriminated against the National banks, the fact that in the assessment of a small portion of the moneyed capital in the State, which is not invested so as to come in competition with the National banks, the tax payer is permitted to deduct his bona fide indebtedness from credits, is not such a discrimination as violates the rule of equity required by the legislation of Congress. The principle was substantially recognized in the case of Bank v. City of New York, supra. In that case the plaintiff, a National bank located in the city of New York, brought suit against the defendants to enjoin the collection of taxes levied upon the shares of the stockholders of the bank, claiming that the laws of the State exempt from taxation so much of the moneyed capital of the individual tax payer as creates a discrimination against capital invested in such shares. The laws of the State of New York exempt from assessment shares of stock in trust companies, life insurance companies, deposits in savings banks and bouds of the municipalities of the State. The court held the exemptions already mentioned did not effect an unfriendly or unlawful discrimination against National banks, or the capital therein invested, nor does it result in taxing the shares of such banks at a higher rate than is levied upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of the State. So in the case of Adams v. Nashville, 95 D. S. 19, it is held that taxes assessed on National bank shares are not invalidated by reason of the exemption from taxation by State authority of bonds issued by the city of Nashville in the hands of individuals. The rule deducible from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court is that, where the rate fixed by the State for the taxation of capital in the hands of individual citizens, situated similarly to that invested in National banks, is not less than that placed upon National bank shares, the rule of uniformity prescribed by the act of Congress is maintained, even though some moneyed capital in the State, which is invested by individuals in business or enterprises, which do not come in competition with National banks, is exempt from taxation, or is assessed at a less rate than is imposed upon shares of stock in National banks. It is obvious that the laws of this State providing for the taxation of National banks are in perfect harmony with this rule, and that the plaintiff in error has no legal ground to complain because he was not permitted to deduct the amount of his debts from the value of his National bank stock. If our statute permitted debts to be deducted from the value of all kinds of property or from all credits, in listing the same for assessment, as the laws of some of the States allow, then the indebtedness of the owner of National bank shares would have to be deducted from the value of his shares. But the proviso clause of section 27 of the Revenue Law of this State provides that the rule

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