the act was committed, so that as to that offense it is ex post facto?" "In that case," said the court, "the Constitution of Missouri so changes the rule of evi Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, quoted afterward by the Supreme Court of the United States with approval, and which has been generally accepted by the courts as a comprehensive and correct defini-dence that what was conclusive evidence of innocence tion, which is as follows: "(1) Every law which makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action; (2) every law that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; (3) every law that changes the punishment and enforces a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender." Measured by this standard, the law in question cannot be said to be ex post facto in its effect. If so,uuder what classification does it fall? We cannot agree with the appellant that either any thing decided or any dictum in the case of Kring v. State, 107 U. S. 221, supports his contention in this case. What was held in that case was that "within the meaning of the Constitution any law is ex post facto which is enacted after the offense was committed, and which, in relation to it or its consequences, alters the situation of accused to his disadvantage." Kring had been indicted for murder in the first degree. He had been tried four times and convicted once on a plea of guilty of murder in the second degree, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for twenty-five years. He took an appeal from the judgment on the ground that he had had an understanding with the prosecuting attorney that if he would plead as he did his sentence should not exceed ten years' imprisonment. The judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court, and when the case came on for trial again he refused to withdraw his plea of murder in the second degree, and refused to renew his plea of not guilty, which had been withdrawn when he pleaded murder in the second degree. The court then, against his remonstrance, made an order setting aside his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree, and directed a general plea of not guilty to be entered. On this plea he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to death, and the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. It was conceded in that case that, at the time of the commission of the crime, in the State of Missouri under the law, the acceptance by the prosecuting attorney and the court of the plea of murder in the second degree to an indictment of murder in the first degree, and the conviction and sentence of the defendant under it of murder in the second degree, was an acquittal of the charge of murder in the first degree, and that he could not be tried again for that offense, but the State court overruled this defense on the ground that by section 23 of article 2 of the Constitution of Missouri, which took effect after the commission of the crime by Kring, the former law was abrogated, and that he could be tried for murder in the first degree notwithstanding his conviction and sentence for murder in the second degree, and the Supreme Court of the United States, by a divided court, held that the article in the new Constitution was an ex post facto law. But in that case a perfect defense to the crime of murder in the first degree which existed at the time of the commission of the crime was taken away by the new law, a defense at least which the defendant could avail himself of by the consent of the court, and a defense which he had availed himself of by such consent at his former trial. And well the court said: "Whatever may be the essential nature of the change, it is one which to the defendant involves the difference between life and death." And again says the court: "The question here is, does it deprive the defendant of any right of defense which the law gave him when of the higher grade of murder when the crime was committed, namely, a judicial conviction for a lower rate of homicide, is not received in evidence at all, or if received is given no weight in behalf of the offender. It also changes the punishment, for whereas the law as it stood when the homicide was committed was that when convicted of murder in the second degree he could never be tried or punished by death for murder in the first degree, the new law enacts that he may be so punished notwithstanding the former conviction." But it is certainly difficult to see the application of this reasoning to the case at bar. It is true, as urged by appellant, that section 1000 of the Code of Washington provides that "when an indictment indorsed 'Not a true bill' has been presented in court and filed, the effect thereof is to dismiss the defendant, and the same cannot be submitted to or inquired of by the grand jury unless the court so orders." But this section is evidently not intended to coufer any right upon the defendant, but simply to expedite the business of the court, subject to the direction of the court. In order to make it avail the defendant it must be presumed, first, that the grand jury would have returned "Not a true bill," and second, that after they had done so the court would not have allowed the charge to be submitted to another grand jury. Such presumptions can hardly be indulged in favor of defendants who seek to escape from a trial upon the merits. No one can or should question the right of the defendant to be tried by the law in force when the crime was committed. This is a principle that is founded in natural justice, that is warranted by the wisdom of ages and guaranteed by our Constitution, but while the defendant must be protected in every substantial right, the rule must not be so narrowly construed as to defeat the ends of justice, or hamper or retard progress by preventing the enactment of laws governing questions of procedure which experience teaches us should be enacted, but the limitation must be construed as affecting the rights of parties, as distinguished from such as merely change the remedies by which those rights are to be enforced. In this case we cannot see that the condition of the defendant is changed for the worse. The law complained of makes no new offense. It gives no new definition to the crime he is charged with. It does not increase the punishment for the commission of the crime. It does not change the rules of evidence to make conviction more easy. None of his rights are interfered with. Upon his arraignment he stands in exactly the same position with reference to his trial and the probabilities of his acquittal or conviction that he did when the old law was in force. The State has simply changed its procedure. Of this he cannot be heard to complain, for as is said by Mr. Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, page 329: “So far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party has no more right in a criminal than in a civil action to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies must always be under the coutrol of the Legislature, and it would create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to be conducted only in accordance with the rules of prac. tice, and heard only by the courts in existence when its facts arose." So far as the retroactive or retrospective quality of the law is concerned, it is not retroac tive in any sense that can injure the defendant, or in any constitutional sense. In all retroactive laws there must be an element of surprise, by which the persons whose rights are affected are taken unawares, and are called upon to act in a manner different from what they had been led by the previous state of the law to anticipate. Wade Retro. Laws, § 34. It is unnecessary to repeat that the defendant's case does not fall within the scope of this definition. The only limit imposed upon the legislative power of the States in reference to the passage of retroactive laws by the Constitution of the United States is that such laws shall not be ex post facto, and shall not impair the obligations of a contract. Railroad Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395, and cases cited; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, and cases cited. Wash. Sup. Ct., July 14, 1891. Lybarger v. State. Opinion by Dunbar, J. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGULATION OF COMMERCE -TAXATION-EXPRESS COMPANIES-INTER-STATE TELEGRAPH.-The act of the Kentucky Legislature providing that express companies within the State shall pay a liceuse tax of $500 or $1,000 per aunum, according as the lines over which they operate are less or more than one hundred miles in length, is void, as a regulation of inter-State commerce, within the inhibition of the Constitution of the United States, article 1, section 8, subdivision 3, in that it seeks to lay a burden upon the business of such companies, rather than upon their property. The act of the Kentucky Legislature providing that telegraph companies within the State shall pay a yearly tax of $1 per mile for the line of poles and first wire, and fifty cents for each additional wire, is also void, for the same reason. The case of Crutcher v. Com., 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851, recently decided on an appeal from this court, where a license fee of $5 was required to be paid by every agent of an express company before engaging in such business, was held to be an exaction in respect of commerce; and the reasons given by this court for sustaining the validity of the act upon the idea that it was passed to protect its citizens against irresponsible corporations, and not to interfere with inter-State commerce, was held not to be a sufficient response to the defense, because the effect of the act was to impose conditions as to the manner of conducting inter-State commerce that could not be sustained. This is a stronger case for the corporations than that of Crutcher. It is plain that this tax is imposed upon the business, or upon the privilege of transacting business, within the State; and if such a right, when given, can be taxed as contended by counsel for the State, it would be conceding to the State government the right to prohibit any express company in another State from doing business here, by reasou of the heavy burdens placed upon it by State legislation. If the regulation of commerce belongs alone to the Na. tional government, and of this there is no question, then it is apparent the State has no power to impose such burdens. Nor is it material that the burden imposed may not likely affect inter-State business or commerce. It may not amount to a prohibition, still if the attempts or the effect of the legislation is to regulate inter-State traffic, the statute is invalid. Such is the decision of the Supreme Court in several cases. Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161; Crutcher v. Com., 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851. "All foreign express companies doing business in the State shall pay a license tax," and this being exacted for the right to do business, the act must be held to be invalid. In the case of Commonwealth v. Charles Smith, the appellee questions the validity of the revenue law taxing telegraph companies, Smith being an agent of the Western Union Telegraph Company, and as such liable for the tax imposed, and for the penalty for non-payment. The provision of the revenue law is as follows: "Sec. 4. It shall be the duty of the president, secretary or manager of any telegraph company or association working, operating or controlling any telegraph line in this State to report, under oath, to the auditor of public accounts on or before the first of July in every year, a full and complete statement of each line, and the whole number of miles of wire worked or under their control and management in this State; and shall pay into the treasury on or before the tenth of July in each year a tax equal to one dollar per mile for the line of poles and first wire, and fifty cents per mile for each additional wire." This corporation has tangible property within the State, and this property, as is conceded, is subject to taxation under its laws; nor is it denied that it does an extensive business within the State, as well as out of it; and it is admitted, as has been al ready determined in more than one case, that this company is an agent of inter-State commerce. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 96 id. 1. The lines of this company cross the boundary of the State at Louisville, and all the principal cities bordering on the Ohio river. The penalty for the failure to pay this tax, and to which the agent is subjected, is a fine of $500. It is contended by the defense that the tax imposed is a mere arbitrary sum fixed by the State, without regard to the value of the property owned by the company, or even the income derived from it; and in addition, that specific taxation is not a tax on property, but must necessarily be a tax on the occupation or business of the person sought to be taxed; while, on the other hand, it is claimed that the Legislature must judge whether the tax shall be ad valorem or specific, and when uniform, it must be held valid. In this State the power of the Legislature to determine the mode of taxation, and to classify the property to be taxed, is not an open question. It may be termed a specific tax as to corporate property, and an ad valorem tax as to property that is ordinarily the subject of taxation. A railroad company may be taxed at a certain valuation for each mile, and if termed specific tax, it is a taxation based on value; or the franchise itself granted by the State may be the subject of taxation, without reference to the tangible property it owns. Railroad Co. v. Com., 81 Ky. 492. The right of a State to tax the property of its citizens, where uniformity and equality exist in imposing the burden, cannot well be doubted; and if this was the question presented in this case, he would have no difficulty in sustaining the tax. If this is a tax on the property of the corporation within the State, the statute imposing the burden must be enforced; but if a tax on the business of the corporation, and that corporation an agent of inter-State commerce, it is then an exercise of power belonging to the National government, and must be held invalid. As said by Mr. Justice Strong in Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5: "It is therefore manifest that exemption of Federal agencies from State taxation is dependent, not upon the nature of the agent or upon the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents, but upon the effect of the tax; that is, upon the question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government as they were intended to serve it, or does it hinder the efficient exercise of their power. A tax upon their property has no such necessary effect. It leaves them free to discharge the duties they have undertaken to perform. A tax upon their operations is a direct obstruction to the exercise of Federal power." In this case the tax alleged to be due the State for the year ending in July, 1888, is $4,024.45, with a fine of $500 for the failure of the corporation or its agent to pay it. It may be difficult to estimate the value of the telegraph poles and the strands of wire necessary to the conduct of the business, but it becomes apparent from the act itself, connected with the burden imposed on the corporation, that it is its occupation and business that have been taxed, without regard to the value of the property it actually owns within the State, and with the heavy penalty imposed, may directly interfere with track. The deceased and the other boys had no right to be upon the defendant's track meddling with its property. They were technically trespassers, and the defendant owed them no duty as in the case of passengers or employees. If the boys who took this car and placed it on the track had found a common wagon standing beside the road, and had hauled it to the top of a hill, removed or raised the tongue, and all gotten in and let it run down the hill at such a reckless rate of speed as to cause one of their number to become so alarmed as to jump or fall out and get killed, or if they had gone on a ueighbor's premises without permission and while there had taken a sled belonging to him and engaged in the amusement called "coasting," and while so engaged one of them had fallen off and been run over and killed, it would scarcely be contended that the owner of the wago:1 or sled would be liable in damages for the injury, and yet in principle those cases would differ but little, if any, from the oue under consideration. The case of Railway Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, cited by plaintiff, was a case where a turn-table was left unfastened, and a small child was injured while it was being turned around. The court charged the jury in that case that, "if the turn-table in question, in its construction and the manner in which it was left, was not dangerous in its nature, the defendants were not liable for negligence," and this instruction was approved by the Supreme Court of the United States. A machine to be dangerous in and of itself must be of such a character that it can only be handled with safety by persons of mature years and experience. But we think a common hand-car, standing on the ground beside a railroad track, is not a thing dangerous in and of itself, which the railroad company is required to guard or lock. Railroad Co. v. McLaughlin, 47 Ill. 265; Railroad Co. v. Stumps, 69 id. 414. We think that to leave the hand-car where it was left in this case, under the circumstances, was not negligence, and that the verdict is unsupported by the evidence. Utah Sup. Ct., Sept. 12, 1891. Robinson v. Oregon, S. L. & U. N. Ry. Co. Opinion by Anderson, J. the regulation of inter-State commerce, and cannot be the track are old enough to fully understand and apsustained. Mr. Justice Field, in Ferry Co. v. Penn-preciate whatever danger there is in running upon the sylvania, 114 U. S. 196, says: "While it is conceded that the property in a State, belonging to a foreign corporation engaged in foreign or inter-State commerce, may be taxed equally with like property of a domestic corporation engaged in that business, we are clear that a tax or other burden imposed on the property of either corporation, because it is used to carry on that commerce, or upon the transportation of persons or property, or for the navigation of public waters over which the transportation is made, is invalid and void, as an interference with and obstruction of the power of Congress in the regulation of such commerce." And in the case of Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, the court, through Mr. Justice Bradley, says: "The fairest and most just construction of the Constitution leads to the conclusion that no State bas a right to lay a tax on inter-State commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transporta- | tion of the subjects of commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on; and the reason is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, that belongs solely to Congress." There is no limitation to the power within the State to tax, except such as virtually amounts to a confiscation of one's property; but there is not only a limitation, but a prohibition, on the power of the State to enforce a tax on the business of corporations or other agencies of inter-State commerce that in fact regulates inter-State traffic. In both the cases under consideration mere arbitrary sums are fixed, without reference to value, and evidently, as is to some extent conceded, on the business of each; and whether under the guise of a specific or an ad valorem tax, it is manifest that the object and effect of each section of the statute are to impose burdens on the transportation or business of both corporations, and not upon the property within the State. The amount of the tax, and the penalties annexed for enforcing payment are in effect a prohibition of the exercise of the legitimate business of each of the appellees without first complying with the conditions of the statute. In view of the authorities cited, and the mode of enforcing this specific tax, it must be held that the two sections of the statute are in violation of section 8, subdivision 3, of the Federal Constitution. Ct. App. Ky., Sept. 24, 1891. Commonwealth v. Smith; Same v. United States Express Co. Opinion by Pryor, J. NEGLIGENCE-LEAVING HAND-CAR UNGUARDED.— In an action against a railroad company for occasioning the death of a boy eleven or twelve years old, the evidence was that the sectionmen, when they quit work, left their hand-car unlocked and unguarded at the foot of an embankment four or five feet below the level of the track, and at a point a quarter of a mile from any house; that deceased was attracted by some boys, who had lifted the car upon the track, and were running it to and fro, and that he came to his death by jumping or falling from it when it was descending a grade at high speed. One of them testified that he aud others had used the car eight or ten times before, with the permission of the "boss," when the men were there at work, but that he had never given them permission when the men were not there. The car weighed six hundred or seven hundred pounds. Held, that it was not a thing dangerous in itself, and the company was not negligent in leaving it unlocked beside the track. A hand-car weighing six or seven hundred pounds, standing on the ground a quarter of a mile outside the settled limits of the city, is not of itself dangerous, and boys of sufficient age and strength to lift it up an embankment four or five feet high and place it upon NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-INDORSER "WITHOUT RECOURSE "-LIABILITIES.-Au indorser of a promissory note without recourse" for value engages that the signatures borne by said note as makers or prior indorsers are the genuine signatures of the persons thereby represented, and that such note is their valid obligation. Plaintiffs' counsel contend and cite authorities to prove that an instrument indorsed "without recourse renders the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the instrument, and relieves him of all responsibility for its payment or value. This I do not understand to be exactly the law, or rather that the law is as given by Daniel in his work on Negotiable Instruments, at section 670: "When the indorsement is, 'Without recourse,' the indorser specially declines to assume any responsibility as a party to the bill or note; but by the very act of transferring it he engages that it is what it purports to be-the valid obligation of those whose names are upon it. He is like a drawer who draws without recourse, but who is nevertheless liable if he draws upon a fictitious party or one without funds." And again, at section 672: "The indorser contracts that the bill or note is in every respect genuine, and neither forged, fictitious nor altered. Undoubtedly, and by universal admission, this principle applies to the signatures of the drawer, acceptor and maker of the bill or note, who are the original parties; and it is often expressed in language to the effect that the indorser warrants that it is a genuine instrument," citing many authorities. Neb. Sup. Ct., Sept. 16, 1891. Palmer v. Courtney. Opinion by Cobb, C. J. · CORRESPONDENCE. EXCEPTIONS PROVE THE RULE. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: I have been interested in the article of your correspondent on the meaning of the so-called maxim that "The exception proves the rule." Is the meaning any thing more than that all rules and all general propositions have their exceptions; in other words, that it is nothing against any rule that it has its exceptions; that it would not be a rule if it had not exceptions? The same idea is involved in the Spanish maxim, that "A man who does not sometimes err always errs." If a man does not sometimes make a mistake it is because he always does. No man lives who does not make a mistake-and he mistakes occasionally or all the time. The mistakes-the exceptions-prove the general proposition that he is a man. Yours truly, BANGOR, ME., Dec. 14, 1891. "N'EST RUEL SMITH. MY A DISPUTER L'ANCIENT PRINCIPLES Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis is the usual form, and is to be found in Bacon's Aphorisms, 17. The same authority however places it thus: Exceptio firmat regulam in contrarium. Translated in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, the exception proves the rule to be the other way. Here certainly our authors Bacon and Gale do not agree. Again, under the same head, Exceptio quoque regulam declarat, the exception also declares the rule. Exceptio quae firmat legem, exponit legem. 2 Buls. 189. This, if I mistake not, was Dr. Chambers' argument, misunderstood by Mr. Gale Another form taken from Jenks Cent. Cases, 106 (Bouv. Law Dict.), corrects Mr. Gale's statement of its use as meaning whatever refutes a thesis verifies it," and this form is, Exceptio nulla est versus actionem quae exceptionem perimit. Mr. Gale's exceptio is of the prohibited form, not Dr. Chambers' legitimate use, of a maxim thoroughly well understood. Yours truly, W. P. PRENTICE. NEW YORK, Dec. 14, 1891. NOTES. ABRAVE French officer, now on the retired list, who lost his right arm in the Franco-Prussian war, appeared as a witness before court in a city in the south of France a few weeks ago. When called upon to swear that he would tell the truth, in the customary manner, the officer naturally raised his left hand. The counsel for the defendant objected to the witness at hand was worthless." The learned judges were unable once, on the grounds that "an oath taken with the left to decide the question, and withdrew to an ante-room for consultation. In a few minutes the solons reap peared, and the president read the following decision, from a literary and patriotic point of view worthy of a Monsieur Prudhomme: "In consideration of the fact that, when the glorious remnants of our army appear in our courts to respond to their legal duties, we cannot demand that they take oath with those limbs which they have lost in the service of their country, we decide that the oath just made with the left hand of the witness is admissible." If your "funny man" who wrote the black-cat article in your issue of November 26 has given all your readers as much pleasure as he has given me in his series of articles devoted to the funny column, then great must be the sum of such pleasure. You may be interested to know that the scheme for rearing black cats for their fur is not new, as the record of a Maryland jury trial would show. Many years ago the plan was tried on Poplar Island in the Chesapeake Bay. The island was selected because the cats could not escape therefrom, and fish for their food was abundant. This scheme failed. It was said that the cats, like those of Kilkenny, destroyed each other. Colonel Carroll, a wealthy gentleman, employed a manager to carry on farming and to direct the work of extensive saw-mills. Among other duties the manager had charge of the rearing and skinning of the black cats, whose furs were to be exported to China. The manager sued the colonel for a balance claimed in settlement of accounts between them, and among the items there appeared in the account a charge for managing the black-cat scheme. The case was litigated for several years, from lower to appellate court and back again for a new trial. Some of the most prominent counsel in the State were pitted against each other at the trial, and when they read to the jury the colonel's letters to the manager referring in glowing terms to the anticipated profits of the venture, and directing him, among other instructions, how to preserve the pure black color of the cats' coats, as well by what Darwin would call "sexual selection," as by surgery, the court, jury and audience were convulsed with laughter. Hence the case became celebrated all over the State of Maryland as the "black cat case. It is reported in 8 Maryland Reports, 328, entitled Carroll v. Ridgaway, though the black cat item of the account does not appear in the appellate court's decision, which is confined to questions of law. -Lex, in N. Y. Tribune. CURIOUS VERDICTS THAT HAVE BEEN RENDERED BY CORONER'S JURIES.--Some of the coroner's verdicts in the country of fifty and sixty years ago are very curious. The following are some of the causes assigned for death: "She came to her death by strangulation in testimony we have sit our hands and seal the day above wroten." "Paul Burns came to his death by a mule running away with a waggon and being thrown therefrom." By taking with his own hands an overdose of morphine." "From causes unknown to the jury and having no medical attendance." "Came to his death from natural causes." "An inquisition holden upon the body of John Brown there lying dead 64 down. It is a common error to slant it, making it appear like ch. The stem ch, liue 3, is for convenience called chay. Second-Frequently compare your work with the Plate, looking closely to see if it can be improved in any way. It should correspond as to shading, straightness of stems, and the nearness of the signs to each other. In size, the letters may be as small, and ought not to be much larger than those given in the Plate. The vowel dot a and dash o should always be placed at the middle of the stem. Write mostly with a pen; it is superior to a pencil in every way. by the jurors whose names are hereto subscribed, who upon their oath do say that he came to his death in the following manner, by falling off the plauk bridge accidental while trying to cross the stream and was drowned." "Said child, aged 1 day old, came to her death from spasms, said child having been found by the witness in a trunk, under very suspicious circumstances." "The joueres on thare ouathe do say that he come to his deth by old age, as tha could not see ennything else the matter." Come to his death from the following causes, to wit: From some suddent cause to the joueres unknown." "The said deceased being an orphan, father and mother being both dead." Third-Read one page of your writing without ref"From an overdose of gin administered by his own erence to the key. Better still, read each page you hand." "Disability caused by lunacy.' 'Being run write. Line 5, for example, would be read thus: peover by two coal trucks, while detached from the en- chay, chay-pe, etc. Short-hand is written by sound. gine." "Come to his death by tender No. 7 jumping Only as many letters are employed as there are disthe track, on which he was riding, either jumping or tinct sounds heard: thus, fo, foe; na, nay; lo, low; falling off and engine running over him which was an felo, fellow; do, dough; fabl, fable; fotograf, photoaccident, and no fault of the engineer of said engine." | graph; mikst, mixed; kwil, quill. There are no silent "She come to her death by the lighten stricken her." letters, as b in lamb. Each letter is used only when "From hart deseize." "Come to his death in the fol- its particular sound is heard; thus p is used in pie, but lowing manner, to wit: He was born dead." "From not in sophist (spelt sofist). In copper (pronounced excessive drinking and laying out in the sun." "From coper) p occurs but once. Hence the usual manner of the hands of some person or persons to the jury un- spelling a word has nothing whatever to do in deterknown, and afterward placed on the track and got run mining the way to write it in short-hand. over by incoming train." "The body was so mangled Fourth-Practice on Plate 2 till you can copy it in and mutilated that tha could not tell ennything about five minutes. it, but tha think it was put in the sisterne by some unknown person or persons." "Diseas of the hart and applexity fitze." "Calded on the left side by kittley of hot water burning over on hir left side and immegitely causing her death." "From the effect of injuries received by her close accidental taking fire." "From exposier."-N. Y. Morning Journal. KEY TO PLATE 2. Line 11 Tie dike Ike pipe pied tied chide typo. 12 1 P\ \ PLATE 2. \\\ THE SECOND LESSON. If not joined the special abort-hand class, and intend to do so, you would do well to act promptly. You will then receive the full benefit of the supplementary lessons given by mail by the author to each member. For information see announcements or apply to the publishers. CAUTION.-You write too large. All beginners do. Make your characters one-third smaller. Use black ink and the best quality of paper. Some practice with a pencil is useful, but a pen should be employed mostly. Do not send in an exercise for correction until you have spent at least two or three hours in writing it over and over. Then state the number of times you have copied it; also how many hours you have given to practice. Numerous exercises have already been prepared for correction. Many of these were executed correctly and artistically. They indicate the great interest taken in this course, and the results are gratifying. We understand the feeling of reluctance which restrains many an earnest learner from sending an exercise to be inspected by a person who is believed to be very critical and very severe. Now, be assured that this is all a mistake. Your exercise may prove the very best. Questious concerning the lesson will be cheerfully answered. First-Copy Plate 2 ten times. It is very important to make the light letters as thin and light as possible. The shaded strokes, b, d, j, etc., should not be very heavy, enough so only for distinction. In writing any word, as jacket (j-k-t, see line 8), do not lift your pen from the paper until the word is entirely finished. Be careful to write t vertical-that is, straight up and |