It refused to hold that no recovery could be had in this action for damages accruing subsequent to the day of trial, but held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover wages from the 1st of May to the 15th of June for services rendered during that period at the contract price; aud from the latter date, being the date of his discharge, to the date of the trial, the measure of damages for breach of the contract was the contract price, less $700 earned by the plaintiff; and that the measure of damages for the unexpired term subsequent to the trial was the contract price, less a discount of six per cent per annum from the trial to the expiration of the term of service. In this action the plaintiff sued for a present breach of the contract, and seeks to recover not for any one or more of the installments due or to become due, but once for all, the damages he has sustained by the breach of the coutract by the defendant. fore the expiration of the contract by its terms, but also had trial before that time. The measure of damages in that case is not so easily determined, nor are the authorities uniform. There is no difficulty in determining the elements of damage, but for what time they should be recovered. By the English rule, as it would seem, he might recover for any loss during the entire unexpired term of employment, while by the rule adopted in many of the American States the recovery is limited to damages sustained to the time of the trial. Fowler v. Armour, 24 Ala. 194; McDaniel v. Parks, 19 Ark. 671: Rogers v. Parham, 8 Ga. 190; Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64; Wright v. Falkner, 37 Ala. 274; Prichard v. Martin, 27 Miss. 305; Alfaro v. Davidson, 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 87; Machine Co. v. Brighton, 44 Iowa, 159; Lewis v. Insurance Co., 61 Mo. 534. In Wood's Mayne ou Damages, page 197, it is said: "When the service is to be commenced at a future day, and before the arrival of that day the employer positively renounces the covenant, even without doing any thing to incapacitate himself from performing at the appointed day, the servant may sue at once, and the jury, in assessing the damages, would be justified in looking at all that had happened, or was likely to happen, to increase or mitigate the loss of the plaintiff, down to the day of trial;" Instead therefore of alleging as a breach the nonpayment of installments, the breach averred is the prevention of plaintiff from performance on his part, whereby he is deprived of profits and gains he would have realized from the completion of the agreement. The special count is in all substantial particulars taken from Chitty. 2 Chit. Pl. 325-327. As held by this court in Hamlin v. Race, 78 Ill. 422, if the plaintiff sought the enforcement of the contract heciting Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678; Church would be required to proceed in accordance with its terms-that is, he must allege that the installments are due and unpaid-and could not recover for any installment before due by the terms of the contract. It is clear however that plaintiff did not seek to keep the contract alive and proceed under it. The averment that the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform was not intended to and does not show that the plaintiff was seeking to keep the contract obligatory on him after suit brought. Its purpose was accomplished in showing that the plaintiff was guilty of no default at the time of bringing this action. If after judgment rendered in this action, the defendant should demand performance of the unexpired term, the plaintiff would not be obliged to perform, the recovery being for the present damages occasioned by breach of the contract by defendant. In such cases the averment of readiness and willingness to perform is not an issuable averment. 2 Saund. Pl. & Ev., pt. 1, p. 351; Wilkinson v. Gaston, 9 Q. B. 137. Wood, in his work on Master and Servant, in the section before cited, says: "When a servant is discharged without sufficient legal excuse, before the expiration of his term, he has his choice of two remedies: He may elect to treat the contract as rescinded, and at once bring an action for the value of the services rendered; or he may sue for a breach of the contract, and recover his probable damages for the breach; or he may, in some cases, wait until the term is ended, and sue for the actual damages he sustained, which can in no case exceed the wages provided for in the contract for the entire term." As we have seen, this court has held that the contract may be kept in force, and installments recovered as they severally fall due (Hamlin v. Race, supra), but that is unimportant here. Upon notice of his discharge the plaintiff had the right to immediately bring action for a breach of the contract, or he might have waited until the expiration of the term of employment. It he sued before the termination of the contract, and the action was not tried until after the period of service stipulated for had expired, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover for the whole time, less payments made, and such sums as he had or might by reasonable diligence have earned subsequent to the breach. Suth. Dam. 433, and authorities cited; Fuller v. Little, 61 Ill. 22: Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362; School Directors v. Crews, 23 Ill. App. 369. But the plaintiff not only brought his action be Ward v. Queen, L. R., 1 Q. B. 204-208; Frost v. Knight, L. R., 7 Exch. 111; 41 L. J. Exch. 78. The same author, in his work on Master and Servant, page 250, after stating the rule laid down by Smith in his work on Master and Servant on this subject, says that he (Smith) goes on to state that in such action the servant "may not only recover for wages actually earned, but also for his probable loss for being unable to secure other equally profitable employment, even to the extent of the entire period covered by the contract." Mr. Wood however adds: "And there is no question but that is the rule in England, but I am aware of no case in this country in which a similar rule has been adopted; but on the contrary, the drift of American decision is opposed to any such rule of recovery, and limits the judgment to the actual loss at the day of trial." In view of the fact that the servant may die or become incapable of performing before the expiration of the term of his employment, the uncertainty of the wages or emoluments he may be enabled to earn in the future, we are disposed to follow the rule that the plaintiff shall be limited to his actual loss at the time of the trial. It must necessarily be that the actual loss of the plaintiff between the trial and the expiration of the term cannot be definitely determined, and any amount allowed must, from the very nature of things, be largely speculative. By the adoption of the rule limiting recovery to the day of trial all difficulty would be avoided in the assessment of his damages. There is no hardship in this, for as we have seen, if he desires so to do, he may lie by until the expiration of the term. It is clear that the servant wrongfully discharged is not entitled, as a matter of law, to recover the full amount of the contract price, even after the expiration of the term, if he has earned other wages, or received other compensation for his time and labor, af ter the breach of the contract. All such sums as he has earned or might by reasonable diligence have earned must be deducted, and if he has earned more than the price agreed to be paid, his recovery would be limited to nominal damages merely. It is apparent that it is impossible to tell whether from the day of trial to the expiration of the term he will earn more or less than the contract price. The plaintiff can recover only his actual loss. It is however insisted by appellant that recovery should be had only to the time of suit brought, and the case of Ham lin v. Race, supra, is referred to as supporting this contention. As we have seen, the suit was there brought for the recovery of installments of wages, keeping the contract in force; and it was held that no recovery could be had for an installment not due at the commencement of the action. We there said: "Had appellee, when discharged, terminated the agreement, and sued on the breach of the contract, it may be that a different rule [from the one there announced] might have prevailed." The case there being considered is clearly distinguished from the one at bar. There the recovery was not sought for a breach of the contract, but for the recovery of wages fixed by the contract and under the contract; and it was properly held that as the plaintiff sought to recover under the contract, he was limited to the recovery of wages due at the time suit was brought. was delivered to Thomas Connell, and on the next day was recorded. Upon this state of facts the contention is that such deed is void because the name of Thomas Connell was not inserted when the deed was signed and sealed. It is said in Shepherd's Touchstone, page 54, that "every deed well made must be written-i. e., the agreement must all be written-before the sealing and delivery of it; for if a man seal and deliver an empty piece of paper or parchment, albeit he do therewithal give commandment that an obligation or other matter shall be written in it, and this be done accordingly, yet this is no good deed." This is founded upon that ancient and technical rule of the common law that the authority to make a deed, or to alter or fill a blank in some substantial part of it, cannot be verbally conferred, but must be created by an instrument of equal dignity. As the deed was under seal, to alter or complete it by the insertion of the name of the grantee The required the authority to be under seal. So firmly dam-rooted was this principle that it mattered not with what solemnities a deed may have been signed and sealed, unless the grantee's name was inserted, and delivery was made to him, or some one legally authorized under seal, it was a nullity. It imposed no liabil ity on the party making it, nor conferred any rights upon the party receiving it; it was in fact no deed. Hence it was held that parol authority to fill a blank with the name of a grantee could not be conferred without violating established principles of law and rendering the deed void. This doctrine still prevails in Eugland. It is true that in the case of Texira v. Evans, cited in Master v. Miller, 1 Anstr. 225, Lord Mansfield held otherwise, but this was in effect overruled in Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 6 Mees. & W. 200, on the ground that an authority to execute a sealed instrument could not be given by parol, but must be given by deed, although this latter case seems more or less trenched upon by the decision in Eagleton v. Gutter We are of opinion that the wages earned were recoverable under the indebitatis assumpsit count. court however erred in allowing recovery for ages accruing after the trial and before the expiration of the term. The damages should have been limited to recovery for the wages earned and for the loss of the plaintiff by reason of the breach from the date thereof to the trial. It will be observed that we have carefully refrained from expressing any opinion in respect of the right of the defendant to discharge the plaintiff and to terminate his employment. No propositions were asked to be held by the court which, in our judgment, properly present that matter for our consideration. For the error of the court before indicated the judgments of the appellate and trial court are reversed, and the cause remanded to the Superior Court for retrial. Reversed and remanded. ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS — VALIDITY idge, 11 Mees. & W. 465, and by Davidson v. Cooper, id. -BLANK AS TO GRANTEE. OREGON SUPREME COURT, NOV. 2, 1891. A deed of general assignment was valid where a third person W. M. Gregory, for appellants. Killin, Starr & Thomas, for respondents. LORD, J. This is a suit in equity, brought by the plaintiffs, to have a deed of general assignment set aside and declared void, and to have the attached property applied in payment of their judgment. The single proposition of law involved is whether, in a deed of general assignment, the name of the grantee could be inserted in the blank after the deed has been sigued, sealed and acknowledged, but before delivery, by some one authorized by the grantors to insert it, upon parol authority. For the purposes of this case the facts are these: That the deed of assignment was made on the 17th day of November, 1888, by C. E. Deal, J. C. O'Reilly and J. W. Brockett, partners, doing business under the firm name of Deal, O'Reilly & Co., to Thomas Connell, for the benefit of creditors; that it was in all things completed and signed and sealed and acknowledged, except that a blank was left for the name of the grantee; that F. A. E. Starr was authorized to insert as the name of such grantee any person satisfactory to himself and the members of such firm; that on the following day Starr, with the consent of the members of such firm, inserted the name of Thomas Connell as assignee in such deed, and the deed 778, and in West v. Steward, 14 id. 47. But the rule bas never been universally accepted in this country, and however the holding of some courts may be, still the better opinion and the prevailing current of authority is that when a deed is regularly executed in other respects, with a blank left therein for the name of the grantee, parol authority is sufficient to authorize the insertion of the name of such grantee, and that, when so filled out and delivered, it is a valid deed. It is true that Chief Justice Marshall, in U. S. v. Nelson, 2 Brock. 74, felt bound to follow the ancient rule, but his opinion clearly indicates that he felt that the authority to fill a blank in an instrument under seal should be held to be valid. He says: "The case of Speake v. U. S., 9 Cranch, 28, in determining that parol evidence of such assent may be received, undoubtedly goes far toward deciding it, aud it is probable that the same court may completely abolish the distinction in this particular between sealed and unsealed instruments." Again: "If this question depended on those moral rules of action which in the ordinary course of things are applied by courts to human transactions, there would not be much difficulty in saying that this paper ought to have the effect which the parties at the time of its execution intended it should have." And he concludes with this statement: "I say with much doubt, and with a strong belief that this judgment will be reversed, that the law on the verdict is, in my opinion, with the defendants." The rule was purely technical, and the outgrowth of a state of affairs and condition of the law which does not now exist. The rea son of the law is the life of it, and when the reason fails the law itself should fail. At the present day the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments is fast disappearing, and the courts are gradually doing away with them. As Judge authority, but no authority under seal from the person who executed it, to fill up the blank in his absence and deliver the deed to the person whose name is inserted as grantee, when so filled out and delivered is a valid deed." In Duncan v. Hodges, 4 McCord, 239, it is held that a deed executed with blanks and afterward filled up and delivered by the agent of the party is good. So in Van Etta v. Evenson, 28 Wis. 33, it was held that where a note and mortgage otherwise fully executed, but with a blank in each for the name of the payee and mortgagee, were delivered to an agent, who was to procure from whomsoever he could a loan of money thereon for the maker, this shows an intention that the agent should fill the blanks, and when so filled the instruments were valid without a new exe Redfield said: "But it [the rule] seems to be rather technical than substantial, and to found itself either on the policy of the stamp duties, or the superior force and sacredness of contracts by deed, both of which have little importance in this country; and the prevailing current of American authority and the practical instincts and business experience and sense of our people, are undoubtedly otherwise." Redf. Railr. 124. In Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24, the court says: "Although it was at one time doubted whether parol authority was adequate to authorize an alteration or addition to a sealed instrument, the better opinion of this day is that the power is sufficient." Again, in Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 119, the court says: "It may be, and probably is, the law in Iowa, as in several States, that the grantors in a deed convey-cution and delivery. And the same doctrine was exing real property, signed and acknowledged, with a blank for the name of a grantee, may authorize another party by parol to fill up the blank." "But," he continues," there are two conditions essential to make a deed thus executed in blank operate as a conveyance of the property described in it: The blank must be filled by the party authorized to fill it, and this must be done before or at the time of the delivery of the deed to the grantee named." In the case at bar these conditions were fulfilled. In Inhabitants of South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me. 89, the court held that a party executing a deed, bond or other instrument, and delivering the same to another as his deed, knowing there are blanks in it to be filled necessary to make it a perfect instrument, must be considered as agreeing that the blanks may thus be filled after he has executed it. In delivering the opinion of the court, Kent, J., said: "The rule invoked is purely techuical. Practically there is no real distinction in this matter between bonds and simple contracts. There is no more danger of fraud or injury or wrong in allowing insertions in a bond than there is in allowing them in a promissory note or bill of exchange, and in neither can unauthorized alterations be made with impunity. Considering that the assumed difference rests on a mere technical rule of the common law, we do not think that the rule should be extended beyond its necessary limits, viz., that a sealed instrument cannot be executed by another, so as its distinguishing characteristic as a sealed instrument is in question, unless by an authority under seal." Likewise in Bridgeport Bank v. New York, etc., R. Co., 30 Conn. 274, Ellsworth, J., said: "Nor can any reason be assigned, which is founded in good sense, and is not entirely technical, why a blank in an instrument under seal may not be filled up by the party receiving it, after it is executed, as well as any other contract in writing, where the parties have so agreed at the time. In either case the contract, when the blank has been filled, expresses the exact agreement of the parties, and nothing but an extreme technical view, derived from the ancient law of England, can justify the making of any distinction between them." It is to be noticed that both of these adjudications were by courts of States where seals were not abolished. In Burnside v. Wayman, 49 Mo. 357, where the name of the grantee in a trust-deed was left in blank, Wagner, J., said: "It is contended that no recovery could be had or relief granted on the first count, because no grantee was named in the deed of trust, and that in consequence thereof the instrument was void, and no title conveyed; but we think otherwise. Whatever may have been determined in some of the old books, the better doctrine is against such a position." And subsequently, in Field v. Stagg, 52 Mo. 534, this doctrine was affirmed in all its breadth, the court saying: "A deed, regularly executed in other respects, with a blank left therein for the name of the grantee, and placed in that condition in the handf of a third person, with verbal pressly affirmed in Schintz v. McManamy, 33 Wis. 301, the court, by Lyon, J., saying: "It was doubtless competent for the grantors to authorize Emil by parol to insert the name of the grantee in the deed, after they had signed and acknowledged the same.' And in State v. Young, 23 Minn. 551, it was held that authority to fill a blank in a sealed instrument may be given by parol, and that such authority may be either express or implied from circumstances, and that it may be implied from circumstances whenever these, fairly considered, will justify the inference. So in Swartz v. Ballou, 47 Iowa, 188, where the owner of land executed a deed in blank, and placed it in the hands of another party under circumstances which raised an implied authority in the latter to insert the name of the grantee, it was held that the insertion of the grantee's name, either by the party receiving the deed or by some one authorized by him, made the instrument perfect as a conveyance. Without referring to the authorities at greater length, there are numerous other cases supporting the same doctrine. Wiley v. Moor, 17 Serg. & R. 438; Smith v. Crooker, 5 Mass. 538; Gibbs v. Frost, 4 Ala. 720; Woolley v. Constant, 4 Johns. 54; Ex parte Decker, 6 Cow. 60; Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 7 Blackf, 412; Boardman v. Gore, 1 Stew. (Ala.)517; Bank v. Hall, 14 N. J. Law, 583; Ragsdale v. Robinson, 48 Tex. 379. The contrary rule was adopted in Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85; Preston v. Hull, 23 Gratt. 600; Ingram v. Little, 14 Ga. 173, and some other cases. It seems to us that the weight of authority and better opinion is that parol authority is sufficient to authorize the filling of a blank by the insertion of the name of the grantee in a deed, after its execution, but before delivery, as in the case at bar. There is no pretense of any mistake or fraud, or that the blank was not filled as authorized and directed; in a word, that it was filled by a party authorized to fill it, and was done after its execution and before its delivery to the grantee named. Nor is it questioned but that the deed faithfully expresses the intention of the parties and was duly executed for the purposes specified, and in such case, it seems to us, complete effect ought to be given to that intention, notwithstanding the technical rule of the common law in respect to such instruments. As Mr. Justice Swayne said: "If a person competent to convey real estate sign and acknowledge a deed in blank, and deliver the same to an agent, with an express or implied authority to fill up the blank and perfect the conveyance, its validity could not be well controverted." Drury v. Foster, supra. It results that the decree dismissing the bill must be sustained. title-page of the edition of 1847, are now public property, by reason of the expiration of the copyright; and any one may reprint that edition, and entitle the reprint "Webster's Dictionary." (2) I am also of the opinion that no publisher can claim an exclusive right to make a book of a certain form or size. The forms into which objects like books may be cast are likewise public property. The fact therefore that defendant's book is similar to complainant's in size and form is in itself no ground for granting the relief sought. (3) The next matter to be considered is the charge that defendant uses the device of a book, with the words "Webster's Dictionary" printed thereon, on its circulars, bill-heads, etc., in imitation of a like practice pursued by the complainants. In my judgment, no person engaged in publishing and selling a book or books can acquire an exclusive right to use the device of a book on letter-heads and bill-heads, or on wrappers or boxes containing books. The device in question, when used in that connection or relation, is not sufficiently arbitrary to constitute a valid trade-mark. When so used by a publisher or book-seller, such a device serves to indicate the kind of business in which a party is engaged, or it is descriptive of the contents of particular packages. Other persons engaged in the same business have the right to advertise their calling, or to describe the contents of packages, by the use of the same device. If a publisher or book-seller can acquire an exclusive right to use the device of a book on letter-heads, bill-heads, wrappers, etc., then a watch-maker might acquire the exclusive right to use the picture of a watch, a shoe-maker to use the picture of a shoe, and so on throughout the entire list of occupations in which men are engaged. I conclude therefore that no relief can be granted merely because defendant has stamped the device of a book on its circulars and advertisements. U. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Mo., Sept. 10, 1891. Merriam v. Famous Shoe & Clothing Co. Thayer, J. 47 Fed. Rep. 414. * * Opinion by CRIMINAL LAW-ABORTION-ADVISING.-Under the provision of the Penal Code (section 294) that "A person who, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of a woman, * advises a woman to take * * * any medicine, drug or substance, is guilty of abortion," held mere advice, not followed by any action on the part of the woman based upon such advice, does not make out the crime of abortion. All the other words in the section in a similar position include some act other than mere speech. Such are prescribes, supplies, administers," uses or causes to be used." And where the word "advises" is used the connection is "advises or causes a woman to take." Further, the person who does any of these is declared to be guilty of abortion. Now abortion is the producing of young before the natural time, though the word must have a qualified meaning in this section, since the crime may be committed, according to the language, in respect to a woman who is not pregnant. It is true that the word advises" of itself does not imply that the advice is followed. Advice which is rejected is still advice. But we must judge of the meaning here by the context. Section 295 provides for the punishment of the pregnant woman who takes a medicine or uses an instrument, or submits to its use with intent to produce her miscarriage. And section 294 provides for the punishment of the accessory, including even the offense of giving medicine with such intent to one not pregnant. Probably this part of the section was enacted in view of the injurious effect of such medicine on a woman whether pregnant or not. But no injury could be done to a pregnant woman or to her child by advice not acted upon. One who counsels another to commit a crime is now a principal. Penal Code, § 29; People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 82. But where the crime is not committed, such a person is not a principal, whatever counsel he may have given. We have no occasion to consider the subject of attempts to commit a crime (Penal Code, 334), because the defendant was not convicted of an attempt to commit abortion. § 686. He was convicted of hav ing committed abortion, and therefore the question is presented whether that crime is committed by advice which is not acted upon. The Legislature were careful to explain that abortion might be committed on a woman not pregnant. It seems to us that if they intended that abortion could also be committed by mere speech, followed by no act, they should have stated this unequivocally. As they have not done this, we are of opinion that the word "advises" in this section like the word "causes" which stands in the same connection, implies that the woman advised acted upon the advice, and took the medicine, drug or substance. We are of opinion that mere advice to take medicine where no medicine, drug or substance of any kind is taken, and where therefore no injury has been done to any one, cannot be the crime of abortion. People v. Phelps. Opinion by Learned, P. J. - Hun, 115. - CRIMINAL LAW-BRIBERY.-The Constitution of Pennsylvania, article 3, section 32, provides that persons may be compelled to testify in any lawful proceeding against one charged with bribery, but that such testimony shall not be afterward used against the witness except for perjury in giving such testimony. Held, that the words offense of bribery "include bribery of delegates to a convention for the nomination of a candidate for Congress. It is claimed that in adjudging the relator guilty of contempt of court, and sentencing him therefor, the court below proceed upon the erroneous assumption that his case was within the purview of section 32, article 3, of the Constitution, which ordains as follows: "Any person may be compelled to testify in any lawful investigation or judicial proceeding against any person who may be charged with having committed the offense of bribery or corrupt solicitation, and shall not be permitted to withhold his testimony upon the ground that it may criminate himself, or subject him to public infamy, but such testimony shall not be afterward used against him in any judicial proceeding except for perjury in giving such testimony," etc. The relator's contention is that this provision relates solely to the crime of "bribery" and the offense of "corrupt solicitation," etc., specified in the twenty-ninth, thirtieth and thirty-first sections of the same article, and is necessarily restricted thereby. This, we think, would be a too narrow construction of our organic law. In construing a Constitution it must be borne in mind that its provisions are necessarily general, aud couched in the language of the people by whom it was ordained. Its words should therefore be taken in their popular, natural and ordinary meaning, rather than in any technical or restricted sense. The object of construction, as applied to such an instrument, is to give full effect to the intent of its framers, and the people in adopting it. That intent of course is to be sought for in the instrument itself. If the words convey a definite meaning, involving no absurdity or conflict with other portions of the instrument, that meaning which is apparent on its face must be adopted. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 679, and cases there cited. Little if any significance can be attached to the wording of the captions and title of the several articles of such an instrument. At most they are merely intended to indicate the general character of the articles to which they are prefixed. That they were intended as critical and precise definitions of the subject-matter of the articles, or as exercising restraining limitations upon the clear expressions therein contained, cannot be assumed. Houseman v. Com., 100 Penn. St. 222. This will be apparent by reference to several articles of our Constitution. For example, article 12, "Public officers," section 1 of which relates to election, etc.; section 2, to incompatibility of offices, and section 3, to duelling, etc., as a disqualification. It must be very apparent that the many different subjects to which its provis to take other property to enlarge their cemeteries, is unconstitutional, in that it authorizes private corporations to exercise the power of eminent domain for private purposes. The contention of respondent is that there is no valid statute which authorizes or permits the condemnation of private property for the enlargement of this cemetery; that the act of 1869 au ions relate are much more numerous than the eigh-thorized the formation of corporations to establish teeu articles and schedule which constitute the instrument. "To impose a limitation upon words of comprehensive import, some express declaration to that effect or inevitable inference would be requisite. Especially is this so in construing the organic law of the State. Such instruments deal with larger topics and are couched in broader phrase than are legislative acts. Houseman v. Com., supra. The word "bribery" appears to be first used in section 7, article 2, wherein it is declared that "no person hereafter convicted of embezzlement of public moneys, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime shall be eligible to the General Assembly or capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this Commonwealth." These words, "bribery, perjury," etc., were doubtless used in their plain and ordinary meaning, and without restriction, embracing both common-law and statutory offenses, coming within the same designation. In section 9, article 8, the word "bribery" is again used without restriction, but in a connection which shows its relation to our election laws. The "bribery" therein mentioned is complete by offers, promises, etc., as was held in Leonard v. Com., 112 Penn. St. 607. The word "bribery" again occurs in section 29, article 3, which, after defining what may be termed "legislative bribery," declares that the offender" shall be held guilty of bribery within the meaning of this Constitution, and shall incur the disabilities thereby provided for Baid offense, and such additional punishment as is or shall be provided by law." Section 30 of the same article declares that any person who shall, directly or indirectly, do certain things, "shall be guilty of bri- | bery," etc. By these sections 29 and 30, which are legislative in their character, it was doubtless intended that the kinds of bribery therein defined should be taken out of the hands of the General Assembly, so that they could not be changed by statutory enactmeut. Having thus given these provisions the force of organic law, the thirty-second section, now under consideration, makes provision for securing testimony "in any lawful investigation or judicial proceeding against any person who may be charged with the offense of bribery," etc., by declaring that "any person may be compelled to testify," etc. We think the words "offense of bribery,'' employed in the thirtysecond section, mean all bribery, whether bribery at common law, or under the Constitution itself, or any kind of statutory bribery. The learned court was therefore right in saying to the relator that he must testify, and that his testimony could not afterward be used against him in any judicial proceeding. But whether the court was right or wrong in holding that the relator was thus protected by the section under consideration, the decision itself would have shielded him. No court would permit the testimony of a witness, truthfully given under such circumstances, to be afterward used against him in any judicial proceeding. Penn. Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 1891. Commonwealth, ex rel. Tate, v. Bell. Opinion by Sterrett, J. EMINENT DOMAIN-POWERS OF CEMETERY ASSOCIATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-Act of Michigan, 1869, authorized the formation of stock companies to establish rural cemeteries, and provided for their regulation and maintenance. Held, that an amendment passed in 1875 (How. Stat. Mich., § 4778), whereby such companies were authorized, on condemnation proceedings, rural cemeteries, and provided for the care and main- |