and I have urged that viewpoint upon the distinguished Members on the other side of the building.

Senator TYDINGS. What did Mr. Celler have to say? ?

Mr. SEGAL. I don't think he would mind my saying that he enthusiastically endorses the principles of having trained court executives. I think he feels there ought to be more detail in the bill. We have offered his committee and him as we have to you and your subcommittee all of the help that he thinks we can afford to him.

Now, the sum total on this first point of the changes which have come about, Mr. Chairman, is, and it is as simple as it is forcefully so, that whatever we do with court machinery, the demands in our courts and the judges who preside in them require as never before that every Federal court in the land, since we are talking about Federal courts, have on the bench as active judges only men and women who are in the fullest possession of their physical and mental powers and who are able, dedicated, and conscientious in the performance of their duties. I suggest that the hour is late for ridding our judicial system of the inevitable few, who will prevail in any group of 500, who do not meet these standards.

I should say, second, that in one respect there has been improvement, and that is in the quality of the Federal courts during the past 15 years, the quality of the judges who are in them, in their general level of competence and diligence. In these regards I believe I can say unequivocally that there have never been higher standards. But more than ever before what this does is it fixes a glaring spotlight on the judge who, because he is incompetent or physically or mentally disabled or because he simply does not realize the ethical demands of his position, does not or cannot do his job in the manner that the public has a right to expect, in a manner which advances the administration of justice.

Mr. Chairman, we lawyers are the ones who are on the firing line. We represent the people who have the cases in the courts. We meet at first hand the ever-increasing criticism which our clients express, the escalating dissatisfaction of the public when litigants are unable to secure reasonably prompt determination of their causes. It is regrettable but it is just as true as when I first stated it that one bad judge can undo the efforts of 100 excellent judges and that is aggravated today when causes beyond the control of even our most able judges have created such widespread cynicism among our citizens as to the efficiency of our judicial system to meet the demands which the modern world presses upon it.

I will not repeat today the experiences recounted the last time I was here of situations created by the judge who, because he is alcoholic or because he is physically or mentally incapacitated, or because he simply does not realize the lofty nature of the duties of a judge or the ethical restraints upon him, is causing untold agonies for his associates and a very regrettable viewpoint of the public toward the bench.

So the point I make, Mr. Chairman, is that the need for a bill like S. 1506 is even greater today than it was when these hearings began 4 years ago.

I should like to tell you about the developments in the States very briefly. When we met last I believe California was the only State in which a judicial qualifications commission was operating. Í reported

at that time that the Texas electorate had just approved a constitutional amendment which for every practical purpose was modeled on the California system.

Today, only 4 years later, and I think nothing could more graphically demonstrate both the need and the public attitude, 17 States and Puerto Rico have judicial qualifications commissions. I have looked back into the history of judicial reform and I believe that this is the greatest achievement in the shortest time of any major judicial reform in the history of the United States.

There are five States with special commissions for involuntary retirement, one of which also has a judicial qualification commission and one a court on the judiciary.

I state in passing that we must realize not all of these are ideal judicial qualifications commissions but they make great improvements upon the past and they provide incentives for improvement in the future.

Finally, I report just one more development since the subcommittee initiated its hearings on February 15, 1966. At that session I reported on a meeting which I had just held of the members of the Standing Committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure, and Compensation of the American Bar Association of which I was then chairman, and to which I had also invited the following, all of whom attended-the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Katzenbach; the Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Ramsey Clark; Robert Meserve, of Boston, who had succeeded me as chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary; and former Presiding Justice David W. Peck, of New York, then chairman of the ABA Section on Judicial Administration. I reported that we had just recommended, as your hearings began, a nationwide on-the-scene study of judicial removal, discipline, and compulsory retirement.

Soon after that the American Bar Foundation undertook the project. It encompassed in-depth field studies in five States-California, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, and New York-selected because of the wide divergencies among them in the methods of handling problems of removal, discipline, and compulsory retirement. They ranged all the way from simple impeachment, and I guess I should really emphasize the word "simple" and add "unused," to the California commission which has provided more and simpler remedies applicable in many more instances and has been most effective.

I have seen some of the field studies of the American Bar Foundation project. The situation, I think, is worse, at least in some major places around the country, than any of us had thought, particularly insofar as judges suffering the infirmities of age, physical disability, and mental incapacity, and to a lesser but still alarming extent, alcoholism.

You may wonder why the report has not been completed. Mr. William Braithwaite, who was in charge of the project, was called to the armed services. For a time he was in Chicago and continued his work with the cooperation of the Army, but then he was sent to Korea. I am glad to report that he is due back and it is our expectation that the final report will be available to this committee early in the summer or soon thereafter.

I think you will find it useful, but there is nothing in it you do not know and nothing in it which would justify 1 minute's delay in the consideration of S. 1506. It will merely support your record and accentuate the need.

Now I come specifically to the subject of remedial legislation to meet these increasing and accelerating problems. The ABA has been active on this subject for more than three decades.

Our record has been uniform and has had one single objective and one result. In 1937 a resolution was passed by the assembly of the association, upon recommendation of its Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, recommending a system for the removal of U.S. district judges by a court of seven judges with certain rights of appeal. I think it is significant that in the floor debate, Congressman Sumners, then chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, stated unequivocally that in his opinion the procedure of removal would be constitutional. Three years later, in 1940, the association adopted a resolution urging the enactment by Congress of legislation providing for a panel of three circuit judges designated by the Chief Justice to hear cases involving the issue of good behavior by Federal judges.

Francis Biddle, then Acting Attorney General, rendered an opinion to the effect that the proposed legislation would be constitutional. Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt, perhaps the most respected legal scholar of that period, rose during the ABA debate and unequivocally expressed the view that the legislation would be constitutional.

Í skip, Mr. Chairman, the studies to which you referred and numerous others to February 24, 1970, when we brought to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, titles I and II of S. 1506. By virtue of some of the things said at your hearing last Thursday, I should like to clarify one point. The precise resolution I did not find in the record of that hearing except as it appears in the minutes of the debate in the ABA House of Delegates. So I should like to read the recommendation of the Section of Judicial Administration which was adopted by the House as follows:

Resolved, that the American Bar Association supports, in principle, the enactment of the Judicial Reform Act (Senate Bill 1506) and that the Section of Judicial Administration is authorized to represent the American Bar Association before congressional bodies of the United States concerned with this legislation. I should point out that the debate and the recommendation of the board of governors make clear that that applies to Titles I and II only. But I do want to explain the use of the words "in principle" because it has come to my attention that that has been assumed by some to mean that the bill as it presently reads is not what was approved.

The words "in principle" are required by ABA procedures in order to provide an expedient to a person who, like me, might be testifying for the American Bar Association after amendments not changing the principle of the bill had been made. The "in principle" words are simply added to indicate that the bill, though satisfactory as it stands, would be equally satisfactory if changes not altering the principle of the bill were made, if subsequent amendments in form or procedure only were adopted.

I might say that it was made clear to everyone that what was being debated was S. 1506, and I am sure that the action of the House of Delegates was approval of S. 1506 as it stands.

I have spoken of Senator Tydings' remarks to the House. He was present as I was when the vote was taken. To my surprise, I must say, there was only one single dissenting vote at a time when there were at least 260 members present in the House of Delegates. I should add that although not specifically mentioning S. 1506, the ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure, and Compensation also unanimously recommended approval by the House of Delegates of a resolution which in fact states the principles underlying S. 1506.

Now a word about constitutionality. I have no doubt whatever that the basic principles of the legislation would stand constitutional attack. I have studied the question over a number of years. I have participated in panels when I have heard the reverse argued vigorously. I have sat on a moot court argument where brilliant young men argued both sides. I have heard nothing which gives me any concern on the constitutional issue.

I have read the memorandum on constitutionality prepared by the subcommitte staff which I consider to be excellent. I have read the statements on the subject submitted by Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist at the hearing before the subcommittee last Thursday which is very perceptive and knowledgeable. I agree with the conclusions in both those memoranda.

I share the concern of Mr. Rehnquist as to the provision in 28 U.S.C. 378 (d), page 5, lines 5 to 8, which would permit the commission provided for by the bill to suspend the judge whose removal they had recommended to the Judicial Conference. I too, believe, that there is a real question whether a body basically investigatory in nature can be given power to suspend an article III judge prior to his removal even when the commission is composed entirely of judges. I think a simple and acceptable alternative would be to permit the commission to recommend immediate suspension to the Judicial Conference with its recommendation of ultimate removal.

The Conference could promptly appoint a committee to hear arguments on both sides and then act. Under this procedure, little time would be lost and I do not think the public interest would suffer.

My real concern, if it please the subcommittee, is to have the question of constitutionality come up unencumbered by collateral issues like this one. I do not mean to indicate I think it would be clearly unconstitutional. I simply think it is taking on a burden that we need not assume when the basic question should come to the Supreme Court clear and unencumbered.

In my view, there is also force to other suggestions Mr. Rehnquist has made. Some of them may be resolved in the Chandler case, the opinion on which I gather is expected any day.

One thing I should like to make clear for this record is this. If all of the amendments suggested by Mr. Rehnquist were made, I believe that the principles of the bill would not be altered. I am strongly of the view that the approval of the American Bar Association applies to the bill as now drafted, and that the same approval would apply to the bill if any or all of these amendments were made in it.

Mr. Chairman, during the past 3 years, three bipartisan national commissions of leading citizens appointed by the President of the United States, as well as the American Assembly on Law and the Changing Society, have in their various ways gravely concluded that

we face challenges to the public order and to the realization of American ideals greater than any since the Civil War. In substance, they all agree that in no period in the Nation's history has there been so severe a testing of our basic legal institutions, never such great disillusionment as to the efficacy of law, either in preserving order or in assuring equal justice.

I do not fault any agency of our Federal system, executive, legislative, or judicial, nor any segment of the organized bar in the attempts that are being made to meet these conditions. But it is fundamental that no judicial system can be better than the judges who administer it. I am convinced that the American people still revere their judges, although I do wish that this were reflected in a public insistence that judicial selection be made by methods designed to produce only highly qualified judges in all the courts of the land. That is not so today. But the significant fact is that when public attention is drawn to a judge who is corrupt or alcoholic or flagrantly disregardful of the canons of judicial ethics or one who is so physically or mentally disabled or incapacitated that he cannot perform his job, the whole system of justice suffers and the public esteem is substantially lowered for that system. And then there is one other important consideration and that is the good judges who sit on the bench. I have had the regrettable experience in two States in this country of addressing the Judicial Conference at a time when justices of the supreme court of the State were either under suspicion of misbehavior or had been convicted of that offense. I don't think you can appreciate unless you are with them the pain that the judges who sit with such associates suffer when that happens.

If it please the committee, I think that we have come full circle since we first met. At that time, fairness would have had to dictate a reply of "No it hasn't, not yet" to the question of whether the system of the California commission had been proved. Today we know that a commission on judicial qualifications is an effective instrument, both to satisfy the public cry for a place to lodge its complaints about judges and to provide suitable action when the complaints are meritorious. Judges stand alone in the government without an agency to which the public can express itself when it has a complaint. I think it has been demonstrated that the good judges are protected from unjust complaints about their conduct, and I believe it has been conclusively shown that the mere existence of the commission results, first, in better behavior by judges who are inclined to be somewhat slovenly, and most often by the resignation of those who realize that they have been guilty of an act or a course of conduct which justifies their removal. Again and again the mere filing of a charge has resulted in a resignation.

In my own State, where I had the privilege of drafting a new judiciary article for our constitution, we found, as so many of us do, that we could not prevail, at least at first, when we hit the sacred preserve of politicians' patronage; but when it came to the principles which we are discussing today, the principles embodied in S. 1506, they recognized that the public would no longer tolerate interference, and they approved a commission much like the California commission, and that was overwhelmingly adopted by the voters at the polls.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you and the members of this subcommittee on the complete and conclusive record that has been made in support of this legislation. I do not see how a better one could be pro