Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

Attorneys to be Re-admitted.—Selections from Correspondence.

Gowland, Richard, 32, Norfolk Street; formerly of Gloucester Street, Bloomsbury. Green, William, Liverpool.

Green, Henry Gibson, late of 1, Staple Inn;
now of 3, Cold Harbour Lane, Camberwell.
Harling, John, Lancaster.

Hemington, John, West Felton, Salop; for-
inerly of Oldbury, Hales Owen, Salop.
Henson, William Smith; formerly of Upper
Stamford Street; now of 13, Strand.
Hodge, Charles, Birmingham.

Hunter, Abraham, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
Knowles, James, Kendal Green, Harrow Road.
Leighton, Thomas, late of Gloucester; now of
12, Southampton Buildings.

Makinson, Titus, late of Manchester; now of
Blackburn.

Marchant, Henry, 16, Theobald's Road.
Miller, George, late of Dudley, Worcester;

211

now of 34, Northampton Street, Walcot,
Somerset.

Mullington, Henry, late of Philpot Lane; now
of Wellington Place, Wandsworth Road.
Palmer, John, Coleshill, Warwick.
Parry, James, Aberdovey, County Merioneth,
and of Aberystwith, Cardigan.

Powell, John Withers, Lenham, County Kent.
Savill, Joseph, formerly of Chelmsford, then

of Halstead, and late of Long Melford, Suf-
folk; now of Colchester.

Slater, Isaac Faulkner, heretofore of Birming-
ham; lastly permanently residing at Soho
Hill, Handsworth, Stafford.

Thompson, George, late of 2, Staple Inn,
London; now of 1, Furnival's Inn.

Wheeler, Thomas, Fulham Lane, Hammer-
smith.

Wiseman, William, late of Guildford Street; now of Blandford, Dorset.

SPECIAL NOTICES OF ADMISSION IN THE KING'S BENCH.

Clerks' Names.

To whom articled.

Robinson, Charles Barrington, 21, Park Road, Alfred Robinson, 17, Orchard Street, PortRegent's Park.

Thom, William, Bucklersbury.

Thompson, Thomas, of Bishopwearmouth.
Wallis, Charles William, 34, Brudenell Place,
New North Road.

man Square.

Henry Pye, South Lincoln; assigned to William Humphrey Pilcher, New Broad Street; assigned to William Duncan Cramond, New Broad Street; re-assigned to W. H. Pilcher. Frederick Horn, Sunderland.

Henry Aston, 2, New Broad Street.

[blocks in formation]

Overton, John Jefferson, of Fakenham, Norfolk.

If any reason is known to exist why any of the above-named persons should not be admitted, communication may be made to the Secretary of the "Incorporated Law Society."

SELECTIONS

FROM CORRESPONDENCE.

FUGITIVE DEBTORS.

To the Editor of the Legal Observer. Sir,

A desire to contribute my mite to the diffusion through your publication of professional information, which is not to be obtained elsewhere, induces me to draw the attention of your readers to the result of the following case, which shews that fugitive debtors may in some cases at least be followed and sued in France with success.

On the 13th of August 1834, Mr. Barber made an application to the Lord Chancellor, in a cause wherein Christian Dill of Oxford Street,

baker, and others, were plaintiffs, and John Quenell was defendant, and stated that the defendant many years ago administered to the estate of Andrew Quenell deceased, who left a blind widow and three children, and took possession of and carried on his businessthat the plaintiffs filed a bill in the year 1809, and after many years investigation an order was made, that the defendant should pay into Court a sum of 17,000l. but the defendant being in France, and consequently out of the jurisdiction of the Court, Mr. Barber moved that the order might be varied by directing the sum to be paid to the plaintiffs, by which means they would be enabled to proceed in the French Courts for the recovery of the sum in question. His Lordship directed the order to be made as prayed for, and I have lately learnt that the money was in consequence

212 Selections from Correspondence: Superior Courts-- Lords Commissioners.

actually recovered from Quenell in one of the French Courts.

This, even with regard to suits in Equity, is important; but does not the inquiry necessarily follow, whether judgments at Law may not be equally available?

MUNICIPAL

Sir,

[blocks in formation]

P.

OF

Having seen a question agitated in the papers lately, upon the election of Mayors for the different Boroughs, I am induced to trouble you with the following observation.

If the act be carefully perused, no directions are found to exist as to the mode for the election of the Mayors under the new system. But how far may not the election take place under the first section of the act, which enacts that all statutes, usages, &c. inconsistent and contrary to the act, should be repealed, annulled, &c.?

The word "inconsistent" would certainly give a power to the aldermen to choose the new mayors; for the old custom of so choosing them is not inconsistent with the provisions of the act, since there is no mode pointed out wherewith it can be inconsistent; therefore I presume that notwithstanding the doubts of many, and among them of a gentleman of the bar of high standing, whose opinion upon the subject has been taken, and which was, that he did not see how there could be any mayor under the act, such doubts are rather premature. At all events the words referred to, and not noticed in the opinion, deserve consideration.

Perhaps some of your correspondents may feel disposed to take up the question pro bono W. F. publico.

SUPERIOR COURTS.

Lards Commissioners' Court. AGREEMENT.-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

EVIDENCE.

Circumstances in which specific performance
of an agreement is decreed against parties,
who denied all knowledge of the agreement
being made on their behalf by their partner.
The examination of this partner, after the
dissolution of the partnership, held inadmis-
sible to prove the agreement.

This was a suit instituted for specific performance of an agreement to purchase, which the Vice Chancellor decreed with costs, and interest on the purchase money. This was an appeal from his Honor's decision.

Mr. Knight, Mr Wigram, and Mr. Koe, in support of the decree below-the appeal being against the whole decree.-The plaintiff was the executor of one Bland, who held an agreement for a lease from Mr. Spencer Stanhope, of some iron-works, at Silkstone, in

Yorkshire, which he agreed to sell for 10007. to Messrs. Graham and Hartopp. They accepted the title and entered into possession. They had iron-works at that time at Milton, about six miles from Silkstone. Hartopp became a bankrupt, and the Messrs. Graham refused to perform the agreement, alleging that the same had been entered into by Hartopp on his own account, without their privity, and that the partnership between them and him was restricted to the iron-works at Milton, to which their joint liabilities also were restricted. Hartopp was examined, and his depositions proved that the Messrs. Graham were cognizant of the contract, and sanctioned it. The same was proved by the fact of the partnership accounts including the expen-es at Silkstone, as well as the expenses at Milton; and also by a long correspondence between the parties from 1825, when the contract was made, down to 1829, when Hartopp's retirement dissolved the partnership.

Mr. Jacob, for Messrs. Graham, the appellants. The agreement for this lease was made by Hartopp alone, who, without the knowledge or consent of the appellants, removed a large portion of the property belonging to the Milton works to Silkstone Mills. That was the reason that the mention of Silkstone so often occurred in the accounts and correspondence. The appellants had been allalong ignorant that Hartopp was carrying on the works at Silkstone in the name of the partnership, and as soon as they discovered that they stopped the works. There was also a preliminary objection to the contract as binding, inasmuch as there was nothing to purchase, the vendor having only a promise of a lease.

Sir C. C. Pepys, Chief Lord Commissioner.The defendants were the partners of Hartopp in the Milton Iron-works in the year 1825, but being also agents in London for several iron manufacturers, they did not permit their names to appear in the partnership transactions, and the works at Milton were carried on in the name of the firm of Hartopp and Co. Mr. Hartopp thinking that the blast furnace erected by Bland at Silkstone, which was within six miles of Milton, would be a great acquisition to the works at the latter place, entered into an agreement for the purchase thereof from Bland for 10007., in March 1825. Possession was taken by Hartopp with the knowledge, as it was alleged, of the defendants; but the purchase money was not paid, and Hartopp became bankrupt. The questions were, therefore, whether the defendants, his solvent partners, recognized the contract to purchase, and whether the contract was such a one as the Court would enforce. With respect to the first question, the defendants admitted that in 1827, the works at Silkstone were carried on for the benefit of the firm, but they denied all knowledge of the contract of 1825. The defendants ought to have shewn by some evidence at what time it was that they became aware of the contract; but they did not offer any such evidence. The dealings of the firm with the

Superior Courts: Lords Commissioners; King's Bench Practice Court.

works, proved beyond a doubt that the defendants must have been acquainted with the contract between Hartopp and Bland as early as 1825.

213

was sworn that the defendant was seen alive
within twelve days, and a case was cited where
a longer period having elapsed, the Court
granted the rule.

Putteson, J.--You may take your rule.
Rule granted.-Phillips v. Waters, H. T.

With respect to the second question, whether this was a contract which the Court could enforce it was said to be a contract to pur-1836. K. B. P. C. chase iron-works at Silkstone, where there

SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DECLARATION ON
DEFENDANT'S SON.

In ejectment, a service of the notice of de-
claration on the defendant's son on the pre-
mises, if it shall appear that it afterwards
came to the defendant's possession, will be
good.

was nothing to purchase except the blast fur-JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CASUAL EJECTOR.— nace. But it was clear from the evidence that the defendants were well aware of the nature of the interest which they by their partner proposed to purchase; for negotiations had been entered into between the firm and Mr. Spencer Stanhope, the owner, as to the amount per acre which was to be given for the iron stone. It was the opinion of his Lordship, upon both This was a motion for judgment against the points, that the appeal should be dismissed, casual ejector. It appeared, from the affidavit with costs. He wished it to be understood on which the motion was made, that the notice that he came to this conclusion without any of declaration was served on the defendant's regard to the evidence given by Hartopp, to son on the premises, and its contents explained the admissibility of which a well founded ob-in the usual way. The defendant's attorney jection was raised in the argument a

was afterwards seen with the notice in his pos

Patteson, J., granted the rule.

Sir J. B. Bosanquet concurred in the judg-session. ment delivered by his brother Commissioner, and said, that in making up his mind on the questions under appel, he had altogether excluded from his consideration Hartopp's evidence.

Wheat v. Graham. Westininster, Nov. 7, and Lincoln's Inn Hall, Sittings after Michaelmas Term, 1835.

[blocks in formation]

On an application for leave to enter up judg-
ment on an old warrant of attorney, proof
of the defendant's having been seen alive
within twelve days, is sufficient to entitle
the plaintiff to the rule.

This was an application for leave to enter up judgment on an old warrant of attorney. It

a See on this point the case of Prichard v. Draper, Russ. & Mylne, 200; and S. C. on appeal, 2 Clark & Finnelly, 379, 392.

Rule gran ed-Doe v. Roe, H. T. 1836. K B. P. C..

DEBT. COGNOVIT.-BREACH OF FAITH.-
ENTRY OP FINAL JUDGMENT.

An action having been brought for debt and
seitled by consent of both parties, but judg-
ment having been entered up by the plain-
tiff, contrary to good faith, the Court will
grant a rule ta set aside the judgment.
This was an application for a rule to shew
cause why judgment signed by the plaintiff's
attorney should not be set aside, and the costs
of the present application paid. It appeared,
that an action was brought by the plaintiff
which was settled by a cognovit, by which the
money sued for and costs. were agreed to be
paid by instalments. At the same time an
undertaking was given to the defendant that
on the whole of the instalments having been
paid the cognovit should be void, and satisfac-
tion entered up for the costs and debt. Not-
withstanding this, however, notice had been
given to the defendant to tax the costs, and
final judgment had been entered up.

Patteson, J., granted the application.
Rule granted.-Skeates v. Short, H. T. 1836.
K. B. P. C.

JUDGMENT AGAINST CASUAL EJECTOR-RE-
FUSAL OF DEFENDANT TO RECEIVE NOTICE.
-SUBSEQUENT SERVICE ON THE SON OF
THE DEFENDANT ON THE PREMISES.

If the defendant shall have refused to open
the door to receive the notice of decluru-
tion, the contents of which were explained
to her, subsequent service of the notice on
her son on the premises, will be sufficient
to entitle the plaintiff to a rule to shew

cause

A motion was made for judgment against

214

Superior Courts: Exchequer.-Chancery Sittings; Fees to Counsels' Clerks.

the casual ejector. From the affidavit, it appeared, that the deponent had gone to the premises for the purpose of serving the notice on the tenant in possession, whose name was Elizabeth Morgan. On his knocking at the door, however, she answered him from within, and refused to open the door. The papers were explained to her, but she went away, and refused to receive them. Her son was afterwards served with a true copy of the notice, on the premises, and the deponent stated, that he believed he lived with his mother.

Patteson, J. said, if the notice had been put under the door at the time the mother was present, it would have been sufficient. As it appeared she had had notice of its contents, however, a rule to shew cause might issue.

Rule to shew cause granted.-Doe d. Grimes v. Roe, H. T. 1836. K. B. P. C.

PRISONER'S DISCHARGE UNDER SMALL DEB-
TORS' ACT.-NOTICE OF PERIOD TO APPLY.

The Court, however, said, that the particulars made no difference in the case, because the plaintiff might afterwards amend his particulars, and claim only single rent.

The case of Lawrence v. Stephens, 3 Dowl. 777, was cited in support of the application. The Court said, that that decision, although in favor of the present application, was wrongly decided, though correctly reported.

Rule refused.-Thornton v. Whitehead, H. T. 1836. Excheq.

CHANCERY SITTINGS,
Hilary Term, 1836.

Tuesday

Before the Lord Chancellor.

Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday

On an application for the discharge of a pri- Wednesday soner under the Small Debtors Act, notice having been given of the intention to apply on the last day of the preceding term, the Court will not grant the rule. This was a motion for a rule for the discharge of a prisoner under the Small Debtors' Act. The affidavit stated that the defendant had been in custody for twelve months, and that the plaintiff was served with the usual notice. The notice, however, stated that the application would be made on the last day of last term, or as soon after as counsel could be

heard.

Patteson, J., thought that the plaintiff might have been misled, and fresh notice should be given.

[ocr errors]

Rule refused. 1936. K. B. P. C.

Thursday

Friday
Saturday -
Monday

[ocr errors]
[merged small][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

Since the preceding list was issued, the cause of The Skinners' Co. v. The Irish Society ·Jameson v. West, H. T. has been postponed till after Term; and the Adjourned Lunatic Petitions and Appeals only will be taken till Wednesday, Jan. 27.

Exchequer.

PLEADING. STRIKING OUT COUNTS. USE
AND OCCUPATION.-IENALTY.-LANDLORD
AND TENANT.

Where the Court will not interfere to order counts to be struck out of a declaration. This was an application to strike out one of two counts from a declaration, under these

circumstances:

The first count was framed on the 11 G. 2, c. 19, s. 18, for the recovery of double rent. The second count was for use and occupation. The Court was of opinion that there was no objection to the plaintiff framing his declaration in this way. It did not seem to come within the meaning of the rule of court by which counts may be struck out.

It was then urged, that by the plaintiff's particulars it appeared that the action was brought for the double value pursuant to the statute only.

NEW REGULATION OF
FEES ALLOWED ON TAXATION.

FEES TO CLERKS OF COUNSEL.

SOME question having arisen upon the subject of fees paid to the clerks of counsel, and some of the clerks having made a claim of a per centage upon the fees paid to counsel, the Taxing Officers think it right to state that no claim of the kind can be allowed, and that such payments have always been gratuitous only.

In this view they consider themselves authorized to allow only as under, according to the directions which they have received from the Judges.

[merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]
[merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

Common Law.

MAGISTRATES. P. 135.

215

By 5 G. 2, c. 18, no practising attorney is capable of acting as a justice of the peace for any county; and by 18 G. 2, c. 20, the qualification of every justice (except as therein is excepted,) is a clear estate of 100l. per annum.

Practice.

L. S.

AFFIDAVIT OF ACKNOWLEDGING DEEDS. P.

136.

The affidavit verifying the certificate, is seldom on stamped parchment. It is stated in Mr. Hayes's Treatise on Conveyancing, p. 251, that the affidavits not being like affidavits as to fines made in a suit, must be stamped. The Stamp Act, 55 G. 3, c. 184, enacts, that an affidavit not made for the immediate purpose of being filed, read, or used, in any court of law or equity, shall be charged with duty, and exempts from stamp duty, an affidavit required, or authorized by law, to be made before any commissioner or commissioners appointed, or to be appointed, by act of parliament. I think that the affidavit verifying the made for the immediate purpose of being filed certificate, may be considered as an affidavit in a court of law. If it is not so considered, as the commissioners before whom the affidavit is sworn are appointed by act of parliament, the affidavit is, I think, exempted from duty. L. S.

[blocks in formation]

1. The presumption arising from the leading cases on this point is, that where legacies in equal proportions are given to executors apparently as such, and no relationship exists between them and the testator, to induce a contrary inference, then the legacies are intended as a reward for services done, and not giving the executors a title to them unless they prove, and act in their appointed capacity. Piggott v. Green, 6 Sim. 72. Reference to which case, and to Leg. Obs. Vol. 10, p. 305, where this doctrine is fully treated of, will make it appear, that the executors in the case T. L. J. put, would not be entitled. 2. If a legacy be left to A. as executor, whe

A landlord's right to distrain cattle agisting upon the lands held of him by a tenant, is uncontested, and it has even been so decided where the beasts were put in by the consent of the lessor, and licence of the lessee. Wood-ther expressly for his care and trouble or not, fall's Land. and Ten. 473, 7th ed. The question is then only between the landlord and he must either act, or distinctly shew his inassignees; and in page 476 of the same work, tention to act, before he shall become entitled it appears that a landlord having a legal right Cha. Rep. 95; 3 Ves. jun. 148; 4 Ves. jun. 312; to it. Toller's Executors, 347, citing 3 Bro. to distrain goods while they remain on the pre-13 Ves. jun. 417. In this case neither B. nor C. mises, for one year's rent, the issuing a commission of bankruptcy against the tenant, and appears to have acted, or shewn such intention; the messengers' taking possession of these and it therefore would appear from the above goods, will not hinder the landlord from dis- authority, that the legacy to them is void. training for rent. F. The proving the will, however, is by no means the only way in which they may have shewn their intention to act.

F.

« AnteriorContinuar »