ON THE LAW RELATING TO TRAF- | case held, "that bribery at elections of
FICKING IN SEATS IN PARLIA-
MENT.

2

On the Law relating to Trafficking in Seats in Parliament.—Changes in the Law.

all bonds made by the said Thomas Longe | she, or they shall forfeit to any person who

to any person or persons touching the discharge of the exercise of the said room or place of burgess-ship in anywise."

It is to be observed, that one of the parties here brought before the House was the returning officer; but it is not stated that Watts stood in any such capacity; and we apprehend that the jurisdiction of the House of Commons in all such matters is general, and not confined to any particular class of persons. But supposing an offence of this nature could be proved against one of its own members, we conceive that then the cognizance of it particularly belongs to the House, and would no doubt be gravely dealt with as to the offending parties.

shall sue for the same, to be recovered, with such costs of suit, by action of debt, in any of his Majesty's Courts of Record at Westminster, if the offence be committed in England or Wales; and in any of his Majesty's Courts of Record at Dublin, if the offence be committed in Ireland (s. 1). But by the second section an exception is made as to any money paid or agreed to be paid to or by any person for any legal expense bond fide incurred at or concerning any election; and by the fourth section, actions on this statute are limited to two years after the offence committed.

should the alleged offender be one of its own members, it seems befitting its own dignity that an inquiry should be there prosecuted. If the charge were established, the offending member would be visited heavily, either by fine, as in the Westbury case, or more probably by expulsion, as in similar cases of grave offence.

CHANGES IN THE LAW DURING
THE LAST SESSION OF PARLIA-
MENT.

We think we have now shewn that any person guilty of the offence of procuring Not only, however, is the offence which the return of another to the House of we have been considering punishable by the Commons for a sum of money, is liable House, and also at the Common Law, "by to an action for penalties under the staindictment or information ; but as it ap-tutes referred to, and the forfeiture of the pears to us, it comes within the express sums paid, which action may be brought by terms of that well-known act, the 49 any one; and that the offence is also cogG. 3, c. 118, intituled, "An Act for bet-nizable by the House of Commons; and ter securing the Independence and Purity of Parliament, by preventing the procuring or obtaining of Seats in Parliament by corrupt Practices," which, after reciting that the giving or procuring to be given, or promising to give or procure to be given, any sum of money, gift or reward, in order to procure the return of any member to serve in Parliament, if not given to or for the use of some person having a right, or claiming to have a right to act as returning officer, or to vote at such election, is not bribery within the meaning of the 2 G. 2, c.24, but that such gifts or promises are contrary to the ancient usage, right, and freedom of elections, proceeds, among other things, to enact, that any person or persons who shall receive or accept of, by himself, herself, or themselves, or by any other person or persons, in trust for or to the use, or on the behalf of him, her, or them, any sum of money, gift or reward, or any promise upon any engagement, contract, or agreement that such person or persons to whom, to whose use, or on whose behalf such gift or promise shall be made, shall by himself, herself, or themselves, or by any other person or persons whatsoever, at his, her, or their solicitation, request, or command, procure or endeavour to procure the return of any person to serve in Parliament for county, city, town, &c. shall forfeit to the king the value and amount of such sum of money, gift or reward, over and above the sum of 5007.; which said sum of 500l., he,

h Rex v. Pitt, ubi supra.

any

CERTIORARI.

5 & 6 W. 4, c. 53.

ACCORDING to the 5 & 6 W. & M. c. 11, writs of certiorari could not be granted to remove indictments before trial at the Quarter Sessions, at the instance of the parties indicted, unless on the motion of Counsel and by rule of Court, and on finding sureties for 201. to appear and plead; and according to the practice on removals from a Court of Assize, recognizance was taken for 501. from the party indicted. Such was the law as to Defendants.

The present act is intituled, " An Act for preventing the vexatious Removal of Indictments into the Court of King's Bench; and for extending the Provisions of an Act of the fifth year of King William and Queen' Mary, for preventing Delays at the Quarter, Sessions of the Peace, to other Indictments;

Changes in the Law.-The Property Lawyer.

and for extending the provisions of an Act of the seventh Year of King George the Fourth, as to taking Bail in cases of Felony."-Passed 21st August, 1835.

It recites, that it is expedient to prevent prosecutors of indictments and presentments from vexatiously removing the same out of inferior Courts into his Majesty's Court of King's Bench; and it is now enacted,

1. That from the passing of this act no writ of certiorari shall issue from the Court of King's Bench at Westminster for removing into that court any indictment or presentment from any court of session, assize, oyer and terminer, or gaol delivery, or any other court, at the instance of the prosecutor or any other person (except His Majesty's attorney general), without motion first made in the Court of King's Bench, or before some judge of that court, and leave obtained to remove such indictment or presentment, in the same manner as similar motions may now be made, and leave given where such application is made on the part of defendants; any law, practice, or usage to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding.

3

to take their trial in due course of law, and it is therefore expedient in such cases to amend and extend the provisions in that respect of the 7 G. 4, c. 64; it is therefore enacted,

That it shall be lawful for any two justices of the peace, if they shall think fit, of whom one or other shall have signed the warrant of commitment, to admit any person or persons charged with felony, or against whom any warrant of commitment for felony is signed, to bail, in the manner and according to the provisions directed by the said recited act, in such sum or sums of money, and with such surety or sureties as they shall think fit, and notwithstanding such person or persons shall have confessed the matter laid to his or their charge, or notwithstanding such justices shall not think that such charge is groundless, or shall think that the circumstances are such as to raise a presumption of guilt

THE PROPERTY LAWYER.

FRAUDULENT REMOVAL OF GOODS.

2. That instead of the recognizance now by law required to be entered into before the allowance of a writ of certiorari, every person indicted or presented in any court of session, assize, oyer and terminer, gaol delivery, or By the 11 G. 2, c. 19, s. 1, it is enacted, any other court, who shall obtain a writ of that where any tenant or lessee for life or certiorari for removing any indictment or pre-lives, for years, at will, sufferance or othersentment whatever into the Court of King's

Bench, not being in custody for want of bail wise, of any messuages, lands, tenements to answer such indictment or presentment, or hereditaments, upon the demise or holdshall, before the allowance of such writ, entering whereof any rent is reserved or made into a recognizance before one of His Ma- payable, shall fraudulently or clandestinely jesty's Justices of the Court of King's Bench, convey or carry off such premises his goods or before a justice of the peace of the county or chattels, to prevent the landlord or lessor or place in which the offence is charged to have distraining the same for arrears of rent so been committed, or in which such person shall reserved, the landlord or lessor, or any perreside, in such sum and with such sureties as the said Court of King's Bench, or one of His son by him empowered, may, within the Majesty's Justices of the said Court, shall by space of thirty days next ensuing the reindorsement on the said writ order and direct; moval of the goods, take and seize them as which recognizance shall contain the same a distress, wherever they may be found, conditions as are now by the 5 & 6 W. & M., provided they have not, before such seizc. 11, and the 8 & 9 W. 3, c. 33, required in ure, been sold bond fide and for valuable consideration. In order, however, to entitle a landlord to pursue the goods of the tenant under this statute, it was held by Eyre, C. J., that the removal must have taken place after the rent actually became due and was in arrear. Watson v. Main, 3 Esp. 15; acc. 2 Wms. Saund. 284, n. 2. But in a subsequent case, where the goods had been removed from the premises the night before the rent became due, Lord Ellenborough, C. J., declared that upon this point he entertained some considerable doubts, and but that the case before him turned upon another point, would have reserved it for the opinion of the Court. Furneaux v. Fotherby, 4 Camp. 136. This point

cases of indictments removed from the general or quarter sessions of the peace; and thereupon all the clauses and provisions contained in the said several acts with respect to costs or otherwise shall extend to such last-mentioned recognizances; and every person being in custody for want of bail, to answer the charge contained in such indictment or presentment, shall be detained in custody until the like recognizances as are hereinbefore directed to be entered into (previous to the allowance of such writ of certiorari) shall have been entered into, or until such person be discharged by due course of law.

3. Reciting that in many cases the taking bail for the appearance of persons charged with felony may be safely admitted, without endangering the appearance of such persons

Property Lawyer: Unqualified Practitioners at the Sessions.

lately came before the Court of Common | dispose of in such manner as if the said goods

Pleas, where it will be seen that the learned Chief Justice decided according to the case of Watson v. Main. The circumstances were these:

had been actually distrained by such landlord in and upon such premises, for such arrears of rent." It is the place, therefore, not the time of the distress, to which the statute intends to apply the remedy: and, indeed, it is obvious, that if the construction contended for by the defendant is adopted, as the landlord may, after five days next after the distress, sell the goods and pay himself the rent, he might do so in many cases before the rent became due, which never could have been intended. Looking to the intention of the act, therefore, and the great uncertainty which would arise, if a removal of the goods at any time before the

This was an action of trespass against the defendants, in bar of which they both pleaded a joint plea of not guilty; and the defendant Duffield then pleaded specially, as bailiff of Vaughan, the landlord, a justification for a distress under the 11 G. 2, c. 19, s. 1, the plea stating, that the rent for which the distress was made became due on the 25th of March, 1834; that the goods of the plaintiff were fraudulently and clandestinely conveyed away to pre-rent became due would be sufficient to let in vent the distress, and that the distress was taken within thirty days next ensuing such carrying away of the goods. The plaintiff, in his replication, alleged that the goods were conveyed away on the 24th of March, 1834, before the time when the rent became due and payable; and the defendant Duffield, in his rejoinder, took issue on that allegation. The jury found a verdict for the defendant Vaughan, on the plea of not guilty; and for the plaintiff upon both the pleas of the defendant Duffield, with 107. damages.

Tindal, C. J. (after stating the pleadings and finding of the jury) said, this case comes before us on a motion to enter a verdict for the defendant Duffield, non obstante veredicto. The motion would, perhaps, have been more correct in point of form, if it had been a motion to arrest the judgment for the plaintiff, on the ground that enough still remains upon the defendant's special plea confessed by the plaintiff's replication, to bar the plaintiff's demand; for we are not aware that any instance can be produced where the defendant,

the provisions of the act; for if at any time, how long before, would be the question; we think the present distress was illegal. We therefore think the law to have been correctly laid down by Eyre, C. J. in Watson v. Main, 3 Esp. N. P.15, upon which Lord Ellenborough appeared to have doubted only, but to have expressed no opinion, in 3 Camp. 136.

Rule discharged.-Rand v. Vaughan, 1 Bing. 767, New Cases.

UNQUALIFIED PRACTITIONERS AT
THE SESSIONS.

WE referred in our last number (vol. 10,
p. 522), to a gross case of mal-practice
tried at the Middlesex Quarter Session, on
the 24th October last; we subjoin a report
of the case. It was set up in defence for
the party, who was indicted for obtaining
money under the false pretence of being an
attorney, that " any man who knew any
thing of law, was as competent in these
proceedings as an attorney. Criminal
courts knew nothing of attorneys."

the 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 12, which recites, Now in opposition to this, may be cited

after an issue which he has taken has been found against him, has been allowed to have judgment entered in his own favour, non obstante. But we think there is no ground whatever for the motion in one form or the other. The short question raised by the pleadings is, whether the statute applies to cases where the tenant removes his goods fraudulently and clandestinely, before the rent becomes due; and we are of opinion that such case is not that frequent delays, inconveniences, and provided for by the statute. By the common unnecessary expenses arose and happened, law, the distress for rent was necessarily inade as well to parishes as private persons, by upon some part of the demised premises, other- the mismanagement and unskilfulness of wise the tenant might rescue the distress, or persons employed as solicitors or agents at bring an action of trespass; and it was only in sessions held for the several counties, who, case the landlord, coming to distrain, saw the having never been regularly bred to the cattle on the premises, and the tenant, to pre-law, and being ignorant of the forms and vent the distress, drove them off the premises, that the landlord could justify freshly following and distraining them. And the statutes 8 Ann, c. 14, s. 2, & 11 G. 2, appear to have been passed with the view of removing such difficulty in the way of the landlord's remedy, in the case of a fraudulent or clandestine removal of the tenant's goods off the premises: for it expressly empowers the landlord "to take and seize such goods, wherever the same shall be found, as a distress for the said arrear of rent; and the same to sell and otherwise

operations thereof, offenders against the laws of the land had frequently escaped with impunity;" and for remedy thereof it was enacted, "that no person whatsoever should act as a solicitor, attorney, or agent, or sue out any process at any general or quarter sessions of the peace for any county, &c., either with respect to matters of a civil or criminal nature, unless such person should have been admitted an attorney of

Unqualified Practitioners at the Sessions.

It is evident, therefore, that for the due administration of justice, attorneys are the only persons who can practise at the sessions. It is observable also, that the penalty does not depend on the party's receiving money for his services, nor is it essential to prove that he represented himself to be an attorney; it is sufficient if he acted in that capacity.

tent to do. Any man who knew any thing of law was as competent for this as an attorney. Criminal courts knew nothing of attorneys. If the prisoner only represented himself as an agent, and not as an attorney, then the indictment must fall to the ground. The prisoner had actually brought the prosecutrix's case into court. He had a perfect knowledge of the consequences of a false representation in this case, and there could be no motive for making one.

The Chairman.-It is of no consequence whatever whether the prisoner represented himself as an attorney or an agent.

Mr. Heaton.-If the point is of no importWe now proceed to give the report of the ance, it is somewhat singular that the prosecase; and would particularly direct the at-cutor should have sent a person to examine tention of our readers to the Chairman's the roll, to see whether the prisoner's naine remarks, and especially in conclusion, where was on it. he states the magnitude of the evil, and the course intended to be pursued to repress it

in future.

Michael Collins was indicted upon three counts, for obtaining at various times sundry sums of money from Rebecca Lawrence, amounting to 87., under the false pretence of being an attorney, and undertaking to bring her case into court. It appeared on the crossexamination of the prosecutrix, that the sum of money which she had given to the prisoner in consequence of his representation of being an attorney, was 51. 10s. 844., the balance she had paid as the expences of bringing that action into court. She was obliged to pawn her ear-rings and her household furniture to raise the money.

A female witness, who was called in favour

of the prisoner, deposed that she stated in the hearing of the prosecutrix, that the prisoner was not an attorney, and that the prisoner answered and said, No, I am not."

66

The Chairman, in summing up, said the indictment was not that the prisoner represented himself to be an attorney, but that he obtained money under false pretences, in acting as an attorney. It was most mischievous to state, that if a man did not represent himself as an attorney, he did not violate the law by undertaking to bring cases into criminal courts. The fact was the very reverse. A man might in that case do a great deal of injury among the lower classes of society, and yet be perfectly honest in his motives. The evils of the system were very great, for there were a great many unprincipled persons, who, by repreMrs. Brown deposed to the fact of having senting themselves as agents, fraudulently obheard the prisoner represent himself as an at-tained money from ignorant people. The torney to the prosecutrix, and also undertake to bring a case of her's into court, by which he got money of her.

Mr. Jones, clerk to Mr. Mills, an attorney, deposed, that he searched the roll, containing the names of the attorneys, and that the name of the prisoner was not on that roll.

moment a man took money for his services in such a case, he subjected himself to legal consequences; he rendered himself liable to transportation. In the present case, the prisoner had not only got money for his own trouble, but had overcharged the prosecutrix for the indictment, the subpoena, warrant, &c. It was of no consequence whether or not the prisoner suid in so many words he was an attorney; his acting as an attorney was the same as saying it. A person might represent himself by his dress or conduct as of any particular profession, without opening his mouth: a person, for example, without saying a word, might represent himself as a soldier, by as

Mr. Heaton, counsel for the prisoner, submitted that this evidence could not be received. The witness could not know whether the roll he saw was the attorneys' roll or not. The original roll ought to have been produced, or a certified copy. The onus of proving that the prisoner was not an attorney rested with the prosecution. The Chairman (Mr. Rotch), said the prose-suming the dress of a soldier. cutor could not prove a negative. He considered the evidence to be secondary evidence. Safety required in many cases, that original documents of importance should not be given out of the custody of the person intrusted with them. The objection therefore was overruled. Mr. Heaton addressed the jury for the priHe maintained that the prisoner had not represented himself as an attorney, but simply as one who could instruct the prosecutrix as to the best measures to be taken to bring a case of assault against a Mr. Oliver into court, and that he was perfectly compe

soner.

The jury, after deliberating for some time, expressed a wish to have the law again laid down by Mr. Rotch respecting the difference between an agent and an attorney.

The Chairman repeated, that if a person charged, or accepted of any remuneration for his own services in bringing cases before a court of that kind, and was not an attorney, he rendered himself liable to transportation, whether he called himself an agent or an attorney.

Mr. Heaton begged to differ in opinion from the Chairman; he maintained that any man had