FY 1979 Gas & Oil Regulation caseload will increase by 18.2% over FY 1978. Regulatory Support 161 162 166 268 (32.5) 338 338 333 336 333 ( 26.9) FY 1979 Regulatory Support caseload will increase by 26.1% over FY 1978. Total* 6,791 7,351 7,997 8,946 (711.1) 10,453 11,334 12,228 13,145 14,048 (954.3) The FY 1979 FERC total* caseload will increase 16.8% over FY 1978 (*Totals are without Gas Producer rate filings which are not typical representations of manpower effort.) Answer 5(c) Indicate if new legislation will be required during the next five years in order to continue major programs of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). No new substantive legislation will be required to enable the FERC to continue the agency's regulatory programs (except that the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, with respect to which the Commission has substantial review functions, will expire on September 30, 1981, unless extended by Congress). The Commission will, of course, require the usual periodic annual appropriation authorizations to carry out the functions and jurisdictional responsibilities enumerated and described in the Department of Energy Organization Act, Public Law 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, and the basic Acts of Congress therein cited or referred to. It should be noted that Title X of the DOE Organization Act contemplates a comprehensive reivew of each program of the Department prior to authorization for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1982. The review under Title X is required to include "(14) recommendations for necessary transitional requirements in the event that funding for such program is discontinued, including proposals for such executive or legislative action as may be necessary to prevent such discontinuation from being unduly disruptive." The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, your October 21 letter to the Secretary requesting $50.8 million was prepared almost 6 months ago. Since then, have you identified other requirements for fiscal year 1979 which were not included in that original request? Mr. CURTIS. Yes, sir. Let me try and describe somewhat of our difficulties in the budgetary process. The September letter, which was forwarded to the Secretary over the signatures of the then-sitting members of the Commission, which were Commissioner Sheldon, Commissioner Smith, and myself, was written at a time prior to the activation of the Department of Energy. It was also at a time when we were only some 2 weeks on the job and attempting, as best we could, to evaluate our resource requirement. We did not, for example, have any experience under the new functions assigned to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission under the Department of Energy Act. We have now evaluated those new functions and have concluded that they will impose rather significant additional requirements for staff resources on the Commission. I would point out and remind the committee that the Department of Energy Organization Act, although it assigned new functions to the Commission, did not authorize the appropriation of additional moneys. Second, we have now had the benefit of a further analysis of the Commission's obligations in carrying out the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System which was subsequently approved by the Congress and that, too, has convinced us to reassess our requirements upward. Also, we have received from the Interstate Commerce Commission a transfer of the case involving the fixing of the tariffs for the Alaska oil pipeline and it is clear to us that we need significant additional investment, primarily in contractual support for the Commission, to successfully proceed to carry out its obligations in that case. And then lastly, certain agreements have emerged from the National Energy Act Conference which caused us to reassess our resource needs should we be required to implement that act; we put those in the range of an additional $7 to $12 million. I would point out that that does not include anything on natural gas pricing, but is merely on those matters which the conference has already concluded on. I have supplied to the committee The CHAIRMAN. You supplied the committee the specific numbers? Mr. CURTIS. Yes, sir. I have. The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would like to be sure that it is fully up to date and if we need any additional information we will get back to you. Senator Hansen, do you have a statement? Senator HANSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, yes I do. STATEMENT OF HON. CLIFFORD P. HANSEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING Mr. Chairman, the FERC budget contains money in the General Counsel's Office for legislative activity and its support. Congress has been generally concerned with the extent to which administrative bodies may go in lobbying or advancing legislation. It is, of course, proper for the FERC to take a formal position on legislation. We welcome such participation on the public record and within the bounds of the Commission's independence. It appears, however, that the current Cominission chairman has been persuaded to go far beyond this role. In today's hearing I hope to elicit some specific information as to the activities of Chairman Curtis in regard to the pending legislation on natural gas and with regard to the legal and ethical proprieties. Some of the legalities are complex and may be unclear. Additional legislation may be needed, but let me set out as clearly as I can what to a layman appears to be a very serious situation. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is supposed to be an independent regulatory commission. In drafting the Department of Energy Organization Act we worked very hard to make FERC independent both of the Administration and of the interests that might try to influence it. The FERC is also absolutely crucial to every phase of the natural gas discussions. FERC's possible action in its biennial rate review is crucial to the question of the desirability of any gas legislation. FERC's possible action on incremental pricing, mandated under all of the proposals now under consideration, is crucial to the outcome of the secret negotiations. FERC's possible action on the many discretionary pricing policies contained in all the proposals is crucial to all Americans in the years ahead. This very crucial role of this independent body makes it even more important than ever that FERC's independence not be compromised. Yet there is strong evidence that the Chairman of FERC has been heavily engaged in the negotiations and advocacy concerning this bill in secret. It was publicly reported and not denied that the Chairman and his general counsel participated along with Secretary Schlesinger to persuade Senator Jackson to rescue the gas bill. Further, the chairman has confirmed that he has participated in several secret sessions at the White House concerning the natural gas bill and the relationship of FERC policy to that bill. There have been hearsay reports and let me say that I regret using such hearsay, but the nature of the secret meetings means that such is the only evidence available to many conferees or to the public and the press. There have been hearsay reports that the chairman has advised members of the secret negotiations, provided information and questions and generally conducted himself as a part of the deliberations. All of this activity cannot help but undermine confidence in the fairness of future FÈRC deliberations and raise suspicions about the commitments or assurances that may have been given in these secret sessions. For example, have assurances or prognostications been made concerning FERC's action in the absence of congressional action? For example, if the legislation should pass and FERC subsequently adopts an extremely stringent or an extremely lenient incremental pricing rule, how could suspicion be dispelled that this result had been foreordained during these secret negotiations? Finally, let me say that the secret nature of this participation is particularly disturbing. If the Chairman of FERC were asked to come |