the trailer for Jackie O's transportation to the 30th Anniversary National Walking Horse Trainers Show, he provided a helper to accompany Jessie Smith to the 30th Anniversary National Walking Horse Trainers Show, he provided hay and feed for Jackie O's use during the 30th Anniversary National Walking Horse Trainers Show, and he paid the entry fee necessary for Jackie O to enter the 30th Anniversary National Walking Horse Trainers Show (Tr. 119-20). I find Respondent's claim that Jessie Smith was acting outside the scope of his employment when he entered Jackie O at the 30th Anniversary National Walking Horse Trainers Show while Jackie O was sore, is belied by Respondent's admissions regarding the extent of control he gave Jessie Smith over Jackie O and Respondent's knowledge of and acquiescence in Jessie Smith's entering Jackie O in the 30th Anniversary National Walking Horse Trainers Show. Therefore, I reject Respondent's contention that the Chief ALJ erred when he found Respondent entered Jackie O in the 30th Anniversary National Walking Horse Trainers Show through his employee, Jessie Smith. The record clearly establishes that Jessie Smith was Respondent's employee and that Jessie Smith's entry of Jackie O was within the scope of Jessie Smith's employment. Third, Respondent contends he cannot be liable for violating the Horse Protection Act because he meets the tests set forth in Baird v. United States Dep't of Agric., 39 F.3d 131 (6th Cir. 1994), and Burton v. United States Dep't of Agric., 683 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1982) (Respondent's Appeal Pet. at 4). Section 5(2)(A) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(A)) prohibits any person from showing or exhibiting, in any horse show or horse exhibition, any horse which is sore; section 5(2)(B) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(B)) prohibits any person from entering for the purpose of showing or exhibiting, in any horse show or horse exhibition, any horse which is sore; section 5(2)(C) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(C)) prohibits any person from selling, auctioning, or offering for sale, in any horse sale or auction, any horse which is sore; and section 5(2)(D) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(D)) prohibits any horse owner from allowing another person to do one of the acts prohibited in section 5(2)(A), (B), and (C) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(A), (B), and (C)). Baird and Burton hold that a horse owner cannot be found to have allowed another person to do one of the acts prohibited in section 5(2)(A), (B), or (C) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(A), (B), or (C)) in violation of section 5(2)(D) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(D)) if certain factors are shown to exist. The Chief ALJ did not conclude and I do not conclude that Respondent violated section 5(2)(D) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(D)). Therefore, I find Baird and Burton inapposite. 60 Agric. Dec. 570 Timeliness of Complainant's Appeal Petition In addition to responding to the issues raised by Complainant in Complainant's Appeal Petition, Respondent contends in Respondent's Response that Complainant's Appeal Petition should be dismissed because it was not timely filed (Respondent's Response at 3-4). Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a)) provides that a party may file an appeal within 30 days after receiving service of the administrative law judge's decision. The record contains no evidence of the date on which the Hearing Clerk served Complainant with the Chief ALJ's Initial Decision and Order." Therefore, I cannot conclude that Complainant's Appeal Petition was late-filed. 17 Moreover, on June 28, 2001, Complainant requested that I extend the time for filing an appeal petition. I granted Complainant's June 28, 2001, request, by extending the time for filing Complainant's appeal petition to July 20, 2001." On July 20, 2001, Complainant made a second request for an extension of time within which to file an appeal petition, and on July 23, 2001, I extended the time within which Complainant could file an appeal petition to July 23, 2001.18 Therefore, based on the extensions of time granted to Complainant, I conclude that Complainant's Appeal Petition, which Complainant filed on July 23, 2001, was timely filed. Respondent further contends that Complainant cannot "use an order nunc pro tunc to file its untimely appeal” (Respondent's Response at 4). Complainant made a timely request for an extension of time to file an appeal petition on June 28, 2001. I granted Complainant's request extending the time for filing an appeal petition to July 20, 2001. Complainant's request for a second extension of time was left on the voice mail of the Office of the Judicial Officer on July 20, 2001, before 4:30 p.m., the time the Hearing Clerk's Office closes for the purpose of filing documents in proceedings conducted under the Rules of Practice. Therefore, Complainant's second request for an extension of time was filed before Complainant's appeal petition was due. I was not able to file the Informal Order granting Complainant's July 20, 2001, request for an extension of time until July 23, 2001. As Complainant's Appeal Petition had been due July 20, 2001, I issued the July 23, 2001, Informal Order nunc pro tunc. Under these circumstances, I conclude that my granting Complainant's July 20, 2001, request for an extension of time nunc pro Respondent further contends he was denied the opportunity to submit his views on Complainant's June 28, 2001, and July 20, 2001, requests for extensions of time to file an appeal petition (Respondent's Response at 4). Section 1.147(f) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.147(f)) provides that in all instances in which time permits, notice of a request for an extension of time shall be given to the other party with opportunity to submit views concerning the request. The record does not indicate that Respondent was given notice of Complainant's requests for extensions of time within which to file an appeal petition. However, time did not permit my giving Respondent an opportunity to submit views on Complainant's July 20, 2001, request for an extension of time. Moreover, the Judicial Officer has long held that because of the backlog of cases before the Judicial Officer, requests for extensions of time have been routinely granted without burdening the opposing party with the opportunity to submit views concerning the requests and the Judicial Officer put litigants on notice that this practice will continue at least until the backlog in the Office of the Judicial Officer has been eliminated. See In re Embry Livestock Co., 48 Agric. Dec. 1010 (1989) (Order Denying Respondent's Request to Set Aside Extension of Time). The backlog in the Office of the Judicial Officer has been significantly reduced since 1989, when In re Embry Livestock Co. was decided, but it has not been eliminated. Since I have not previously given any notice that I would no longer follow In re Embry Livestock Co., I follow In re Embry Livestock Co. in this proceeding. However, since the backlog in the Office of the Judicial Officer has been substantially reduced, in future cases, I will no longer follow In re Embry Livestock Co., and instead, I will adhere to section 1.147(f) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.147(f)). For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued. ORDER 1. Respondent is assessed a $2,200 civil penalty. The civil penalty shall be paid by certified check or money order made payable to the "Treasurer of the United States" and sent to: Colleen A. Carroll United States Department of Agriculture Office of the General Counsel Marketing Division. Room 2343-South Building Washington, DC 20250-1417 60 Agric. Dec. 570 Respondent's payment of the civil penalty shall be forwarded to, and received by, Ms. Carroll within 60 days after service of this Order on Respondent. Respondent shall indicate on the certified check or money order that payment is in reference to HPA Docket No. 99-0028. 2. Respondent is disqualified for a period of 1 year from showing, exhibiting, or entering any horse, directly or indirectly through any agent, employee, or device, and from managing, judging, or otherwise participating in any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction. "Participating" means engaging in any activity beyond that of a spectator, and includes, without limitation: (a) transporting or arranging for the transportation of horses to or from any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction; (b) personally giving instructions to exhibitors; (c) being present in the warm-up areas, inspection areas, or other areas where spectators are not allowed at any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction; and (d) financing the participation of others in any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction. The disqualification of Respondent shall become effective on the 60th day after service of this Order on Respondent. 3. Respondent has the right to obtain review of this Order in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which he resides or has his place of business or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Respondent must file a notice of appeal in such court within 30 days from the date of this Order and must simultaneously send a copy of such notice by certified mail to the Secretary of Agriculture. 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2), (c). The date of this Order is September 6, 2001. PLANT QUARANTINE ACT DEPARTMENTAL DECISIONS In re: HERMINIA RUIZ CISNEROS. P.Q. Docket No. 99-0054. Decision and Order. Filed July 11, 2001. PQ - Importation - Mango trees - Soil - Statutes at large constructive notice - Regulations constructive notice - Ability to pay – Civil penalty - Sanction policy. The Judicial Officer (JO) affirmed the Initial Decision and Order of Administrative Law Judge Dorothea A. Baker assessing the Respondent a $9,600 civil penalty for importing 32 live mango trees without a written PPQ permit as required by 7 C.F.R. § 319.37-3(a), without meeting the postentry quarantine conditions as required by 7 C.F.R. § 319.37-7, without ensuring that the mango trees were free of soil as required by 7 C.F.R. § 319.37-8(a), and at a port that was not a designated port of entry as required by 7 C.F.R. § 319.37-14(a). The JO concluded that the Complainant proved the violations by a preponderance of the evidence and that the $9,600 civil penalty recommended by the Complainant was justified by the facts and circumstances. The JO found that the Respondent had actual knowledge of the regulations prior to her March 17, 1997, violations. Further, the JO stated the Plant Quarantine Act and the Federal Plant Pest Act are published in the United States Statutes at Large and the United States Code and the Respondent is presumed to know the law. The JO also stated that the regulations regarding the importation and offer for entry of prohibited and restricted articles (7 C.F.R. §§ 319.37-.37-14) are published in the Federal Register, thereby constructively notifying the Respondent of the requirements for the importation of mango trees. The JO rejected the Respondent's contention that she did not import the mango trees for a commercial purpose. The JO also held that the Respondent failed to prove, by producing documents, that she was not able to pay the $9,600 civil penalty. James A. Booth, for Complainant. Respondent, Pro se. Initial decision issued by Dorothea A. Baker, Administrative Law Judge. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture [hereinafter Complainant], instituted this disciplinary administrative proceeding by filing a Complaint on September 3, 1999. Complainant instituted this proceeding under the Act of August 20, 1912, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 151-154, 156-164a, 167) [hereinafter the Plant Quarantine Act]; the Federal Plant Pest Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj) [hereinafter |