3 If that body did come up with the same findings as the Surgeon General did, what would the attitude of the tobacco people be about the present legislation? Mr. GRAY. To begin with the grantees who receive money under the scientific advisory board; that is, the vehicle which handles these grants, are perfectly free and certainly requested to publish whatever findings they may arrive at in the course of their investigations. These, however, are scientifically and medically oriented and directed research programs and are not concerned with surveys and statistical reports. Mr. GRAY. The group that have been handling this money here have made public all the findings, as far as I know, of this research. Up to now none of it has come up with a positive answer which would be in the area that this causes ill health or this is injurious. Mr. MACDONALD. If they did? Mr. GRAY. If they did they would bring it out. Then what do we do? Mr. GRAY. We get awfully fast to work to see what we can do about it. Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Curtin? Mr. CURTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gray, assuming that it was proven beyond all doubt that cigarette smoking did cause cancer of the lung and bronchitis, would you then feel that the Federal Trade Commission was fair and reasonable in making a request for a notice, such as they have outlined, on all packages of cigarettes? Mr. GRAY. I believe you assumed that it had been proven beyond doubt that this was a fact; yes, sir. Mr. CURTIN. You think such a notice would then be justified? Mr. GRAY. I think you would have a whole lot more than just the Federal Trade Commission Act involved in such a situation. Mr. CURTIN. Assuming that it was proven, do you think it would be all right for the Federal Trade Commission to require such a notice? Mr. GRAY. I do not know how you prove this and that is one of the problems. If it is proven that cigarettes are harmful, we want to do something about it regardless of what somebody else tells us to do. And we would to our level best. This is just being human. 3. Eight years later, in February of 1972, Tobacco Institute President Horace Kornegay, appearing before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee stated: Let me state at the outset that the cigarette industry is as vitally concerned or more so than any other group in determining whether cigarette smoking causes human disease, whether there is some ingredient as found in cigarette smoke that can be shown to be responsible and if so what it is. That is why the entire tobacco industry--growers, warehousemen, and Let me first briefly review the conduct of the cigarette industry in relation to this continuing and unresolved controversy. Its conduct has been both responsive and responsible to an extent unparalleled in American industry. 4. At the same hearing, Robert C. Hochett, Ph.D., acting Scientific Director for the Council for Tobacco Research stated: In 1965 and 1969 I described in considerable detail the nature, My thesis in these previous presentations was that neither tobacco and 5. On February 15, 1978 Horace Kornegay, President of the Tobacco Institute, appeared before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment and stated: Generally, the industry funds scientific research on smoking and health Advisory Board, composed of well known and qualified people from all over 5 6. In 1982 Edward A. Horrigan, Jr., then the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Tobacco Institute, came before the same Subcommittee and stated: After three decades of investigation and millions of dollars invested by the government, the Tobacco Industry and private organizations, the smoking and health controversy remains unresolved. The net result of all of this effort has been that no causal link between smoking and disease has been established. That is not merely the opinion of tobacco industry executives. That is scientific fact readily available to anyone willing to make an objective, unemotional study of the existing evidence. Mr. Horrigan added: I am saying that science to date after much research including over $100 million funded by our industry, indicates that no causal link has been shown. 7. During the same hearing Sheldon Sommers, M.D., then the Scientific Director of the Council for Tobacco Research described in the CTR as a "funding agency for biomedical research in the area of smoking and health, funded by tobacco manufacturers." Dr. Sommers then stated that the CTR "exerts no influence upon the grantees" who Dr. Sommers stated "may freely publish what they find as they choose." One year later, Dr. Sommers reappeared before the Subcommittee on Health and the During the past 18 months, I have served as Scientific Director, Council for The donors of the money and the Council for Tobacco Research give complete scientific freedom to grant recipients in conducting their studies. The grantees are free to publish their findings and report them at professional meetings. Dr. Sommers closed his testimony on behalf of the Council for Tobacco Research as follows: Cigarette smoking has not been scientifically established to be a cause of chronic diseases, such as cancer, cardio-vascular disease or emphysema. Nor has it been shown to affect pregnancy outcome adversely. Rapidly accumulating new basic scientific discoveries and reports and the medical literature render the simplistic statements and the proposed bill invalid. Forty years after the TIRC and the CTR were established, the tobacco industry continues to claim that there is no established causal relationship between cigarette smoking and disease (including cancer, cardiovascular disease, emphysema, stroke, premature births, etc.). Evidence which first came to light as part of documents released in the Cipollone case and now supplemented by many other internal industry documents indicates that the TIRC and the CTR were nothing but a public relations front for the 6 tobacco industry, designed to head off any litigation, legislation, and regulations involving the tobacco industry and its products. A 1965 internal Council memorandum to W.T. Hoyt from Simon O'Shea summarized the history of the Council and its effectiveness as follows: The Council has, during the last two years, passed through a period which was dominated by events surrounding the preparation and issuance of the Surgeon General's Report and subsequently by congressional consideration of cigarette labeling legislation. During this period the general tone of the Council's public information activities has changed considerably and much staff activity has been devoted to assisting with the problems posed by the Surgeon General's Committee and the legislative deliberations. The period of primary focus on governmental and legislative concerns may now be ending. However, the provision of the labeling bill which will require annual reports by various governmental agencies to the Congress undoubtedly will affect policy in the future. We should at the earliest moment try to learn whether these periodic reports will have an effect of continuing to mute the industry's statements in the scientific field. It certainly must be considered that an open program of scientific discussion might draw governmental attacks on the Council. A 1972 memorandum from Fred Panzer, Vice President of the Tobacco Institute, to Horace R. Kornegay, President of the Tobacco Institute, summarize the motives and objectives of the industry: For nearly twenty years this industry has employed a single strategy to defend itself on three major fronts - litigation, politics, and public opinion. While the strategy was brilliantly conceived and executed over the years, helping us win important battles, it is only fair to say that it is not - nor was it intended to be - a vehicle for victory. On the contrary it has always been a holding strategy, consisting of: - creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it, - advocating the public's right to smoke, without actually urging them to take up the practice, and - encouraging objective research as the only way to resolve the question of health hazard. The memorandum goes on to lay out a strategy for dealing with the tobacco and health issue for the future, including advancing the idea of convincing the public that "cigarette smoking may not be the health hazard that the anti-smoking people say it is because other alternatives are at least probable." A review of all the existing evidence that has come to light indicates that the Council for Tobacco Research, and its predecessor the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, were an important part of the tobacco industry's attempt to mislead the public and the Congress about the dangers of cigarette smoking. The industry's specific purpose was clearly to head off litigation, legislation, and regulation. For the last forty years the tobacco industry has been able to conduct its business outside the public eye. Unfortunately for the American public and the estimated 10 million people who have since died from cigarette related diseases since 1964, the tobacco industry was able to convince the Congress that regulation of its product was unwarranted, that they voluntarily would conduct "independent" research on the health risks associated with tobacco, openly provide their findings to the public and the Congress, and take appropriate steps to protect the public if such findings found smoking to cause disease. The evidence that has come to light indicates an urgent need for the federal government to assume both oversight and regulatory control over tobacco products. The special treatment afforded an industry which produces this nation's single most preventable cause of death must come to an end. THE COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH-U.S.A., INC. By way of re-introduction, I am the Chairman, At the May 26 hearing, I answered to the best of |