the concurrence of Chancellor Walworth, his | the effect to be given to their own orders and learned successor, who has presided in that judgments. court with distinguished ability for the last twenty years, and is familiar with its organization and powers. If it is possible, therefore, for a judicial question involving the construction of State laws to be settled by learning or authority in its own courts, it would seem that the one before us has been. But there is another view of this branch of the case, which, in my judgment, is equally decisive of the question; and much more important, on account of the principle involved. Where are we to look, for the purpose of ascertaining the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery of the State of New York? To the judgment of this court, or to the laws and the decisions of the courts of the State? It should be recollected, that, in the trial of titles to real property held or claimed under the laws of the State, the federal courts sitting in the State are administering those laws, the same as the State courts, and can administer no other. They are obliged to adopt the local law, not only because the titles are founded upon it, but because these courts have no sys tem of jurisprudence of their own to be administered, except where the title is affected by the Constitution of the United States, or by acts of Congress. It has been held, accordingly, that we are to look to the local laws for the rule of decision, as ascertained by the decisions of the State courts, whether these decisions are grounded on the construction of statutes, or form a part of the unwritten law of the State. The court adopts the State decisions, because they settle the law applicable to the case. Such a course is deemed indispensable in order to preserve uniformity; otherwise, the peculiar constitution of the judicial tribunals of the States, and of the United States, would be productive of the greatest mischief and confusion-a perpetual conflict of decision and of jurisdiction. I suppose it will not be denied but that each State has the right to prescribe the jurisdiction of her courts, either by the acts of her Legislature, or as expounded by the courts themselves; and that, if that jurisdiction is settled by a long course of decision, or, in respect to the particu lar case, by the authority which has a right to settle it. this court, professing to administer the laws of the State as they find them, and acting upon their own principle, as well as the principle of the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act, cannot disregard the jurisdiction as thus settled. It is no answer to this view to say, that the question here is the construction of a private statute of New York. That assumes the very point in controversy. The point is, Can this court reach the question involving the construction of the statute? That depends upon the prior one, whether Chancellor Kent acted in the exercise of the jurisdiction of his court in expounding the statute. If he did, the question upon its construction is concluded; and whether the construction be right or wrong is a matter not inquirable into in this collateral way. The case, therefore, comes down to a question of jurisdiction-a question which Chancellor Kent himself settled in this very case in 1815, which settlement has since been confirmed by the highest tribunals in the State, and about which no one of them there could be brought to entertain a doubt. I must be permitted to think, therefore, that, looking at the question as an original one, Chancellor Kent was right in the jurisdiction that he exercised in administering the acts in question; and that, whether so or not, it belonged to the courts of that State to expound and settle the limit of his jurisdiction; and that, when so settled, it becomes a rule of decision for the federal courts sitting in the State, and administering her laws; and that therefore the order of the Chancellor in question was conclusive upon the matter before him, and is not inquirable into collaterally in a court of law. In construing the statutes of a State on which land titles depend, say the court, infinite mischief would ensue should this court observe a different rule from that which has been established in the State; and whether these rules of *But were we compelled to go be- [*560 land titles grow out of the statutes of a State.hind the order, and to re-examine the case, as or principles of the common law, adopted and upon an appeal, we perceive no difficulty in applied to such titles, can make no difference; sustaining it. as there is the same necessity and fitness in preserving uniformity of decisions in the one case as in the other. This court has repeatedly said, speaking of the construction of statutes, that it would be governed by the State construction where it is settled, and can be ascertained, es559*] pecially where the title to lands is in question. (12 Wheat., 167, 165; 6 Peters, 291.) In the case of Nesmith et al. v. Sheldon et al. (7 Howard, 818), decided at the last term, involving a question upon the statutes of Michigan, the court say: It is the established doctrine of this court, that it will adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in the construction of their own constitution and statutes, when that construction has been settled by the decision of its highest judicial tribunal." Now, what can be more peculiarly a matter of local law, and to be ascertained and settled by the State tribunals, than the character and extent of the jurisdiction of their courts, and When Clarke applied to the Legislature, in 1815. for relief, he was the owner of the life estate, and of the ultimate remainder in the premises, the residue belonging to the children; and for this reason, doubtless, the act which was passed at that time left it discretionary with the Chancellor to determine the portion of the proceeds that should belong to Clarke, individually, and also as trustee for the children. And under this provision of the law, before any order was made for the disposition of the proceeds, the court ordered a reference to the master to ascertain the amount of his debts, and what portion of them had been contracted for the maintenance of the family and education of the children. The interest of Clarke in the proceeds was properly applicable to his own debts, as well as to the debts contracted for the support of the family; and after the coming in of the report which exhibited the amount of the debts, and for what purposes contracted, the order for the application of the proceeds was made. This is the order referred to and confirmed by the Act of 1816. It, in effect, applied what was regarded by the Chancellor as the interest of Clarke in them to the payment of his own debts, the amount of that interest, as we have seen, having been left to be ascertained by him in the exercise of his judgment in the matters. That Clarke had a considerable interest is apparent, having united in himself two portions of the estate. That the Chancellor erred, in the exercise of his judgment in dividing the proceeds of the estate between Clarke and his children, according to their respective interests, does not appear, nor can it be shown from anything to be found in the record; much less can a want of power to act, or an excess of power in acting, be predicated of the exercise of any such discretionary authority. Then, as to the application of a portion of the fund belonging to the children for the maintenance of the family, as well as their own education. From the cases already referred to on that subject, we have seen that this is within the acknowledged powers of the Court of Chancery and of which it is in the habitual exercise, in cases where the parents are in narrow circumstances, and unable to furnish the means of support. The application is made for the benefit of the children, that they may have the comforts and enjoyments of a home, with all the wholesome and endearing influences of the family association. 561*] *Even beyond this, small annuities have been settled upon the father and the mother, in destitute circumstances, out of the estates of the infant children. It was a knowledge of these principles, which were familiar to the mind of Chancellor Kent, as was the whole system of the powers and duties of his court over the persons and estates of infants, that dictated the granting of the order in question; and, in my judgment, so far as the power and authority of the court was concerned, which is the question here, it requires but an application of these principles to the facts before him to enable us to see that it was well warranted. Again, it is said that the children were not parties to the proceedings. The same may be said concerning the exercise of all the powers of the Court of Chancery over the estates of infants. The answer is, the proceeding is not an adversary suit. The estate is regarded as a fund in court, and the infants as wards of the court; the Chancellor himself, as the general guardian, exerting his great power, either inherent or vested by positive law, over a class of persons specially committed to his care. for their own benefit, for the proper management of their estates, real and personal, for their maintenance and support, for their education and advancement in life. It is a proceeding in rem, the property itself in custodia legis; and if a guardian had been appointed, it would have been but a desecration of the power of the court, which in the pro- | ceeding before us was exercised by the court itself, through the agency and instrumentality of its officers. The rule in respect to adversary suits against infants, requiring the appointment of a guardian, pendente lite, has no sort of application to the proceedings in question. It has also been argued, that the order of the Chancellor, authorizing Clarke to sell and convey the premises in question, required a certificate of the approval of one of the masters of the court to be indorsed on the deed; and that no such certificate has been given or indorsed thereon. The deed to De Grasse was executed on the 2d of August, 1821; and on the next day it appears that the master was a witness to prove the execution before the commissioner who took the acknowledgment. It further appears, that on the same day, the master, having had the life estate of Clarke in the premises previously conveyed to him in trust.. in order to complete the title, indorsed on the back of the deed, and executed under his hand and seal, a release of this life interest to the purchaser, and duly acknowledged the *same, that it might be recorded in the [*562 register's office along with the deed. This was done, as the master recites in the release, at the request of the trustee, and for the purpose of completing the title. One can hardly conceive of a more effectual approval than is to be derived from these acts of the master; for without the release of the life estate, which he held in trust, the title could not have been perfected, and the sale must have fallen through. The release enabled the trustee to complete it, and invest De Grasse, the purchaser, with the fee. But the courts of New York in the case already referred to have held, that, upon the true construction of the order, the approval of the master was not necessary, as the direction in that respect was limited to conveyances by the trustee in satisfaction of debts. Even if this construction should be regarded as doubtful, or that requiring the approval was thought to be the better one, inasmuch as this construetion has been given by the highest court of a State upon this very title, in a case in which its judgment was final, the habitual deference and respect conceded by this court to the decisions of the State courts upon their own statutes and orders of their courts, would seem to render it conclusive. This view was directly affirmed, and acted on, in the case of The Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee (2 Peters, 492). That, as is the case before us, was an action of ejectment by the heir to recover a tract of land situate in the city of Cincinnati. The defendant held under a deed made by administrators, upon a sale under an order of the Court of Common Pleas for the County of Hamilton, which possessed the powers of an orphans' court. The title depended upon the effect to be given to the order under which the sale took place. It was made at the August term, and entered as of the May term preceding. It was allered that, though grapted at the May term, the clerk had omitted to enter it. The law conferring the powers of the Orphans' Court upon the Cominon Pleas had been repealed between the May and August terms; and the question was whether the order was a nullity, or valid until set aside. The sale had taken place at an early day, and the property had become of great value. The case was most elaborately argued. The action of this court, independently of the principle decided in the case, is worthy of remark. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion, observed, that the case had been argued at the last term, on the validity of the deed made by the administrators; but as the question 563*] was one of great interest, on which many titles depended, and which was to be decided upon the statutes of Ohio, and as the court was informed that the case was depending before the highest tribunal of the State, the case was held under advisement. The State court held, that the order of the Court of Common Pleas, entered at the August term as of the preceding May term, was coram non judice, and void; and that the deed under which the defendant derived title was, of course, invalid. This court held, that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio should govern the case. I will give its language. "The power of the inferior courts of a State," said the Chief Justice, "to make an order at one term as of another, is of a character so peculiarly local, a proceeding so necessarily dependent on the revising tribunal of the State, that a majority consider that judgment as authority, and we are all disposed to conform to it." I will simply add, that the Court for the Correction of Errors in New York possessed a revising power in all cases over the orders and decrees of the Chancellor, and that that court has held, upon this very title, not only that the order in question was an order entered by him acting as a court, but, in expounding it, that the deed of conveyance given to De Grasse under it did not require the approval of a master. Further comment to show the identity of the two cases would be superfluous. But I forbear to pursue this branch of the case farther. The validity of the execution of the deed to De Grasse by the trustee, as it respects the alleged want of approval, stands— 1. Upon the acts of the master in the execution of it, as a substantial approval within the meaning of the order; and, 2 Upon the decision of the highest judicial tribunal of the State, whose laws we are admin istering, that, upon a fair interpretation of the terms of the order, an approval was not es sential. It has also been argued, that, according to the true construction of the order, the sale should have been for cash, and that here it was otherwise. But this is an action at law; and the deed on the face of it shows a cash consideration of $2,000. The nature of the consideration was not inquirable into, and should have been excluded at the trial. If the complainant had sought to invalidate the proceedings on that ground, he should have gone into a court of equity, where the question could have been appropriately ex564*] amined, and justice done to all the parties. That it was not examinable in a court The recital of law is too plain for argument. of the considerations can no more be varied by parol proof than any other part of the deed. (2 Phillips on Ev., 353, 354. 2 C. & H., note 289, and cases there cited; 1 Ib., note 228, p. 384: 7 Johns., 341; 8 Cow., 290; 2 Denio, 336; 4 N. H., 229; 1 J. J. Marsh., 388, 390.) I have thus gone over the several grounds relied on for the purpose of impeaching the title of the defendant to the premises in question; and, although in the minority in the judgment given, have done so, not so much on account of the magnitude of the interest depending, which is great of itself, as of the importance of the principle involved; and upon the application of which the judgment has been arrived at. Notwithstanding several questions have been brought within the range of the discussion, there are but two, in reality, involved in the determination of the case. 1. The effect to be given to the order of Chancellor Kent made on the 15th of March, 1817; and 2. The execution of the conveyance by Clarke, the trustee, under this order. If the order was made by the Chancellor in the exercise of his jurisdiction as a court, his judgment was conclusive in the matters before him; and there is an end of that question. It affords an authority to sell and convey, that cannot be controverted in a court of law. And the validity of the deed executed under it stands upon an equally solid foundation. The title of the defendant, therefore, would seem to be beyond controversy, were it not for the principle against which we have been contending, and which imparts to the case its greatest importance, namely, the right claimed for this court to inquire into the nature and character of the jurisdiction exercised by the Chancellor in making the order coming before us collaterally; and as this court determines that jurisdiction to be general or special, to refuse or consent to go behind his judgment, and re-open and rejudge the merits of the case; and according to the opinion entertained upon that question, to affirm or disaffirm the validity of all acts and proceedings that have taken place under it. And this, too, in a case where the jurisdiction thus exercised by the Chancellor has been settled by himself in his own court, under the State laws, and affirmed by the judgment of the highest judicial tribunals of the State. It is apparent, that if this principle becomes ingrafted upon the powers of this court, and is to be regarded as a rule to guide its action in passing upon the judgments of the State courts coming up collaterally, a revising power is thus indirectly acquired over them, in cases [*565 where no such power exists directly, under the Constitution or laws of Congress. For, if the right exists to inquire into the kind and char acter of the jurisdiction, without regard to that established by the laws and decisions of the States; and to determine for itself whether the jurisdiction is general or special, and if the lat ter, to go behind the judgment to see whether the special authority has been strictly pursued, there is no limit to this revising power, except the discretion and judgment of the court. The principle will be as applicable to every State judgment coming before us collaterally, as to the one in question. It denies, virtually, to the States the power, in the organization of her courts, to prescribe and settle their jurisdiction, either by the acts of her Legislature, or the adjudication of her judicial tribunals. 1 cannot consent to the introduction into this court of any such principle, and am, therefore, obliged to refuse a concurrence in the judgment given. Cited 8 How., 568; 11 How., 226, 318; 20 How. 431: 24 How., 431; 6 Wall., 478, 729, 735; 18 Wall., 467; Construction of private act of New York Legis 13 Otto, 198; 2 Abb. U. S., 548; 1 Biss., 270; 12 Bank. Reg., 101; 1 Woods, 444; 6 McLean, 8; 4 Dill., 196; 17 Blatchf., 52. lature. The principles established in the case of Williamson and Wife v. Berry applied to this case also. Under the acts of the Legislature of New York for the relief of Thomas B. Clarke, the Chancellor had no authority to order that the trustee might make a conveyance of any part of the premises devised for a precedent debt due by the trustee to his grantee. The deed executed by Clarke to Chrystie in this case was not made in the due execution of the power and authority to sell and convey, though approved by the master in conformity with the Chancellor's order, it not having been within the Chancellor's jurisdiction to order that the trustee might make a conveyance of the premises to a creditor in payment of the debt. Although the defendant in this case may have paid to such a grantee a valuable consideration, yet he cannot be said to have acquired any title Construction of private act of New York Legis- against the plaintiffs; inasmuch as Clarke had no lature. THIS HIS case was similar to the preceding one, in which the same facts and principles were involved. The only difference between them was, that the following point was certified in this case, which was not in the preceding, viz. : 8. Whether the defendants, who derive title bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, by purchase through the grantees of George De Grasse, as set forth in the case, have a valid title as against the plaintiffs. It was argued in conjunction with the preceding case, as has been mentioned in the report of that case. Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court: In this case the points certified to this court are identical with those certified in the case of 566*] Williamson et ux. v. *Joseph Berry, except the eighth. We direct that our rulings in that case shall be sent to the Circuit Court, as our answers to the points certified in this case. And further rule to the eighth point certified in this case, that the defendants, having paid to the grantees of George De Grasse a valuable consideration for the premises in dispute, do not thereby acquire a valid title against the plaintiffs. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY, Messrs. Justices CATRON and NELSON dissented. See the rereport of the preceding case. Cited 24 How., 431; 6 Wall., 729. lawful authority to convey to his grantee, that grantee had no right to convey to another. THIS HIS case was similar to the two preceding ones in all the leading facts. It will be perceived, however, that all the children of Thomas B. Clarke now united as plaintiffs. Upon the trial in the court below, the will of Mary Clarke, the acts of the Legislature of the State of New York, the orders of the Chancellor of that State, and other facts, were shown, as in the case of Charles A. Williamson et ux. v. Joseph Berry. It further appeared in evidence, that on the 8th of December, 1818, Mr. Clarke conveyed the lot in question, with other lots, to Albert Chrystie, reciting that "the said Thomas B. Clarke is justly indebted to the said Albert Chrystie in the sum of $525, and is willing to convey in satisfaction of such debt the prem ises hereinafter mentioned and described *: and declaring, *" that the said Thomas B. [*567 Clarke, in consideration of the premises, and of $525 to him in hand paid," conveys, &c. This deed was approved by James A. Hamilton, master in chancery. There was also a quitclaim executed by him, he having acquired a title to Mr. Clarke's life estate, under a sale upon execution. A conveyance from Mr. Chrystie to James Covell, from Covell to John R. Driver, and the will of Driver, were also shown. A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court, upon a case. On the argument, the judges ruled as stated in Williamson v. Berry and were divided in upinion upon the following points: 1. Whether the authority given by the said acts of the Legislature to the trustee, to sell the estate, was a special power, to be strictly pursued, or whether he acquired the absolute power of alienation, subject only to review and account in equity. 2. Whether the orders set forth in the case, made by the Chancellor in this behalf, were authorized by, and in conformity to, the said several acts of the Legislature, and are to be regarded as the acts of the Court of Chan cery, empowered to proceed as such, or the doings of an officer, acting under a special authority. 3. Whether the Chancellor had competent authority, under the said acts, to order or allow a conveyance of the premises by the trustee, in payment or satisfaction of a precedent debt owing by the trustee to the grantee. 4. Whether the deed executed by Thomas B. Clarke to Albert Chrystie, stated in the case, was in due execution of the power and authority of said trustee. 5. Whether the defendant, deriving title by purchase bona fide, and for a valuable consid eration, from such grantee, has a valid title against the plaintiffs. It was argued in conjunction with the case of Williamson et ux. v. Berry, as was stated in the report of that case. Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court: In this case Thomas B. Clarke made a conveyance of the premises in dispute to Albert Chrystie for a debt, of $525; and the approval of the master in chancery is indorsed upon the deed. The plaintiff objected to it as any evidence of title, on account of its having been made without authority of law. Chrystie conveyed the premises in dispute to James Covell, for the consideration of six hun568*] dred dollars. Covell and wife *conveyed the same to John R. Driver for eight hundred dollars. Driver died, having devised the premises to his executors, Nicholas Zelpen and George Deroche. In the course of the trial of the cause in the Circuit Court, the judges thereof were divided in opinion upon five points of law, and have certified them to this court for decision. The first and second points certified in this cause have been decided by this court, in its ruling of the second and third points in the case of Williamson et ux. v. Joseph Berry. We direct that those rulings of the second and third points in the case just mentioned shall be taken as the answers given by this court to the first and second points in this case. To the third point in this case, we rule that the Chancellor had authority, under the acts passed for the relief of Thomas B. Clarke, to assent to a conveyance of the premises in dispute by his trustee, but that it was not within the jurisdiction given to the Chancellor by the acts of the State of New York mentioned in this case, to order that the trustee might make a conveyance of any part of the premises de vised, as is mentioned in this case, for a precedent debt due by the trustee to his grantee. To the fourth point, we rule that the deed executed by Clark to Chrystie was not made in the due execution of the power and authority to sell and convey, though approved by the master in conformity with the Chancellor's order, it not having been within the Chancellor's jurisdiction to order that the trustee might make a conveyance of the premises to a creditor in payment of the debt. To the fifth point, which is, whether the defendant, deriving title by purchase bona fide HOWARD 8. U. S., Book 12. and for a valuable consideration from such grantee, has a valid title against the plaintiffs, we answer, that, though the defendant may have paid to such a grantee a valuable consid eration, he cannot be said to have acquired any title against the plaintiffs, inasmuch as Clarke had no lawful authority to convey to his grantee, that grantee had no right to convey to another. We direct the foregoing rulings to be certified to the Circuit Court, as the answers of this court to the points certified to it for decision. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY, Messrs. Justices CATRON and NELSON dissented. See the re port of the case of Williamson et ux. v. Berry. Cited 24 How., 431, 435; 6 Wall., 729. *ADAM L. MILLS, JOHN H. GAY, [*569 CHARLES MULLIKIN, JOHN O'FALLON, WILLIAM C. WIGGINS, ANDREW CHRISTY, ELIZABETH CHRISTY, MARY F. CHRISTY, MELANIE CHRISTY, which MELANIE is the Widow, and which said ELIZABETH CHRISTY and MARY F. CHRISTY are the only Children and Heirs at Law of SAMUEL C. CHRISTY, Deceasedsaid Children being Infants, and appearing by said MELANIE, their next Friend EMILY PRATTE, Widow of BERNARD PRATTE, LEWIS PENGUET AND THERESE, HIS WIFE; STEPHEN F. NIEDLET AND CELESTE, HIS WIFE; LOUIS V. BOGY AND PELAGIE, HIS WIFE; JOSEPH BLAINE AND AIMI, HIS WIFE; which said EMILY PRATTE, BERNARD PRATTE, THERESE PENGUET, CELESTE NIEDLET, PELAGIE BOGY, and AIMI DIANE BLAINE, are Children and only Heirs at Law of BERNARD PRATTE, Deceased, Plaintiffs in Error, v. THE COUNTY OF ST. CLAIR AND JAMES HARRISON. Grant of ferry right by State-two interpretations -this court no jurisdiction to try question whether oppressive use has been made of right. of eminent domain by county under State law. In the year 1819, the Legislature of Illinois authorized Samuel Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, to establish a ferry on the east bank of the River Mississippi, near the town of Illinois, and to run the same from lands" that may belong to him," provided the ferry should be put into actual operation within eighteen months. At this time he had no land, but within the eight een months acquired an interest in a tract of one hundred acres. |