in the assertion of adverse rights. claim, where no statute of limitations directly gov-1793; and entries Nos. 1705 and 1706, made the erns the case. In such cases, the court often act 21st of January, 1793. upon their own inherent doctrine of discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated demands, by refusing to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or long acquiescence The rule upon this subject,originally laid down by Lord Camden, in Smith v. Clay (3 Brown's Chancery Reports, page 640, note), and adopted by this court in 1 Howard, 189, again asserted." Long acquiescence and laches by parties out of possession are productive of much hardship, and injustice to others, and cannot be excused but by showing some actual hindrance or impediment caused by the fraud or concealment of the party in possession, which will appeal to the conscience of the Chancellor. The party guilty of such laches cannot screen his title from the just imputation of staleness, merely by the allegation of an imaginary impediment or disability. The facts in this case bring it within the operation of the above principles, and the bill must, therefore, be dismissed. Complainants file a certified copy of said deed. aver that the same was duly recorded in Fayette County, Kentucky, and on the 26th of February, 1798, a certified copy, from the records in Fayette County, Kentucky, was recorded in the recorder's office of Hamilton County, in the Northwestern Territory, in which county the lands in controversy lay. The original deed of trust is lost; due search has been made for it, and the complainants *ver- [*236 ily believe that the original was consumed by fire in the recorder's office in Kentucky. That on the 16th of August, 1796, John O'Bannon procured of Lawson an assignment of 3,3334 acres of said warrant. That Lawson, at the time he made this assignment, was habitually intemperate, and mentally incapable of transacting business. O'Bannon well knew this HIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court-knew of the deed of trust-and procured the of the United States for the District of Ohio, assignment by fraud, and on the false pretenses sitting as a court of equity. that he was the locator of the whole tract of 235*] *The case, as set forth by the com- 10.000 acres. plainants, is contained in the following exract from the brief of Mr. Ewing, one of their solicitors: THIS The bill, which was filed on the 18th day of November, 1840, charges, that on or about the 21st of November, 1783, Brigadier-General Robert Lawson obtained of the State of Virginia a military land warrant, No. 1921, for 10,000 acres of land due him for military services in the Revolutionary War, in the Virginia line on Continental establishment. That afterwards, on the 25th of August, 1796, O'Bannon, knowing that entry No. 1707 had been conveyed to the trustees aforesaid, fraudulently withdrew so much of said warrant 1921 as was entered in said No. 1707, and caused the same to be entered on the lands in controversy; and, on the 29th of August, 1796, surveyed the same, and returned the plat to the surveyorgeneral's office. That prior to the 12th of February, 1799, O'Bannon applied for a patent in his own name That prior to the 12th of January, 1788, said for said survey; and that on said day the trustwarrant was lodged in the office of Richard C. ees, in the deed of trust aforesaid, by Joshua Anderson, then principal surveyor of the Vir-Lewis, their agent, filed a caveat against the ginia military lands, and that prior to the 4th issuing of patents to the assignees on said warof June, 1794, divers entries had been made on rant 1921, and with it a copy of the deed of said warrant, to wit: entries, Nos. 1704, 1705, trust. 1706, 1707, 1714, 1715, 1716, 1817, 1718, and That O'Bannon continued to urge the depart1719, of 1,000 acres each; and that Nos. 1704, ment to issue patents on his claims under said 1705, and 1706 had been withdrawn and re-assignment; which was for a long time postentered, so as to leave Nos. 1707 and 1714 the first subsisting entries made for the said Robert Lawson on the surveyor's book. That on the 4th day of June, 1794, the said Robert Lawson, by deed of indenture of three parts, between him, the said Robert Lawson, of the first part, his wife Sarah Lawson, of the second part, and James Speed, George Thompson, Joseph Crocket, and George Nicholas, of the third part, for the consideration therein expressed, conveyed to the said Thompson, Crocket, and Nicholas, for the uses and purposes therein specified, 2,000 acres of land, described as situate on White Oak Creek, on the northwest side of the Ohio River, being the land mentioned in the first entry made for said Robert on the surveyor's books; which said 2,000 acres of land is averred to be the land embraced, not in a single entry, but in entries Nos. 1707 and 1714, made January 12th and February 11th, 1788. That the said Robert Lawson, by the same deed, conveyed to the said trustees five other tracts of land of 1,000 acres each, described as being the last entries made on said warrant in the name of said Robert Lawson; which, it is averred, embrace the land contained in entries Nos. 1718 and 1719, made the 11th of February, 1788; entry No. 1704, made February 11th, poned, and, on the 9th of May, 1811, refused or suspended, because said assignment was in violation of the deed of trust aforesaid. That said deed of trust, among other things, directed the trustees aforesaid to convey the 2,000 acres of land first above mentioned to either of the sons of said Robert and Sarah Lawson that the said Sarah might direct, unless it should be necessary to dispose of the same for the use of the family; that the last named 5,000 acres should be conveyed, 1,000 to America Lawson, 2,000 to John P. Lawson, and 2,000 to Columbus Lawson. That the said Sarah did not, in her lifetime, direct the conveyance of the said 2.000 acres; and the said trustees did not convey the same, nor any part of the 5,000 acres. That all the trustees are dead, and that the last survivor of them, George Thompson, died on the 22d of March, 1834, leaving the complainant George C. Thompson his only child and heir at law." That America Lawson intermarried with Joshua Lewis, December 23d, 1797. General · Lawson died March 1, 1805, leaving three children, John Pierce Lawson, America Lewis, and Columbus Lawson, his heirs at law. That on the 10th of June, 1809, said Sarah [*237 Lawson died. That on the 7th of January, 1807, John Pierce Lawson conveyed to Joshua Lewis all his interest in said lands. That on the 1st of June, 1809, John P. Lawson died, leaving Mary P. Lawson, now Mary P. Bowman, his only child and heir at law, who intermarried with complainant John Bowman. That on the 8th of January, 1815, Columbus Lawson died unmarried and intestate, leaving said America Lewis and Mary P. Bowman his heirs at law. That about the 1st of January, 1813, John O'Bannon died, leaving Robert Alexander and George T. Cotton executors of his last will and testament. That Cotton, who qualified, applied to the general land office for a patent on survey No. 1707, of 965 acres, as executor of said O'Bannon, but the patent was withheld, and the record thereof cancelled. That, about the 21st of December, 1816, the said Cotton deposited in the general land office a paper, purporting to be a certificate of, and signed by, Robert Lawson, dated the 27th of November, 1802, and purporting to be witnessed by J. Bootwright and C. McCallister. Said certificate was false and forged; but by means thereof the patent was procured to be is sued. That Cotton died testate; complainants exhibit a copy of the will of O'Bannon, and of Cotton. The devisees of said John O'Bannon and George T. Cotton are not residents of the district of Ohio; prays process of subpœna against them, or such of them as may be found in the said district; and that they, and such others as will voluntarily appear, be made defendants. That on the 1st of October, 1830, America Lewis died; on the 20th of June, 1833, Joshua Lewis died, and left complainants their only surviving children and heirs at law. Aver that the remaining 3,000 acres of land, of warrant 1921, not included in the deed of trust, vested in them as heirs of Robert Lawson, through America Lewis. That America Lawson, afterwards Lewis, was under the disability of infancy or covert ure during her whole natural life; and that at the time of issuing the patent to George T. Cotton, and from that time till her death, she was under the disability of coverture. That Columbus Lawson was an infant at the time of the death of his brother, John P. Lawson, and that he was killed at the battle of New Orleans, on the 8th of January, 1815; and that neither of the trustees in the deed of trust, nor either of the persons under whom complainants claim title, was ever resident in the State of Ohio. That John Baird, James W. Campbell, Thomas Jennings, Isaac E. Day, Duncan Evans, William King, Victor King, Absalom King, William More, and Christian Snedecher 238*] (who are *made defendants), are in possesson of, and claim to have derived title to, portions of said tract No. 1707, of 965 acres, mediately or immediately from George T. Cotton, executor of John O'Bannon, deceased. Call upon defendants to exhibit their title. Aver that they had full notice of the title of complainants and the fraud of O'Bannon; pray subpæna, &c. An affidavit of search for the deed of trust, and belief that it is lost or consumed, is attached to the amended bill. The defendants, terre tenants, severally plead that they are bona fide purchasers, without notice of complainants' title. They answer jointly, putting in issue the material allegations of the bill; set forth specifically their own derivation of title; aver that the claim of complainants is stale, and that a part of the persons named as trustees have been in the State of Ohio since the execution of the deed of trust, and before the issuing of the patent. That the caveat was filed by Joshua Lewis without authority from the trustees, and that the patent was wrongfully suspended at the general land office. They refer to the certificate of Lawson, November 27th, 1802; the affidavit of James Speed, November 20th, 1803; and the certificate of James Morrisson, December 9th, 1816. To these answers there is a replication. The above statement of the case is taken, as was before remarked, from the brief of Mr. Ewing, and presents it in as strong a point of view, for the complainants and appellants, as can be given to it. In the progress of the cause in the court below, a great mass of evidence was taken, and many exhibits were filed, which it is unnecessary to set forth. In December, 1842, the Circuit Court dismissed the bill with costs, an appeal from which decree brought it up to this court. It was argued at the preceding term, by Mr. Ewing and Mr. Scott (in a printed argument) for the appellants, and Mr. Stanberry for the appellees. It is unnecessary to give any of the arguments of counsel, except upon the point of lapse of time, as the decision of the court turned upon that point. Mr. Eicing, for the appellants: And lastly, the defendants rely on the lapse of time. The statute of limitations of Ohio, January 25th, 1810, bears directly upon this case. (1 Chase, 656, sec. 2.) By the second section of this statute, all actions or suits for the recovery of possession, title, or claims to land are barred in twenty-one years; with a proviso, in these words: That if any person *or per [*239 sons who are, or shall be, entitled to have, sue, or bring any suits, action or actions, as aforesaid, shall be within the age of twenty-one years, insane, feme covert, imprisoned, or beyond sea at the time when any such suit, action or actions, may or shall have accrued, then every such person or persons shall have a right to have, sue, or bring any action or actions aforesaid within the time hereby before limited in this act after such disability shall have been removed." Unlike this, the statute of 21 James 1, c. 16 (4 British Stat. 751), enumerates several forms of real actions, and bars or saves them; and there is nothing which can, in general terms, include a case in equity. But we here come within the direct operation of the statute, and also within the direct action of the proviso. The law gives us twentyone years, after disability removed, to bring this suit. It is subject to no discretion; we have a right to it. And so are the decisions. (Larrowe v. Beam, 10 Ohio, 502; Tuttle v. Wilson, Ib., 25; Fales v. Taylor, Ib., 107; Elmendorf v Taylor, 10 Wheat., 168-177; Carey v. Robinson, 13 Ohio, 181; Lockwood v. Wildman, Ib., 452; Ludlow v. Cooper, lb., 582, foot of page.) The complainants are within the saving in the proviso. The trustees all resided out of the State until the death of Thompson, March 22, 1834. All of the cestuis que trust were absent from the State until their deaths. America Lewis died in 1830; Joshua Lewis, 1833. In this state of things, there is no principle of equity which warrants the court in holding the complainants barred by time, until time would constitute a bar by the direct application of the statute of limitations. Mr. Scott, on the same side: The defendants cannot successfully repel the claim, here asserted by the complainants, on the ground assumed, that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations, which took effect June 1st, 1810 (see ch. 18, Vol. VIII., p. 63). That statute does not commence running against land claims in this district until patent emanates. (See Lessee of Wallace v. Miner, 6 Ohio, 366, and 7 lb., 249.) The words "beyond sea," in the statute, are construed to mean out of the State. (Richardson v. Richardson, 6 Ohio, 125; Wirt v. Homer, 7 Ohio, 235; Whitney v. Webb, 10 Ohio, 513.) When the action accrued under the Act of 1810, it is not barred by the subsequent act. (Putnam v. Reese, 12 Ohio, 21.) ground that their demand is stale by reason of the lapse of time. The rules in equity, which allow lapse of time to be interposed as a bar to equitable relief, have been adopted in analogy to the statute of limitations in cases at law, and are governed by precisely the same principles. And here it is worthy of remark, that the statute of limitations of Ohio. in one important particular, is essentially different from any of the statutes of limitations of the British Parlia ment which have come under our notice. In the British statutes the particular suits are named towhich a limitation, as to the time of bringing them, is fixed, but as no suits in equity are named in those statutes, the courts have adjudged that. those statutes, in direct terms, did not apply to suits in equity. The statutes of Ohio limit the time for bringing “actions of ejectment, or any other action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands," &c., to twenty-one years. In Ohio, there is no other action or suit [*241 known to the law for the recovery of the title to land, except an action or suit in equity. And we, therefore, insist that this is an action or suit, and the only one the law authorized us tobring, for the recovery of the title and possession of the lands in question, and consequently it falls within the letter and spirit of our stat utes of limitations. And if our construction of the statute be correct, it consequently results that the plea of the lapse of time has no application to this case, as the statute itself furnishes the rule, and the only rule, by which we can be barred. But suppose we are mistaken. in the construction we have contended for, will the condition of the defendants be improved? We think not: because the courts of equity, in England and in this country, have adopted the statute of limitations as furnishing reasonable equitable rules for the limitation of The right of action in those under whom the complainants have derived title accrued, under 240*] the Act of 1810, in December, *1816, when the patent to Cotton was obtained; but as they were, and continued to be, non-resdents, the statute of limitations never com menced running, against the claims now asserted by the camplainants, until 1830, on the death of their mother, America Lewis, and in 1833, on the death of their father, Joshua Lew-suits in equity. is. The statute commenced running against three sixths parts of the lands now claimed in the bill on the death of Mrs. Lewis; and as respects two sixths parts thereof, it commenced running on the death of Mr. Lewis. But the statute has never commenced running against the remaining sixth part, which is claimed by Mrs. Bowman. After the statute begins to run, it requires twenty-one years to complete the bar. And the Supreme Court of Ohio, sit ting in bank, in the case of Carey's Administrators v. Robinson's Administrators (13 Ohio, 181), has recently decided, that, where nonresidents are within the saving clause of the Act of Limitations of 1810, the statute does not begin to run until their death; and that their heirs may commence suit within the period of twenty-one years, limited in the statute, after the death of such ancestor. And, in accordance with this decision, the same court, at the same term, in the case of Lockwood and others v. Wildman and others decided that under the Act of 1810, persons residing out of the State at the commencement of adverse possession are not barred under twenty-one years after the disability is removed. These decisions have overruled the decision made by the same court, at a previous term, in the case of Whitney v. Webb (10 Ohio, 513), and demonstrate that the claims here asserted by the complainants are not barred by the statute of limitations. The complainants are not barred on the His Honor, Mr. Justice McLean, in delivering his opinion in this case, in the Circuit Court, said: I Had the statute of limitations remained open for our contemplation, and we construed it as above intimated, which would not bar the complainants' rights, still I should have been clearly of the opinion that they were barred by the lapse of time." The position here assumed by the learned judge will, I trust, be deemed a sufficient apology on my part for dwelling a little longer on this branch of the case than I originally intended. The Supreme Court of this State, in the case of Amelia Fahr, Administrator of Casper Fahr, v. James Taylor and others (10 Ohio, 106), decided ed that chancery will not set up lapse of time against a claim, when an action of debt for its recovery would not be barred by the statute of limitations. In the case of Ridley and others v. Holtman and others (10 Ohio, 521), the court decided that equity ordinarily acts in analogy to the law, giving effect to the statute of limitations, and therefore, where the owner of an older entry and junior patent, who was never in the State, died, with an adverse possession, under a junior entry and older patent, against him, equity, after the lapse of twenty-one years from his death, will allow the act of limitations to be set up, as a bar against his heirs, seeking to get in the legal title under the older entry. And in the case of Larrowe v. Beam (10 Ohio, 498), the court said: "We do not The rule, however, may now be considered as permanently established; and the principles on which it is founded are perfectly understood and clearly developed. It is true, courts of equity, by their own rules, independently of any statute of limitations, give great effect to length of time; but it is equally true, that they refer frequently to the statute of limitations, for the purpose of furnishing a convenient measure for the limitation of time, which might operate as a bar, in equity, to any particular demand. (See Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves., 87.) In Kane v. Bloodgood (7 Johns. Ch., 9, affirmed in 8 Cowen, 360), Chancellor Kent remarked, in substance, that the limitation of suits, being founded in public convenience, and attended with so much utility, the courts of equity have adopted principles analogous to those established by the statutes of limitations, as positive rules for their conduct. know that there is any case in which the defense has been distinctly placed upon this ground (lapse of time), where there was a statute of limitations in force applicable to the case. If the party be guilty of such laches in prosecut ing his title as would bar him if his title were solely at law, he should be barred in equity." Mortgages are held not to be within the 242*] words of the statute of limitations; and no positive rule hath, as yet, been fixed upon which shall be an absolute bar to redemption. But the making up of accounts, after long periods of time, being very difficult, and attended with great hardship on the mortgagee, it hath been thought reasonable to establish in equity, in analogy to the statute, a period at which, prima facie, the right of redemp tion shall be presumed to be deserted by the mortgagor, unless he be capable of producing circumstances to account for his neglect, such as imprisonment, infancy, coverture, or by having been beyond seas, and not by having absconded, which is an avoiding or retarding of justice. (See Knowles v. Spence, Mos., 225; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr., 315; Ord v. Smith, Sel. Ch. Cas., 9, 10; 1b., 56; Jenner v. Tracy, 3 P. Wms., 287, note; Belch v. Harvey, 1b; 3 Sug den on Vend., App., note 15; Saunders v. Hoard, 1 Ch. R.. 184; Clapham v. Bowyer, lb., 206; 3 Atkins, 313; Bony v. Ridgard, 1 Cox, Ch. Cas., 149; Hever v. Livingston, 1 P. Wms., 263; Trash v. White, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas., 289; Leman v. Newnham, 1 Ves., 51; and Shipbrook v. Hinchingbrook, 13 Ves., 387.) And to pre-gal proceedings, the Court of Chancery had serve uniformity between the proceedings in courts of law and equity, twenty years after forfeiture and possession taken by the mortgagee, no interest having been paid in the mean time and the mortgagor laboring under none of the disabilities enumerated in the stat ute of limitations, hath been fixed upon as the period beyond which a right of redemption shall not be favored. (See 3 Johns. Ch., 134; and Lamer v. Jones, 3 Harr. & McH., 328; and Doe v. Calvert, 5 Taunt., 170.) It has been said that this rule is not founded on the presumption of an absolute conveyance, but is merely a positive rule, introduced for the sake of quieting the title after so long a neglect to redeem. (Per Eyre, C. B., in Corbet v. Barker, 1 Anstr..,143.) The rule was first hinted at in Winchcomb v. Hall (1 Ch. R., 40), and Porter v. Emery (1637, lb., 97), then in Saunders v. Hoard (1 Ch. R., 184) and Ciap ham v. Bowyer Ib., 206); and afterwards adopted as a rule of court, by Lord Keeper Bridgman and the Master of the Rolls, in Pearson v. Pulley (1 Ch.. Cas., 102); and followed by Lord King, in White v. Ewer (2 Vent., 340). But the rule seems not to have been permanently settled until about the middle of the last century. So late as the year 1722, an appeal came on in the House of Lords, wherein the doctrine was but imperfectly acknowledged. It was, however, there held that a mortgagee in possession for seventy years, under legal title, should not be redeemed or disturbed; for so long an acquiesence should be taken as an implied waiver of the right to redeem, especially when the rents were insufficient to keep down 243*] the interest for more than *fifty years. (Stone v. Byrne, 2 Bro. P. C., 399; S. P., 3 Johns. Ch., 129.) Lord Camden, in Smith v. Clay (3 Bro. Ch. R., 639, note), said that laches and neglect were always discountenanced in equity; and therefore, from the beginning of that jurisdiction, there was always a limitation to suits. Expedit reipublicæ ut sit finis litium was a maxim that had prevailed in chancery at all times, without the help of an act of Parliament. As, however, the court had no legislative authority, it could not define the bar by a positive rule. It was governed by circumstances. But as often as Parliament had limited the time of actions and remedies to a certain period, in le adopted that rule, and applied it to similar cases in equity; for when the Legislature had fixed the time at law, it would have been preposterous for equity to continue laches beyond the period to which they had been confined by Parliament; and therefore, in all cases where the legal right has been barred by Parliament, the equitable right to the same thing has been concluded by the same bar. Lord Redesdale, in Hovenden v. Annesley (2 Sch. & Lefr., 607), said: "I think the statute of limitations must be taken, virtually, to include courts of equity; for when the Legislature limited the proceedings at law, in certain cases, and provided no express limitations for proceedings in equity, it must be taken to have contemplated that equity followed the law; and therefore it must be taken to have virtually enacted, in the same cases, a limitation for courts of equity also." In the case of The Marquis of Cholmondely v. Lord Clinton (see 2 Meriv., 171, and 2 Jac. & Walk., 190), upon appeal to the House of Peers, Lord Eldon said he could not agree to, and had never heard of, such a rule, as that adverse possession *however long, would[*244 not avail against an equitable estate; and he concluded by stating his opinion to be, that an adverse possession of an equity of redemption for twenty years was a bar to another person claiming the same equity of redemption, and worked the same effect as disseisin, abatement or intrusion, with respect to legal estates; and that, for the quiet and peace of titles, and of the world, it ought to have the same effect. During that whole period of twenty years, in which Lord Clinton had held adverse possession of the premises in question, the Marquis of Cholmondely, or those under whom he claimed, was not laboring under any of the disabilities enumerated in the statute. So that the bar in chancery, in analogy to the statute of limitations, was complete. Lord Redesdale was clearly of the opinion that the plaintiffs were barred by the effect of the statute of limitations, and that the bill, therefore, should be dismissed. He wished it to be understood that his decision rested, principally, on that ground. He remarked that it had been argued that the Marquis of Cholmondely might, at law, have had a writ of right-that was, a writ to which peculiar privileges were allowed; but courts of equity had never regarded that writ or writs of formedon, or others of the same nature. They had always considered the provision in the statute of James which related to rights and titles of entry, and in which the period of limita tion was twenty years, as that by which they were bound, and it was that upon which they had constantly acted. He considered that the statute was a positive law, which ought to bind courts of equity, and that the Legislature must have supposed that they would regulate their proceedings accordingly, by it. The decree of Sir Thomas Plumer was confirmed. The following clauses in Sir Thomas Plumer's opinion have a direct bearing on this question, viz.: "Mrs. Damer, the devisee, is, on all sides, admitted to be the only person who could have had any claim of title under Horace, Earl of Orford, to this estate; and the full period of twenty years having elapsed since the death of George, Earl of Orford, when that title, if at all, first accrued, the remedy would have been taken away by the statute, in consequence of the laches and non-claim. The lapse of twenty years affords a substantive, insuperable plea in bar. It is the fixed limit to the remedy-the tempus constitutum; one day beyond is as much too late as one hundred years. This is the peremptory, inflexible rule of law, fixed by positive statutes, if there has been adverse posses sion, and no disability or fraud. No plea of poverty, ignorance, or mistake can be of any avail. However clear and indisputable the title, if the merits could be inquired into," &c. 245*] *Lord Chancellor Manners, in Medlicott v. O'Donnell (1 Ball & Beat., 164), thus expressed himself: "I think, then, I stand well supported by principle and authority in saying that the court is bound to regulate its proceedings by analogy, or in obedience to the statute of limitations. Upon a uniform concurrence of a long train of the highest authorities. I can en tertain no doubt in the present case. It is clear that, had it been the claim of a legal estate, in a court of law, the remedy must, by analogy, be equally barred in a court of equity." On the same ground, another case, between the same parties, has since been decided; the Lord Chancellor observing, that, where there has been adverse possession for twenty years, not accounted for by some disability, as coverture, &c., a court of equity ought not to interfere. (! Turn., 107.) In New York, the analogy between the right to redeem in equity and the right of entry at law is complete and entire throughout. (Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch., 134.) Lord Manners, in the case of Medlicott v. O'Donnell, to which reference is had above, said: "It has been suggested that I lay too much stress upon length of time, and that I attach more credit to it than Lord Redesdale or any of my predecessors have done. I confess, I think the statute of limitations is founded upon the soundest principles and the wisest policy, and that this court, for the peace of families and to quiet titles, is bound to adopt it, in caseswhere the equitable and legal title so far correspond, that the only difference between them is that the one must be enforced in this court, and the other in a court of law." In Cook v. Arnham (3 P. Wms., 287), the rule was put on this footing, that where length of time will not bar the right to bring an ejectment, then it shall not bar the right to file a bill in equity; and Sir Joseph Jekyll, in Toyer v. Larington (1 P. Wms., 270), placed the rule on the same footing; and, in that shape, it was approved by Lord Redesdale in the cases above cited. In Nelson v. Carrington (4 Munf., 332) and Lamar v. Jones, the court decided that lapse of time is permitted, in equity, to defeat an acknowledged right, on the ground only of its affording evidence of presumption that such right has been abandoned; and it never prevails where the presumption is outweighed by opposing facts and circumstances. From the cases of Topliss v. Baker (2 Cox, Ch. Cas., 122, in the Exchequer); Turnstall v. McLelland (Hard., 519); Hele v. Hele (2 Ch. Cas., 28); Sibson v. Fletcher (1 Ch. R., 59): Le man v. Newnham (1 Ves., 51); Trash v. White (3 Bro. Ch. Cas., 291); Hatcher v. Fineaux (1 Ld. Raym., 740); and Blewitt v. Thomas (2 *Ves., Jun., 669), we deduce these [*246 points: that no rule exists, in equity, for presuming a release or satisfaction of a mortgage, after the lapse of twenty years, or any other particular period of time, on the ground that no notice has been taken of the debt, either by payment of the interest on one side, or demand of principal and interest an the other; and that if a jury should on that ground presume the bond to be satisfied, yet the mortgagee will not thereby be prevented from showing the truth of the case to the court; and the court will, on proof that the money is due, or in the absence of proof that it has been paid, decree in favor of the mortgagee, notwithstanding a period of more than twenty years may have elapsed between the making of the mortgage and the last demand of principal and interest. But it will be incumbent on the mortgagee and his representatives to define, particularly, the period and essence of the acknowledgments which he avers to have taken place, and to show with accuracy the commencement and continuance of every disability which he suggests as the cause of forbearance. Lord Chancellor Erskine, in the case of Hillary v. Waller (12 Ves., 239), said: The presumption in courts of law, from length of time, stands upon a clear principle, built upon reason, the nature and character of man, and the result of human experience. It resolves itself into this, that a man will naturally enjoy what belongs to him; that is the whole principle. Then, as to presumptions of title: 1st. As to bond taken, and no interest paid for twenty years, nay, within twenty years, as Lord Mansfield has said; but upon twenty years the presumption is that it has been paid, and the pre |