586; 11 Wendell, 375; 7 Greenleaf, 63.) But these defects in collateral matters, as here, when they relate to form, are as fully cured by the statutes of jeofails as those connected with the verdict are by intendment at common law. (Stennel v. Hogg, 1 Saunders, 228, note; Dale v. Dean, 16 Conn., 579.) Any omission like this would certainly be amendable below, and some cases have gone so far as to hold, in error, that any defect amendable below will be considered as actually amended. (Cummings v. Lebo, 2 Rawle, 23.) In conclusion on this point, this court, by Catron, Justice, in the writ of error before named, of Stockton et al. v. Bishop (4 How., 164), stated, that "it must be admitted that Congress acted wisely in declaring that no liti. gant party shall lose his right in law for want of form; and in going one step further, as Congress unquestionably has done, by declaring that, to save the parties' rights, the substance should be infringed on to some extent, when contrasted with modes of proceeding in the English courts, and with their ideas of what is substance." After this, it would seem hypercritical, and -contrary to the whole spirit of the statutes of jeofails, both of the United States and of Mississippi, to allow an exception so contrary to legal presumption as this to be sustained. Nor does it promote the ends of justice to let parties lie by and not take exceptions, and afterwards reverse judgments for omissions, which, if noticed at the time, would have been corrected. (McCready v. James, 6 Wharton, 547.) And this court, where the issues were three, and the verdict and judgment not separate on each, but general on all, and the objection was taken on 722*] the writ of error, in Roach v. Hulings (16 Peters, 321), said, by Daniel, Justice: "Objections of this character, that are neither taken at the usual stage of the proceedings nor prominently presented on the face of the record, but which may be sprung upon a party after an apparent waiver of them by an adversary, and still more after a trial upon the merits, can have no claim to the favor of the court, but should be entertained only in obedience to the strictest requirements of law"; and they were in that case accordingly overruled or considered as cured. some of her eminent jurists as "inconvenient and ill judged." If this provision, then, in Mississippi, should be regarded as a rule of practice, it existed there when the last process act, of May, 1828, passed, and hence, by acts of Congress and the rules of our circuit courts, binds them; but if it be a right conferred by her statute, it equally must govern us, by the Judiciary law of 1789. in all cases tried like this in that State. (16 Peters, 89, 303.) But, besides these reasonings and views, to some of which a portion of the court except, there exists another ground for affirming the judgment below, which appears to us fully established both on principle and adjudged cases. The first fault in the pleadings connected with the demurrer seems to have been committed by the defendant himself, and no reason appears on the whole record why the original judgment should not have been rendered against him on that ground. His only defense set up was the statute of frauds and perjuries. This statute was pleaded specially; but, on the facts and the law, it does not seem to have been applicable to the case. The case was a transaction of money paid by the plaintiff on account of the defendant, and must have been consid- [*723 ered by the court and jury as done under an original undertaking to repay it in a particular way, which the defendant had not fulfilled, and which was not within the provisions of the statute. The defendant was misled, by the mode of payment being special and to a third person, into an impression that the original promise was to a third person. The suit is not brought by the third person, to whom the original plaintiff owed a debt, nor was the promise made to a third person; but it is brought by the person who advanced money on account of the defendant, on a consideration moving from him alone, and on the promise made to him alone for its payment in a particular manner. (See, on this, Read v. Nash, 1 Wilson, 305; 2 Leigh's N. P., 1031; King v. Despard, 5 Wendell, 277; Towne v. Grover, 9 Pick., 306; Hodgson v. Anderson, 3 Barn. & Cress., 842.) This was virtually, therefore, an undertaking by the defendant to pay his own debt, but simply specifying a particular manner of doing it; and unless it was found at the trial that the statute of frauds did not apply, it is to be presumed that a recovery would not have been had before the jury, where it was competent to make this an objection. The matter of the plea, then, having been clearly bad, it appears to be well settled, that, when a demurrer is filed to a replication, if the plea is bad, jugdment ought to be given for the (Anon., 2 Wilson, 150; Semble, Moor, 692; Com. Dig., Pleader, Proceedings in Error, 3 B., 16; 1 Levinz, 181.) The whole record connected with the demurrer is open on the writ of error, and judgment goes against the earliest fault. (Breese, 207; Morgan v. Morgan, 4 Gill & Johns., 395.) Another ground for affirming the judgment, which the plaintiff in error cannot easily overcome, is, that if the three counts to which the special plea is filed cannot be sustained, the defendant in error has obtained a verdict on all the counts; thus showing, at least, that there was no valid defense to the others. And if those three were conceded to be bad, the others are good, and, notwithstanding a verdict and judg-plaintiff. ment on all, the latter must not in such case be reversed on error. By an express statute in Mississippi, passed June 28th, 1842, one good count, though others are bad, will sustain a judgment. (Hutch. Code for Miss., ch. 5, art. 1.) This is not a peculiarity confined to Mississippi, but a like rule prevails in several other States. (2 Bibb, 62; 2 Litt., 100; 2 Bay, 204; 2 Hill, 648; 1 Blackf., 12; 1 Stewart, 384; 2 Conn., 324.) And though in some it is other wise (1 Caines. 347; 11 Johns., 98; 9 Mass., 198), and is otherwise in England (Grant v. Astle, Doug., 703), yet it has been regretted by In regard to the suggestion that the demurrer might have applied to some other objection than the statute of frauds, either in the plea, or, going back to the declaration, some defect there (as the first defect bad on general demurrer is the fatal one, 1 Chit. Pl., 647), it is enough to say that no other appears, then or error. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. now, to have been pointed out, and none is in-special plea out of which the demurrer arose 1849 timated in the argument for the plaintiff in applied only to three counts. except by the plea of the general issue; and fourth count, to which no defense was made There was a according to the law and practice of Mississippi, one good count is sufficient to support the judgment when there are several counts in the verdict on the *general issue, the [*725 a declaration, and the others bad. decision of the demurrer was immaterial, and And after the judgment must still have been for the plaintiff even if the demurrer was decided for defendant. The omission to dispose of an immaterial issue is not a ground for reversing a not influence the judgment of the District judgment, as the decision of such issue could Court. But I do not concur in the other portions of the opinion, and think that many of the positions taken in it cannot be supported. It is very doubtful, also, if, in this particu- From the whole record, therefore, it appears The propriety of our conclusions in this case becomes more manifest when we consider that a reversal of the judgment would be of no use to the original defendant; because, if reversed, the order here could not be to render judgment for the defendant, but to have a record made of the waiver or decision of the demurrer, if either occurred, and if not, then a joinder in demurrer and an opinion below on the question presented by it, and which opinion, as already shown, must probably be for the plaintiff, and then the same judgment be entered again on the verdict which exists (McGriffin v. Helson, 5 Litt., 48; 2 Strange, 972; now. Jackson v. Runlet, 1 Wood. & M., 381.) Finally, so far as doubts on any of these considerations should any presumptions or operate against either party in forming our conclusions, we are unable to see anything in the acquiescent conduct of the original defendant before the judgment, or in the merits of his original defense, or in his writ of error, brought after such an uninterrupted silence and assent for years, which entitle him to any peculiar favor. The plaintiff in error, likewise, must always make out his case clearly and satisfactorily, as every reasonable intendment should be in fa vor of a judgment already rendered. (Fentriss v. Smith, 10 Peters, 161; Lander v. Reynolds, 3 Litt., 16; La. Code of Prac., 909, note, and cases there cited: 3 Martin, N. S., 29; 15 La., 480, &c.) This not having been done in the present case, we think that the judgment below must be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY: I think the judgment of the District Court may be supported, on the ground that the de cision on the demurrer had become immaterial after the verdict on the general issue. The 888 Mr. Justice CATRON Concurs with the Chief Justice. Mr. Justice DANIEL: Regarding the opinion just delivered as in ing at law, I feel constrained to declare my direct opposition to the very canons of pleaddissent from it. I cannot subscribe to, and can hardly comprehend, a doctrine of presumpquestions of pleading, infers that the parties or tions, which, in proceedings at law and on the court have acted in direct contravention of the facts apparent upon, and standing prominently out upon, the record, operating by such presumption a false feature of the record itself. In this case the defendant has tendered an issue in law to the replication to the third plea; the record discloses the fact that this issue has never been tried; it is therefore undeniable that there is a chasm in the proceedings, and that the court has not passed upon the whole case. was withdrawn, where shall such presumption If presumption can be admitted to warrant the conclusion that this demurrer end? Would it not be equally regular to prehad been withdrawn? Then, if any other sume that any other plea or issue on the record source than the record itself can be resorted to in order to ascertain what was in truth involved in the trial, conjecture or evidence aliunde must be introduced to determine; and that which, by legal intendment, is the only evidence or proof of the proceedings, the record, becomes the weakest of all proof, or rather should be reversed, and the cause remanded becomes no proof at all. I think the judgment for a trial on all the issues of law and of fact. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel; on the United States for the Northern District of consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment the same is hereby affirmed, with costs, and of the said District Court in this cause be, and damages at the rate of six per cent. per annum. Cited-13 How., 215; 7 Wall., 94. Silence in answer to bill in equity concerning immaterial fact, no ground for exception. If an exception be taken to an answer in chancery upon the ground that certain allegations in the bill are neither answered, admitted, nor denied, it becomes necessary to inquire whether the facts charged in the allegations are material, and might, if established, contribute to support the equity of the complainant. If they will not, the omission to answer the allegations is not a good ground for exception to the answer, and the exception must be overruled. to support the equity of the plaintiff's case as to contribute to induce the court to give him the relief sought by the bill." This being the clear and well settled rule, it remains to inquire, whether the omission referred to in this exception be material to the object of the complainants' bill. That it is not is unquestionably clear. (Grores v. Slaughter, 15 Pet., 449: Harris v. Runnels, 5 How., 135; Truly v. Wanzer et al., 5 How., 141; Sims v. Hundley, 6 How., 1.) In support of the second proposition in the defendant's brief, it is insisted That the omission alleged in the complainants' second exception does not in fact exist to the extent therein stated, and if it did, it is wholly immaterial. That Hardeman, one of the complainants, was a mere surety in the note sued upon at law, is substantially admitted by the defendant, and will be apparent upon the examination of the answer, wherein he states the sale of slaves, for which the note was given, to have been original Therefore, when a bill charged that certain notes were given for the purchase of slaves introduced into the State of Mississippi, as merchandise and for sale, after the first day of May, 1833, and the answer omitted to notice the allegation, such omission was not a good ground for an exception. This court has repeatedly decided that the fact stated is no defense to a suit at law. Still less can it be a defense in equity. Where an allegation in the bill was, that the com-ly made to James M. Smith, on credit, and plainants were only sureties, and that their prin- that he "received in payment therefor the notes cipal was insolvent, the answer was not justly sub- or bonds of said James M. Smith and of the ject to exception for omitting to notice it. The said William Hardeman. fact in no way strengthened the equity of the com- said bonds or notes a judgment was obtained, That upon one of as stated in the bill, and that the note or bond sued on, upon which the judgment enjoined was recovered, was given in satisfaction of the first mentioned bond or note and judgment. plainants. THIS HIS case came up from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of the State of Mississippi, on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges thereof. The facts in the case are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court. It was argued by Mr. Nelson on behalf of the respondent, Harris; no counsel appearing for the complainants. Mr. Nelson contended that neither of the exceptions was well taken. The first, because the allegation to which it refers was wholly immaterial, and not therefore required to be answered. The second, because the allegations therein referred to, contained in said bill, if at all material, which is denied, have been substantially responded to by said answer. In support of the first proposition it is submitted Now, all that is necessary for a defendant to do, in a case like the present, is to answer substantially the allegations of the bill. (Welford's Equity Pleadings, 261.) As to the objection, that the allegation of the insolvency of James M. Smith's estate is not answered by the defendant, it is sufficient to say that the fact is nowhere so alleged in the bill as to require any answer. There is no such averment in the bill, the only suggestion being that "it seems that nothing can be found," &c. But if it were otherwise, it is indisputably clear that the allegations are wholly immaterial; that, however answered, the complainants could not be aided in the purpose of their bill; and that therefore, upon the authority of the cases already referred to, the omissions furnish no sufficient grounds for an exception. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opin That to justify an exception to an answer in chancery upon the ground of insufficiency, it is necessary to show that the omission alleged is material to the purpose and object of the com-ion of the court: plainants' bill. (2 Dan. Chan. Prac., 261; Welford's Equity Plead., 368: Hare on Disc., 160; 1 McClellan & Younge, 334.) In Hirst v. Peirce (4 Price, 136; 2 Eng. Exch. Rep.), Chief Baron Richardson says: "There is great mistake in general in this court as to what is a material exception. The true way of arguing and con sidering such an exception is by ascertaining whether, if the defendant should answer in the affirmative, his admission would be of use to the plaintiff. If it would, it must be answered; if not, it is not material." And in Bally v. Kenrick (13 Price, 294; 6 Eng. Exch. Rep., 99), Sir William Alexander, 727*] Chief Baron, says: "The materiality of the exception will depend on this-whether the interrogatory be of such a nature, without reference to the objectionable part of the answer, as that the answer to it might, if it were answered simply as it is put, so far contribute In this case, the complainants filed a bill in the Circuit Court *for the Southern Dis- [*728 trict of Mississippi, praying a perpetual injunction against a judgment at law which had been obtained against them. The bill, among other things, states that the note upon which the judgment was awarded was given for the purchase money of certain slaves brought by the defendant into the State of Mississippi, as merchandise and for sale, after the first day of May in the year 1833, and sold in the State to a certain James M. Smith, in violation of the constitution and laws of the State; that the complainant Hardeman was surety for Smith; that a judgment was afterwards obtained against him, and an execution issued and levied upon his property, and that, to prevent it from being sold, he executed a forthcoming bond with the other complainant, Hill, as his security, which bond had become forfeited, and therefore had the form and effect of a judgment against the complainants; and that Smith, for whom he was security, was dead, and his estate insolvent. The defendant answered; and upon the coming in of the answer, the following exceptions were taken to it by the complainants: "1st. The bill charges that the slaves mentioned in complainants' bill, sold by the defendant, Harris, to James M. Smith, and which constitute the consideration of the note upon which the judgment at law enjoined in this cause was rendered, were introduced into the State of Mississippi by the said defendant, Harris, for sale and as merchandise, after the first day of May, 1833. This allegation has not been answered, admitted, or denied. "2d. It is alleged in the bill, that complainant Hardeman was only surety in the note sued upon at law, and that C. P. Smith, executor of James M. Smith, was principal, and that the estate of James M. Smith is insolvent, &c. These allegations are neither answered, admitted, nor denied." And upon the hearing of these exceptions, the judges were divided in opinion upon the point whether they were well taken and should be sustained, or not, and therefore ordered the question to be certified for decision to this court. It is very clear that neither of these exceptions can be maintained. It has been repeatedly decided in this court, that the fact stated in the first is no defense at law, and still less can it be a ground of relief in equity after a judgment at law. And as regards the second, certainly the insolvency of the principal debtor is no defense to the surety, either at law or in equity. If, therefore, the defendant had admitted in the most explicit terms the allegations mentioned in the exceptions, they would not have contributed in any degree to support the claim of 729*] the *complainants to the relief they ask. And consequently, the omission to answer (if the answer be open to that objection) furnishes no ground of exception. It is not a sufficient foundation for an exception, that a fact charged in a bill is not answered, unless the fact is material, and might contribute to support the equity of the case of the complainant, and induce the court to give the relief sought by the bill. The exceptions ought, therefore, to have been overruled, and we shall direct it to be so certified to the Circuit Court. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, and on the points or questions on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that the exceptions by the complain ants were not well taken, and ought to have been overruled. Whereupon, it is now here ordered and decreed, that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court. Cited 7 Wall., 212. U. PLINY CUTLER, Appellant, v. WILLIAM A. RAE. S. courts no jurisdiction in admiralty, of libel by the ship owners against consignee of cargo, to recover share due in general average -ship lost in saving cargo. Where a vessel was run on shore by the captain in order to save the lives of those on board, and for the preservation of the cargo, by which act the vessel was totally lost, but the cargo saved and delivered to the consignee a libel in personam,filed by the owner of the vessel against the consignee of the cargo (and the result would be the same if filed against the owner of the cargo), for a contribution by way of general average, cannot be sustained in the admiralty courts of the United States. sel or cargo is subject to an absolute lien, created by the maritime law; and will follow property subject to such a lien into the hands of assignees. The lien, in such cases, does not depend upon pos Those courts have jurisdiction wherever the ves session. But in cases of general average, the lien is a qualified one, depends upon the possession of the goods, and ceases when they are delivered to the owner or consignee. Whatever may be the liability of the owner after he has received his cargo, it is founded upon an implied promise to contribute to the re-imbursement of the owner of the lost vessel, which promise is implied by the common law, and not by the martime law. The case is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty, and the libel must be dismissed. THIS Was United States for the District of HIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of Massachusetts. It was a libel filed in the District Court, as a court of admiralty *and maritime juris- [*730 diction, by Rae, the owner of a vessel called the Zamora, against Cutler, in a cause of contribution or general average, civil and maritime. The facts in the case are set forth by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the court, to which the reader is referred. The District Court decreed that Rae should recover $2,500 from Cutler, which decree was affirmed in the Circuit Court. It was submitted upon printed arguments in this court by Mr. Loring for the libelant below, and Mr. Fletcher and Mr. Curtis for the respondent and appellant. The Reporter would be gratified if he could insert the whole of these arguments, but want of room forbids it. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court: This is a proceeding in admiralty, and the point first to be considered is the question of jurisdiction. The appellee filed a libel in personam against the appellant, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, setting forth that he was the owner of the bark Zamora, which sailed from New Orleans for Boston, on the 6th of November, 1845, with an assorted cargo, a part of which consisted of 154 bales of cotton, consigned to the appellant: that she was overtaken by a storm in Massachusetts Bay, and was run on shore by the captain, in order to save the lives of those on board, and for the preservation of the cargo, which, together with the vessel, were in imminent danger of being totally lost; that by this voluntary stranding, the vessel was totally lost, but the cotton was saved; and that the appellant had saved the value of it, to wit, $5,400; and that the appellee is entitled to contribution from the owners of the cargo and the appellant, to indemnify him for the loss of his vessel. The appellant answered, admitting the ownership of the vessel as alleged in the libel; that she was wrecked in Massachusetts Bay, and that the cotton had come to his hands in a damaged state; but denies that the appellee is entitled to the general average he claims, and insists that he is not liable to contribute on account of the cotton, to indemnify the owner for the loss of his bark. Upon this libel and answer, the parties proceeded to take testimony to show the circumstances under which the vessel had been stranded; and upon the hearing, a decree was passed in the District Court in favor of the appellee for $2,500, which was affirmed in the Circuit Court, and from which last mentioned decree the present appeal to this court was taken. 731*] *Upon the face of the proceedings, therefore, the question arises, whether the District Court had jurisdiction, as a court of ad miralty, to try the matter in dispute. And it is unnecesary to state more fully the pleadings and testimony until this question is disposed of. It is true, the counsel for the appellant has waived all objections on that score. But the consent of parties cannot give jurisdiction to the courts of the United States, in cases where it has not been conferred by the Constitution and laws. And if the proceedings show a case which the District Court was not authorized to try, it is the duty of this court to take notice of the want of jurisdiction, without waiting for an objection from either party. The Court of Admiralty undoubtedly has jurisdiction in cases where the vessel or cargo is subject to a lien created by the maritime law. And where the lien is attached to the vessel or cargo, it will, until it is discharged, adhere to the property in the hands of third persons, and will follow the proceeds, in certain cases, in the hands of assignees. And in such cases, the lien may be enforced in a court of admir alty, by a proceeding in personam, against the party who holds the property or proceeds. This doctrine was recognized in this court in the case of Sheppard v. Taylor (5 Pet., 675). In that case, the holders of the proceeds of a ship which had been condemned in a Spanish tribunal, and the value of the vessel afterwards paid to the owners by the Spanish government, were held liable for seaman's wages, in a proceeding in personam, although they held them as assignees of the owners in payment of a bona fide pre-existing debt. And in deciding that case, the court said, that, in cases of prize, bottomry, and salvage, as well as seaman's wages, the party entitled to the lien may proceed in admiralty in personam against the party holding the proceeds of property to which the lien had attached. But in the cases mentioned by the court, the maritime law attaches an absolute and unconditional lien upon the property. The possession is not necessary to its validity. Indeed, in cases of seaman's wages and bottomry, the party entitled to the lien never has possession; and the same is most commonly the case where salvage services are rendered. But it is otherwise in general average. The party entitled to contribution has no absolute and unconditional lien upon the goods liable to contribute. The captain has a right to retain them until the general average with which they are charged has been paid or secured. And as he may do this for the security of the party entitled, he must be regarded as his agent in this respect, and exercising his rights. This right of retainer, therefore, is a qualified [*732 lien, to which the party is entitled by the maritime law. But it depends on the possession of the goods by the master or ship owner, and ceases when they are delivered to the owner or consignee. It does not follow them into their hands, nor adhere to the proceeds. This is the doctrine not only in England, but on the Continent also. It is unnecessary to refer to the various authorities on this point, as the principal ones are collected in Abbott on Shipping, 507 (margin), Perkins's edition, and 3 Kent's Com., 244. In the case before us, the goods, with the bill of lading, were delivered to the consignee, and not to the owner. We do not, however, propose to inquire, whether, upon the facts stated in the libel, the consignee would be liable for the contribution in any form, but whether a court of admiralty can try the question. And treating the case as if the consignee stood in the place of the owner, and was liable to the same extent, we think it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty. The owner is liable, because, at the time he receives the goods, they are bound to share in the loss of other property by which they have been saved; and he is not entitled to demand them until the contribution has been paid. And as this lien upon his goods is discharged by the delivery, the law implies a promise that he will pay it. But it is not implied by the maritime law which gave the lien. It is implied upon the principles of the common law courts, upon the ground that in equity and good conscience he is bound to pay the money, and is therefore presumed to have made the promise when he received the goods. Indeed, this case seems, in its principles, to be nothing more than the common law action for money had and received, brought in a court of admiralty. It is very much to be regretted, that the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty in this country is not more clearly defined. It has been repeatedly decided in this court, that its jurisdiction is not restricted to the subjects over which the English courts of admiralty exercised jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was adopted. But there is no case, nor any principle recognized by this court, that would justify us in extending it to a subject like the one now before the court. Whether the Court of Admiralty might not have proceeded in rem to enforce the maritime law before the goods were delivered, is a question which does not arise in this case, and upon which, therefore, we express no opinion. But the case, as presented in the record, we think, is not within the admiralty jurisdiction, and the judgment must therefore be reversed, and |