becomes an agent for the collection, and is bound to use reasonable diligence. If, in consequence of negligence in obtaining judgment and execution in a reasonable time, the debt is lost, he is personally responsible: Kinnard vs. Willmore, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 619.

SLANDER.

1. On the trial of an action of slander, for words imputing a want of chastity, on a plea of not guilty, it is not allowable to prove the general reputation and belief of the community, that the house in which the plaintiff resided was a house of ill-fame: Kacket vs. Brown, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 264.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

1. A contract for the sale of lands made during the war, and at the factitious prices then prevailing, will not be specifically executed. A sale of lands to several persons, heirs or tenants in common, purchasing in unequal amounts, at unreasonable prices, as above, if set aside as to part who resist a specific execution of the contract, will not be enforced against those who insist upon its execution: Hudson vs. King, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 560.

See CONTRACTS, 8.

STAMPS. See EVIDENCE, 23.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The admission by one partner of a partnership debt, after the dissolution of the partnership but before the statute of limitations has taken effect, is sufficient to remove the bar of the statute as to all the partners: Beardsley vs. Hall, 270, 36 Conn.

STAYOR.-See CONTRACTS, 4.

STAYOR. See CONTRACTS, 4.
SURETYSHIP.

1. If a vendee sell lands purchased, and he and his vendee join in a note for the remainder of the purchase money to the original vendor, the presumption will be that the second vendee joins as principal-not as surety-and the acceptance of such a note by the original vendor will not raise a presumption of waiver of the lien reserved in a deed: Hines vs. Perkins, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 395.

2. If a surety to a note notify the holder to sue the principal, when by so doing the money could be made, his failure to sue discharges the surety: Hopkins vs. Spurlock, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 152. See GUARDIAN and WARD, 1, 3; TRUSTS, 1.

TAXES AND TAX SALES.

1. The annual premiums of an insurance company received by an agent thereof residing in a city, are not subject to taxation as personal property, under the general power conferred upon the city by its charter, to provide for the taxation and assessment of all taxable property within the city. Such premiums are in the nature of a gross income, and do not constitute property in its proper sense: The City of Dubuque vs. The Northwestern Life Insurance Co., 9, 29 Iowa.

2. A tax deed is void upon its face which shows several tracts of land sold together for a gross sum. But that a tax deed because it shows a sale en masse, does not of itself, render the sale invalid : Ware et al. vs. Thompson et al., 65, 29 Iowa.

See ACTION, 7; BANK, 2, 3, 4; CITY, 1, 2.
CORPORATIONS, 2.

TENANTS IN COMMON.

Where one of two tenants in common of land, obtains the actual exclusive possession of the whole tract, claiming it as his own, and denying any right of his co-tenant in the premises, and upon ejectment being brought against him by his co-tenant to recover his interest, the defendant instead of entering a disclaimer as to the plaintiff's interest in the land pleaded not guilty, and set up the statute of limitations; Held, that these acts on the part of the defendant constituted an ouster and relieved the plaintiff from the necessity of proving an ouster by any other evidence: Noble vs. McFarland, 51 Ill., 227.

TOWN PLAT.

1. Where husband and wife executed, acknowledged, and put upon record a plat of a town, laid out on lands of the wife, exhibiting thereon a railroad track, and having inscribed upon a lot adjoining such track the words, "Depot of Ohio & Penn. R. R.," this did not constitute a dedication of said lot to the railroad company, nor to a public use: Todd vs. P., Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co., 514, 19 Critchfield, (O.)

2. Nor will acts of the wife during coverture, tending to show an agreement on her part to donate said lot to the railroad company, on the faith of which such company has acted, estop her from asserting her rights of ownership therein: lb., 514.

VOL. I.-8

TRESPASS.

1. The owner in fee of land, has no right to make a forcible entry on a tenant holding over, or upon ary other person wrongfully in possession; the law gives him an action and he must resort to it: Farwelt vs. Warren, 51 Ill., 467.

2. Any unlawful exercise of authority over the goods of another will support TRESPASS, even though no force be exerted. Trespass will lie against the purchaser, with notice, of the goods of a third person at a sale under execution. The doctrine of CAVEAT EMPTOR applies to such a purchaser: Hardy vs. Clendening, 25 Ark., 436.

3. The administrator of a person instantly killed by the act of another, has a right of action, for the use of the wife and children of the deceased, and the damages are to be estimated, not only by the pain and suffering of the deceased, but also by the loss and deprivation occasioned to the wife and children: N. & C. R. R. Co. vs. Prince, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 580.

See DAMAGES, 4, 8.

TORT.-See ACTION, 2.

TROVER.

1. The doctrine is well settled that an action of trover may be maintained by a naked bailee. And equally so by a pledgee for value; one in such position may loan the property pledged, temporaily, to the pledgor for a special purpose, and recover in trover, if the property is not returned to him: Huelon vs. Arnett, 51 Ill., 198.

2. Where a landlord took forcible possession of the demised premises, from which he removed the goods of the tenant and then refused to permit the tenant to take them away, that was held to be a conversion of the goods by the landlord, and the tenant might maintain trover therefor: Hipple, exr., De Puie, 51 Ill., 528.

TRUSTS.

Neither the maker of a mortgage with a power of sale in a trustee, nor a surety of such maker, is released of the liability to the debt by the fact of a sale and receipt of the money by the trustee, the trustee having applied the money to the payment of other debts by the consent of the maker: Loughmiller vs. Harris, 2 Heiskeli, (Tenn.,) 253.

UNDUE INFLUENCE.-See WILLS, 3.

USAGE.-See BROKER 1, CONTRACTS, 7.
USURY.-INTEREST, 1, 2. ASSIGNMENT, 7.

VENDOR'S LIEN.

1. Taking a note, not by way of security, but as a mode of payment of the price of the land, is not a waiver of the lien, but on failure of payment the lien may be enforced. A conveyance afterward, and before the non-payment was ascertained, is not a waiver, though the deed recite that the purchase money is paid: Denny vs. Steakly, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 156.

2. If a vendee of lands, with a reservation of a lien on the face of the deed, sell to another, and procures him to execute notes to the vendor, which are substituted in lieu (not accepted in satisfaction) of the notes of the first vendee, in absence of express proof of the retention of the lien, the presumption will be that the lien is not waived.

Such lien reserved, stands on a different footing from the implied lien of a vendor who has conveyed, and will be superior to conveyances made by the second vendee: Hines vs. Perkins, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn., 395.)

WAGER.

An action will lie and a recovery may be had against a stakeholder for the amount of a wager placed in his hands, and which he paid over to the other party, after being notified by plaintiff not to do so: Adkins vs. Fleming, 122, 29 Iowa.

WAIVER.-See EXECUTOR, etc., 5; LIEN, 5; MISTAKE, 2; SALES, 2; SURETYSHIP, 1; VENDOR'S LIEN, 1, 2; BILLS AND NOTES, 10. WARRANTY.-See DISSEISIN; CONTRACTS, 11.

WASTE.-See ACTION, 11.

WIFE.-See EVIDENCE, 11.

WILLS.

1. An oral disposition of property on the day immediately preceding his decease, by one who had been an invalid for fifteen years, and for eight months previous to his death had been confined to his house, gradually yielding to the ravages of consumption, had been admonished by his physician that recovery was hopeless, and who died in the full possession of his faculties, will not be recognized as a nuncupative will: O'Neill vs. Smith, 33 Md., 569.

2. On the trial of an issue devisavit vel non, the evidence of the declaration of a deceased subscribing witness, that the testator was

of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will, is not admissible in evidence: Sellars vs. Sellars, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 430.

3. If a testator has a sound, disposing mind, his will, obtained by the wife, in her own favor, without fraud or misrepresentation, but by fair importunity, and by the influence which she has acquired by affection and kindness, is a valid testament. That is not undue influence in the sense of the law.

4. Mere injustice or inequality in the disposition of an estate by will, affords no ground for impeaching it. It is the legal right of the citizen to give his estate by will to a stranger to his blood; and the disposition of juries to set aside wills because of an inequitable disposition of the testator's property, deserves the severe reprobation of the courts: Smith vs. Harrison, 2 Heiskell, (Tenn.,) 231.

5. The condition and position of the testator when his will is attested, in reference to the act of signing by the witnesses, and their locality when signing, must be such that he has knowledge of what is going forward, and is mentally observant of the specific act in progress and-unless blind-the signing of the witnesses must occur where the testator, as he is then circumstanced, may see them sign, if he chooses to do so: Aiken vs. Weckerly, 482, 19 Mich.

See EXECUTOR, ETC., 1, 2; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 3.

WITNESS. See PARTNERSHIp, 1.