whom it was given? It follows that, by that clause, it goes to some one else; as if it had been written, "and upon my wife's dissenting and taking dower, I give her life estate to Sarah or to my other childrer, or to my heirs." There is no rule of law, or pretended rule, that could insert the words, "to my other children," in the absence of aid from other parts of the will; nor is there any rule to insert the words, "to my heirs." If there were no obstructing rule, it would go to the heir as undevised, not as devised. So that, if the whole estate in the 100 acres be devised, it does not go "to the other children, nor to the heirs." Is there a rule of law that carries the estate for life to Sarah, as against the heirs, and this without the admission that the whole estate is devised? Is any admission necessary? Has she not in her favor a positive rule of law, giving her the estate?

It is admitted, and is doubtless the law, as laid down in the text books and all the decisions, that where an estate is given in land to one for life, and to another in remainder, that if the gift of the life estate is void for any cause, as to a monk or to superstitious uses, or if it is given to one who refuses to take, as to an infant who refuses to take when he becomes of age; or if it is surrendered without consideration, or forfeited; in all these cases the estate of the remainderman is accelerated, and he is entitled to immediate possession. It is insisted, however, that where the life estate is declined or surrendered in order to take something else from the estate of the donor in lieu, that the rule does not apply, and that the life estate in such a case goes either to the heir as undevised, or to some person whose right may be discovered from the whole scope of the will, or to indemnify some one whose estate is diminished by the election of the donee. Now in the case before me, it would be perhaps of little avail to the complainants to establish the doctrine that the estate would go as undevised, and it would also be inconsistent with what they contend for and admit. But as it is my opinion that the rule above referred to, applies as well to the one class of cases as the other, I shall look no further to the admissions of complainants, or to the effect that these admissions would have on his interests.

I believe the rule of law, then, as established in Tennessee, to be this: that wherever the life estate fails from any cause, to take effect, that the remainder-man is entitled to immediate enjoyment and possession of the estate. This general proposition embraces the case of a widow who dissents from a will giving her a life estate and takes

dower. She has nothing to do with the will but to dissent from it. When she has done this, the estate is open to her. Every will is made in view of this right. No one is wronged or injured by the assertion of it. The husband can provide, if he will, to equalize the rights of his devisees for any damage done by an eccentric assertion of her right. He can provide, that, if any specific devise is materially affected by the assignment of dower, the devisee shall be indemnified by contribution. If he fails to do this, it is because he does not choose to make provision for the case. A will which fails to allude to such dissent and claim of dower, can not be construed in the light of her subsequent act. Consequences that he might have provided against and that he might well anticipate, are presumed to have been in his mind. Can the husband be then said to have died intestate as to a life estate, which it is so common to have surrendered or refused? Could he not much more readily anticipate a refusal to accept by a widow who has her indemnity in dower, than by one who would surrender or refuse and take nothing from his estate? Could he anticipate a forfeiture? Would he probably know that a gift to a monk or to a superstitious use, was void? And yet it is agreed that in these latter cases the estate falls in and does not go as undevised.

Now, if it were a question whether the widow herself should derive any benefit under the will, there might be some reason for inaking an exception in her case to the general rule; but here the estate goes to her child; she has no pecuniary interest; her maternal feelings may indeed be gratified in such a case, and she may even rejoice to defeat what she deems the unjust will of her husband.

The rule I have stated above as a general rule, is so stated by Jarman in his Treatise on Wills: See 1st Jarman, p. 513. The cases cited by him do not embrace that of dissent by a widow and claim of dower, nor could they, as no such case could occur in England. There is a case, however, in our own books, that of Armstrong's Adm'r vs. Parkes' Devisees, 9th Humph., 195, where this principle is carried out in the case of a widow's dissent. And in a late case in 4 Cold., page 51, Waddle vs. Terry, the general principle is laid down and many authorities cited to sustain it. As to the reason or policy of the rule in its inception, I have nothing to say. I find it well established, and I do not find any exception to it. Many other authorities are cited in the Briefs in the case, some of which are also referred to in the decision above of our own Courts. I do not find in them,

however, any thing to impugn my decision, and much to sustain it. The cases referred to upon Rent charges, if they stood alone, and if there were no cases directly upon the point, and we were left to puzzle our way out by analogies, might present considerable difficulty. These cases are, however, treated apart from the direct question here presented; the decisions upon them are conflicting and unsatisfactory, and do not, I think, demand examination at my hands. Upon the whole matter referred to me, I am of opinion that Sarah H. Ezell, upon her mother's dissent from the will, was entitled to the immedi ate possession and enjoyment of the 100 acres not covered by her mother's dower. The case has been argued with exceeding ingenuity, and I believe that I have got all the light that can be thrown upon it. EDWIN H. EWING, Referee.

ADDENDUM.

Though in deciding the Ezell case I did not think it either necessary or proper to go into the discussion of what might be done with a rent charge as between the heir and devisee, in case the donee refused it or the cbject for which it was created was void, yet I might perhaps well make this remark by way of addendum to my opinion, viz.: that a Reut charge is not an estate in the land; that it neither limits nor diminishes the estate, nor takes out of it anything but its profits or a portion of them; there is but one taker of the estate, and the whole estate is subject to the Rent charge. Although a Rent charge may be for a specific term of years, or indefinite that is until some definite object is accomplished, or for the life of a person, yet it is at last but a mode of raising money out of the estate. Whether this should go to the heir or the devisce, (in the absence of controlling words in the will,) would depend, perhaps, originally upon no principle, and might be determined either way according to the spccial hardship of the case. This probably has bred the conflict of opinion upon this subject.

E. H. E.

NOTE. This case was by request, twice argued before the Chancellor, who was of opinion that the testator died intestate as to the 100 acres of the home tract not included in the dower. It was afterwards argued in the Supreme Court, but no opinion was had. It was then, in vacation, by agreement, left to the determination of Mr. Ewing. The older children were represented by Mr. Thompson, and the infant Sarah, by Mr. Cooper. Although often decided in England, it is believed that the same question has never been before so fairly presented in the United States.

BOOK NOTICES.

Fisher's Digest of Criminal Law. By R. A. FISHER, Esq., of the Middle Temple Barrister at Law, in 1 Vol., from the Excelsior press Bacon & Co., printers, 536 Clay street, San Francisco; and for sale by Paul & Tavel, 48 Union Street, Nashville, Tenn.

The ratio of crime in a country is, strange to say, in proportion to its advancement in the scale of civilization.

The refinements of modern art and ingenuity and the existence of a high state of commercial and material prosperity, while exerting an inestimable influence in developing the power and wealth of a nation, tend likewise, toward the increase of vice and criminal practices.

In the complicated transactions of large and flourishing communities, new artifices are constantly employed to evade the force of criminal laws already existing, while the increasing density of our population foment pernicious desires and appetites, which, in the earlier days of the country, were unheard of, and to remedy which requires either the enlargement of the criminal code, or the expansion of common law principles, to meet exigencies as they arise.

"Dolus crescit in orbe mundi," and the means by which it may be circumvented, must likewise be increased.

On account of the diversified pursuits and interests of our people, growing out of the wonderful progress we have made in material wealth and consequence, the American Bar are beginning to appreciate what the English Bar have long since done-the necessity of dividing the practice of the law into specialties; and the time can not be very far distant when the duties of our practitioners will be of such a nature as to render it both necessary and convenient to define the different kinds of lawyers, with as much distinctness as we now do the difference between a lawyer and a member of any other profession.

To the lawyers, therefore, who make a specialty of the criminal law, and to prosecuting officers of the State and Federal Governments, the volume here briefly noticed, recommends itself, because of its cheapness, the reputation of its compilers, Messrs. Harrison & Fisher, and the clear and methodical manner in which it is arranged. It is a digest of the reported criminal cases, relating to criminal law, criminal information and extradition from 1756 to 1870 inclusive, and is founded upon Harrison's Analytical Digest. It is a full reprint of Fisher's Common Law Digest of the Titles, Criminal Law and Information, and is a complete compendium of English law of crimes and punishments, upon which our American criminal law is founded. Some of the cases being based upon statutory provisions, it was deemed wise to include the digests of statutory enactments, which precedes the notes of cases in Mr. Fisher's work, and in this volume. The later decisions from the tenth and eleventh volumes. of Cox's Criminal Cases, have been added under their appropriate heads. Each note has been compared with the original volume of Reports, and the citations have been corrected and verified. We cordially commend it to the profession.

American Trade Mark Cases. A compilation of all the reported cases decided in the American courts, prior to the year 1872, with an Appendix containing the leading English cases, and the United States' acts in relation to the Registration of Trade Marks, with the constructions of the Commissioners of Patents affecting the Edited by RoWLAND COX, Counsellor at Law, and Editor of the American Law Times. Price, $8.00. Robert Clarke & Co., publishers, Cincinnati, Ohio.

This work of Mr. Cox, containing nearly eight hundred pages, is printed and bound in a style very creditable to the printers, and is, doubtless, what it purports to be-a compilation of all the American Trade Mark cases decided prior to 1872.

Though we have hurriedly examined this compilation of Mr. Cox's, we are satisfied that it is a valuable acquisition to a general law library, and may be of great benefit to the profession in those States of the Union where the manufacturing interests are extensive. Although the general law upon the subject may be found in ten or twelve leading cases, sufficiently defined and construed for all ordi