strument, the adding of immaterial memoranda, and the like. (Smith v. Smith, 1 R. I. 398; Bachellor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 399.) So the correcting of a mistake to conform to the intention of the parties is an immaterial alteration. (Bank v. Bank, 13 N. Y. 309.).

The holder of a bill altered materially cannot recover on the original consideration, unless the alteration was made before he received it and he had no notice of the fact; or unless he was innocent of fraud in making the alteration, and the party sued would not have had any remedy over or recourse to others, if it had not been altered. (Benj.'s Chalmers, B. N. & C., Art. 249.)

Bona fide holders are only protected against forgery or material alterations discharging the party liable, when some carelessness or negligence on the part of the person whose liability has been changed by the alteration, has contributed to the negotiation of the paper without suspicion of the fraud, as where blank spaces have been left, or written partly in pencil so as to be easily erased. (Zimmerman v. Rote, 75 Pa. St. 188; Harvey v. Smith, 55 Ill. 224.) So a memorandum which can be detached without affecting the paper will, when detached in fraud, not be allowed to avoid the paper in the hands of a bona fide holder. (Noll v. Smith, 64 Ind. 511.)

It must not be forgotten in this connection, that the drawee, by accepting a bill, warrants the genuineness of the drawer's signature, and the indorsers likewise guarantee the genuineness of all parties to the bill at the time of the indorsement. As against such parties the alteration or forgery of a signature prior to their

signature will not avoid the instrument. (See ante, Secs. 834-837.)

Sec. 844. TIME WITHIN WHICH SUIT MAY BE BROUGHT ON A BILL.-At the common law the limitation within which an action may be brought on a bill or note is six years, and after the expiration of this time the holder who has had a right of action for this period against any party cannot sue such party. (Woodruff v. Moore, 8 Barb. 171.) The period or limitation varies in the different States, and in some the common law term has been lengthened, in Ohio it is fifteen years. (Rev. Stat. Ohio, Sec. 4980.)

The time begins to run as regards the acceptor from the maturity of the bill, except where presentment for payment is necessary, in which case time runs from the date of such presentment, and where the acceptance is made after maturity the time probably runs from date of acceptance. (Benj.'s Chalmers, B. N. & C., Art. 252.) Notice of dishonor fixes the date when the time begins to run as regards the drawer and indorsers. (Wood v. McMeans, 23 Tex. 481.)

Any circumstance which delays or defeats the operation of the statute of limitations in the case of an ordinary contract will delay or defeat it in the case of a bill. Thus if the holder is a minor, married woman, a lunatic, or otherwise protected from the running of time, the statute will not begin to operate until the disability is removed. So the bill when barred from the operation of the statute of limitation may be subsequently rendered valid by an acknowledgment in writing by the party sought to be charged.

CHAPTER VIII.

PROMISSORY NOTES AND CHECKS SPECIALLY CONSIDERED.

Sec. 845. FORM AND INTERPRETATION OF A PROMISSORY NOTE.-In a previous section (ante, Sec. 752) a promissory note has been defined and somewhat explained, and we only need to state here some special provision applicable to promissory notes. The person making the promise is called the maker of the note, and the person in whose favor it is made is called the payee. These two parties are essential to every note, and a note payable to maker's order would not be a note until a payee had been designated by indorsement. (Miller v. Weeks, 22 Pa. St. 89.) The note is incomplete until delivery has been made to the payee.

As regards the form of a promissory note, any writing which has all the essentials laid down for a promissory note will be a valid note if the intention of the maker, as gleaned from the writing, was to make a note. (Sibree v. Trip, 15 M. & W. 29.) The following have been held not to be notes but mere evidences of indebtedness: "Due C $100, value received;" "I. O. U. $100;"

*The preceding chapters have discussed principles applicable alike to bills of exchange, promissory notes and checks, and when not otherwise limited the expression "bill" heretofore used referred to all of these negotiable instruments.

"I acknowledge the within note to be just and due," written on the back of a note. (Daggett v. Daggett, 124 Mass. 149; Currier v. Lockwood, 40 Conn. 349.) While the following are held to be notes since importing a promise to pay: "I owe you $100, to be paid May 5th;" "Due C or order $100 on demand." (Waithman v. Elsee, 1 C. & K. 35; Carver v. Hayes, 47 Me. 257.)

There may be two or more makers to a promissory note, and in case it is written "I promise," it will be considered joint and several if they are not partners. (Maiden v. Webster, 30 Ind. 317.) If written "We promise," and signed by several it is considered a joint note only. (Barnett v. Juday, 38 Ind. 86.) But these holdings are subject to statutory modifications.

The note may contain a pledge of collateral security, and give the payee the right to dispose of such security, and the right to the security passes with a transfer of the note, and free from equities if the note was free. (Knipper v. Chase, 7 Ia. 145; Duncan v. Louisville, 13 Bush 378; Kelley v. Whitney, 45 Wis. 110.)

So an instrument is still a note which gives the holder an option of taking a cash sum, or the performance of another act from the maker. Thus where the note promised to pay a sum certain in money or in goods on demand, it was held a valid note in the hands of the payee, as he could demand money, and the promise to pay money was absolute notwithstanding the option. (Hosstatter v. Wilson, 36 Barb. 307.) But as to the maker, it is held not to be a note. (Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y. 573.)

Sec. 846. THE TRANSFER OF PROMISSORY NOTES.-Promissory notes have been made negotiable the same as bills of exchange by statute, though many decisions hold that they are negotiable independent of statute.

Like bills of exchange, a promissory note, payable on demand and not known to be dishonored, will be deemed overdue after the lapse of a reasonable time from the date of its issue. Reasonable time is a question of law, but governed in the absence of statute, by the circumstances of the case and the intention of the parties. (Herrick v. Wolverton, 41 N. Y. 581; Poorman v. Mills, 39 Cal. 345.) And such a note must be presented for payment within a reasonable time in order to charge indorsers. (Crim v. Starkweather, 88 N. Y. 339.)

Sec. 847. LIABILITY OF MAKER OF A NOTE.-The maker of a promissory note, in general corresponds to the acceptor of a bill of exchange, each being the principal debtor on the bill, and each engages that he will pay at maturity according to the tenor of the bill. And the maker of a note payable to order, warrants and admits to a bona fide holder the existence of the payee, and his then capacity to indorse. (Esley v. People, 23 Kan. 510; Benj.'s Chalmers, B. N. & C., Art. 287.)

CHECKS.

Sec. 848. A CHECK DEFINED AND DISCUSSED.-Professor Tiedeman defines a check "to be a draft or order, having essentially the character