out passing upon the question whether the guaranty was negotiable and available to the plaintiff, as a remote holder, WHEELER, J., among other questions that arose in the case, decided that the indorsement was a contract of indorsement running to the bearer, and that demand, notice and protest fixed the liability of the indorser to pay the coupons, and gave judgment for plaintiff for the amount of the coupons. The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that the statute of limitations begins to run upon interest coupons payable annually or semi-annually, from the time they respectively mature, although they remain attached to the bonds which represent the principal debt. (Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S., 470.) Where the indorser is the payee of the note there would seem to be no difference in his liability in respect to interest whether the maker's promise to pay it is contained in the body of the note or in interest coupons not indorsed, the notes to which they are attached being indorsed, and the coupons being mentioned in the notes; but it is unnecessary to decide that question here. Upon the facts found by the county court this action cannot be maintained for the reason that the plaintiff never fixed the defendant's liability to pay the three years' accrued interest. It does not even appear that the makers refused payment of it or that they were requested to pay it before this suit was brought; therefore nothing is due from the defendant to the plaintiff. Ross, Ch. J., dissents. Judgment affirmed. HARRIS v. BRADLEY. 7 Yerg. 310. 1835. This was an action brought by Bradley against Harris upon a note for $200, upon which he was the last indorser. The note was executed by Peter R. Rison and payable to William C. Anderson, and the names of Anderson and C. M. Ratcliffe were upon it as indorsers, but their names were forgeries. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. GREEN, J. It is insisted by the counsel for the plaintiff in error that he is not bound by his indorsement, because he was imposed on and induced to indorse the note on account of the supposed genuineness of the other indorsements. This proposition is altogether fallacious. The holder of a bill or note has nothing to do with the preceding indorsements, and whether genuine or not his immediate indorser is liable to him. The last indorsement is, in fact, a guaranty of the preceding indorsements, and admits the handwriting of the drawer and prior indorser, although the bill be forged: Chitty on Bills, 197-8; 3 Kent Com. 60; 2 Salk. 127. The Judge, therefore, properly admitted the note, with its indorsements, to be read to the jury, upon proof having been made of the indorsement by the defendant. Judgment affirmed. ERWIN v. DOWNS. 15 N. Y. 575. 1857. Action against defendant as indorsee of two promissory notes, signed in the firm name by two married women doing business as a mercantile firm under the name of Waller & Burr. Before the notes matured defendant indorsed them to plaintiff, who paid full consideration, but had notice of the fact that the makers were under legal disability to contract. The notes were duly presented for payment, which was refused, and defendant was duly notified. There was judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed. SHANKLAND, J. The note was void, as against the makers, because they were married women, and incapable of contracting obligations in that form. But when the defendant indorsed the note, he impliedly contracted that the makers were competent to contract, and had legally contracted, the obligation of joint makers of the note. He also assumed the legal obligation, in most respects, of the drawers of the bill. The fact, known to the plaintiff at the time he took the note, that the makers were married women did not deprive him of the character of a bona fide purchaser. Nor does the payee's knowledge that the drawee is a married woman discharge the drawer in case of non-payment of the bill by the drawee. Nor is the indorser discharged, though the name of the maker is forged: 1 Comst. 113. The fact is not found that the plaintiff was aware the note was accommodation paper. The plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser within the law merchant. Neither the complaint nor the finding of the referce tell us who transferred the notes to the plaintiff. The legal presumption is that he received them from some legal holder in due course of business. The judgment should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. FISH v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DETROIT. MARSTON, J. This action was brought by the bank to recover upon certain promissory notes made payable to the order of I. N. Jenness & Co. and Francis S. Fish, and indorsed by them. The indorsement of Mrs. Fish was under and made after that I. N. Jenness & Co. The defense set up is that at the time these notes were given and indorsed, the firm of I. N. Jenness & Co. was not in existence, because of the death of Henry Fish, one of the members thereof; that if Mrs. Fish is liable upon these notes, she is jointly liable with Isaac N. Jenness, and that if he is released because there was no such firm, then she is released also. These notes were given to the bank to take up other notes upon which the firm name of I. N. Jenness & Co. appeared, that firm having done business with the bank previous to the date of the paper in question. An indorsement admits all prior indorsements to have been duly made. It is said the indorser warrants the title and genuineness of the paper he transfers, and that when sued he cannot deny the existence, legality, or validity of the contract which his indorsement put in circulation, for the purpose of defeating his own liability: Edwards on Bills and Notes, 289, 291. This is strictly right. Parties dealing in such paper are not expected to be familiar with the signatures of the several indorsers. If satisfied that the last indorsement is genuine, they are not required to look beyond in the absence of a knowledge of such facts as would impute to them bad faith in case they did not. A person has no right to indorse paper, thereby making it negotiable, and offer it or permit it to be offered in the usual course of business, unless satisfied that the signatures previously appearing thereon are genuine. Mrs. Fish is not in a position in this case to escape liability upon the ground that the prior indorsement was invalid. Mrs. Fish in her evidence denied having received notice of the non-payment of some of these notes. She did not annex to her plea an affidavit denying the fact of having received such notice, as required by the statute: 1 Comp. Laws, § 603. There was direct and positive evidence given on the trial by the notary of demand made, protest and notice thereof regularly mailed to the defendant, and the usual notarial certificate was attached to each of the notes. The facts are undisputed, and we discover no error. The judgment must be affirmed with costs. Qualified, Conditional and Restrictive Indorsements.-Indorsement Without Recourse.* WATSON v. CHESIRE. 18 Ia. 202. 1865. This is a joint action, against John and Wesley Chesire and John M. Griffith. The facts, necessary to an understanding of the case, are as follows: John and Wesley Chesire sold, May 15, 1858, certain land in Mills County to one Moore, receiving, * See Sec. 808, Vol. 6, Cyclopedia of Law. for part of the purchase-money, his note, secured by a mortgage on a portion of the land sold. Afterward, January 20, 1860, the Chesires traded or sold the note and mortgage of Moore (which note was dated May 15, 1858, was for the sum of $743, payable one year after date, with ten per cent. interest) to the defendant Griffith, receiving in payment or exchange ninety acres of land, a mare and a heifer, variously estimated by the witnesses as being worth from $250 to $400, and upwards. The Chesires indorsed to Griffith the note and mortgage, without recourse to them. Afterward, about April, 1860, Griffith traded or exchanged the Moore note and mortgage to the plaintiff, Watson, for certain land, also indorsing the same, without recourse. Watson sues the Chesires and Griffith on the indorsement. The nature of the pleadings and questions raised will appear in the opinion. Verdict and judgment for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals. DILLON, J. The first error assigned by the plaintiff is, that "the Court erred in sustaining the defendants' demurrer to the first count of the petition." This makes it essential to set out the substance of this count with accuracy. It commences by alleging that John and Wesley Chesire held and owned the Moore note and mortgage, describing them; that, January 20, 1860, the said Chesires, for a good and valuable consideration (but not alleging what), sold and assigned said note to their co-defendant, Griffith, whereby they falsely warranted the said note to be genuine, unpaid and unsatisfied in any way; that afterward Griffith, assignee as aforesaid, sold and assigned said note to the plaintiff for a good and valuable consideration, whereby he, Griffith, falsely warranted, etc., as above; that plaintiff relied upon said warranties and paid Griffith for said note; that the said note, at the time the same was assigned by Chesires to Griffith, and by Griffith to the plaintiff "had been fully paid, extinguished, and nothing was due thereon from the said Moore to the defendants or either of them;" whereby "the defendants fraudulently deceived the plaintiff, to his damage" in the amount of said note. Copies of these assignments are set forth, showing that they were made "without recourse." The first was an assignment in full by |