There this case the only condition of Coster's undertaking was that the bank should purchase the drafts to be issued by Kohn, Daron & Co., and upon complying with that condition the rights of the parties became fixed, and the contract binding. There is nothing in the contract from which we can infer that it was the intention of the parties that notice should be given in order to fix the guarantor. No more is required to make the guarantor liable than to make Heckscher & Coster, and the only notice to them necessary was the presentment of the drafts for their acceptance within a reasonable time. Allen v. Rightmere, 20 John. 365; Clark v. Burdett, 2 Hall, 197; Cro. Jac. 287, 685; 2 Salk. 457; Vin. Ab. Notice, A. 3; Com. Dig. Plead. C. 75; 2 Chitty, 403. As to notice of non-acceptance and non-payment of the bills by the drawees, that can only involve the subject of laches on the part of the holders of the drafts, and all the cases, both in England and in this country, concur in holding that this defense can only be set up to an action against the surety in cases where he has suffered damage thereby, and then only to the extent of such damage. 7 Peters, 117; 12 id. 497; 1 Mason, 323, 368; 1 Story, 22; 13 Conn. 28; 5 Man. & Gran. 559; 13 Mees. & Wels. 452; 3 Kent's Com. 122. If, therefore, it were necessary in this case to give any notice, no evidence has been given showing that the defendants, or the guarantor, suffered any loss in consequence of the want of such notice. The only remaining question, therefore, worthy of consideration in this case, arises out of the fact that another bank had previously purchased drafts drawn in pursuance of the letter of credit and guaranty. It is claimed that by such purchase the contract became a fixed and binding contract between such bank and the promisor, and thereby lost its negotiable character, and became located so that no other person or bank could purchase drafts upon the credit of it. The guaranty, in this case, was manifestly intended to accompany the letter of credit, and is subject, in this respect, to the same construction If, therefore, it was competent for Kohn, Daron & Co. to draw several drafts not exceeding the limit in the bill of credit specified, and to negotiate them at different banks, and Heckscher & Coster would be bound by their letter of credit to accept and pay them, the guarantor would also be liable to the same extent. As a general rule the surety is liable to the same extent as the principal, unless he expressly limits his liability. (Theobold on Prin. and Surety, 46.) It therefore only becomes necessary to examine the letter of credit, and ascertain whether it was intended to be limited to one particular bank, or is a general letter of credit to any and all persons who may advance money upon it. It is somewhat singular that we find so few adjudications in our courts upon a class of commercial instruments which enter so largely into the commerce and business of this country, and of the world. In England it seems to be at this time questionable whether a party who advances money upon a general letter of credit can sustain an action upon it. Russell et al. v. Wiggins, 2 Story, 214; Bank of Ireland v. Archer, 2 Mees. & Welsby, 383. The reason assigned is that there is no privity of contract between them. It is there assumed that it is only a contract between the drawer of the letter and the person for whose benefit it is drawn. But in this country the contrary doctrine is well settled. Letters of credit are of two kinds, general and special. A special letter of credit is addressed to a particular individual by name, and is confined to him, and gives no other person a right to act upon it. A general letter, on the contrary, is addressed to any and every person, and therefore gives any person to whom it may be shown authority to advance upon its credit. A privity of contract springs up between him and the drawer of the letter, and it becomes in legal effect the same as if addressed to him by name. Russell v. Wiggins, 2 Story's Rep. 214; 12 Mass. 154; 2 Metcalf, 381; 12 Wend. 393; 12 Peters, 207; Burkhead v. Brown, 5 Hill, 641; Story on Bills; See Beames' Lex. Mer. 444. But these general letters of credit may be subdivided into two kinds, those that contemplate a single transaction, and those that contemplate an open and continued credit, embracing several transactions. In the latter case they are not generally confined to transactions with a single individual, but if the nature of the business which the letter of credit was intended to facilitate, requires it, different individuals are authorized to make advances upon it, and it then becomes a several contract with each individual to the amount advanced by him. Thus a general letter of credit may be issued to a person to enable him to purchase goods in the city of New York, for a country store. The very nature of the business requires him to deal with different individuals and houses in order to obtain the necessary assortment. It has never, as I am aware, been questioned that the guarantor might be bound to several persons who should furnish goods upon the credit of the letter. So letters are issued by commission houses in the city, to enable persons to purchase produce in the western states. The money as obtained from the local banks in those states by drafts drawn upon those houses, and upon the faith of the letters of credit. It may often happen that a single bank can not furnish the requisite amount, or it may be necessary to use money in different and distant localities. I am not aware of any question ever having been raised as to the authority of different banks to act upon the same letter of credit. It is absolutely necessary that such should be the effect of them in order to facilitate the commerce of the country, and to carry out the object of the parties in issuing the letters of credit. Burkhead v. Brown, 5 Hill, 641; 2 Story's Rep. 214. The letter of credit in this case was evidently intended to be general; it did not contemplate a single transaction, or draft for the whole amount, but several drafts limited in the aggregate to twenty-five thousand dollars. Although the address "sir," and "your bank," is in the singular number, yet I think it was intended to be used in a distributive sense, and apply to any bank or banks who should purchase the drafts. I can see no object which the drawers should have for limiting the party for whose benefit the letter was issued to a single bank. It is said that it would enable them more readily to revoke the authority. But these letters are not issued without either undoubted confidence in the persons for whose benefit they are drawn, or upon ample security. The idea of giving notice of revocation to any party but that for whose benefit they are drawn, is never entertained by the guarantors in cases of general letters. When they wish to provide for any such contingency the letters are framed accordingly. Again, in this case the parties themselves have treated this letter as not limited to a single bank, for they accepted bills which had been discounted by the plaintiffs. I am, therefore, satisfied that the plaintiffs were authorized to purchase bills upon the faith of the letter and accompanying guaranty, and that the previous purchase of bills by another bank is no defense. Whether the letters had been revoked with the knowledge of the plaintiffs before the draft was discounted by them, was a question of fact for the jury. It would clearly constitute no defense unless the plaintiffs had notice of it. The judgment of the superior court must therefore be affirmed with costs. Judgment affirmed. Effect of the Statute of Frauds upon the Contract of Surety or Guarantor.* HOOKER ET AL., RESPONDENTS, v. RUSSELL, 67 Wis. 257; 30 N. W. 358. 1886. Appeal from the County Court of Fond du Lac County. ORTON, J. In 1883 the village board of the village of Brandon, in Fond du Lac county, determined that no license for the sale of intoxicating liquors in said village should be granted during the ensuing year, and passed an ordinance prohibiting such sale and providing for the punishment of those who should violate the same. Certain persons continued to sell intoxicating liquors in said village notwithstanding, and in violation of said ordinance, and in July, 1883, said village board, by resolution, employed the said plaintiffs and respondents to act as the attorneys of the village in the prosecution of such offenders. The respondents, as such attorneys of the village, commenced several prosecutions under such employment, and rendered therein legal services, amounting in value to $173.66 up to and including September 7, 1883, when on that day an injunction was served upon said village, at the suit of one David Whitton, a taxpayer of said village, restraining the village board from appropriating * See Sec. 880, Vol. 6, Cyclopedia of Law. or paying out of the treasury any money for the payment of attorneys' fees in the prosecution of criminal actions theretofore or thereafter had for the violation of the excise laws of the state, and from appropriating or paying any money for expenses incurred in such prosecutions. Notwithstanding said injunction, the respondents continued to render legal services for said village in such prosecutions up to and including the 26th day of January, 1884, the value of which then was the sum of $657.34, including the above amount of $173.66. The bill for these services was presented to and filed with the village board as a claim against the village, and the respondents brought suit against the village therefor, which suit is still pending. The seventh finding of fact, which must be received as a verity in the case as neither party has accepted thereto, is as follows: "That on or about the 8th day of September, 1883, and subsequent to the service of such injunctional order upon said village, the defendant, George A. Russell, requested the plaintiff to continue said prosecutions notwithstanding said injunction, and promised and agreed to pay them for their past and future services therein in case of their inability to collect their claim therefor from said village." It was on this promise that this suit was brought against the appellant, and on which the respondents recovered in the county court. There can be no question but that this special promise of the appellant, not in writing, to answer for the debt of the village of Brandon, is void by the statute of frauds (R. S. sec. 2307, subd. 2). The services of the respondents were rendered for the village, and under a contract with the village. They have presented their claim to, as being against, the village, and have sued the village as being liable therefor. "So long as the original debt remains payable by the debtor to his creditor, any arrangement whatever by which another party promises to pay that debt is within the very letter of the statute, no matter from what source the consideration of the latter promise is derived." Emerick v. Sanders, 1 Wis. 77; Cotterill v. Stevens, 10 Wis. 422; Cook v. Barrett, 15 Wis. 596. Against the operation of the statute upon this promise it is claimed (1) that it has been judicially determined, in the in |