in such words as to put a third person in a better condition than the drawee. If one man, to give credit to another, makes an absolute promise to accept his bill, the drawer, or any other person, may show such promise upon the exchange to get credit; and a third person, who should advance his money upon it, would have nothing to do with the equitable circumstances which might subsist between the drawer and acceptor."

What is it that "the drawer, or any other person, may show upon the exchange?" It is the promise to accept the naked promise. The motive to this promise need not, and cannot be examined. The promise itself, when shown, gives the credit; and the merchant who makes it is bound by it.

The cases cited from Cowper (Cowper, 571), and Douglass are, it is admitted, cases in which the bill is not taken for a pre-existing debt, but is purchased on the credit of the promise to accept. But in the case of Pillans v. Van Mierop, the credit was given before the promise was received or the bill drawn ; and in all cases the person who receives such a bill in payment of a debt, will be prevented thereby from taking other means to obtain the money due to him. Any ingredient of fraud would, unquestionably, affect the whole transaction; but the mere circumstance, that the bill was taken for a pre-existing debt had not been thought sufficient to do away with the effect of a promise to accept.

In the case of Johnson and another v. Collings (1800) (1 East, 98 (1800)), Ld. Kenyon shows much dissatisfaction with the previous decisions on this subject; but it is not believed, that the judgment given in that case would, even in England, change the law as previously established.

In the case of Johnson v. Collings, the promise to accept was in a letter to the drawer, and is not stated to have been shown to the indorser. Consequently, the bill does not appear to have been taken on the credit of that promise. It was a mere naked promise, unaccompanied with circumstances which might give credit to the bill. The counsel contended, that this naked promise amounted to an acceptance; but the court determined otherwise. In giving his opinion, Le Blanc, J., lays down the rule in the words used by Ld. Mansfield, in the case of Pierson v. Dunlop.

Ld. Kenyon said, in that case, that "this was carrying the doctrine of implied acceptances to the utmost verge of the law; and he doubted whether it did not even go beyond it. In Clarke and others v. Cock (4 East, 57), the judges again express their dissatisfaction with the law as established, and their regret that any other act than a written acceptance on the bill had ever been deemed an acceptance. Yet they do not undertake to overrule the decisions which they disapprove. On the contrary, in that case (Clarke v. Cock), they unanimously declared a letter to the drawer promising to accept the bill, which was shown to the person who held it, and took it on the credit of that letter, to be a virtual acceptance. It is true, in the case of Clarke v. Cock, the bill was made before the promise was given, and the judges, in their opinions, use some expressions which indicate a distinction between bills drawn before and after the date of the promse; but no case has been decided on this distinction; and in Pillans & Rose v. Van Mierop & Hopkins, the letter was written before the bill was drawn.

The court can perceive no substantial reason for this distinction. The prevailing inducement for considering a promise to accept, as an acceptance, is that credit is thereby given to the bill. Now, this credit is given as entirely by a letter written before the date of the bill as by one written afterwards.

It is of much importance to merchants that this question should be at rest. Upon a review of the cases which are reported, this court is of opinion, that a letter written within a reasonable time before or after the date of a bill of exchange, describing it in terms not to be mistaken, and promising to accept it, is, if shown to the person who afterwards takes the bill on the credit of the letter, a verbal acceptance binding the person who makes the promise. This is such a case. There is, therefore, no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court, and it is affirmed with costs.

Judgment affirmed.

SPAULDING v. ANDREWS.

48 Pa. St. 411. 1864.

STRONG, J. The plaintiff in error was sued by an indorsee, upon an alleged parol acceptance of an inland bill. The evidence of acceptance was, that soon after the bill was drawn the payee, who was then the holder, presented it for acceptance, and received for answer from Spaulding, the drawee, that it was contrary to his mode of business to accept a draft. When told what the payee wished to do with the bill, and urged to accept in writing, Spaulding replied that it was not his custom to accept in writing, his word was as good as writing, and that the draft would undoubtedly be paid at its maturity. Soon after, when again applied to for an acceptance in writing, he replied: "The draft would be paid at maturity. You know me, and you may rely upon it, the draft will be paid; it will certainly be paid at maturity," adding, "he had a running account with the drawer, and there would be funds in his hands before the draft matured." When first applied to he also said "he would take a memorandum of the draft and place it to the account of Lambert" (the drawer). After this evidence had been given the Court permitted the draft to be laid before the jury, and instructed them, that if they believed Spaulding promised to pay the draft at maturity the plaintiff (who became an indorsee after this alleged parol acceptance) was entitled to recover. In all this there is no error of which the plaintiff in error can complain. That a parol acceptance of a bill is binding upon the acceptor, in all cases not regulated by statute, is beyond doubt, and that a promise to pay a draft when it shall mature is an acceptance is equally certain. Nor can it be doubted that the evidence of acceptance in this case was exceedingly strong and unimpeached.

It is said that even if there was a promise to pay the draft there was no promise to Andrews, who obtained it after the acceptance. But an acceptance is a promise to pay any one who may thereafter become the holder. And the legal effect is the same, whether it be in parol or in writing. Nor does it make any difference when a parol acceptance is given, if it be

after the bill is drawn. It inures to the benefit of all parties to the bill. It may be given to the drawer or any other party to the bill, after it has been indorsed away, and even after it has become due. It may even be given to a person by whose direction and on whose account the bill was drawn, though he be no party to the bill and although the bill had been previously indorsed. See Byles on Bills, 147, 148, and cases cited, especially Fairlee v. Herring. 3 Bink. 625. If a bill comes into a man's hands with a parol acceptance, though he does not know of that acceptance, he may avail himself of it afterward when it comes to his knowledge. If not, then he has not all the advantages previous holders had.

Of course, if there was an acceptance of the bill, it was not a promise to pay the debt of another. The acceptor is the primary debtor, and the Statute of Frauds does not require his engagement to be in writing.

Judgment affirmed.

SPEAR v. PRATT.

2 Hill, 582. 1842.

Assumpsit, tried at the Onondaga Circuit, in September, 1841, before MOSELEY, C. J. The action was against the defendant, Frederick Pratt, as acceptor of a bill of exchange, payable to the order of the plaintiffs. The defendant's name was written across the face of the bill; and the question was, whether this was such an acceptance as is required by the statute. It was admitted that the defendant, at the time of the acceptance, was a resident of this State. His counsel insisted at the trial that the acceptance was insufficient to charge him, but the Circuit Judge, being of a different opinion, directed the jury to find for the plaintiffs, which they accordingly did; and the defendant's counsel, having excepted, now moved for a new trial upon a bill of exceptions.

COWEN, J. Any words written by the drawee on a bill, not putting a direct negative upon its request, as "accepted," "presented," "seen," the day of the month, or a direction to a

third person to pay it, is prima facie a complete acceptance, by the law merchant: Bayley on Bills, 163, Am. ed. of 1836, and the cases there cited. Writing his name across the bill, as in this case, is a still clearer indication of intent, and a very common mode of acceptance. This is treated by the law merchant as a written acceptance-a signing by the drawee. "It may be," says Chitty, "merely by writing the name at the bottom or across the bill," and he mentions this as among the more usual modes of acceptance: Chitty on Bills, 320, Am. ed. of 1839.

It is supposed that the rule has been altered by 1 R. S. 757, 2d ed., § 6. This requires the acceptance to be in writing, and signed by the acceptor or his agent. The acceptance in question was, as we have seen, declared by the law merchant to be both a writing and signing. The statute contains no declaration that it should be considered less. An indorsement must be in writing and signed; yet the name alone is constantly holden to satisfy the requisition. No particular form of expression is necessary in any contract. The customary import of a word, by reason of its appearing in a particular place and standing in a certain relation, is considered a written expression of intent quite as full and effectual as if pains had been taken to throw it into the most labored periphrase. It is said the revisers, in their note, refer to the French law as the basis of the legislation which they recommended; and that the French law requires more than the drawee's name-the word accepted at least. That may be so; but it is enough for us to see that both the terms and the spirit of the Act may be satisfied short of that word, and more in accordance with the settled forms of commercial instruments in analogous cases. The whole purpose was probably to obviate the inconveniences of the old law, which gave effect to a parol acceptance.

New trial denied.