144 Opinion of BRENNAN, J. ing $5,000 recoveries from state election officials who merely carried out their official duty to prevent the plaintiffs from voting under discriminatory state statutes which made them ineligible to vote. Of course, there may be cases where it would be proper to give declaratory or injunctive relief without damages. See Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 110 U. S. App. D. C. 358, 370, 293 F. 2d 835, 847 (1961) (Bazelon, J., dissenting). To recover punitive damages, I believe a plaintiff must show more than a bare violation of § 1983. On the other hand, he need not show that the defendant specifically intended to deprive him of a recognized federal right, as is required by the word "willfully" in 18 U. S. C. § 242, see Screws v. United States, supra. Nor need he show actual damages. Basista v. Weir, supra, at 87-88; Tracy v. Robbins, 40 F. R. D. 108, 113 (D. C. S. C. 1966). It is sufficient for the plaintiff to show either that the defendant acted "under color of [a] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory," with actual knowledge that he was violating a right "secured by the Constitution and laws," or that the defendant acted with reckless disregard of whether he was thus violating such a right. Cf. C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 79 (1935). However, in my view, a proprietor of a place of public accommodation who discriminates on the basis of race after our decision in Peterson v. City of Greenville, supra, and the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6, does so with reckless disregard as a matter of law, and therefore may be found liable for punitive damages. Of course, it is proper for the factfinder to consider the degree of recklessness or actual knowledge and other circumstances in assessing the amount of punitive damages to award in a particular case. 34 34 Moreover, there was evidence below that respondent's attention was expressly called to the Civil Rights Act. Opinion of BRENNAN, J. 398 U.S. It may be argued that it is inequitable to impose punitive damages on a defendant, a restaurateur for example, who knowingly or recklessly violates a constitutional right and § 1983 out of fear that he will lose some of his customers if he does not. That argument is plainly unacceptable. The protection of constitutional rights may not be watered down because some members of the public actively oppose the exercise of constitutional rights by others. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). To give any weight at all to that argument would be to encourage popular opposition to compliance with the Constitution. Moreover, the argument is particularly devoid of merit in the context of § 1983, which was enacted by a Congress determined to stamp out widespread violations of constitutional rights at virtually any cost, and which imposed liability even on persons who simply failed to prevent certain violations. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess., 804 (remarks of Rep. Poland). If § 1983 is given an interpretation befitting its purposes, the threat of withdrawal of patronage will be largely empty since no other place of public accommodation in the community will be in a better position to discriminate. The prospect of substantial punitive damages may be the most effective means to persuade all proprietors of places of public accommodation to respect constitutional rights. Syllabus BOYS MARKETS, INC. v. RETAIL CLERKS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 768. Argued April 21-22, 1970-Decided June 1, 1970 Petitioner company and respondent union were parties to a collectivebargaining agreement containing a provision that all controversies concerning its interpretation or application should be resolved by arbitration and that there should be no work stoppage, lockout, picketing, or boycotts during the life of the contract. A dispute arose and, when petitioner did not accede to respondent's demand, a strike was called and the union began to picket petitioner's establishment. Petitioner's effort to invoke the contract's arbitration procedures being unsuccessful, it sought injunctive relief in the state court, which issued a temporary restraining order. The union removed the case to the Federal District Court, which ordered arbitration and enjoined the strike and the picketing. The Court of Appeals reversed, considering itself bound by Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962), which held that § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars a federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike clause in a collective-bargaining agreement, even though that agreement contains binding arbitration provisions enforceable under § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. Held: In the circumstances of this casewhere the grievance was subject to arbitration under the collectivebargaining agreement, petitioner was ready for arbitration when the strike was enjoined, and the District Court concluded that respondent's violations of the no-strike clause were causing petitioner irreparable injury--the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar the granting of injunctive relief. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, supra, overruled. Pp. 240-255. (a) The doctrine of stare decisis, "a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula," does not bar re-examination of Sinclair. Pp. 240-241. (b) The mere silence of Congress after Sinclair was decided does not foreclose reconsideration of that decision. Pp. 241-242. (c) Arbitration is an important instrument of federal policy for resolving labor disputes, and a refusal to arbitrate is not an abuse against which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957). Pp. 242-243. (d) This Court's holding in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U. S. 557 (1968), that § 301 (a) suits initially brought in state courts are removable to federal courts (a decision which in conjunction with Sinclair had the effect of ousting state courts of jurisdiction in such cases where injunctive relief is sought for breach of a no-strike obligation), contravenes the congressional purpose embodied in § 301 (a) to supplement, and not encroach upon, the pre-existing jurisdiction of state courts. Avco has created an anomalous situation urgently necessitating reconsideration of Sinclair. Pp. 244-245. (e) Congress did not intend that the removal procedure be used to foreclose completely injunctive and other remedies otherwise available in the state courts. P. 246. (f) Extending Sinclair to the States would be an unacceptable resolution of the dilemma created by Sinclair and Avco because it would substantially lessen the employers' incentive to agree to submit grievances to arbitration in exchange for the unions' undertakings to refrain from striking and would totally eliminate, contrary to congressional intent, the injunction as the most effective device to enforce no-strike obligations. Pp. 247-249. (g) The literal terms of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommodated to the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act and the purposes of arbitration, equitable remedies to enforce which are essential to further congressional policy for peacefully resolving labor disputes. Pp. 249-253. (h) The narrow holding in this case comports with the principles of the dissent in Sinclair, supra, at 228, which the Court adopts as guidelines for the district courts in determining whether to grant injunctive relief. Pp. 253-254. 416 F. 2d 368, reversed and remanded. Joseph M. McLaughlin argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Kenneth M. Schwartz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Laurence D. Steinsapir and Robert M. Dohrmann. 235 Opinion of the Court Briefs of amici curiae were filed by William H. Willcox and Lawrence M. Cohen for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by George R. Fearon for Associated Industries of New York State, Inc.; by John E. Branch and James Pulm Swann, Jr., for General Electric Co.; by Carl M. Gould and Stanley E. Tobin for the PlumbingHeating & Piping Employers Council of Southern California, Inc.; by Harold I. Elbert for Peabody Coal Co.; and by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we re-examine the holding of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962), that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act1 preclude a federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation under a collective 1 "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: "(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; "(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence; "(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute; "(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified. 70, 29 U. S. C. § 104. § 4, 47 Stat. |