knowingly did, directly and indirectly, ask, demand, solicit and receive for himself illegal gratuities "for and because ..", in violation of 18 " of official acts U.S.C. § 201(g). Under Count 3 of the indictment Muntain was further convicted of having received an illegal contribution to his salary from a source other than the United States Government, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 209. Count 1 charged defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by participating in a conspiracy having two objects: (1) to defraud the United States of the "conscientious, loyal, faithful, disinterested and unbiased services, actions and performances of official acts and duties" by the defendant free from concealed interests; and (2) to violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(g). Finally, defendant was convicted on Counts 4 and 13 of having filed false statements with HUD which concealed his involvement in the automobile insurance venture. Following his conviction by a jury, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. The Court denied both motions and imposed a suspended sentence, placing defendant on five years probation. From that judgment, defendant appeals. For reasons to be discussed, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court below. The Government's case against Muntain was based upon his involvement in a private scheme to sell group automobile insurance to labor unions as a negotiated benefit in union contracts at a time when he was employed as the Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations at HUD. In his capacity at HUD, Muntain functioned as the principal labor relations policy advisor and consultant to the Secretary, the chief liaison between HUD and organized labor and the chief Department spokesman on labor relations matters. His responsibilities at HUD brought Muntain into frequent contact with contractor associations, trade associations and unions regarding labor relations and 1. As part of the terms of his probation, defendant was required by the Court to contribute 100 hours of community service work without com labor relations policies affecting programs and projects within HUD's jurisdiction. The Government did not contend and produced no evidence at trial, however, to suggest that automobile insurance as a benefit for labor unions fell within HUD's jurisdiction. The plan to sell automobile insurance with which Muntain became involved originated with an agreement negotiated by Charles Cordial, an unindicted coconspirator in this case, with a company called Group Marketing Consultants, Inc. (GMCI). Under this agreement, Cordial and Deryl Fleming, another unindicted coconspirator, became consultants to GMCI to assist in the mass marketing of group auto insurance. Within a month after signing the agree ment with GMCI in February 1974, Fleming and Cordial contacted Muntain in Washington to obtain his assistance in marketing group automobile insurance to labor unions. Both Fleming and Cordial testified at trial that they sought Muntain's help because he knew labor people and they hoped that he would open doors for them by introducing them to these people. In exchange for his assistance, Muntain was to be reimbursed for any expenses he incurred. In addition, he was to share equally in any commissions that might be generated from the sale of insurance. Cordial and Fleming both testified that, pursuant to an oral agreement entered into in early 1974 and later reduced to writing, it was understood that Cordial, Fleming and Muntain were to be equal partners in the group automobile insurance venture. In the ensuing months during 1974 and 1975, Muntain arranged and participated in a number of meetings around the country with labor officials at which Fleming and Cordial were introduced and the concept of group automobile insurance discussed. Many of these same labor officials, according to testimony, had dealings with HUD concerning official HUD business. In fact, Muntain would frequently combine the pro pensation as directed by the Probation Officer of the Court. motion of the automobile insurance with trips taken at government expense for the purpose of conferring with labor officials across the United States concerning official business. In connection with at least some of the trips paid for by the Government, evidence was introduced suggesting that Muntain requested and received supplementary "reimbursement" from Cordial and Fleming for expenses he claimed were incurred in arranging and attending meetings to promote the insurance plan. In addition to his domestic travels, Muntain, accompanied by his wife, took a ten day trip to Ireland in May 1974 as part of a charter tour organized by the International Laborers Union. This trip, which formed the basis for Count 3 of the indictment, was taken at the insistence of Fleming and Cordial who testified that they wanted Muntain along to introduce them to the labor officials who would be going on the trip. At the time of the trip, Muntain was on annual leave from his position at HUD. The final evidence relevant to defendant's appeal consists of testimony and documentary evidence that in June of 1974 and again in 1975 defendant caused to be filed with the Office of General Counsel at HUD a Confidential Statement of Employment and Financial Interests which failed to disclose defendant's involvement in the group automobile insurance enterprise. [1] The first of the statutory provisions under which Muntain was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 201(g), proscribes the receipt by a public official of anything of value “for or because of an official act performed or to be performed by him."? "Official act" in turn is defined in § 201(a) as: any public official, in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or profit." At trial the Government contended that Muntain's efforts to promote, or to assist Fleming and Cordial in promoting, the group automobile insurance plan with labor officials, and his encouragement of HUD subordinates to assist in that promotion, fall within the proscription of § 201(g). Muntain argues on appeal, however, that none of his activities undertaken in furtherance of the insurance scheme constitute "official acts" within the meaning of § 201(a) and, therefore, he cannot be held to have violated § 201(g). Specifically, Muntain contends that his meetings with labor officials concerning the insurance scheme were not "official acts" because there is no evidence that these meetings involved any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy which by law might have been brought before Muntain in his official capacity as Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations at HUD. It is undisputed that HUD has no responsibility for the development, administration, evaluation or promotion of group automobile insurance for labor unions. The Government, however, urges this Court to construe the scope of "official acts" to encompass any acts within the range of an official's public duties, broadly defined, including, in the instant case, any meeting between the Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations at HUD and labor union officials to discuss matters of interest to the unions. In essence, the Government would have this Court construe 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) as a statutory prohibition against the misuse of public office and contacts gained through that office to promote private ends. To construe the statute in the manner advocated by the Government is we think, to extend its language beyond permissible bounds. To the extent that defendant of any official act performed or to be per- 3. The Government cites United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223. 34 S.Ct. $12, 58 L.Ed. 930 (1914), in support of its proposed broad reading Muntain's use of his official position to promote a purely private venture created an appearance of impropriety, his conduct is reprehensible, but it is not criminal within the strictures of § 201(g). Section 201 of Title 18 is an anti-bribery statute aimed at preventing public officials from accepting anything of value in exchange for particular decisions or actions taken or to be taken by the public officials in their official capacity. The foundation of the Federal bribery statute has been described in the following terms: "It is a major concern of organized society that the community have the benefit of objective evaluation and unbiased judgment on the part of those who participate in the making of official decisions. Therefore society deals sternly with bribery which would substitute the will of an interested person for the judgment of a public official as the controlling factor in official decision. The statute plainly proscribes such corrupt interference with the normal and proper func of "official acts." In Birdsall, the Supreme Court stated that: "Every action that is within the range of official duty comes within the purview of these sections [antecedents of §201] In numerous instances, duties not completely defined by written rules are clearly established by settled practice, and action taken in the course of their performance must be regarded as within the provisions of the statutes against bribery [now § 201].” 233 U.S. at 230-31, 34 S.Ct. at 514. The quoted language establishes clearly that "official acts" are not to be limited to those duties set forth in a written job description but may include as well those duties customarily associated with a particular job. In the instant case, however, no evidence was introduced to suggest that the responsibilities of the Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations at HUD have been expanded by settled practice or otherwise to include meeting with labor union officials concerning group automobile insur ance. Recent opinions that have depended on an interpretation of "official act" have sustained convictions only where allegedly illegal payments were made for actions or decisions involving matters falling indisputably within the ambit of a public official's official duties. Thus, for example, in United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1972), a case upon which the Government relies heavily, the defendant tioning of government United States v. Heffler, 402 F.2d 924, 926 (3rd Cir 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Cecchini v. United States, 394 U.S. 946, 89 S.Ct. 1280, 22 L.Ed.2d 480 (1969), quoting United States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393, 394 (3rd Cir. 1958). It is the corruption of official decisions through the misuse of influence in governmental decision-making which the bribery statute makes criminal. In the instant case there was no evidence that Muntain's meetings with labor officials to discuss and promote group automobile insurance involved a subject which could be brought before Muntain-or, for that matter, anyone else at HUD-in an official capacity. There was, therefore, no apparent danger that the receipt of gratuities from Fleming or Cordial in connection with the group automobile insurance scheme would induce Muntain to act improperly in deciding a HUD-related matter. Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) simply does not apply. received money in return for approaching an official of the Justice Department in an effort to quash a pending action by that Department. At the time of his indictment, the defendant was the administrative assistant to Senator Fong, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the activities of which affect directly the operation of the Justice Department. In Carson there was, moreover, testimony from the defendant himself that "as part of his job and under the applicable procedure that goes on at Capitol Hill, he, as an administrative assistant to Senator Fong, would exert influence on various agencies and branches of the Government 464 F.2d at 434. Based upon this explanation of the scope of defendant's duties, the Second Circuit found that defendant's attempt to influence the Justice Department fell within the ambit of his official duties. A similar approach has been used when defining "official acts" in United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978) (HEW official with responsibilities for student loan program received payments from a private collection agency which had and sought contracts for the collection of delinquent loans); United States v. Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1978) (loan officer with Small Business Administration paid by applicant for SBA loan); and United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976) (Administrator of Federal prison paid by son of prison inmate). to The Government's allegations concerning Muntain's efforts to encourage his subordinates at HUD to assist in promoting group automobile insurance may appear present a closer case on first impression since there is no question that, in his official capacity, Muntain could and did direct subordinates at HUD in the performance of certain duties. There is also apparently no question that on at least two occasions Muntain directed his subordinates to assist Fleming and Cordial in promoting the insurance scheme with labor unions and that Muntain was reimbursed for his expenses in this regard. The crucial question under § 201(g), however, is whether in directing his subordinates to act, Muntain himself engaged in an "official act." Under the analysis applied above, the determinative factor is whether Muntain's actions involved a matter or issue that could properly, by law, be brought before him as Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations at HUD. Since the promotion of group automobile insurance was not such a matter, we conclude that no official act occurred and, hence, 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) cannot be invoked. [2] Under Count 3 of the indictment, Muntain was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 209 by having knowingly received $800 as "a contribution to, and a supplementation of, the salary he received from the United States Government as compensation for his services as the Assistant to the Secretary for Labor Relations . to or supplementation of salary, from any source other than the United States as compensation for services as an employee of the United States. In the instant case there can be no dispute that defendant, a highranking official in the executive branch, received a contribution from a source outside the Government when he accepted payment for the Ireland trip. For there to be a violation of § 209, however, the contribution must have been received as compensation for "services" and those services must have been "rendered as an employee of the United States." With respect to the first requirement, the $800 received by Muntain in connection with the Ireland trip was allegedly paid as reimbursement for the cost of the two airplane tickets used by Muntain and his wife. As such it might be argued that the $800 was reimbursement for "expenses" and not compensation for "services" within the meaning of § 209. Whatever merit this argument may have as to the $400 representing the cost of Muntain's own air fare, the Court does not believe that the $400 representing the cost of the ticket used by Mrs. Muntain can fairly be characterized as compensation for expenses incurred by defendant in the course of promoting the group automobile insurance plan. There was absolutely no evidence presented at trial that suggested that Mrs. Muntain's presence on the trip was in any way essential to the promotion of the automobile insurance scheme. Therefore, the jury could reasonably conclude that the cost of Mrs. Muntain's air fare constituted a reward or bonus paid to Muntain, above and beyond reimbursement for his own legitimate expenses, as compensation for services he had provided or was expected to provide in promoting the automobile insur viction in this case The record on appeal [3] Under Count 1 of the indictment 5. An Attorney General's Opinion dealing with explicitly requires the receipt of something A review of the record in this case reveals 6. The general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. "If two or more persons conspire either to |