CHAPTER CXLVI. A FEW days after receiving his commission, Hamilton was instructed to concert a plan, and to superintend its execution, of fortifying the harbor of New York. The funds being a grant from the State, the service was to be performed in concert with the Governor. He wrote to Jay: "I do not recollect that I have had any answer to a suggestion in one of my letters respecting the employment of engineers to assist in forming the desired plan. This appears to me an essential preliminary. It is very possible, the contrary may have been said to you by persons of whose intelligence you may have a good opinion. Self-sufficiency, and a contempt of the science and experience of others are too prevailing traits of character in this country. But as far as I am to be concerned, auxiliary lights are a sine qua non. I do not feel myself adequate to the complicated task of an Engineer, unaided by men of more technical knowledge than myself.” The suggestion was adopted, and a plan for the defence of New York was formed. It is not found. Urgent letters were addressed to him by members of the Cabinet, indicating the necessity of his assuming essentially the conduct of the War Department. The Head of that department could derive no aid from the President. It was important that consultations should be held preparatory to the adoption of a well-digested system, which would protect that branch of the service from the undigested and impulsive interferences of Adams. With this view Washington and Hamilton met at Philadelphia on the tenth of November, and were subsequently joined by Pinckney. There a series of questions were propounded to the two latter. The principal points of inquiry were, the probability of an invasion of the United States by France during her war with Great Britain, where the first attack would be made? Whether France would, by exchange or other means, become possessed of the Floridas and Louisiana, the consequences of such an event, and the means of counteracting them. Questions were also submitted by the Secretary at War to Washington, respecting the apportionment of the officers and men to be raised among districts and States -whether the appointments should be made, and the recruiting commenced immediately. If the pay of the officers should be suspended-the stations and distribution of the troops-the mode of supplying the army-the quantity of cannon and military materials requisite, and the best sites for magazines. On the basis of these questions, the deliberations were held, and, after the lapse of a month, two answers were submitted by Washington. These answers were drafted by General Hamilton,* but were signed officially by the Commander-in-chief. The first of these replies advised as a primary rule in the appointment of commissioned officers, that the relative representative population of the several States should be adopted, but that no such rule should prevail as to the rest of the army. This was in conformity with the practice of the Government in the selection of public officers, as tending both to justice and public satisfaction, by a * "General Hamilton presents his respects to the Commander-in-chief, and sends the sketch of a letter in conformity to what passed this morning' Nov. 13. Washington's Writings, xi. 346. This also appears from Hamilton's autograph minutes. distribution of public honors and emoluments among the citizens of the different States, but sometimes was yielded to collateral considerations. As to the noncommissioned officers and privates, it was conceived to be both unnecessary and inexpedient to make any absolute appointment among the States. As to the question of an immediate or deferred appointment of the officers and recruiting of the troops, and whether the pay of the officers should be suspended, it was answered, that the Act for augmenting the army was peremptory in its provisions. The bounds of Executive discretion, as to the forbearance to execute such a law, might perhaps involve an investigation, nice in its own nature, and of a kind which it is generally most prudent to avoid. The voluntary suspension of the execution of a similar law could not be justified, but by considerations of decisive cogency. "There was nothing in the foreign relations of this country to dictate an abandonment of the policy of this act. Measures of security, suggested by the experience of accumulated hostility, were not to be abandoned because of merely probable symptoms of approaching accommodation. If such symptoms existed, they were to be ascribed to the measures of vigor adopted by the Government, and may be frustrated by a relaxation in those measures, affording an argument of weakness or irresolution. The authoritative declaration of the President, recently confirmed, showed that there was nothing discoverable in the conduct of France which ought to change or relax our measures of defence. Though some late occurrences rendered the prospect of an invasion less probable, or more remote; yet, duly considering at all times the rapid vicissitudes of political and military events, the extraordinary fluctuations of the contest in Europe, and the more extraordinary position of its principal nations, "it can never be wise to vary our measures of security with the continually varying aspect of its affairs." "Our safety should be placed beyond the reach of the casualties of those nations, by pursuing a steady system, organizing all our resources, and putting them in a state of preparation for prompt action. Regarding the overthrow of Europe as not entirely chimerical, they ought to cultivate a spirit of self-dependence, and to endeavor by una nimity, vigilance and exertion, under the blessings of Providence, to hold the scales of their destiny in their own hands. Standing in the midst of falling empires, it should be our aim to assume a station and attitude which would preserve us from being overwhelmed in their ruins. If driven to unqualified war, frequently the most effectual mode to defend is to attack. Instances of very great moment to the permanent interests of the country were to be imagined which would certainly require a disciplined force, that should be raised and prepared so as to be ready for the conjuncture, whenever it shall arrive. Not to be ready then may be to lose an opportunity, which it may be difficult afterwards to retrieve." The state of the finances, as exhibited by the Treasury Department, opposed no obstacle to this policy. Hence the whole of the officers and men ought to be immediately raised, disciplined, and paid. To accomplish this would require a year. "What may not another year produce? Happy will it be for us, if we have so much time for preparation, and ill judged indeed, if we do not make the most of it!" Under existing circumstances, it was not deemed advisable to withdraw any of the troops from the interior frontier to the seaboard. The rest of this communication referred to the distribution of the troops, and to arrangements for the recruiting service. As to the supplies, the union of the two modes by purchase and by contract was advised, under the superintendence of a Department of supplies, uniting under one Head the two departments of Quartermaster and Commissary. The provision of arsenals, magazines, of artillery, small arms, military stores, and camp equipage, on a basis of fifty thousand men, was proposed as adequate to resist a serious invasion. The magazines to be stationed in Massachusetts, Virginia, and South Carolina. The second letter, of the same date, gave a plan for the organization of an army, and various important suggestions as to its efficiency, its uniform, clothing, the composition of the rations, regulation of rank, distinction by badges, rules of promotion. These suggestions were preliminary to the formation of a General Army system which Hamilton had in view, and which was successively developed in his correspondence with the military department. The destruction of the War office prevents a full exhibition of his various and extensive reflections on the art of war, and explains the fact, that his communications do not fill that large and prominent place in the military archives of this country, which his contributions to other branches of the public service are seen to occupy. Imperfect as these materials are, they are sufficient to show, that in the short period of his command, he took a large view of the principles and conduct of a system of MILITARY ADMINISTRATION-of the functions of a GENERAL,-of the ORGANIZATION and CORRESPONDENCE of an Army-its interior economy, its formation, field exercise, movements; regulations in barracks, and in the field; the police of garrisons and of the camp-its subsistence and supplies the issue and delivery of arms, clothing, fuel, stationery-with the measures necessary to ensure a due accountability. Though many of his communications on these subjects bear marks of haste, they strongly indicate the grounds of his own conviction, that, if called to act in an extensive field of operations, his genius for arms would have been more distinguished than in any other of the important vocations in which it was exerted. While these serious matters were occupying the minds of Washington, Hamilton, and Pinckney, the President's letters show his fluctuations. The vigorous policy Hamilton had induced Congress |