after verdict and notes it in his minutes of trial, it is no cause for reversal on certiorari that he did not enter the judgment upon his docket for two or three days afterwards. 6 Hill, 38.

SEC. 17. Where a justice made an entry of a civil action upon his memorandum book, and of the proceedings therein, as follows: "1842, December 3, Daniel Darling vs. Horace Park. Entered and defaulted, and judgment for plaintiff for damages, 9.69, cost 3.11-12.80," and issued execution accordingly; but neither the writ nor the evidence. of the plaintiff's demand was then filed in the case or in the possession of the justice; it was held, that if these papers were before the justice when the execution was issued the proceedings were not irregular, and that upon being subsequently produced before him and verified, he would thereupon be authorized to make a record of the judgment at large. 4 Cush. 197.

SEC. 18. A suit was set down for trial for the fourth day of September, 1849, and continued, but to no day certain, on the application of the defendant. On December twentysecond following, the justice made a memorandum on the warrant: "Judgment thirty-seven dollars" and issued an execution; on the twenty-fourth, he entered a formal judgment, and dated it September 4th, 1849. The defendant was not notified to appear, and did not appear after the fourth of September: Held, that the memorandum-"judgment, thirty-seven dollars"-was a nullity, because of its uncertainty; and that the formal judgment was void for want of notice to the defendant. 11 Hamp. 220.

SEC. 19. In a suit on a justice's judgment, the docket must show the issuing of summons, and a return of personal service in the cause in which judgment was rendered. 19 Wend. 477.

SEC. 20. The docket entry of the return of summons was "returned on oath": Held, that the judgment entered was not void, but remained in full force until reversed. 18 Penn. State (16 Harris) 120.

SEC. 21. The time when the action was commenced and judgment recorded should be entered on the docket. 1 Penn. 379.

SEC. 22. If a justice appoint a special constable, but has omitted to make an entry thereof in his docket, he may make the entry at any time, without a rule of the court above to that effect. 7 Ind. 525.

SEC. 23. A justice must enter the names of all witnesses and jurors on his docket. 1 Penn. 207, 321.

SEC. 24. A justice need not record any evidence in a case before him except such as is objected to-that must appear of record, whether admitted or not. 2 Stew. 474; 1 Stew. 26; 2 Port. 86.

SEC. 25. It must appear on the record of the justice that the jury were sworn. 2 Penn. 742.

SEC. 26. It is no ground for reversing the judgment of a justice of the peace that his report does not state whether the plaintiff was present or called when the verdict was rendered by the jury. 3 Hill, 75.

SEC. 27. Section six hundred and seven of an act to amend an act entitled an act to regulate proceedings in civil cases in the courts of justice of this state, passed April twenty-ninth, eighteen hundred and fifty-one, is hereby amended so as to read as follows: It shall be the duty of every justice of the peace, upon the expiration of his term of office, to deposit with his successor his official dockets and all papers filed in his office, as well his own as those of his predecessors or any other which may be in his custody, to be kept as public records. If the office of a justice become vacant, by his death or removal from the township or city or otherwise, before his successor is elected and qualified, the docket and papers in possession of such justice shall be deposited in the office of some other justice in the township, to be by him delivered to the successor of said justice; and while in his possession he may issue execution on a judgment there entered and unsatisfied (may make all orders in proceedings supplemental to execution, and may file notices and undertakings on appeal, and may take the justification of the sureties, and on the filing of the undertaking on appeal order stay of execution), in the same manner and with the same effect as the justice by whom the judgment was entered might have done. If there be no other justice in the township, then the docket and papers of such justice

shall be deposited in the office of the county clerk of the county, to be by him delivered to the successor in office of the justice. Stats. 1870.

SEC. 28. Any justice with whom the docket of his predecessor is deposited shall have and exercise over all actions and proceedings entered in the docket of his predecessor, the same jurisdiction as if originally commenced before him. In case of the creation of a new county or the change of the boundary between two counties, any justice into whose hands the docket of a justice formerly acting as such within the same territory may come, shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered the successor of said former justice. Pr. Act, 608.

SEC. 29. The justice elected to fill a vacancy shall be deemed the successor of the justice whose office became vacant before the expiration of a full term. When a full term expires, the same or another person elected to take office in the same township or city from that time shall be deemed the successor. Pr. Act, 609.

SEC. 30. When two or more justices are equally entitled under the last section to be deemed the successors in office of the justice, the county judge shall, by a certificate, subscribed by him and filed in the office of the county clerk, designate which justice shall be the successor of a justice going out of office or whose office has become vacant. Pr. Act, 610.

SEC. 31. A justice with whom the docket of a former justice is legally deposited, may give certified copies from such docket, but the certificate must show that the justice making it has the legal custody of the docket. · 4 Blackf. 417.

CHAPTER XLV.

ESTOPPEL.

General Principles.

SECTION 1. An estoppel may arise either from matter of record, from the deed of the party; or from matter in paisthat is, matter of fact. Thus, any confession or admission

made in pleading in a court of record, whether it be express or implied from pleading over without a traverse, will forever preclude the party from afterwards contesting the same fact in any subsequent suit with his adversary. This is an estoppel by matter of record. As an instance of an estoppel by deed may be mentioned the case of a bond reciting a certain fact; the party executing that bond will be precluded from afterwards denying, in any action brought upon that instrument, the fact so recited. As an instance. of estoppel in pais, may be mentioned the case of accepting rent of another; he will be estopped from denying that such man was his tenant. This doctrine of law gives rise to a kind of pleading that is neither by way of traverse or denial, nor confession and avoidance, but is a pleading that waives any question of fact and relies merely on the estoppel, and after stating the previous act, allegation or denial, of the opposite party, prays judgment if he shall be received or admitted to aver contrary to what he before said or did. This pleading is called a pleading by way of estoppel. Every estoppel ought to be reciprocal: that is, should bind both parties; and this is the reason that, regularly, a stranger shall neither take advantage of nor be bound by an estoppel.

SEC. 2. An estoppel is when a man is concluded by his own act or acceptance to say the truth. And when A conveys land to B by a valid conveyance, he is not allowed to reclaim the estate because he is estopped, but because he has no existing title to it. Estoppels being odious because they will not permit a man to speak the truth, the law will not base a conclusion upon that ground when it can find a sufficient ground that is consistent with the truth. 9 Cal. 350.

SEC. 3. The sense of estoppel is, that a man, for the sake of good faith and fair dealing, ought to be estopped from saying that to be false which by his means has become accredited for truth and by his representations has led others to act. Although it is generally true that estoppels bind only parties and privies, yet even parol admissions may be conclusive where they have had the effect of inducing another to alter his condition. 3 Cal. 306, 307.

SEC. 4. It is undoubtedly true that a party will in many instances be concluded by his declarations and conduct which have influenced the conduct of another to his injury. The party in such cases is said to be estopped from denying the truth of his admissions. But to the application of this principle with respect to the title of property, it must appear: 1st. That the party making the admission by his declarations or conduct was apprised of the true state of his own title. 2d. That he made the admission with the express intention to deceive or with such careless and culpable negligence as to amount to constructive fraud. 3d. That the other party was not only destitute of all knowledge of the true state of the title, but of the means of acquiring such knowledge. 4th. That he relied directly upon such admission and will be injured by allowing its truth to be disproved. 14 Cal. 367, 368.

SEC. 5. Estoppels are of two kinds-solemn and unsolemn admissions. The latter are those which have been acted upon, or have been made to influence the conduct of others, or to derive some advantage to the party and which cannot afterwards be denied without a breach of good faith. Admissions, whether of law or of fact, which have been acted upon by others, are conclusive against the party making them in all cases between him and the person whose conduct he has thus influenced. It is of no importance whether they were made in express language to the person himself or implied from the open and general conduct of the party; for in the latter case, the implied declaration may be considered as addressed to every one in particular who may have occasion to act upon it. If the implied declaration may be so considered, there is no reason why an express declaration to a third party may not be considered as equally addressed to others who afterwards act upon it. If the express declaration be confided to the third party as a confidential communication, then it might admit of some doubt. But where the express declaration to the third party is not confidential but general, and this is afterwards acted upon by others, the party making the declarations should be estopped. The particular intention with which the declaration, express or implied, was made, is not mate