CHARLES PINCKNEY 1758-1824 Charles Pinckney was born in Charleston, S. C., in the year 1758. He came of a family of influence and culture and was accustomed from his boyhood to hear the discussion of political questions. He thus acquired a comprehensive knowledge of economical subjects at an early age, and before he had reached his seniority he was elected a member of the provincial legislature. He was elected to Congress from South Carolina in 1785 and subsequently took an active part in forming a plan of government for the new commonwealth. He was a delegate to the convention that framed the Constitution of the United States, and offered a draft of that instrument to the convention. The Constitution as it now stands contains some provisions proposed by him. In his observations on the Federal Constitution, printed and widely circulated at the time, he showed himself an acute dialectician, but not a great nor convincing pleader. He was a strong advocate for the adoption of the Federal Constitution in the legislative body of his own State in 1788, and, in the following year, was chosen Governor and presided over the convention that adopted the constitution of South Carolina. He was a great admirer of Jefferson, and when chosen United States Senator as a Republican in 1798 became one of the most active promoters of Jefferson's candidacy for President. Under the latter he became Minister to Spain and rendered valuable services to his country in acquiring from Spain a clear and undisputed title to the territory purchased from France. He was again elected Governor in 1806. Pinckney was a member of Congress from 1819 to 1821 and raised his voice strongly in opposition to the passage of the Missouri Compromise bill. He saw that such a measure of compromise could only temporarily abate the evil it was intended to check, and that in time the whole discussion must needs be opened afresh. This was the last public service he rendered his country in an active and highly successful career. Charles Pinckney, though not usually considered a statesman of the highest order, had an honorable share in the organization of the federal government. He was a man of liberal views on all subjects and was progressive and active in behalf of timely reforms. As a writer on political subjects his style is always clear and concise, while as an orator he was possessed of no mean degree of eloquence. His oration entitled "Plan for a Federal Constitution" is highly instructive, because of the light that it throws on the views and motives that were current at that time. PLAN FOR A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION M R. PRESIDENT: It is perhaps unnecessary to state to the House the reasons which have given rise to this Convention. The critical and embarrassed situation of our public affairs is, no doubt, strongly impressed upon every mind. I well know, it is an undertaking of much delicacy, to examine into the cause of public disorders, but having been for a considerable time concerned in the administration of the federal system, and an evidence of its weakness, I trust the indulgence of the House will excuse me, while I endeavor to state with conciseness, as well the motives which induced the measure as what ought, in my opinion, to be the conduct of the convention. There is no one, I believe, who doubts there is something particularly alarming in the present conjuncture. There is hardly a man in or out of office who holds any other language. Our government is despised-our laws are robbed of their respected terrors-their inaction is a subject of ridicule-and their exertion, of abhorrence and opposition-rank and office have lost their reverence and effect-our foreign politics are as much deranged as our domestic economy—our friends are slackened in their affection, and our citizens loosened from their obedience. We know neither how to yield or how to enforcehardly anything abroad or at home is sound and entire-disconnection and confusion in offices, in States and in parties, prevail throughout every part of the Union. These are facts. universally admitted and lamented. This state of things is the most extraordinary because it immediately follows the close of a war when we conceived our political happiness was to commence; and because the parties [A few days subsequent to the meeting of the Federal Convention at Philadelphia, in May, 1787, Mr. Pinckney submitted to that assembly a "Plan of VOL. I.-20 305 a Federal Constitution," which he supported with the speech here given.EDITOR.] which divided and were opposed to our systems are known to be in a great measure dissolved. No external calamity has visited us-we labor under no taxation that is new or oppressive, nor are we engaged in a war with foreigners, or in disputes with ourselves. To what, then, are we to attribute our embarrassments as a nation? The answer is an obvious one: To the weakness and impropriety of a government founded in mistaken principles-incapable of combining the various interests it is intended to unite and support, and destitute of that force and energy, without which no government can exist. At the time I pronounce in the most decided terms this opinion of our confederation, permit me to remark that, considering the circumstances under which it was formed-in the midst of a dangerous and doubtful war, and by men totally inexperienced in the operations of a system so new and extensive, its defects are easily to be excused. We have only to lament the necessity which obliged us to form it at that time, and wish that its completion had been postponed to a period better suited to deliberation. I confess myself in sentiment with those who were of opinion that we should have avoided it if possible during the war-that it ought to have been formed by a convention of the States, expressly delegated for that purpose, and ratified by the authority of the people. This indispensable power it wants, and is therefore without the validity a federal constitution ought certainly to have had. In most of the States it has nothing more, strictly speaking, than a legislative authority, and might therefore be said, in some measure, to be under the control of the State legislatures. Independent of this primary defect of not having been formed in a manner that would have given it an authority paramount to the constitutions and laws of the several States, and rendered it impossible for them to have interfered with its objects or operations, the first principles are destructive and contrary to those maxims of government which have been received and approved for ages. In a government where the liberties of the people are to be preserved and the laws well administered, the executive, legislative, and judicial should ever be separate and distinct, and consist of parts mutually forming a check upon each other. The confederation seems to have lost sight of this wise distribution of the powers of government, and to have concentred the whole in a single unoperative body, where none of them can be used with advantage or effect. The inequality of the principle of representation, where the largest and most inconsiderable States have an equal vote in the affairs of the Union; the want of commercial powers; of a compelling clause to oblige a due and punctual obedience to the confederation; a provision for the admission of new States; for an alteration of the system by a less than unanimous vote; of a general guarantee, and, in short, of numerous other reforms and establishments, convince me, that upon the present occasion, it would be politic in the convention to determine that they will consider the subject de novo; that they will pay no farther attention to the confederation than to consider it as good materials, and view themselves as at liberty to form and recommend such a plan as, from their knowledge of the temper of the people and the resources of the States, will be most likely to render our government firm and united. This appears to me far more proper than to attempt the repair of a system not only radically defective in principle, but which, if it was possible to give it operation, would prove absurd and oppressive. You must not hesitate to adopt proper measures, under an apprehension the States may reject them. From your deliberations much is expected; the eyes as well as hopes of your constituents are turned upon the convention; let their expectations be gratified. Be assured that however unfashionable for the moment your sentiments may be, yet, if your system is accommodated to the situation of the Union, and founded in wise and liberal principles, it will in time be consented to. An energetic government is our true policy, and it will at last be discovered and prevail. Presuming that the question will be taken up de novo, I do not conceive it necessary to go into a minute detail of the defects of the present confederation, but request permission to submit, with deference to the House, the draft of a government which I have formed for the Union. The defects of the present will appear in the course of the examination. I shall give each article that either materially varies or is new. I well know the science of government is at once a delicate and difficult one, and none more so than that of republics. I confess my situation or experience have not been such as to enable me to form the |