CRS-6 having been repealed, there is no longer 70 N.E. at 512. Emphasis added. CRS-7 In the case of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872), concerning legislation which purported to authorize and condition a civil war pardon and amnesty by the President, the Supreme Court found that the Congress may not place conditions on the President's pardon power, under the separation of powers doctrine, since that pardon power is reserved to the President by the Constitution: It is the intention of the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the government the Legislative, the Exshall be, in its ecutive, and the Judicial Now it is clear that the legislature 80 U.S. at 147-148. Some commentators have noted that although the Congress does not possess express pardoning power under the Constitution, that is, to pardon specified individuals, or to interfere with or limit the President's powers, it might still legitimately exercise an "amnesty" power itself by legislating a general amnesty provision, or a law which works to provide the release or protection from criminal liability to all those that fall within a particular 3/ class. In the case of Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the Supreme 3/ "Congressional Amnesty for War Resisters: Policy Consideration and Constitutional Problems," 25 Vanderbilt Law Rev. 525 (1972). CRS-8 Court found that a legislative grant of immunity for prosecution, an action described by the Court as "virtually an act of general amnesty," was not violative of the separation of powers doctrine as in conflict with the President's pardon power: The distinction between amnesty and pardon 161 U.S. at 601-602. Emphasis added. In the case of The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 (1885), the Court there found that the Presidential pardon power was not exclusive, to the extent that Congress was permitted in that case to grant to an executive officer by legislation the power to remit fines and statutory penalties due the United States. The Court there emphasized the consistent practice under similar statutes: "From the adoption of the Constitution to the present moment, Congress has asserted its right, by CRS-9 statute, to invest the Secretary of the Treasury and other officers of the executive branch of the government with power to remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed for the violation of the laws of the United States. And in none of the cases in this court or in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States · was it ever suggested or intimated that the legislation was an encroachment upon the President's power of pardon so far, at least, as it invested the Secretary of the Treasury, or other officers, with the authority to remit pecuniary penalties and forfeitures." 114 U.S. at 414-415. The issue of whether an act of Congress releasing from criminal liability one individual, or a class of individuals, after final conviction through the judicial process, which would work in practical effect as a legislative pardon, is violative of the separation of powers doctrine because of the express presidential pardoning power, as opposed to being a permissible general amnesty act, is therefore one which apparently has not been definitively resolved. Furthermore, the amnesty power of Congress in general is also an issue in question which has not been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court. Jack H. Wastell Jack H. Maskell Legislative Attorney The UNITED STATES of America George Vernon HANSEN, Defendant. Crim. No. 83-00075. United States District Court, District of Columbia. June 13, 1983. As Amended June 17, 1983. On United States congressman's motion to dismiss indictment in which he was charged with making false statements concerning its financial status on financial dis closure reports he was required to file with the United States House of Representatives, the District Court, Joyce Hens Green, J., held that: (1) statute providing criminal penalty for such conduct was not repealed by implication by financial disclosure provision of the Ethics in Government Act; (2) filing of financial disclosure reports under the EIGA did not constitute "legislative activity" protected by the speech or debate clause of the Constitution; and (3) congressman made no colorable showing that he was singled out for prosecution in viola tion of his equal protection rights. Motion denied. Where two statutes concern the same subject, a court considering them must make every effort to reconcile allegedly conflicting provisions and give effect to both, so long as doing so does not deprive one or the other of its essential meaning. 4. Criminal Law →29 Where a single act violates more than one statute, the government may elect to prosecute under either. 5. Criminal Law 15 Where statute providing civil remedy for certain conduct and statute providing criminal penalty for same conduct are not irreconcilable, there must be an affirmative showing of an intention to repeal before court may find the criminal provision repealed by implication. United States congressman charged with having made false statements concerning his financial status on disclosure reports he was required to file with the United States House of Representatives failed to make affirmative showing of intent of the Ethics in Government Act, which provided civil penalty, to repeal by implication statute imposing criminal penalty for such conduct. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001; Ethics in Government Act of 1978, § 106, 2 U.S.C.A. § 706. 7. United States 21%1⁄2 Filing by Members of Congress of financial disclosure reports under the Ethics in Government Act did not constitute "legislative activity" protected by the speech or debate clause of the Constitution. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1; Ethics in Government Act of 1978, §§ 101–109, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-709. 8. Criminal Law 1023(3) Congressman, who was charged with failing to file required-financial disclosure reports, had right to immediate, pretrial appeal of portion of court's decision that filing of such reports was not protected by the Constitution. |