Concentrated Corporate Ownership

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Randall K. Morck
University of Chicago Press, 2007 M12 1 - 394 páginas
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Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising.

What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms?
Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.

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Contenido

Introduction
1
I The Origins of Ownership Structure
15
II The Law and Concentrated Corporate Ownership
137
III Economic Effects of Concentrated Corporate Ownership
263

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Página ix - RELATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS TO PUBLICATIONS REPORTING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Since the present volume is a record of conference proceedings, it has been exempted from the rules governing submission of manuscripts to, and critical review by, the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.

Acerca del autor (2007)

Randall K. Morck is the Stephen A. Jarislowsky Distinguished Professor of Finance at the University of Alberta and has published extensively on corporate governance.

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