Concentrated Corporate OwnershipStandard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy. |
Comentarios de la gente - Escribir un comentario
No encontramos ningún comentario en los lugares habituales.
Contenido
| 1 | |
I The Origins of Ownership Structure | 15 |
II The Law and Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 137 |
III Economic Effects of Concentrated Corporate Ownership | 263 |
Contributors | 373 |
| 375 | |
| 381 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Términos y frases comunes
agency costs analysis assets banks benefits block Canada Canadian capital changes choice close corporation companies concentrated consider constraints contract controlling shareholder corporate costs countries courts directors distributions Economics effect efficient entrepreneur equal equity evidence example exit expected firms foreign freezeout funds gains governance greater heir held hold Holderness important incentives income increase independent industry initial institutional interest investment investors issue Journal less limited lower majority managers mean measures median minority shareholders monitoring Note offer opportunism owner ownership ownership structure parties percent performance positive possible potential problem protection pyramids reason receive reduce relation relative reported returns rule sample shares significant structure suggests tion traded transfer United University variables venture venture capital voting wealth
Pasajes populares
Página ix - RELATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS TO PUBLICATIONS REPORTING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Since the present volume is a record of conference proceedings, it has been exempted from the rules governing submission of manuscripts to, and critical review by, the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.
Referencias a este libro
Información bibliográfica
| Título | Concentrated Corporate Ownership National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report |
| Editor | Randall K. Morck |
| Edición | ilustrada |
| Editor | University of Chicago Press, 2007 |
| ISBN | 0226536823, 9780226536828 |
| Largo | 394 páginas |
| Exportar cita | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |