Concentrated Corporate Ownership

Randall K. Morck
University of Chicago Press, 2007 M12 1 - 394 páginas
Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising.

What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms?
Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.

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I The Origins of Ownership Structure
II The Law and Concentrated Corporate Ownership
III Economic Effects of Concentrated Corporate Ownership
Name Index
Subject Index
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Página ix - RELATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS TO PUBLICATIONS REPORTING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Since the present volume is a record of conference proceedings, it has been exempted from the rules governing submission of manuscripts to, and critical review by, the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.
Página 286 - Significant at the 5 percent level. * * * Significant at the 1 percent level.
Página 59 - Government service in 1970, he was professor of finance at the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago.
Página 160 - ... historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief as the facts of a particular case may dictate. The appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are involved.
Página 216 - ... the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent...
Página 88 - While a complete discussion of the optimal choice of motor poles is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that...
Página 229 - To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares were purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical price.
Página 25 - ... (Venture capital can be defined as equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a financial intermediary who is typically...
Página 146 - Nasdaq and then moved to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (Amex) between 1983 and 1992.

Acerca del autor (2007)

Randall K. Morck is the Stephen A. Jarislowsky Distinguished Professor of Finance at the University of Alberta and has published extensively on corporate governance.

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